PRAGMATISM TODAY
ISSN 1338-2799
The Journal of the Central-European Pragmatist Forum

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND SOMAESTHETICS

Volume 5, Issue 2, Winter 2014


PRAGMATIST FORUM - CEPF
THE CENTRAL-EUROPEAN

EDITORIAL & ADVISORY BOARDS

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INTRODUCTION:
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND SOMAESTHETICS

Alexander Kremer
Hungary
alexanderkremer2000@yahoo.com

It is beyond question that one of the most important topics of aesthetics is the problem formalized in the question „What is art?" If we look at our interpretive framework, it is obvious that without an absolute Archimedean point in a metaphysical sense nobody can give an ultimate definition of art. Our world is inevitably relative and relational, and we eagerly need strong points of reference in this kind of relative situation. This is, I think, one of the reasons why Richard Shusterman (1949 –) also defends the central role of experience in aesthetics. As it is well-known, Shusterman is one of the main figures of contemporary neopragmatism. His general theoretical standpoint can be described as a philosophical aestheticism saturated with democratic political intentions. In his case it is manifested in a naturalistic somaesthetics, tinted by the meliorist strive of pragmatism to democratize society as much as possible.

Shusterman emphasizes that one of the possibilities to define art is the "wrapper model of theory,"[1] which is dominant mostly in analytic philosophy. Philosophers try to cover here the whole domain of works of art: no less and no more, only the artworks. Although, according to Shusterman, Danto's theory "best realizes the dual goals of wrapper definitions: accurate reflection and compartmental differentiation that set art apart from the rest of life" (TTB 137), these goals do not satisfy him. Namely, "if all substantive decisions as to what counts as art are left to the internal decisions of the artworld as recorded by art history, then what useful purpose does simply reflecting those decisions in a philosophical formula serve, apart from appeasing the old philosophical urge for theory as mirroring reflection of the real?" (Ibid.) This could be regarded as valuable philosophical effort if reality could be held to be a fixed and necessary essence, but reality and the works of art especially seem to be different. Not only is everything relative and relational, but also radically temporal, historical and thus contingent. As Shusterman says: "if art's realities are the empirical and changing contingencies of art's historical career, then the reflective model seems pointless" (ibid.). What is more, it is not enough to describe the changing history of art, since it is in countless cases only a conservative reinforcement of the status quo, but – from the pragmatist point of view – theory of art should commit interventions: "so pragmatism also rethinks the roles and limits of aesthetic theory and philosophy" (TTB 138.). If philosophy is indeed (as Shusterman holds it) an embodied way of life (rather than simply a mere theoretical achievement), then its "ultimate aim is to benefit human life rather than serving pure truth for truth's sake" (ibid.).

As Shusterman confesses it, he turned from analytic philosophy to pragmatism for such reasons, while also enlisted "insights from hermeneutics, critical theory, and post-structuralism that challenge in different ways some of the problematic assumptions and limits of analytic aesthetics" (TTB 139). Disregarding these problems here, I would like to emphasize here only that Shusterman, starting from his philosophical turn at around the end of the 80s, regarded the analytic wrapper definitions of art as *demarcational* ones and preferred the pragmatist *transformational* definition of *art as experience* (cf. TTB 139). This is why he followed Dewey's naturalist pragmatist aesthetics, rather than his analytic fellows' aesthetics. Although it was clear for him that Dewey's definition of art as experience is hopelessly inaccurate from the wrapper definitions' point of view, he argued (already in *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 1992) that "it was nonetheless useful as a transformational theory" (TTB 139). Dewey's definition, namely „emphasizing aesthetic experience could not only help break the hold of object

[1] Shusterman, Richard, 2012. *Thinking through the Body. Essays in Somaesthetics.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 134. (Further: TTB)

fetishism in contemporary art, aesthetics, and culture; it could also be used to help acquire artistic legitimacy for popular arts (such as rap music) that provided powerful aesthetic experience but were not yet granted genuine aesthetic or artistic status" (TTB 139). What is more, despite being aware of the fact that Dewey „disliked the notion of 'pragmatist aesthetics'",[2] he developed somaesthetics as his own project of an explicitly pragmatist theory of art.

I had a dream and it came true when I had the opportunity to organize the first somaesthetic conference in Hungary with Professor Richard Shusterman as our keynote speaker. The conference took place in Budapest between June 2-5th, 2014, and we chose *Aesthetic Experience and Somaesthetics* as its title. Its venue was located at the Faculty of Arts, ELTE. The conference was organized and supported by the Hungarian Philosophical Association, Eötvös Loránd University, the University of Szeged, the Central European Pragmatist Forum (CEPF) and the Pro Philosophia Szegediensi Foundation.

Shusterman offered me generously to take a survey of some of the most important questions of his philosophy before our conference. I think this conversation serves as the best philosophical introduction to this collection of aesthetic texts.

The bouquet of the lectures was really rich and colorful (we had more than thirty), but here we publish only some of the best papers. Realizing such a diversity of topics, I have decided only to divide the selected papers into a few bigger sections. This way, we end up with three main chapters. The first chapter („John Dewey and Somaesthetics") contains three papers which show how Dewey thought about art and experience and set out to find connections between his aesthetics and Shusterman's somaesthetics. The second chapter („A Historical Angle") contains six lectures which approach aesthetic experience from very different points of view beginning with the oldest history of mankind, through traditional East Asian aesthetics, Del Biondo and Nietzsche, to Heidegger's, Gadamer's and Gumbrecht's views. Finally, the third chapter's papers („Some Applications of Somaesthetics") try to show some of the occasions where the application of somaesthetics can be useful and can help to enhance our sensory perceptions, understanding and interpretation, thus improving our life.

I launch this new issue of *Pragmatism Today* with a hope that these papers will not only bring the Deweyan way of thinking about art as experience closer to the readers, but they will also help us recognize the novel features of Shusterman's somaesthetics and the importance of the central role of experience in art..

[2] Shusterman, Richard, "The Intervention of Pragmatist Aesthetics: Genealogical Reflections on a Notion and a Name", in: *Practicing Pragmatist Aesthetics: Critical Perspectives on the Arts* (Value Inquiry Book Series), Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2014, p. 14.

RICHARD SHUSTERMAN IN BUDAPEST – AN INTERVIEW

Prepared by Alexander Kremer

Looking at the countries you have visited during the last decade, it is clear that you have lectured much more in Central Europe than other Western philosophers. Why do you prefer Central Europe, especially Poland better than other American philosophers?

You make an interesting observation, but I don't compare my lecture tours with other Western philosophers, and I expect that some of them have visited Central Europe as much as I. In fact, this is my very first academic visit to Hungary, and I've only been a couple of times in Prague and Bratislava. I've been a Visiting Professor in Vienna twice, once at the Academy of Fine Art and once at the Architecture Department of the Technical University. But I don't know whether Vienna counts as Central Europe. You are right, however, that I've been particularly active in Poland. There are two kinds of reasons for this: general and personal. Taking the general reason first, Poland has a very strong interest in pragmatism and neopragmatism. Richard Rorty's contact with some Polish philosophers helped establish that interest, and there is now a Dewey Center in Krakow.

In my personal case, I have published 4 books in Polish translation (one of them a collection of essays translated by a brilliant young Polish theorist WojciechMalecki), so I often come to Poland to follow my books and engage in dialogue with readers.I see my books as tools of communication so I am interested in learning from the reactions of readers of the books. The publication of a new book of mine in Hungarian is one reason why I am coming to Budapest in June. I have been lucky that my books and articles in Polish (some of which are in cultural magazines aimed at non-experts) have been translated by some very smart people who understand not only my mind but also my heart, the spirit that motivates my philosophical writing. Without good translators, my books would be useless for reaching a wide audience in foreign countries. I've been lucky in most countries with excellent translators.

But there may also be other personal reasons why my work has been well received in Poland. When I left my home in America at the age of 16 and arrived in Israel, I was adopted by an Israeli family of Polish origin that had emigrated from Warsaw after the Second World War. The parents still spoke Polish at home and their cuisine and many other aspects of their daily cultural life remained Polish. So Polish culture became familiar and comfortable for me, and when I mentioned this in some of the interviews I gave in Poland, I think that this fact created considerable good will towards me. I should also mention that my father was born in the Western Ukraine that was very close to Poland and that my mother's family came from Vilnius. So if one takes a longer perspective on ethnic identity, I might be seen as neither essentially American nor Israeli (the two countries where I have citizenship) but rather as having deeper Central European roots.

This brings me to another hypothesis about the positive reception of my work in Poland. A hypothesis involving mixed emotions. Because I am obviously a well-travelled, international Jewish intellectual and thus can be seen in the typical mold of the secular, rootless cosmopolitan Jew that became one of the standard targets of twentieth-century anti-Semitism, I think that Polish intellectuals who perhaps feel guilty about the long history of Polish anti-Semitism may have been kind toward my work as a sort of compensation for that history and the elements of anti-Semitism that remain in non-intellectual Polish circles. The ambivalence is that behind the very positive reception of my work by progressive intellectuals there could be a background that is very unsympathetic to all that I represent and embody. I have a strong faith in the value of my ideas but I know that the reception of ideas depends on the prevailing ideologies and mechanisms that structure the

social and cultural field. This is especially true for the importation of foreign authors.

You have started your philosophical career as an analytic philosopher, since you have defended your PhD thesis (**The Object of Literary Criticism*****) in Oxford and published articles, books of analytic vein. Nevertheless, you have changed your mind and since the second half of the 1980s you have been a neopragmatist philosopher. At the same time you have started your own aesthetic project, which is based on John Dewey's aesthetics. What are the main differences between Dewey's naturalist aesthetics and your somaesthetics, which was presented first in a detailed version in your book,* Pragmatist Aesthetics *(1992, Hungarian translation 2003)?***

Yes, I started my career as an analytic philosopher, and that style of argumentation is still an important part of my repertoire, even if my ideas and topics of research have gone far from the analytic mainstream. I was very unimpressed by Dewey when I first read him as a graduate student, partly because of his writing style and his looser manner of reasoning. But by the end of the 1980s he was my principal pragmatist inspiration. My philosophical debts to him are much greater than my differences from him. I could sum up the major differences between his pragmatist aesthetics and mine in four or five points, but before listing them I should note that Dewey never presented his aesthetics as "pragmatist aesthetics" and he actually explicitly refused the idea of a pragmatist aesthetics. I ignored his rejection of the term and instead made it the title of my approach.

Beyond this terminological difference, I critique Dewey's one-sided emphasis on unity as the essential and necessary value in aesthetic experience. I think there can be aesthetic value in experiences of fragmentation and rupture. That is one reason I made rap music a key example for my aesthetic study. Dewey' artistic taste was very conservative. He showed no appreciation of cubism and other avant-garde artistic trends when he wrote his book *Art as Experience* in the 1930s. Second, in defining art as experience,Dewey courts a sort of naturalistic essentialism by not sufficiently recognizing the social institutions that shape and enable those aesthetic experiences. Art is a societal affair and not just an experiential one. One cannot justify an artwork's value by merely saying it gives a good experience. One needs to use the socially shaped instruments of art critical language even if this is done informally in casual conversations about artworks. Third, I emphasize pleasure more than Dewey does. Fourth, I try to establish my aesthetic theories by engaging in extended interpretations of particular artworks (whether it is rap and country music or the poetry of T.S. Eliot), while Dewey does not do this form of practical criticism. Dewey wrote a couple of sentences in support of the idea of popular art, but he never provided any detailed arguments for it or any detailed analyses of particular works of popular art to demonstrate their value. Finally, in recent years I have also started to engage in artistic practice (as an occasional performance artist) as a way of fulfilling the pragmatist aesthetics' idea of engaging practically in the realm of art. With respect to somaesthetics, this practical dimension is especially central. I teach practical workshops in somaesthetics as a way of communicating the full range and meaning of this field. Dewey's aesthetic teaching remains in the realm of theory and discourse, my somaesthetic teaching involves also moving bodies and not just arranging words. Nonetheless, Dewey's appreciation of Alexander Technique (in which he took lessons for many years) was a real encouragement for my decision to become a professional body therapist in the Feldenkrais Method so that my understanding and teaching of somaesthetics could be more complete.

It is clear from* Pragmatist Aesthetics *that you refuse the distinction between high art and popular art (and even mass culture). What is your opinion about Adorno's criticism of „cultural industry"? What would be Adorno's mistake in this criticism?

What I refuse is that there is an ontological or absolute distinction of kind between high art and popular art. Of course, in everyday contexts we can often distinguish between works that are revered as high art classics and works that are designed for the entertainment of popular audiences. But there is no clear, fixed line of demarcation or difference of essence. What were originally enjoyed as popular entertainments (Greek tragedy, Shakespearean drama, the novels of Charles Dickens) have later come to be regarded as high art. I was a fan of Adorno before I embraced Dewey's more democratic perspectives on aesthetics, and I still admire the power of Adorno's thought. Like Dewey he insists on the important and transformative dimension of aesthetic experience as the key to art's crucial cultural value. Adorno makes many good points in his critique of the culture industry. Where he went wrong is in universalizing his critique to all works of popular art. The fact that much popular is merely commercial and superficial does not mean that no popular artworks have aesthetic value. His position is an extreme negativism, but I do not hold a naïve positive position that celebrates all popular art. My position is meliorism: popular art is neither perfectly good nor essentially bad. Rather the meliorist position is that popular art should be improved because it has the potential to be good (and is sometimes rich in value) but it also often suffers from aesthetic faults and therefore requires improvement.

I think Adorno makes a couple of other missteps because of his understandable rage against the vulgarity and rapaciousness of the popular entertainment industry along with the advertising industry that serves and profits from it. He seems to think that all the pleasures of entertainment are false pleasures and that the more one enjoys art the less one understands it. He argues that entertainment's pleasures are false because they are transitory. But all pleasures are transitory to some extent, and the ephemerality of pleasures does not make them unreal. He further claims that pleasure distracts us from the serious aesthetic pursuit of critically understanding artworks, but I believe there is no essential tension between enjoyment and understanding and that our enjoyment can even stimulate us to seek a deeper and more critical understanding of what we enjoy. By the way, I think Adorno and Horkheimer make an analogous mistake in their rejection of somaesthetic cultivation. They simplistically identify the whole idea of cultivating the soma with the racist, brutal, violent body ideology of Nazi KoerperKultur and the mercenary aims of corporate advertising that promote images of bodily perfection that hardly anyone can attain. Rightfully horrified by these ideologies, Adorno and Horkheimer fail to see that somaesthetic cultivation includes the Leib as well as the Koerper and that even working on the Koerper can be beneficial for worthy ethical aims and satisfactions.

Every philosopher is affected by different thinkers oeuvre during her or his intellectual development. Who were those thinkers whose influence played an important role in your development? Who was the most important if you would like to highlight one of them?

If I confine myself to thinkers I've had the fortune to know personally, I would say three great twentieth-century thinkers made my career possible. Richard Rorty, through his inspiring example, converted me from analytic philosophy to pragmatism and helped me see the special value of Dewey's work. Arthur Danto, again by his exemplary practice, showed me that aesthetics need not confine itself to traditional theorizing about past works of art but that it can be actively engaged in the most current and progressive of artistic practices while also extending into the practical criticism of contemporary artworks. I believe that his example

unconsciously helped encourage me to seriously treat the very contemporary and controversial genre of rap. If someone of his generation and stature could treat Andy Warhol and Jean-Michel Basquiat, why couldn't someone of my generation examine the artistry of Grandmaster Flash and Public Enemy. Pierre Bourdieu was crucial to my philosophical work because he showed me how deeply the creation and experience of art and the mechanisms of the artworld are shaped or structured by social institutions and political ideologies that go beyond that artworld. He also was the person who introduced me to French academic life. He invited me to Paris because of his appreciation of my work on Wittgenstein, and indeed Wittgenstein was the dominant influence of my analytic stage, as Dewey and William James largely guide my later pragmatist phase.

Three other philosophers are worth mentioning for their importance in shaping my thought: Montaigne for his celebration of experience, his meditative efforts of self-knowledge, his open-minded tolerance, and his candid confessions of his own weaknesses; Foucault for his genealogical critique, his adventurous explorations in somaesthetics, and his concern with philosophy as an art of living (an idea prefigured in Montaigne and the ancient Greeks), and finally Confucius for his emphasis on embodiment and pleasure and the importance of the arts for the ethical aim of self-cultivation in which the self and its cultivation are always seen as essentially socially constituted through one's relations with others rather than being narcissistically autonomous.

Your own philosophical project, somaesthetics has already become an international philosophical movement. Due to its interdisciplinary character it does not only belong to aesthetics. How do you see the relationship between somaesthetics and aesthetics or/and philosophy now?

When the idea of somaesthetics first came to me, I thought it would be a subdiscipline of philosophical aesthetics, but, as you say, my thinking was wrong. Somaesthetics has become an interdisciplinary field, because the body – as our tool of tools and the central site of our experience -- is crucially related to the many disciplines that concern human flourishing: not only the arts, but politics, education, historical and social sciences as well as health sciences and even technology. In fact, much of my recent work in practical somaesthetics has been with experts in human-computer interaction design, scientists who are researching strategies for designing technological devices that are more somaesthetically friendly than our current technology, designing devices that can help an individual monitor his body or perform somatically in more helpful ways. I don't help them to design because I have no expertise in that area; instead I provide them with a 2-3-day practical workshop in body consciousness that can improve their somaesthetic awareness through which they hope to achieve somatically superior designs. Because of its interdisciplinary character and the increasing international interest it is achieving, somaesthetics will have its own journal, which will be based in Aalborg, Denmark and will start publication later this year. There is already an active somaesthetics Google group that anyone, in principle, can join.

But I should return to your question about the relationship of somaesthetics to philosophy. Genealogically, somaesthetics has its roots in philosophy and more particularly in pragmatist aesthetics. Somaesthetics emerged from the following two ideas: Because the body is crucial both to the creation of art and to its appreciation, a pragmatist approach (which also means a meliorist approach) to aesthetics should try to improve the body's perceptual and performative capacities so that it can improve our aesthetic experience. Moreover, because pragmatist aesthetics, as I conceive it, is also centrally concerned with the ethical art of living and because the body is the necessary medium through which we live, then it follows that a pragmatist, meliorist approach to living should

work on cultivating our key tool or medium of living, namely our soma. These two philosophical arguments, which originally inspired the idea of somaesthetics, continue to inspire it and to shape the approaches of non-philosophers who are working in this field. I believe that philosophical thinking is not confined to professional philosophers with Ph.D.'s in this subject. This brings me to a further point about the somaesthetics-philosophy relationship. If we conceive philosophy broadly as an ethical art of living that is guided by critical inquiry aimed to promote a more aesthetically satisfying form of life for both self and society, then the various disciplines and forms of knowledge that contribute to this art of living (even if they are not distinctively or professionally philosophical) can be related to the broad philosophical project of the quest for wisdom in how to live better lives.Somaesthetic research in forms outside the normal disciplinary bounds of philosophy surely can contribute to this overarching philosophical project.

Between June 2-5th you will be here in Budapest as the keynote speaker of the conference, „Aesthetic Experience and Somaesthetics" (http://www.mft-hps.hu/hirek.html) organized by the Hungarian Philosophical Association, where scholars from 14 countries will give interesting lectures pertaining to the topic. Beside the conference, a new book was published in Hungarian titled* Somaesthtics and the Art of Living *(JatePress, 2014) mostly from your latest texts. What do you hope from this conference, from your first visit in Hungary?

I should first express my deep thanks for the organization of this conference, which I believe is the first international somaesthetics conference of such large scope in Central Europe. My first hope is that all the scholars coming to Budapest (sometimes from very distant places) arrive here and return home safely. International travel is not easy on the soma, but the sort of full-bodied, real-time communicative exchange that a conference or face-to-face meeting provides is truly precious, so I myself endure a great deal of somatic fatigue in my travels connected with somaesthetic and philosophical research. Those travels are motivated by the hope of learning new things from very smart people. I have confidence in this hope because so much of my education has been pursued in foreign lands and through dialogical encounters with many different kinds of people who were generous to share their views with me. I truly look forward to this conference and also to the instructive dialogues with Hungarian intellectuals that can develop through the publication of this new book translated by Prof. Alex Kremer. Hungarian culture, I believe, has an admirable tradition in the practices of somaesthetics. During my younger days in Israel, I learned of Hungary's great traditions in sports and spa culture, and I could directly enjoy the delicacies of Hungarian cuisine in some excellent restaurants established in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem established by native Hungarians. I'm sure the cuisine is even better in Budapest, and I hope I'll have time to enjoy that too, along with some sport.

I. JOHN DEWEY AND SOMAESTHETICS

LIVING AS A CREATIVE ACTIVITY – AN INTRODUCTION TO JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

Belén Pueyo e Ibáñez[1]
United States
belenpueyo@gmail.com

The consideration of the human being as an essentially rational entity has been accepted by the most varied and divergent philosophical and scientific traditions. Due to its significant relevance and fascinating complexity, the study of cognitive functions has occupied a preeminent position within scientific and philosophical inquiry in such a way that the analysis of sensory perceptions, emotional responses, instinctive behaviors or intuitions — non-rational mechanisms, fundamentally — has been often consigned to a secondary place.

As a result of the privileged position traditionally granted to cognitive capacities, the relation of the human being to the environment has generally been described as an intellectual process by means of which the individual transforms the product of non-rational operations into conceptual realities. Sensory perceptions, intuitions or emotional understanding, among many other mechanisms, become thus subordinated to the activity of reason to be considered a mere means to a higher end. Similarly, those cognitive and intellectual operations which do not lead to an objective comprehension of the world are also relegated to a subsidiary role under the suspicion of being too subjective, non-demonstrable, or simply meaningless.

Hence, the importance attributed to intellectual processes has given rise to the ascription of a special relevance and an even greater degree of reality to the product of such operations, namely, the world of physical, tangible, measurable, predictable, and articulable things. As a result, those materials characteristic of non-rational operations — like intuitions or sensory perceptions, among many others — or of those intellectual activities of a subjective or ambiguous nature — fictions or opinions, for example — become neglected in favor of objective, absolute, logical, and stable realities. As John Dewey observes, such a point of view, from which the world is conceived as an organized system subjected to a coherent and universal order that must be necessarily comprehended and explained in conceptual terms, can be found on the basis of a great number of currents of thought. As he observes, "variant philosophies may be looked at as different ways of supplying recipes for denying to the universe the character of contingency which it possesses so integrally that its denial leaves the reflecting mind without a clew, and puts subsequent philosophising at the mercy of temperament, interest and local surrondings."[2]

Due to the relegation of these non-rational and non-objective mechanisms to such a secondary role — not only in the domain of science and philosophy, but also in education and society in general — individuals have been progressively and mistakenly persuaded of the insignificance and unreliability of their intuitive and emotional capacities. Hence, it is possible to recognize nowadays the increasing disorientation that many individuals feel when dealing with those realities that cannot be experienced, or at least not entirely, by means of reason. Works of art, for example, which cannot be understood from a purely intellectual approach, are very often regarded as abstruse pieces that are seldom comprehended or appreciated as they should be. Social and personal relationships, moral matters or education, which, as aesthetic appreciation, demand from the individual an activity that goes beyond that which is strictly intellectual, awaken similar doubts.

Dewey, particularly critical of what he considers an incomplete description of the human experience and of the relation between the individual and her

[1] Academic affiliation: The New School for Social Research. Philosophy Department. New York City, USA. (Graduate Student-Fulbright Grantee)

[2] John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925 – 1953, Volume 1: 1925, Experience and Nature* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 46.

environment, severely questions the privileged position that has been traditionally granted, in particular within the philosophical context, to rational operations.

> When intellectual experience and its material are taken to be primary, the cord that binds experience and nature is cut. That the physiological organism with its structures, whether in man or in the lower animals, is concerned with making adaptations and uses of material in the interest of maintenance of life-process, cannot be denied. The brain and nervous system are primarily organs of action-undergoing; biologically, it can be asserted without contravention that primary experience is of a corresponding type.[3]

In defending the importance of organic functions, which are the means by virtue of which humans come into direct contact with nature, Dewey emphasizes the continuity that indeed exists between the individual and her environment, for as he states, living "is not something which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism: it is always an inclusive affair involving connection, interaction of what is within the organic body and what lies outside in space and time, and with higher organisms far outside."[4]

Dewey's approach to experience entails, therefore, the eradication of those subjectivistic stances according to which the world is conceived as a mere product of the mind, as well as of those which defend the existence of an objective reality ontologically independent of any perceptual process. What he proposes is, in summary, an inclusive conception of the human experience according to which the relation between the individual and her environment is described as an endless and bidirectional interaction. As he argues, "the process of living is continuous; it possesses continuity because it is an everlastingly renewed process of acting upon the environment and being acted upon by it."[5]

The process of interaction to which Dewey refers is not restricted, in any case, to mere primary operations. As he explains, not only organic functions, but also mental processes of all kinds, including complex rational mechanisms, operate concomitantly within the same experiential activity in such a way that none of them, not even the most intellectually elevated, can be dissociated from nature.

> Since both the inanimate and the human environment are involved in the functions of life, it is inevitable, if these functions evolve to the point of thinking and if thinking is naturally serial with biological functions, that it will have as the material of thought, even of its erratic imaginings, the events and connections of this environment. And if the animal succeeds in putting to use any of its thinking as means of sustaining its functions, those thoughts will have the character that define knowledge.[6]

From the Deweyan perspective, the human being is no longer conceived as an exclusively rational entity who observes an antecedent world from a privileged position or who interprets it as the mere product of his mind. He is, rather, a complex being who, in his interaction with the environment, acts making use of what he knows, feels and intuits; of his organic functions, intellectual mechanisms, and instinctive responses; of his predilections, prejudices, social and cultural habits as well as of his past experiences, future aspirations or doubts. Similarly, the world can neither be regarded as a bare unification of objective realities perfectly ordered by the intellect according to a universal system, but as an integral whole which includes also what cannot be understood or envisaged by reason.

According to Dewey's approach, human experience must be described, in summary, as an interaction of interactions, a complex and demanding activity which impels the individual not simply to observe and comprehend the logic of the world, but to confront the contradictory, inexplicable, boring, surprising, beautiful,

[3] Ibid., 29.
[4] Ibid., 215.
[5] John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925 – 1953, Volume 10: 1934, Art as Experience* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 109.
[6] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 212-13.

unfinished or painful, and which requires not only knowledge and understanding, but also ability, imagination, emotion, good taste, effort, or even luck.

Very often philosophy has shown itself unable to or simply uninterested in recognizing the inclusive nature of experience. Dewey is even more severe in describing it as hatefully ironic due to the indifference that, in his view, it exhibits towards "the conditions that determine the occurrence of reason while it asserts the ultimacy and universality of reason."[7] From Dewey's point of view, philosophy must adopt a new perspective, the empirical method, according to which human experience may be recognized as the integral and comprehensive activity it really is.[8]

Such an empirical approach does not entail, however, that experience must be regarded as an indiscriminate sum of exchanges, reactions, events, and realities. Dewey maintains, on the contrary, that critical and selective attitudes play a crucial role both in the occurrence of experience and in the way it must be analyzed. As he states, "the purport of thinking, scientific and philosophic, is not to eliminate choice but to render it less arbitrary and more significant."[9]

The ultra-realist perspective Dewey defends aims, hence, to take into consideration and carefully observe those elements involved in such an interaction of interactions which is experience, as well as to recognise and regulate how they connect and relate to each other at every moment. From such a point of view, experience is conceived as a confluence of elements that become very often imbued with a common quality giving rise thus to unique and distinctive situations. As Dewey argues, such a quality is, in other words, the specific trait which characterizes each experience and which gives it its unitary sense: "An experience has a unity that gives it its name, *that* meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single *quality* that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts."[10]

The importance of the concept of quality, central in Dewey's philosophy, is due to the essential role it plays as a regulative factor in the occurrence of every particular situation, for, as he argues, every selective and associative procedure which takes place in experience depends upon and is regulated by it: "The underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every distinction and relation; it guides selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit terms."[11] Now, how does the predominant quality from which the selective and associative procedures develop manifest itself?

As Dewey explains, the immediate qualitativeness of a situation cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only experienced by means of intuition. Paradoxically, however, it is on the basis of such a predominant quality that all subsequent intellectual operations develop. The quality of a situation is, in other words, the starting point from which all thought begins.

> Reflection and rational elaboration spring from and make explicit a priori intuition. But there is nothing mystical about this fact, and it does not signify that there are two modes of knowledge, one of which is appropriate to one kind of subject-matter, and the other mode to the other kind. Thinking and theorizing about physical matters set out from an intuition, and reflection about affairs of life and mind consists in an ideational and conceptual transformation of what begins as an intuition. Intuition, in short, signifies the realization of a pervasive quality such that is regulates the determination of relevant distinctions or of whatever, whether in the way of terms or relations, becomes the accepted object of thought.[12]

[7] Ibid., 99.
[8] Ibid., 19.
[9] Ibid., 35.
[10] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 44.
[11] John Dewey, "Qualitative Thought," in *Philosophy and Civilization* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968), 99.
[12] Ibid., 101.

At this point we must be careful not to misinterpret what Dewey means by all of this, for the pervading quality to which he refers here cannot be conceived as a mere external trait, neither can the intuitive mechanism by means of which it becomes revealed be seen as a mere perceptual process. Rather, qualities belong to the inclusive interactional experience that naturally takes place between the individual and her environment; they are, Dewey says, "qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake . . . they are as much qualities of the things engaged as of the organism."[13]

From Dewey's a point of view, experience is not conceived as something that simply happens, as an inevitable consequence of the past or as a reality tied to an inescapable present, but as an *activ*ity oriented towards the future. As Richard Bernstein explains in his illuminating study on Dewey's philosophy, we are not "creatures who must wait for the fortuitous circumstances in which nature brings about the goods that we directly prize and the disappearance of the conditions that we find objectionable. We may inquire and deliberate; we may formulate ends-in-view — ends that are chosen for resolving the conflicts of specific situations and will brings into existence states of affairs that are judged desirable."[14] Experience is, in short, a creative activity; it is, Dewey says, "art in germ":

> Experience in the degree in which it *is* experience is heightened vitality. Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing. Because experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is esthetic experience. [15]

Hence, even though experience is constituted by a number of situations and circumstances that go beyond the individual's control, many aspects depend actually upon her predispositions, attitudes and capacities. Life does not occur according to a preestablished itinerary; rather, it is the individual who *creates* — at least, to some extent — the conditions of every particular situation.

The creative character of experience proves to be particularly evident in the occurrence of what Dewey calls experiences with aesthetic quality: singular and particularly unitary situations that are not only imbued with a perveading quality, but that have, in addition, a consummatory sense. As he explains, experiences with aesthetic quality are those that do not happen by chance or as a result of a coincidental convergence of factors, but due mainly to the impulse of a deliberate interest not exclusively motivated by primary urgencies, but inspired by imagination and curiosity, by the desire to learn and enjoy, by the hope to have an entirely satisfying life. As Dewey states, the distinctive trait of such experiences is, in summary, their characteristic orientation towards the achievement of a particular goal, towards an end whose accomplishment gives rise to a moment of exceptional intensity. As Dewey explains, the characteristic feature of these experiences is that there is in them "a conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close."[16] They are, in short, situations in which the elements and forces involved in them are harmoniously connected giving rise thus to an integrated and coherent unity which constitutes an end in itself. Dewey sums up as follows:

[13] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 198-99
[14] Richard J. Bernstein, *John Dewey* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 117-18.
[15] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 25.
[16] Ibid., 62.

> There are situations in which self-enclosed, discrete, individualized characters dominate. They constitute the subject-matter of esthetic experience; and every experience is esthetic in as far as it is final or arouses no search for some other experience. When this complete quality is conspicuous the experience is denominated esthetic. The fine arts have as their purpose the construction of objects of just such experiences; and under some conditions the completeness of the object enjoyed gives the experience a quality so intense that it is justly termed religious. Peace and harmony suffuse the entire universe gathered up into the situation having a particular focus and pattern. These qualities mark any experience in as far as its final character dominates; in so far a mystic experience is simply an accentuated intensification of a quality of experience repeatedly had in the rhythm of experiences.[17]

The correlation between experience and art Dewey suggests may seem unnatural, even unjustified if it is not examined from the appropriate perspective. Very usually, artistic activity has been regarded as a bare expressive exercise while aesthetic appreciation has been considered a mere passive contemplation of something already finished. Due to such a pallid conception, art has been often conceived — and is still so today — as a simple entertainment, superfluous ornament or, at worst, pure business. What Dewey proposes in *Art as Experience* — which must not be merely regarded as a study on aesthetics, but as a true extension of his theory of the human experience — is precisely an invitation to reconsider "the function of art in relation to other modes of experience."[18]

Hence, when art is seen as a form of consumatory interaction between the individual and her environment, its exemplary value and its importance as a true inspiration for the rest of human experiences, transcendental or ordinary, relevant or insignificant, becomes finally revealed. As a result, some of the alleged differences between art and science, philosophy and daily life get dissolved and it is then possible to comprehend that the real distinction lies between the fact of carrying out such activities in an anemic, superficial and unfruitful way or the capacity and desire to do it in a truly creative manner. As Dewey points out, when the individual "perceives clearly and adequately that he is within nature, a part of its interactions, he sees that the line to be drawn is not between action and thought, or action and appreciation, but between blind, slavish, meaningless action and action that is free, significant, directed and responsible."[19] The great artist is not, therefore, the only individual who is capable of living creatively, but so is the committed philosopher, resolute scientist, honest politician, devoted teacher, or good parent.

> The arts of science, of politics, of history, and of painting and poetry all have finally the same *material*; that which is constituted by the interaction of the live creature with his surroundings. They differ in the media by which they convey and express this material, not in the material itself. Each one transforms some phase of the raw material of experience into new objects according to the purpose, each purpose demands a particular medium for its execution.[20]

As Dewey concludes, living creatively means, in summary, solving problems and difficulties by modifying the processes of interaction involved in them with the aim of constructing a more harmonious experience. It implies learning from the past and recreating the present with the final purpose of living a pleasurable future. It means, in short, intelligently interacting with the raw material of experience to create the necessary conditions for the accomplishment of a desired end. Regardless of the form this end acquires — a symphony, a philosophical theory, a scientific discovery, a political precept, an illuminating lesson or a friendly conversation — it will be considered an end with aesthetic quality, a true work of art, in so far as it leads to the expansion and enrichment of life.

[17] John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925 – 1953, Volume 4: 1929, The Quest for Certainty* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 188.
[18] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 17.
[19] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 324.
[20] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 323.

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AESTHETICS, METAPHYSICS, AND POLITICS: JOHN DEWEY AND THE SYMBOLIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD

María Aurelia Di Berardino
Argentina
Ángel M. Faerna
Spain
Angel.Faerna@uclm.es

Many philosophers have dismissed metaphysics without realizing that it is inseparable from human existence. When properly understood, that is as a view that endows meaning and value to the world we live in, metaphysics is a most basic need for every human being no matter how unaware they might be of their metaphysical commitments. Thomas Alexander labels this pervasive need "the human Eros" and finds it exemplified in the "meaning-giving mythic structures" that we all absorb in the process of acquiring both language and the set of symbols, rituals and habits that shape our culture. He adds:

> "Philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular is simply a conscious pursuit of this desire […]. Because the world is a place of change, conflict, and tragedy, our mythic worlds are not immune and may be confronted, modified, or destroyed entirely. Our traditions may collide with each other, each imperiously convinced of its absolute mandate."[1]

In its conscious effort to produce a better (mythic) world metaphysics differs from the mere absorption of ready-made traditions in that it takes into account the possibility for tragedy; it knows that, in a world of chance and conflict, our meaning-giving structures are unstable and may even collapse. This fact turns the metaphysical pursuit of meaning and value into an *intelligent* task having to do with conditions, predictions, operations and corrections in order to reconstruct our symbolic history in accordance to present and foreseeable future demands. Now, this means that metaphysics cannot proceed from an abstract, purely formal questioning of "the meaning of things" as an intellectual problem, but is prompted by specific situations with an experiential import. In particular, it starts with a sense of disruption in our worldview, a presentiment —or a felt presence— of disaster. It is only when the set of meanings and values that hitherto oriented our understanding of events and actions appear to us as worthless or meaningless, that we are in need of a metaphysical shift.

Alexander hits the nail on the head when he interprets that John Dewey linked the very possibility of metaphysics to this destabilization of the symbolic. Dewey's idea is revolutionary because it presents the whole Western metaphysical tradition as fundamentally ill-conceived. The belief in a timeless Being that confronts us in a perfect, immutable form is but an unreflective translation of those pre-philosophic mythic worlds wherein we feel safe and "the possibility of tragedy and of freedom"[2] is denied. This also accounts for the preeminence of the epistemological in Western tradition, for such frame of thought reduces our relation to that "Being" to its sheer apprehension in knowledge, provided that no action, no human ideal or aspiration could transform it in the least.

If, on the contrary, one adopts the Deweyan view that metaphysics responds to specific experiential situations, then one must assume a realm of "primary experience," antecedent to any discursive apprehension, that provides the ground on which metaphysics can pose its questions about being, value, and knowledge. The eventual answers to these questions, when obtained, will not be true *sub specie aeternitatis* but only to the extent that they lead to new forms of ("secondary") experience that fulfil the desires and expectations prompted in primary experience. In this connection, metaphysics can no longer be described as a picture of the world as it really *is* in its ultimate, most impersonal form but as "an art of imaginative understanding and creative envisagement of contexts, histories, and

[1] Thomas Alexander, "Dewey and the Metaphysical Imagination," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28, 2 [1992]: 203.

[2] Alexander, "Dewey and the Metaphysical Imagination," 204.

possibilities of aesthetic meaning realizable through shared activity."[3]

This is particularly congruent with Dewey's lifelong effort to restore the concept of "experience" to its full meaning, after centuries of philosophical distortions and mutilations. The restoration is of metaphysical import because it is meant to overcome the artificial gap between a subject *experiencing* the world and a world that is *experienced*. It was on this gap that a timeless "Being" could become to be thought in the first place as the unfathomable counterpart of the ever-changing world of human experience. In a memorable passage of *Experience and Nature* Dewey refused, as James did before him, to support such a disjointed picture:

> "We begin by noting that 'experience' is what James called a double-barrelled word. Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine —in short, processes of experiencing. 'Experience' denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant. It is 'double-barrelled' in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality. 'Thing' and 'thought,' as James says in the same connection, are single-barrelled; they refer to products discriminated by reflection out of primary experience."[4]

This clarifies the sense in which symbolic operations *do* create new "possibilities of aesthetic meaning." Primary experience conveys beliefs, enjoyments, fears, etc. along with the objects believed, enjoyed, feared, etc.; "act and material, subject and object" are given in one and the same felt unity. Then, the transformation of this material through activity is simultaneously a transformation in the objects *experienced* and a transformation in our *experiencing* those objects. By imposing new meanings upon the succession of events we go through, we in fact alter the qualitative character of the world as it affects us. It is not the case that we learn to react in different ways to objects that we *know* antecedently to be independent of how we experience them; the case is rather that the objects are singled out and *known* only as meaningful parts of what we experience in dealing with the world through action. This is why a difference in aesthetic, qualitative meaning always makes a difference in the world of "things" and not only in the world of "thoughts."

There is a tension between the "human Eros" that strives for living with a sense of meaning and value, on one hand, and the potential in human action to undermine that sense by changing the conditions that sustain it, on the other. The dualism of theory and practice, the depreciation of the practical as ignoble and inferior, are attempts to dissolve this tension by conjuring up the *unconditioned* (and, therefore, "real") as opposed to the conditioned and variable (and, therefore, only "apparent"). Dewey denounced this form of escapism,[5] of course, but was sensitive to its aesthetic appeal.[6] This

[3] Alexander, "Dewey and the Metaphysical Imagination," 209.
[4] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981): vol. 1, 18-9.

[5] "Escape from Peril" is the title of the first chapter of *The Quest for Certainty*. There Dewey states that the alleged superiority of theoretical knowledge over the practical arts lies in that the former is associated to permanence and security: "exaltation of pure intellect and its activity above practical affairs is fundamentally connected with the quest for a certainty which shall be absolute and unshakeable." John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984): vol. 4, 5.
[6] "*Sub specie aeternitatis*? or *sub specie generationis*? I

was not condescension, but a clear perception of the "human Eros". We are not recommended to renounce the aesthetic aspiration for the sake of a more "realistic", tough-minded attitude, but to make the aspiration really effectual by orienting the changing world in the direction of increased aesthetic consummations. The mistake of idealistic philosophies is not to claim for a world endowed with spiritual value, but to fail to relate that value to its generating conditions, thus taking as absolute and unshakeable what in fact is relative and revisable. As Dewey said:

> "There is danger that the philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a by-gone generation."[7]

But Dewey was no less critical to the "philosophies of change" such as Bergson's, for they also contradict experience by making change something absolute. Far from this, the real character of experience is that it encompasses precariousness and stability in a way that cannot be resolved either into combinations of the permanent or into combinations of changes. This inextricable mixture is what makes it possible and necessary at the same time to impose meaning-giving structures onto the succession of events. It makes it possible because similarities and repetitions are needed in order to establish recognizable meanings; it makes it necessary because those meanings are, and will always be challenged by the unknown and the unexpected. A world of pure change would be a totally unpredictable one, whereas in a world of pure permanence nothing at all could be done about it. None of them correspond to the world we have experience of; none make room for action, ends, and accomplishments.

It is not the possibility of change by itself, then, but the *contingent* distribution of stable and mutable traits within nature what grants to action a potential to enrich human experience —that is, according to the "double-barreled" character of the term, to transform both what is experienced and the very process of experiencing it. Reflection discriminates here a "subject" that endeavors to secure some desired "objects", or a "mind" that represents some "things" as valuable and worth existing, but in this perspective these terms are given a relational meaning. The aim of activity is to change the constituents of a given situation so that some parts of it are made permanent or intensified, and some others are suppressed or attenuated. Therefore, the "objects" or "things" pointed at as the ends of action cannot occur to the subject except as a possibility already contained in the given situation, that is to say, as a part of its *meaning*. Secondary experience, which comes after reflection and discrimination —or which, to put it differently, incorporates the meaning-giving structures supplied by language and symbols— interprets the world of primary experience as one that can be controlled and improved and where the means-ends relation is given pride of place.

It is in this connection that Dewey's metaphysics reveals its full import. The reference to the "destabilization of the symbolic" and the consequent possibility of a "symbolic reconstruction of the world" contrast in the sharpest way with the static set afforded by traditional metaphysics, where goods are absolute and evils are irremediable. "Being" is as it should be, therefore it only invites contemplation or, at best, it invites an action that only seeks its own ceasing. In this quest for certainty and fixity, philosophy has neglected that it is the *imperfection* of reality what calls for inspection and understanding, and what mobilize our creative energies. For one thing, it mobilizes knowledge, which is essentially a reconstructive (not a reproductive) faculty:

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am susceptible to the aesthetic charm of the former ideal —who is not?" John Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?", in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1977): vol. 4, 141.

[7] Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?", 142.

> "Not all existence asks to be known, and it certainly does not ask leave from thought to exist. But some existences as they are experienced do ask thought to direct them in their course so that they may be ordered and fair and be such as to commend themselves to admiration, approval and appreciation. Knowledge affords the sole means by which this redirection can be effected. As the latter is brought about, parts of the experienced world have more luminous and organized meaning and their significance is rendered more secure against the gnawing tooth of time. The problem of knowledge is the problem of discovery of methods for carrying on this enterprise of redirection. It is a problem never ended, always in process; one problematic situation is resolved and another takes its place. The constant gain is not in approximation to universal solution but in betterment of methods and enrichment of objects experienced."[8]

It was Sydney Hook who first associated pragmatism with "a tragic sense of life". Indeed there is a touch of tragedy in the recognition that there is no reconciling unity beneath diversity, no necessary order behind contingency, no universal solutions. The uncertain character of the world and the recalcitrant particularity of experience entail that no improvement is guaranteed once for all. The most we can expect is that whatever proves to be serviceable in one particular dimension of our experience will find application within new contexts and for different purposes, or that the goods envisaged by one individual will blaze a path to common goods. But it is not up to philosophy to dictate which goods are the dearest or what ends should be pursued. What existences in particular "commend themselves to admiration, approval and appreciation" depends on the changes in the aesthetic quality of the experienced objects as they are enriched and reorganized by new meanings. Philosophy is apt to preserve the openness of this process by revealing its contingency. Philosophical criticism of obsolete meanings and entrenched habits is needed because there is an all too natural tendency to disregard the precarious condition of our goods and to rely on comfortable myths. Instead of yielding to the demand "to be let alone and relieved from the continual claim of the world in which we live in that we be up and doing something about it,"[9] the task of thinking is to look into the origin of those goods, the conditions that sustain them, and the consequences they lead to.

This is where the metaphysical imagination plays a fundamental role, for it weaves together present and future, the actual and the potential, and assorts the multiplicity of meanings that the arts, science, religion, and social relations of all sorts, are constantly creating in a moving universe. Philosophy here invades the territory of art:

> "Philosophic discourse partakes both of scientific and literary discourse. Like literature, it is a comment on nature and life in the interest of a more intense and just appreciation of the meanings present in experience. Its business is reportorial and transcriptive only in the sense in which the drama and poetry have that office. Its primary concern is to clarify, liberate and extend the goods which inhere in the naturally generated functions of experience."[10]

The metaphysical narrative sets up as a symbolic order that seeks to assemble the variegated experience of a culture into a common history in progress. Such narrative, although, is not animated by a sense of beauty, but by a sense of responsibility. What is at stake is not the possibility of producing ideas and values not thought of before, as is the case in literary imagination, but the possibility of using them to cope with the imperfection of our shared world:

> "If insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis."[11]

[8] Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, 236.

[9] Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?", 141.

[10] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 304-5.

[11] John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy", in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and

Tragedy and freedom go together, and we cannot face them without the ability to reconstruct our mythic world. This requires a constant cultivation of our aesthetic sensitivity, a resolute use of imagination, and a robust sense of moral and social responsibility. Dewey should be credited for having shown that these dispositions can converge on one and the same aesthetic, political, and philosophical ideal.

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THE NECESSITY OF SOMA
– *THE MOTOR LINES OF OPERATION*
IN JOHN DEWEY'S AESTHETICS

Ewa Chudoba
Poland
chudobae@gmail.com

In Dewey's thought all interactions are motor. Aesthetic experience wouldn't be emotional, expressive and fulfilling if not based on motor actions of a body. A human being can have an experience as well as aesthetic experience only through specific behaviors and/or habits. All chaotic actions are responsible for destroying every potentiality of aesthetic experience. Living in accordance with rhythms created and trained by individuals in their daily routine results in happiness and fulfillment of some aesthetic quality.

The main purpose of the paper is to show how the motor lines of operation are important in Dewey's aesthetic experience. In a boarder perspective, I am going to defend the thesis that the body as a motor phenomenon is in the core of Dewey's aesthetics and as such is material for Shusterman's somaesthetics.

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In the thought of an American pragmatist John Dewey (1859–1952) we can find two notions which encompass aesthetic experience. The first one is *an experience* and the other is aesthetic experience *per se*. The relations between them, I shall present below with a special reference to the motor lines of operation.

To clearly understand what aesthetic experience is it is worth contrasting the phenomenon with **anaesthetic** experience which Dewey describes a couple of times in his aesthetic *summa – Art as Experience* (1934). As the philosopher puts it less or more directly, anaesthetic experience leaves an individual in a profound state of emotional numbness and the connotations with an anaesthesia won't be out of place. So anaesthetic experience is slack, discursive and unorganized and gives no satisfaction [Dewey, LW 10, 1981, pp.46–47]. On the other hand, such an experience might be mechanical which makes it devoid of meaning. Dewey gives an example of getting rid of a negative emotion (like anger) through putting things in order in the room [Dewey, LW 10, 1981, p.84]. If tidying is done exclusively on the purpose of diminishing anger, it will result in some kind of emotional fulfillment. On the contrary, if it is done on the basis of a mechanical routine it will lead to anaesthetic, non-meaningful and unemotional experiences [Dewey, LW10, 1981, pp.83–84]. To sum that up, both chaotic looseness and strict automatism destroy the aesthetic quality *in potentia* making aesthetic experience not to happen at all [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.47].

What differentiates the aesthetic experience from the anaesthetic one is the intrinsic aesthetic quality which has the power to integrate chaotic slackness and can speed slowness of all accidental events in individuals' lives. The root of it is the harmonious interaction between doing and undergoing in experience.

The philosopher stresses: *The enemies of the esthetic are neither the practical nor the intellectual* [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p. 47]. These factors are indifferent, irrelevant for aesthetic quality in experience which is based on two main conditions. Firstly, as it was suggested earlier, there must be an interaction between an organism (a human being etc.) and its environment. Experience of aesthetic quality is born out of the context, it never happens in the void. Secondly, the two phases of experience, namely undergoing and doing, must be in balance. Every lack of stability between them prevents the experience from its proper growth and its culmination point (climax). Doing (all movements and actions) and undergoing (perception and all usage of senses) are expressive parts of all aesthetic experiences. *Expressive* in Dewey's vocabulary means full of meaning, important, developing [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.67–68] for an individual involved in such an interaction. Doing and

undergoing are both active according to Dewey [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.60].

The aesthetic quality of experience is an effect of these two factors (interaction as well as harmony between doing and undergoing), however, it is something which cannot be gained on purpose [Dewey, LW1, 1981, p.58]. One cannot get it intentionally. It simply appears under at least two conditions mentioned above. The experience of aesthetic quality is called **an experience** by Dewey. It is aesthetic experience in a board sense as it may occur while doing some practical actions (like tidying the room), it can be emotional (Dewey gives example of an argument between two people) or it can arise during some intellectual work. So, an experience can be practical, emotional or intellectual. Probably it can happen in some other circumstances as people have at least eight types of intelligence including musical, visual, verbal, logical, bodily, interpersonal, intrapersonal, naturalistic, and use them in all kinds of environments[1]. So when a biologist Jane Goodall describes the feeling of entity and peace in the jungle in Africa[2], it might be called *an experience* with a high probability.

While occurring, all these types of experience demand certain actions of the body – it is the core of the *doing* phase.

All aesthetic experiences: an experience with practical or intellectual or emotional quality	
doing	undergoing
motor lines of operation	perception

When one is tidying the room with the intention of getting rid of his/her anger, he or she is doing it in a proper way. To be more picturesque, when you want to clean the carpet you have to move your hands with a vacuum cleaner in them forward and backward for some period of time. Or if you want to wash the dishes you have to put them into water and press the sponge on them in rhythmical movements of your hands. If you want to feel *Waldeinsamkeit*[3], you have to go to the woods and spend some time in there in solitude. So you have to get there by walking and your body has to be in some posture and awareness. All these actions and states need motor lines (or sets) of operation in the body. They don't appear out of nothingness but are consequences of our motor lines operating intentionally in the body to get what we want to get on the very certain purpose. To put it more bluntly, the purpose is specific but those actions are not specific although necessary. You can wash the dishes in many ways so you can clean the carpet and still have an experience while doing this housework. There is no one routine to do this.

However, if you want to get something more, namely some aesthetic experience in a narrow sense, your actions of your body have to be highly specific, but with no specific purpose because aesthetic experience *per se* has no purpose at all. One does it for pure enjoyment of doing it. Aesthetic quality, then, is somehow easier to appear as the other factors (practical, emotional) and the outer goal are not in existence. There is only a pure unintentional action of the body and the mind. Such an experience is called aesthetic experience as such, aesthetic experience *sensu stricto*. Mostly it happens in contact with pieces of art both while creating them and responding to them [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.61].

The problem appears here because Dewey doesn't differentiate an experience and aesthetic experience in

[1] It's a theory of multiple intelligences coined by Howard Gardner (in his book: *Frames of Mind: Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, 1983) and promoted by educators like Colin Rose; Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, Basic Books, 1983; Howard Gardner, *Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, Basic Books, 1993.

[2] Jane Goodall, *Through a Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe*, (Mariner Books, 2000), 23.

[3] Waldeinsamkeit – the feeling of being alone in the woods.

an analytical way being pedantic about the details when he writes about motor lines of operation. The rhetoric I used in a previous paragraph is only partly true. The way I put actions in opposition to goals is understood only to some extent – to the extent you want to differentiate an experience from pure aesthetic experience. But it is not necessary for understanding the importance of motor lines of operation in Dewey's aesthetics.

My main aim is only to stress that the specific motor lines of operations are far more powerful than unspecific ones. Trained and exercised motor sets of the body are responsible for having profound aesthetic experiences regardless of the main factors – practical, intellectual, emotional or aesthetic. Dewey writes:

A surgeon, golfer, ball player, as well as a dancer, a painter, or violin-player has at hand and under command certain sets of the body. Without them, no complex skilled act can be performed. An inexpert huntsman has buck fever when he suddenly comes upon the game he has been pursuing. He does not have effective lines of motor response ready and waiting. His tendencies to action therefore conflict and get in the way of one another, and the result is confusion, a whirl and blur. The old hand at the game may be emotionally stirred also. But he works off his emotion by directing his response along channels prepared in advance: steady holding of eye and hand, sighting of rifle, etc. If we substitute a painter or a poet in the circumstances of suddenly coming upon a graceful deer in a green and sun-specked forest, there is also diversion of immediate response into collateral channels. He does not get ready to shoot, but neither does he permit his response to diffuse at random through his whole body. The motor coordinations that are ready because of prior experience at once render his perception of the situation more acute and intense and incorporate into it meanings that give it depth, while they also cause what is seen to fall into fittings rhythms [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.103].

Specific sets of operations depend on a prior training. The more thorough and complex the training is, the more specific sets of operations are. That leads to more intense aesthetic experiences of all kinds. When a surgeon has an experience operating a patient, it is based on a very specific surgical training which has been lasting since it started one day in the operating room at hospital. The surgeon operating for the very first time has no chance of experiencing any kind of aesthetic quality due to his/her inexperience. He/she doesn't have any motor sets of operations at his/her disposal yet. The surgeon is working on learning them. However, having learnt them the surgeon can have a very profound aesthetic experience during an operation. Its depth as well as artistry depends on the intensity of the prior training [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.101–102].

In the passage quoted above Dewey does not make a strict difference between artists and other professions. Later on in the text this mixture of the artistic-aesthetic [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p. 53] with the practical is even more blurred [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.104]. It seems that for him appearance of aesthetic experience whatever it would be is strictly connected with **how** the body acts, not with **what** the body does. The core of aesthetic experience is hence not what, but how. For **how** the body matters. Body is responsible for how we do things, how we manage the phases of doing and undergoing because the body remembers all trained prior actions. When Dewey explains his concept of motor lines of operation, he writes both about a surgeon and a pianist making no differences in their aesthetic experiences. They both have them. They both have experiences of an aesthetic quality. So it seems like from the standpoint of body (that's where motor lines are living) it is irrelevant to differentiate aesthetic experience in a narrow sense from aesthetic experience in a broader sense. Both a surgeon and a pianist were taught how to behave, act and move while doing their job so both are having aesthetic experiences operating and playing respectively.

What is the other important aspect of the motor lines of operation it that they are inevitably folded with perception as the phase of doing comes together with the phase of undergoing. So to be a fulfilled musician or a fulfilled physician one also has to have trained ways of perceiving things and processes, especially those they are trained in. Perception is something that can be taught. Both motor and perceptive training are parts of esthetic education [Dewey, LW10, 1981, p.103].

A question arises at that point: is, for example, surgical training a part of aesthetic education if surgeons are taught motor sets of their bodies and in consequences they can have aesthetic experiences in the operating room? To avoid absurdity, the distinction between an experience and aesthetic experience in a narrow sense is useful now. In the case of non-artistic professions it seems that the aesthetic quality is a side effect of their trained actions. However, when artistic professions are discussed the aesthetic quality is in the heart of what they are doing. The purpose of an artist it to create something of the aesthetic quality but this purpose is not the same goal as having done the operation properly. It is not made out of intentions but it occurs as it happens, in the way an artist is doing his or her work. The aesthetic quality becomes present out of satisfaction from motor lines of operation in the body.

The solution, however, is not satisfying as from the point of view of motor sets in the body there is no material difference between aesthetic experience in operating and aesthetic experience in playing. At this point Shusterman's ideas are crucial to introduce. Somatic experience is the answer for the problems found in Dewey's aesthetics.

Having established somatic turn in philosophy [Shusterman, 2000, p.154–181], Shusterman started using the term somatic experience which describes all kinds of aesthetic experiences. What he wants to put stress on is that the presence and involvement of the body is crucial in developing and having all these experiences. After somatic turn, the attention of thinkers is paid both on motor and sensuous phases in experiences. Having accepted Shusterman's idea of somaesthetics, it can be said that all experiences had by people of all professions (surgeons, artists, hunters etc.) are somatic. From that standpoint no absurdity can be traced as both surgeon and artist's trainings are somatic ones and on the basis of that, somaesthetics makes it possible to find a good solution for the problem whether surgeon's training is a part of aesthetic education. It is obviously a part of somatic education which is always aesthetic.

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II. A HISTORICAL ANGLE

THE SOMAESTHETIC PRINCIPLE OF "EXPERIENCING" / AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN THE OLDEST HISTORY OF MANKIND OR THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLEX EXPERIENCE FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE?

Lukáš Makky
Slovakia
lukas.makky@gmail.com

Aesthetic experience as such is a complicated phenomenon that many theoreticians tried to explain in exhausting ways, as Richard Shusterman stated in his work *Aesthetic Experience: From Analysis to Eros*[1] or even Virgil C. Aldrich in his well-known work *The Philosophy of Art.* However, Aldrich focused on quite different point of an aesthetical experience and showed the difference of aesthetical experience and scientific observation[2]. I avoid to work with all the theories that would advance the paper into complicated and reduced comparison and compromises search as well as with all the authors that I could mention but that would be just an extended asset to the characteristics of an aesthetical experience. Even though, I'm writing about the complex aesthetical experience within the title of the work, I'm not concerning about its redefinition through somaesthetical discourse, nor about the determination of new understanding of aesthetical experience sui generis. The work is focused on the analysis of aesthetical experience in it's the purest, maybe even completely undeveloped form where particular elements did not follow its own way, but they were interconnected into one huge entity, into the experience (aesthetical?) of a prehistoric man. Somaesthetical approach seems to be the most suitable and the most recent way how to show the possibilities and the potential of prehistoric world and prehistoric world came across as the most suitable "universe" of the demonstration of an importance of sensuousness analysis not just as an object, but also as a medium of understanding and the analysis of the goal.

Limits restricting the work are sourced in the coherence of researched problem and the authorities that established the somaesthetics itself or influenced its origin and tendency. Therefore, the paper suffers from the opinions of Richard Shusterman (though not being negative) and even though, it does not summarize or analyze them somehow, it necessarily has to work with the conclusions being introduced by the author and restricted somaesthetics tendency to the form that we know today. In spite of numerous literature sources being available and formed Shusterman's program, I won't look for the only right way and the form of somaesthetics, whereas the aim of the work is not to analyze and search the integrity of the discipline critically and rigidly, but to show a mentioned period of human history in aesthetical research through it.

The reader certainly has asked the question: *Why do we have to work with the prehistory?* I already offered the main argument in relation to the aesthetical experience. The question is set in different way here. Why do we have to analyze the period so far away from a contemporary life, the period when a human gender has just been born and even the period when we could say that our ancestors were in their "primitive" developmental stage through relatively new optics? Indeed, Shusterman himself often requires approaching the philosophy and the aesthetics to real life, what he stated in these words: *„Bringing aesthetics closer to the realm of life and practice* [...]"[3]. Therefore, why the prehistory, the period practically distant to our knowledge, cannot be a contribution for us? Or are we wrong and still can be?

Primary reason of turning the attention towards the prehistory in relation to the problem of somaesthetics is the expected reality of the richness or rather complexity

[1] Shusterman Richard. "Aeshtetic experience: From Analysis to Eros," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64, 2 (2006): 217-229; Also see: Shusterman, Richard. "Reviewing Pragmatist Aesthetics: HIstory, Critique, and Interpretation – After Twenty Years," *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 4, 1 (2012): 272.

[2] Aldrich, C. Vigril. *Filozofia umenia* (Bratislava: Tatran, 1968), 29-24.

[3] Shusterman, Richard. "Somaesthetics and the Revival of Aesthetics," *Filosofický vestnik* 28, 2 (2007): 137.

of experiential world of prehistoric man. Let's say that aesthetical experience originated with objects being now marked by the term art (as it's common) seems to be inappropriate. It is not possible to look inside the prehistory of human gender when social and "human" rules have been formed within the problem of aesthetical experience. Moreover, when we realize that sensuousness as a determining element was the element building prehistoric world and "provided the gender survival" and its cultural and even social revolution by Darwinian understanding. We can suppose that aesthetical experience, as such, has to logically appear already in the prehistory in various activities and interaction with various objects or external impulses. To refuse such a reality would mean "to cancel" the richness of aesthetical experience as it's described and presented today. I'll use the statement of Jerrold Levinson, who published the paper *Defining Art Historically* in 1979, trying to find the way out of the conflict of essentialist and anti-essentialist aesthetics, applied the so-called historical principle. It's relevant that he uses the term "primeval-art" that represents the original form of the object that makes other objects marked by the term "art"[4] in line with the preservation of particular similarity. I do not want to criticize his inconsistency and blindness towards the fact that similarity line continues back (deeper into the past) even out of the art because artifacts of practical activity towards each other necessarily have to show certain similarity too. I got interested by the term "primeval-art". It's possible to set the problem of "primeval-experience" that should be primary and logically superior (maternal, involving) to all the other experiences by modification and that's why we can accept even the existence of a "primeval-aesthetical experience" that came out of it.

The work *Dewey´s Aesthetic Experience in the Nature – Culture Continuum* by Krystyna Wilkoszewska was the crucial one because it confirmed the effort to look at prehistoric world and mainly cultish ceremonies and practices by its analysis of somaesthetical experience of the animals, but mainly by so called "pre-humans", from somaesthetical point of view[5]. The use of the term "pre-humans" and Shusterman's and Wilkoszevska's response to Darwin offers the possibility to interconnect somaesthetical approach or rather an analysis through the evolutionists' conclusions and we should apply this accrued substrate to the world of prehistoric man that's, however, not my aim yet.[6]

The starting point of somaesthetics, as it's been many times declaimed, is emblematic work of John Dewey *Art as experience,*[7] mainly its ontological theory of a "body-mind".[8] The analysis of his opinions could take on all the paper and wouldn't move us closer to a desirable conclusions according to the title of a paper. That's the reason why I will refer to J. Dewey and especially to his thoughts already integrated into somaesthetics program, most commonly by R. Shusterman or other theoreticians and even though Dewey's pragmatic standpoints broaden the whole meaning of the work, conclusions would be very open and work would profit with the regard to the extent, form of unfinished work.

Wilkoszevska writes: *"Dewey´s aesthetics and his conception of aesthetic experience are open to all*

[4] Levinson, Jerrold. "Definovat umění historicky," in *Co je umění? Texty angloamerické estetiky 20. století,* eds. Kulka, Tomáš and Ciporanov, Denis. (Praha: Pavel Marvart, 2010), 133-157.

[5] Wilkoszewska, Krystyna. "Dewey´s Aesthetic Experience in the Nature – Culture Continuum," (paper presentet on the First European Pragmatism Congres: The Relevance of American Philosophy, Rome, Italy, September 19-21, 2012). http://www.nordprag.org/papers/epc1/Wilkoszewska.pdf

[6] Ibid.; Shsterman Richard. "Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal," *The Journal of Aestzhetics and Art Criticism,* 57, 3 (1999): 309.

[7] Dewey, John. *Art as Experience* (New York: The Barkley Publishing group, 2005) 373.

[8] Shusterman, Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal, 309.

dimensions of the world of nature."[9] Such a formulated thought gives very wide possibility of understanding the aesthetical experience and confirms what was written at the same time and thus, aesthetical experience can occur in any situation. That gives the scope to contemplate further about the correctness of applying somaesthetical approach of prehistory. Such a formulated conclusion considerably suggests the characteristics of aesthetical function by Ján Mukařovský, who wrote: *"the bearer of aesthetical function can be any phenomena or activity".*[10]

I'll partially help with cited Virgil C. Aldrich. His approach is more than sympathetic to me in more ways, but I predominantly admire his effort to express and avoid the problem of the definition of the aesthetical experience at the same time. He opened many possible doors by his thought that *"aesthetical experience is a specific aesthetical sort of experience"*, but did not close any of them.[11] Basically, it would be possible to draw the conclusion that aesthetical experience occurs when the man experiences aesthetical phenomena interacting with the object, phenomena or activity. It's clear that this tautological statement didn't move us further, but actually, it's not necessary to continue in its analysis. I'll finish the idea that help skeptics to understand why the focus of aesthetical experience on sensuousness is necessary that makes the core of the whole discussion. *„The aesthetic experience is never passive, thus, an artwork is not complete until the viewer has experienced and interpreted its particular qualities. This is why there is always an interaction between the artwork and the viewer and the viewing experience is always „a transactional nexus of interacting energies connecting the embodied self and the environing world, including the social world that constructs the biological organism into a self* [...]"[12] It's evident that the author prefers the participation of the subject where an absent presence at aesthetical experience within the work is not perceived aesthetically (there is no aesthetical experience), but it's even not complete. She writes about the compactness, but not about an aesthetical experience compactness as Deway does, but about the compactness and predominantly the determinateness of an aesthetical object, as if aesthetical experience would be the last stage of its creation. Interaction, mentioned by E. M. Buckart, is the key one for semiotic aspect of somaesthetics, mentioned also by R. Shusterman.[13] I will deal with this point of somaesthetics in a slightly more enhanced attention.

Aldrich, who is later referring to Cartesian dualism, also paraphrasing Dewey many times, suggests duality or rather bipolarity that, according to me, is considerably significant for somaesthetics (for its criticism and the criticism done by it) that needs to be revised. I write about the opposite of the soma and the mind that was determining for the development of social principles and the sciences during the vast majority of the Western world history and went his own way mainly under the influence of the Christianity. That is the reason why a sensuousness was not so important than something undesirable. Therefore the human body was not the part of the research scope of an aesthetics for many years. Shusterman appealed to Baumgarden and adjusted his "inconsequence" as somaaesthetics[14] primarily set the aesthetics apart more broadly than we know it now in

[9] Wilkoszewska, Dewey´s Aesthetic Experience in the Nature – Culture Continuum.
[10] Mukařovský, Ján. "Estetická funkce, norma a hodnota jako sociálni fakty," in *Studie z estetiky*, (Praha: Odeon, 1971), 18.
[11] Aldrich, *Filozofia umenia,* 29-24.
[12] Bukdahl, Else, Marie. "Embodied Creation and Perception in Visual Art," (paper presentet on the conference Rethinking Pragmatist Aesthetics, Wroclaw, August 31, 2012). 3/15. http://norheim.mono.net/upl/website/presse112121/elsemariebukdahlforedragpolen.pdf
[13] Shusterman, Richard. "Somaesthetics and C. S. Peirce," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 23,1 (2009): 8-27.
[14] Shusterman, Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal. s. 309.

order to establish the injustice, or using his term, "neglect". Through a reminding Baumgarden's tendency who defined aesthetics as: *"the science of sensory cognition"*[15], Shusterman tried to show the naturalism of somaesthetics and its important place in original understanding of the aesthetics as an independent discipline, while I'm trying to analyze the original form of aesthetical pure experience and the participation of somaesthetical perception. I work with the pre-terminological reality of the aesthetics. It's astonishing how important and key is the role of the body and somatic reception in our lives and what attention has been paid to it. The body was usually perceived only as an object of knowledge or observation or representation. In spite of this fascination by the human body that many acts and generally fine art as such indicates, theoreticians were always just a single step from expressing their meaningful interest in sensuousness and started to search it from the aesthetical and the philosophical point of view. Disregarding some exceptions, not mentioning writings of the Christian philosophers who were too much devoted to the soma, though they dishonored and judged it as an opposite to the purity and the sole, or just: carnal casket of our existence. It's enough to remember the writing of Edmund Burke *"On the Sublime and Beautiful",* where the beauty and the attraction is analyzed through the description of a woman's figure[16] or the work *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, where Friedrich Nietzsche contrasts sensual (Dionysian) and spiritual (Apollonian)[17] and similar texts much more within the history of aesthetics and philosophy as well. The fact that it has been thought about the soma not just as an object of the similarity or admiration, but as the problem itself is awkward. These thoughts were mostly limited to the dance or dramatic art where the body of an actor is and was perceived as the material[18] or his physiognomic expressions were and are perceived as the main features of dramatic art "language"[19]. I do not mention the dance and the theatre by mistake. The potential of the sensuousness in its living, making and also perceiving is stronger than in any other art. Thus, maybe with the exception of the music hiding the hidden energy in itself influencing the sensuousness. Subconscious response to the music is primarily always a dance. The music forces the man to move and "feel" the music through your heart or even invokes emotions.[20] Susanne Langer responded well to the relation of the music and the emotions and she denied emotional content of the music and gave it semiotic character.[21] However, Wittgenstein warned from associating emotions with physiological responses of the body to the music that could oppose to somaesthetical observation and I'll sum up that it's more correct to say: "from a non-critical associating with the emotions". Even Shusterman confirms himself the statement as he writes: *"An emotion is not identical to the bodily sensations associated with the emotions."*[22]

I tended to choose the examples of dance, music and theater. The reason is simple. All of them are types of art or activities that has been practiced even in prehistoric period in various ways. The exception is presented only by theater, but all stated types are what was made directly in line from cultish ceremonies that became a start for particular arts and consist of certain theatricality in itself.

[15] Ibid, s. 300.
[16] Burke, Edmund. "O vkuse vznešenom a krásnom," in *Dejiny estetiky: Antologia, II. diel* eds. Sošková, Jana, et al. (Prešov: FF UPJŠ, 1994), 32-43.
[17] Nietzsche, Fridrich. *Zrod tragédie z ducha hudby* (Bratislava: Národné divadelné centrum, 1998), 145.
[18] Aldrich, *Filozofia umenia,* 120-128.
[19] Dorfles, Gillo. *Proměny umění* (Praha: Odeon, 1976), 133-147.
[20] Maus, Fred, Everett. "Somaesthetics of Music," *Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education* 9, 1 (2010): 13.
[21] Langer, K., Susanne. *O významovosti v hudbe, Genéza umeleckého zmyslu* (Bratislava: Spoločnosť pre Nekonvenčnú Hudbu, 1998), 4-64.
[22] Maus, Somaesthetics of Music, 14.

Antique was one of a few periods of a human history when the same attention was paid to the "sensuousness" and the "spirituality" and when the beauty ideal was presented by their balance. I appeal to an antique ideal in art and in beauty and even though the antique seems to be at least opposed to prehistory, it presents some interference point which we should join when somaesthetically analyzing the prehistory and prehistoric artifacts. I'm going to explain this statement. Gillo Dorles writes in his work *Languages of Arts* about the process of the transaction and, even though, his explanation is not fully satisfying, it could be said that the past, the influence of the acts and the processes of the reality that follows them and so they have direct influence on new emerging things. This influence, as a constant process of the information exchange is maintained and the influence of the human, as a creator, recipient in a conscious, subconscious, but even unconscious way.[23]

In the work *Possibilities of aesthetical research of the prehistory or the presence of "aesthetical" in prehistory,* I worked with such a presumption and concluded that it's preferred in the ethno-genesis of the majority of prehistoric and consequently ancient nations and thus, aesthetical norm (in J. Mukařovský understanding) being valid for a certain time influenced the following period. This principle and "non-expiration" of aesthetical norm having the influence even on the ideal of the sensuousness in every single human history but only current process of the aging of the norms is visible in shaping an early ancient "sculptures" that naturally refer to the statuettes of younger prehistory.[24] Ján Bouzek writes about it properly: *"Archaic Greek art presents after geometrical art next step on the route to artistic understanding of the world's surrounding of the man in anthropological way,"*[25] The key to accept this stated thesis is that geometrical art was typical for Bronze Age that fully falls under the prehistory and it refers to Neolithic products being at least determining for geometrical pattern within Mediterranean area. Bouzek states a bit earlier: "*in the worlds' idea thinking and patterns through a sensual phenomenon, Greek art got more artificial period during humanity period*"[26] But if I returned back to pointed routing, and thus: *why do I mention Greece if I talk about European prehistory?* It's enough to think how the theatre was build and that these cults should have older tradition that had to probably do something. The main point of the relation of the antique and the prehistory is presented by the term "kalokagathia". A beauty ideal of the body and the soul became a starting thought how to adapt still existing contradiction of the "sensuousness" and the "spirituality" in observing an aesthetical experience. As it was written, the prehistory presented the first stage of a human race with the dominance and the attention to the body, even though concerning its length attention to the education attracted to more and more people, meaning their spiritual side (otherwise there wouldn't be such knowledge boom in ancient world) that happens predominantly during Greek ancient symbiosis.

Wilkoszewska working with Dewey's thoughts writes: "[...] *biological commonplaces are something more* [...] *they reach to the roots of the esthetics in experience".*[27] Particularly she says here about "*the harmony of the interactions between a living being and its surroundings".*[28] The interaction is the term that I have drawn an attention to. It's one of the key identifiers of

[23] Dorfles, *Proměny umění,* 133-147.
[24] Makky, Lukáš. "Možnosti estetického skúmania praveku, alebo prítomnosť „estetického" v praveku," in *9. študentská vedecká konferencia: zborník plných príspevkov*. (Prešov: FF PU v Prešove, 2013), 20-29, http://www.pulib.sk/web/kniznica/elpub/dokument/Olostiak6; See.: Mukařovský, Estetická funkce, norma a hodnota jako sociálni fakty, 31-32.
[25] Bouzek, Ján and Kratochvíl, Zdeněk. *Řecké umění a Archaické filosofie.* (Hermann & synové, 1995), 19
[26] Ibid, 13
[27] Wilkoszewska, Dewey´s Aesthetic Experience in the Nature – Culture Continuum.
[28] Ibid.

semiotic relation that was described by J. Dewey, C. S. Pierce. Shusterman writes: "[...] *an icon, an index, and a symbol could help to distinguish a varieties of the body language* [...]."[29] We could build all the morphology of the body language in this form, but to deal with the complete analysis in the spirit of a semiotic approach towards the "soma", we would have to work with biosemiotics. Yes, we should be aware of this semiotic aspect but the term for the interaction, particularly the interaction that happens between a life space and prehistoric man, is closer for the knowledge of prehistoric world. J. A. Svoboda states his opinion to this problem. He writes about obligatory "domestication" of a phenomena that surround prehistoric man.[30] This domestication is semiotic phenomena and is possible to intercept by a simple model similarly as the reactions of human body. Action and reaction. We can see that human body had to play its role in the "pre-experience" and gave impulses that the man had to handle and assess in a semiotic way. "*The experience occur continuously, because the interaction of a live creatures and an environing conditions is involved in the very process of the living".*[31]

Dewey writes: "„[...] *sometimes the harmony of the interaction with the surroundings is easier to achieve at the level of animals than humans* [...]".[32] I suppose that here we get definitive answer for the question "why prehistory?" It is really about the close relationship between the human and the nature. His body is constantly exposed to various natural conditions that the man has to adapt to. But the pressure, nakedness in front of the universe powers, got the man into the interaction with the nature at completely different level as we are able to imagine. And not just this. A magic that seems to be incomprehensible nowadays, unknown and mainly mysterious, presented the core of the practices that prehistoric man applied to the deepening and modifying interaction with the nature. Central medium, actor and artifact of its practicing was human body that moved in the space in warped lines accompanied by rhythmical music and keeping some traditions of predominantly theatrical character. Body became a transmitter, central agent and a receiver at the same time. It is not worth of a justification to separate experience of the creator and the recipient and the distinctness of the role of their sensual aspects as in e.g. music[33]. It is right that a priest/witch man as a central personality of organizing and practicing active "trance" had a dominant position, but without participation of other members of the tribe who had to join the ceremony, the ceremony was not done. Many prehistoric scenes in the caves let us know about the personality of the witch man. The best known of all is a depiction of the witch man from French cave Trois-Freres. Other images of the man on the move or doing some activity are located all around the world, but e.g. even in Slovakia, on the prehistoric pottery. As there is no more space available for my writing, I need to conclude my paper.

There is one more feature left of demonstration of human activity concerning the prehistory and the sensuousness – a touch.[34] Zdeňka Kalnická marked its importance in her paper *Art and Touch.* In spite of the fact that she dealt with its importance for aesthetical experience as underestimated sense, she confronted its problem mainly by the thematic analysis of art history

[29] Shusterman, *Somaesthetics and C. S.* Peirce, 13.
[30] Svoboda, A. Jiří. *Počátky umění* (Praha: Academia, 2011´), 23-24.
[31] Dewey, John. "Art as Experience," in *Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory,* ed. Ross, D. Stephen, et al. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 205.
[32] Wilkoszewska, Dewey´s Aesthetic Experience in the Nature – Culture Continuum.
[33] Maus, Somaesthetic of Music, 15-19.
[34] Shiphosrst, Thesla. *The Varieties of User Experience* (Plymonth: University of Plymonth, 2009), accesed on January 9, 2014, http://www.sfu.ca/~tschipho/PhD/Thecla_Schiphorst_PhD_Chapter_Seven.pdf, 195-196.

intersection.[35] A touch had much more important role during the period of prehistory. It had very important role and the position in the birth of "creative" activity such as crafts production documented by numerous palm imprints on the walls of caves (the birth of cultish practices?), but also deterioration of Paleolithic and even later statuettes of prehistoric art that could be caused only by the touch of a human hand. The touch was important in order to let the man gain other than visual conception of the space which he interact with to find the temperature of the surrounding, segmentation of the surface he planned to walk barefoot etc. It's clear that the mechanism of somaesthetics is limitless and the analysis of a prehistoric man's sensuousness or a sensuousness as such in the prehistory was just briefly introduced. In spite of this, I will take an advantage of the last lines of my analysis and instead of the conclusion I introduce how I understand notified complex experience.

Dualism of the body and the mind (spirituality) is a curse which we must fight constantly with. As somaesthetics prefers the sensuousness and as historical approaches refused it, the antique found a light symbiosis among them. On one hand, there is a catharsis and a contemplation (mind), on the other hand, the man has to enter the interaction with the outer world (soma). Yes, I can be reproached because I work and think about the human body as only an element (even though relevant) of aesthetical experience, but there is no space for other reasoning and the reflection about a prehistoric world. Prehistory should definitely be inspiring. There was no strict dividing of the body and the soul, even though there was a respect towards strengthening the sensual givennesses that made decisions about the life and the death (indeed it's not theatrical turnabout). What I want to say is that, similarly, as the antique represented the beauty ideal by the interconnection of a spiritual and a sensual, prehistory did not have a lot of experiences available, but just a small amount of states and situations for prehistoric man that did not limit him. That is the reason why I think his experience presented much complex version of not just a somatic or, on the other hand, a spiritual, but complex experience, where even aesthetical part was integrated.

[35] Kalnická, Zdeňka. "Art and Touch," (paper presentet on International Congres of Aesthetics, Krakow, Poland, June 25).

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THE BODY OF THE ORIENTS
– THE BODY THAT WHICH ORIENTS.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BODY IN TRADITIONAL EAST ASIAN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES

Lehel Balogh
Hungary
lehel7@gmail.com

> "Why do those philosophically rich and critically reflective somaesthetic disciplines that are central to Asian philosophy remain so foreign to our Western philosophical work?"
> (Shusterman 1999, 310)

I.

Traditional East Asian teachings and practices are notoriously hard to label accurately and to categorize properly from a Western point of view, given the thoroughly alien nature of the classifying "enlightened" Western mind to the deeply-rooted traditions of the Orient. This all-pervasive, systematizing, scientific trend of the Occident prefers to think in perfectly discrete concepts and categories, whereas Eastern traditions are more inclined to leave the demarcation line between various, interrelated phenomena – such as religion, philosophy, politics, etc. – rather dim. Hence, it comes as no surprise when, in reaction to the seemingly impossible demand of molding Eastern notions into appropriate Western conceptual forms, some overly broad, thus virtually meaningless, categories emerge. One of these categories is the widely misused container word of 'spirituality" for Eastern traditions. Without going very deep into the problematic nature of this word, let me just point out that the application of this particular expression as an umbrella term to encompass traditional Asian philosophies and religions is doubly wrong: first, because it suggests that these traditions are to be conceived as "spiritual", that is, as *not bodily*; second, it ties the fundamentally different Eastern sensitivity and sensibility to the specifically Christian notion of spirit and spirituality. Misconception and misunderstanding is therefore readily available.

Yet, if we take a closer look at the presuppositions and categories that I have been using 37nt he previous paragraph, it might also be suggested – deservedly, I should add – that the usage of East and West, Orient and Occident are just as well Western notions themselves, which have an ever shifting web of meanings.[1] I admit I wouldn't disagree with such criticism. These notions are, indeed, quite dubious. However, from a practical point of view, they are still very useful, because they help us to recognize the differences between our "natural" presuppositions and those coming from different world views. For us, Westerners, language (*logos*) essentially orients the ways we conceive our reality. I would not go as far to suggest that this is entirely dissimilar for East Asian peoples. Language does feature a privileged role in China, Korea, and in Japan, as well. 37nt he is also striking to me that there is another, often overlooked reality which seems to orient the people of the Orient far more than most of us would imagine. The reality of which I am alluding to is that of the *body*.

I would argue that the body, its operation and its relation to one's moods and emotions, to the thoughts and even to one's 'rational decision making processes' has a central role 37nt he East Asian experience. I would

[1] The terms 'Orient' and 'Oriental" used to refer to Asia Minor and the Middle East in Roman times, then later to Central Asia, at times, to India as well, and it only came to designate the „Far East" (China, Korea, Japan) in relatively recent times. 'West' or the 'Occident' for Westerners is their natural vantage point from where they constitute their own visions of the world, including that of the „Far East". But for East Asian people „Far East" is neither East, nor too far, since they actually live there. The 'West' for them may seem just as homogenous as „the East" to Western people. Whereas, in reality there are many Occidents and many Orients. That is the reason why in the title of this paper I use the term 'Orient' in a plural form: 'Orients', for it seems to me more reasonable to differentiate between several origins of (East) Asian thought and practice (Indian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, etc.) than to handle it as a single monolithic structure. In the same vein, there is clearly not only one 'Occident' but numerous ones: Europe as a whole is different from Western Europe (which, in turn, is comprised of many very distinctive cultural traditions), just as much as America is different from Europe (not to mention that America does *not* equal to the United States, either). Nevertheless, all of these can be seen in the eyes of an East Asian person as a single indivisible and uniform culture of *the* West.

also argue that it has a far more decisive role than 38nt he Western religious and philosophical traditions, not only because the East is more reluctant to separate the somatic realm from one's mental experiences but also because the experiencing of reality is prone to be more aestheticized there, that is, more conscious in acknowledging the sensory perceptions *qua* bodily perceptions, not merely as 'pictures' or 'ideas' appearing 'in' one's mind. Knowledge is the knowledge of the mind *and* of the body, not exclusively of the mind. Consequently, in this paper I do not limit the term 'aesthetic experience' to a special theoretical attunement of enjoying arts, but I will use 'aesthetic' in its more original sense of gaining knowledge through the deliberate reflection on our sensory experiences. The body might have been considered 38nt he West as a burden that hinders the attainment of 'true knowledge', but for Eastern traditions no wisdom could be imaginable without the participation of the body 38nt he seeking process. I will therefore present the major East Asian traditions' views 38nt he body in terms of its contributions to shaping aesthetic experience and acquiring practical insights and valuable knowledge in this process.

II.

The major East Asian traditions to be presented here are the following: Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism. I will proceed in this order, starting on Buddhism, by offering a concise account on its early days in India. Then the examination will move on to the two indigenous Chinese traditions, Confucianism and Daoism. Eventually, I will compare these three divergent teachings, and show their interplays and mutual transformations during the centuries of living together in China, Korea and Japan, with relation to the meanings and tasks of the body in forming aesthetic experience.

Buddhism is usually characterized as *the* prominent religion of East Asia. Initially, however, it was neither a religion, nor did it originate from East Asia. As A. N. Whitehead aptly put it: Buddhism was a "*metaphysic generating a religion*". (Whitehead 1960, 50) Historically speaking, at its establishment, Buddhism was nothing more than a remarkably comprehensive theory and practice worked out in Northern India by a single individual, named Gautama Siddhartha (later to be called 'the Buddha', the 'enlightened one'). The cultural context from which Buddhism arose was the multifaceted and extremely rich and colorful mixture of Indian religions and philosophies. In this tradition, the practice of meditation and yoga had been already prevalent by the time the Buddha appeared, albeit at that time it had had rather close ties with ascetic tendencies (that is, with the denial of the body, which provided occasions for self-mortification). The Buddha himself also practiced self-mortification for several years before becoming enlightened. As he recognized the futility of such exercises, in his subsequent teachings significant attention was given to the vital importance of the body in attaining relevant aesthetic experiences. He preferred to call his teaching the 'middle way', precisely because it refused both the extremes of self-mortification and indulging in excessive sensual pleasures. The practice of meditation is arguably the cornerstone of his teachings.

One might ask: what does meditation have to do with aesthetic experience? The straightforward answer is that meditation is the *par excellence* aesthetic experience in Buddhism. For the uninitiated, the word 'meditation' would seem to imply the 'mind's withdrawal' from the physical realm, and the resulting 'leaving behind of the body'. However, this couldn't be further from the truth. As Heinrich Dumoulin, the prominent Christian Buddhologist remarked: "*The body is as central to Buddhist meditation as to Yoga. Indeed meditation without the body is unknown to the Eastern religions.*" (Dumoulin 1994, 88) Meditation is, in fact, the bringing into awareness of the body ('kaya') and its functioning

via the keen observation of one of the most basic automatic and unconscious functions of the body: the respiration. Meditation begins with paying acute attention to one's one breathing without trying to control or interfere with it in any way. But even prior to that, one must find the proper position for meditating. The general image of a meditator is a person sitting in a classic lotus position. Yet, meditation can be practiced in a range of other forms and positions as well, such as while walking, standing or lying. In the most authoritative text on mindfulness and meditation, the *Satipatthana Sutta*, the Buddha explains that body awareness is the key to seeing the world as it is. "*One thing, O monks, developed and repeatedly practiced, leads to the attainment of wisdom. It is the contemplation of the body.*" (Smith and Novak 2003, 81)

The Buddha provides several examples of body mindfulness. These include:

(1) Mindfulness of the breathing (directing full attention to breathing, nothing else)
(2) Mindfulness of basic body postures (becoming aware of one's bodily positions)
(3) Mindfulness of constant change in bodily activities (awareness of the way we move)
(4) Mindfulness of the decay of the body (awareness of the impermanent nature of the body)

But this is just the beginning of mindfulness meditation. As soon as one gets accustomed to calmly observing his/her bodily movements, then can he/she start monitoring the body sensations that take place in different parts of his/her body. What is crucial here, just as in any other mindfulness practices, is the dispassionate attitude which one must adopt as the basic state of mind towards all his/her observations. The aim of all these exercises is, after all, nothing else than to be able to see everything with tranquil equanimity. The state of this superior equanimity is called *vipassana*, that is, 'penetrative seeing', which enables one to witness the true nature of reality: its insubstantiality, its unsatisfactoriness and its impermanence. The existential realization of these three basic truths of Buddhism is what meditation is all about, so to speak. It wouldn't be possible without the acknowledgement and, as it were, the taking advantage of the centrality of the body as the locus of the modified aesthetic experience. This heightened awareness of the subtleties of one's aesthetic experience is, in effect, a tool or a means for metaphysical insights. As the Buddha himself described this landmark-experience:

> "*Those truths of which before I had only heard, now I dwell having experienced them directly within the body, and I observe them with penetrating insight.*" (Smith and Novak 2003, 83)

III.

It took about five centuries for Buddhism to arrive in China after the Buddha's death. By that time, the Buddhist Dharma had changed and evolved quite a bit, and we will take this into consideration in the fifth section of this paper. As for now, however, our focus will turn to the predominant body concepts of China, which were native to the Chinese culture much before any foreign influence could have worked out its effects there. The two vastly influential and often competing local traditions of China are Confucianism and Daoism. "*It is often assumed that many Chinese are Confucians in action, and Taoists in contemplation.*" (Ching 1993, 85) To put this in another way, whereas the daily life of social interaction is fairly well covered by the meticulous regulations of Confucianism, private 'spiritual' life may be taken better care for many by Daoism. We will see how 'spiritual' the 'spirituality' of Daoism really is in the next section. However, the teachings of Confucius, who lived around the same time in China as the Buddha did in India, are everything but 'spiritual'. He was a deeply practical thinker who is well known for his reluctance in dealing with religious issues *per se*, and was not much

interested in gods or spirits in general. Instead he was rather fond of referring back to his ancestors' times, and the mores of that – the early Zhou dynasty's – era. What has been all so often and mistakenly attributed to Confucius, the ancestor worship, was actually a much older tradition, antedating the philosopher by at least a thousand years. Although Confucius did not invent the ancestral rituals, he reinforced them by preserving and mediating important ancient anthologies, such as the *I Ching*, which was already an antique text in his time. In these ancient rituals, one can already detect the significance of the body in ritual activities. For instance, when paying ceremonial respect to one's deceased ancestors, the son had to act as the family priest, and the grandson or a nephew was appointed to serve as a *corpse* ('shi'), an ancestral impersonator whose body would be the vessel or the carrier of the ancestor's soul during the ceremony. (Ching 1993, 20)

Body for ancient Chinese was a psychosomatic unity, which, for Confucius and his followers was firmly embedded in its immediate social environment: one's body was a part of his family's body, which was, in turn, part of an ever expanding series of 'bodies': of tribes', clans', and ultimately, of the entire Chinese society. Therefore the cultivation of the self, which was a primary imperative for the Confucian ideal of the learned gentleman, was, in essence, the cultivation of the body, in the sense of developing and refining one's character through a fundamentally aesthetic education of rituals. Interestingly though, the typical Chinese scholar did not carry the cultivation of his body to excesses. The reason for this was another Confucian imperative, that of the prohibition of harming one's own body, for it was held that one's body did not rightfully belong to himself, but rather to his parents (the body is a gift from the parents for which one can never cease to be grateful and responsible). Being cautious and refraining from overdoing bodily exercises lead Chinese Confucian scholars to become physically rather untrained (but skilled at courtly manners and rituals), whereas, at the same time, the Japanese samurais, who blended Neo-Confucianism with Zen Buddhism, were well known for their excellent physical fitness. At any rate, Confucians did not believe in personal immortality, as they held that "*at death a person disintegrates; with is* yang *soul returning to heaven and his* yin *soul to earth, the individual as a distinct entity is no more*." (Lai 2001, 71)

In the *Great Learning*, one of the most highly regarded Confucian classics, one can read about the *xiu shen,* which is usually translated as 'self-cultivation', to be the ultimate concern for every single individual of the society, irrespective of their class or rank. However, the term *xiu shen* literally means the cultivation ('xiu') of the human *body* ('shen'). As Ellen Zhang explains, for most Confucians the human body is not an autonomous entity, but the part of the natural world: it exists in a cosmological, as well as in a social nexus. Not only does the body belong to the cosmos, but it also shares the same governing energy (the *qi*) that flows through all other entities and realms of the universe as well. The human body thus takes after Heaven and Earth and all other beings in its basic characteristics. "*More specifically, the human being is an embodiment of the basic five elements,* (wu wing)*; that is, water, fire, earth, metal, and wood.*" (Zhang 2002, 46) When the five elements are out of balance, sickness occurs in the human body (which brings about the illness of the mind, too, since body and mind are so tightly intertwined). Likewise, when these identical five elements are not in accordance with one another in society, unrest and chaos takes place in the social body, too. This Confucian approach to the human body is the fundament for Chinese medicine which also claims that there is an internal connection between one's mind and body. It also maintains that equilibrium is to be retained by balancing the two opposing natural forces – the *yin* and the *yang* – that are present in the human body, as well

as in everywhere else in the cosmos. In addition, on this basis it is also believed that physical and mental health are conjoined with morality. Consequently, an immoral person is thought to be sick in his entire being. This holistic approach will pave the way for fascinating somaesthetic developments in Neo-Confucianism, which is to be investigated shortly. But now is the time to turn our attention to the body concepts of the other dominant Chinese tradition: Daoism.

IV.

To begin with, it is helpful to note that Daoism may refer to two fairly different cultural phenomena: one being the Daoist philosophy (*Daojia*), and the other being the Daoist religion (*Daojiao*). These are not the most appropriate designations to tell the two apart, for both its philosophy contains a cluster of religious elements, while the religious movement is thoroughly permeated by Daoist metaphysics and ethics. Still, it is a useful distinction to be made because Daoism came into being as a highly sophisticated philosophical approach that grew and sprung from the same fertile soil as did Confucianism, but has become during its subsequent history more institutionalized and religious in its character. Its firs master, Laozi lived around the same time as did Confucius, and allegedly the two had even met on a few occasions; although this claim lacks historical evidence. Then again, there is no doubt that just as *yin* and *yang* are two opposing but complementary forces of the Chinese cosmological thought, so are Daoism and Confucianism two similarly complementary major powers of the Chinese intellectual universe. *Yin* is normally associated with Daoism, being more feminine, yielding, passive and dark, whereas *yang* is related to Confucianism, to the masculine, the active, aggressive and light.

We saw that Confucianism contributed a great deal to Chinese medicine. As a matter of fact, Daoism, which absorbed the teachings of the Yin and Yang School, did at least as much for the expansion of knowledge of the body (anatomy) and for the improvement of healing practices. In addition, Daoism is famed for its elaboration on martial arts and its unique breathing techniques (*qigong*) as well. The guiding principle in all these various disciplines was introduced in the very first Daoist text, the Daodejing written by Laozi himself. This guiding principle is called *wu-wei*, literally 'non-action', but might be better understood as 'effortless action'. As Julia Ching puts it: "*It does not signify the absence of action, but rather, acting without artificiality, also without over-action, without attachment to action itself.*" (Ching 1993, 89) In short, this principle implies going with the natural flow of things, letting the individual enjoy and experience the ordinary aspects of life, without straining the body too much. Indeed, according to Laozi, the senses and passions need purification and moderation, because overindulgence in pleasures in evidently harmful to them. (Daodejing, Ch. 12)

The second great figure of Daoism is Zhuangzi, who celebrated reclusion from the greater communities, and withdrawal from unnecessary social pressures. He emphasized the inner power of the self which can liberate one from self-interested inclinations and prejudices. According to him, self-transcendence is only possible by embracing the Dao, the natural flow of things. For Daoism, the ideal is not the educated scholar who is an extensively learned and erudite person, but the sage who learns only one lesson: how to forget the unimportant things in life. The sage in Zhuangzi[2] is no longer affected by emotional turmoil or any sort of inner or outer uncertainty, for he trained himself to regard life and death with equal equanimity. In fact, the sage or the 'perfect man' lives in such perfect accordance with nature, that he cannot be conquered by death any longer; he acquires supernatural powers, and uses these powers to help others to overcome sickness and other

[2] The person and the book written by the person are both called *Zhuangzi*.

vicissitudes. The doctrine of the 'perfect men' gave rise to the immortality cult within Daoism, with its avid search for the elixir of life. This had become so influential by the time the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE), that the tomb of founder of the dynasty was found to be surrounded by specially designed 'mercury rivers' in order to keep the body of the deceased ruler intact.[3] (Ching 1993, 91)

Zhuangzi was not only the initiator of the immortality cult but also the one who laid down the foundations of Daoist meditation exercises. He taught that absolute bliss is only possible if one moves past the commonplace distinction of self and the universe, and in a mystico-aesthetic experience becomes one with the Dao. This experience supposedly endows one with a higher level of knowledge of the basic metaphysical unity of reality. Nevertheless, this special wisdom cannot be attained by discursive learning, but only by forgetting; forgetting all previous knowledge, and particularly, the knowledge of the self. Zhuangzi mentions *tso-wang* or 'sitting in oblivion' which is the exercise of purging the mind of its contents and to prepare it for the distinctive direct experience of 'emptiness' (*wu*). The practice of special breathing techniques and sitting meditation would bloom in religious Daoism, to which we will turn in the next section, along with the developments of Neo-Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism.

V.

Religious Daoism as a social movement grew out of philosophical Daoism, and became one of the three chief traditions that shaped the bodily conceptions of the peoples of East Asia. It is easy to see how and why Buddhism could find a new home in China due to its affinities to Daoist concepts and their shared concerns regarding human life. Buddhist and Daoist meditation and breathing exercises, the emphatic focus on witnessing of the metaphysical emptiness or nothingness of reality, which points beyond everyday aesthetic experience, along with the acknowledgement of the centrality of the body in attaining 'spiritual' goals, places them on the same platform. Despite all their similarities it is nonetheless also true, that no matter how much they had influenced and shaped one another during the long centuries of coexistence, and though both incorporated some of the doctrines of the other tradition, on one of the most essential points they could never agree; namely, whether human life is in itself satisfactory or not. For Buddhists, life is not and cannot ever be satisfactory: this is essentially to what the Buddha's teaching boils down. Life is suffering, and the purpose of attaining *nirvana* through strict physical training is to enable one to leave the *samsara*, that is, the endless circle of life and death, for good. Daoism, on the other hand, stresses the importance of striving to become immortal with the help of equally strict physical exercises. Daoists, like Confucians, believe that the person's mind is intrinsically tied to his/her body, and they regard this body in high esteem, holding that it was modeled after the universe (the body is conceived as a microcosm). The Chinese yoga or *qigong* applies acupuncture to clear the energy points or meridians of the body in order to keep its energy flow (*qi*) in balance. The ultimate goal of *qigong* and meditation is assisting one to gain a special vision of the life energy (this is called the 'visualization of the *qi*') and of the various benevolent gods that can visit one's body, sometimes with the use of transformative sexual experiences, so that one could produce a perfect, immortal body (by this 'inner alchemy'), and discover his 'true self' that reunites him/her with nature (Dao).

Neo-Confucianism, which was the official state ideology for a thousand years in China and for five hundred years in Korea up until the beginning of the 20th century, was a

[3] *„Chinese aristocrats made sure that their pysical bodies would be proteced from corruption, so that their 'souls' would remain with their bodies, and eventually attain immortality together."* (Ching 1993, 107)

reaction to the 'mysticism' and the allegedly 'superstitious' characters of both religious Daoism and Chinese Buddhism. As it vowed to compete with these two religions, it undertook the rationalization of its own tradition as well. As this process went along, interestingly, Neo-Confucianism came to syncretize and assimilate much of the teachings of its rivals. Thereby, it fused the doctrine of the 'Supreme Ultimate' (*tai ji*) with the concept of *xiu shen* (cultivation of the body or the self). Zhu Xi, who was one of the most prominent rationalist Neo-Confucian scholars, taught about the crucial importance of 'reflective examination' (*xing cha*) which may remind us both the Buddhist and the Daoist contemplative aesthetic experiences of meditation.

> *"For Zhu, one should keep examining the self in order to obtain the Principle of Nature and enter the sage-hood because to become a person with humanity (ren, that is, a high moral principle) requires the process of transforming the physical self by developing a heightened awareness of the self-body (feelings and intentions)."*
> *(Zhang 2002, 49)*

Gradually, other Daoist and Buddhist breathing techniques, meditative positions and body awareness practices also found their way to become part of the Neo-Confucian catalog. So much so, that they joined forces with the old Confucian idea of actualizing ethical behavior by externalizing morality via the ritual performances of the body. The body thus stepped forward as the focal point of moral, religious, metaphysical and epistemological inquiries; inquiries not akin to Buddhism, which had long held that the best way for understanding reality leads through the aesthetic experiences of the body. Since Buddhism was always conceived as an alien tradition within the borders of China, it had to face up to the challenges of living in a fundamentally different cultural milieu than of its origins. As Mahayana Buddhism became immensely popular and influential in China, its numerous sects and schools took on diverse forms of meditative practices, and most of them moved on to Korea and Japan, as well, where they changed their forms once again. I will mention just some examples here. For instance Chán – which is known as Zen in Japan – concentrates on the clear-sighted perception of everyday realities because it is believed that the Buddha-nature is omnipresent; one only has to realize this. The sitting meditation or *zazen* is the typical position in which a Zen Buddhist attempts to reach the experience of the non-duality of the self, in other words, the union of body and mind. As Dōgen, the founder of the Sōtō Zen school put it: "*The attainment of the Way is truly accomplished with the body*." (Dōgen 1971, 47) As a general rule, the Zen Buddhists refuse the primacy of canonical Buddhist texts. Instead their source of knowledge is the body itself. Another Mahayana school, The Pure Land highlights the significance of the visualization of the Amitābha Buddha (who is called Amida in Japan) and the Western Paradise where one is to be born after professing his faith in Amitābha. This aesthetic experience of visualization may seem already familiar to us because it is quite similar to the one performed in religious Daoism. Finally, just to mention a significant Tantric Buddhist school as well, Kūkai, the founder of Shingon Buddhism taught that the *mudras*, that is, the ritual gestures (such as the various symbolic gestures of the hand) are of prime importance in realizing the goal of meditation: our unity with the universe. "*From the endless cycle of samsāra how can we be freed? The only way is to practice meditation and correct thinking.*" (Kūkai 1972, 263)

VI.

The analysis of distinctive East Asian somatic practices could (and should) go on much longer but the limits of this paper do not allow us to proceed any further now. Some of the other representative fields to be investigated would involve the martial arts, the erotic arts, the diverse types of massage therapies, Japanese tea ceremonies and Noh drama, and so on, and so forth. As Richard Shusterman pointed out: "*open-minded*

Western thinking can learn from Asian philosophy and somatic techniques, while pragmatically developing such Asian insights well beyond their original context and use (…) Somaesthetics is a field that could expand philosophy beyond its conventional academic limits, while helping to nourish a rich and fruitful East-West dialogue." (Shusterman 2004, 38) As we have seen, there are plenty of areas to investigate and exploit from the Oriental traditions for the objectives of somaesthetics. Shusterman has already demonstrated, for instance, how well Chinese philosophical ideas can get along with the concepts of American pragmatism. (Shusterman, 2004) However, it is also worth noting that other Western philosophical approaches may also be able to contribute considerably to the understanding, mutual appreciation and to the increasing exchange of Asian, European and American ideas. One of these approaches could be, I believe, existential phenomenology which has an obvious affinity to and accord with both Buddhist[4] and Daoist[5] thought. In-depth examination of the philosophy of the Kyoto School, for example, would definitely yield a number of priceless insights of the interactions of East-West discourses, for the members of this school were both heavily influenced by German philosophy and Zen Buddhism. Therefore, I suggest that different Western approaches should work together hand in hand, in order to constitute a more complete, comprehensive, and more truthful picture of the East; that is, more truthful than those of the past which described Asia as a single, homogenous monolith, the land of the intuitive, mystical, and 'spiritual' Oriental wisdom.

[4] Sartre's epistemology shows striking similarities with Buddhist interpretations of the self. See for example *Derek Heyman*: Dual and non-dual ontology in Sartre and Mahayana Buddhism (1997), or *Phra Medidhammaporn (Prayoon Mererk)*: Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism (1995).

[5] The later Heidegger's work on Mindfulness and Enowning (The Event), and even his earlier musings on the concept of nothingness have connections to both Buddhism and Daoism. On Heidegger's Asian links see *Reinhard May*: Heidegger's Hidden Sources (1996).

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BODY PHENOMENOLOGY, SOMAESTHETICS AND NIETZSCHEAN THEMES IN MEDIEVAL ART[1]

Matthew Crippen
Egypt
crippenm@aucegypt.edu

Introduction

Richard Shusterman suggested that Maurice Merleau-Ponty neglected "'lived somaesthetic reflection,' that is, concrete but representational and reflective body consciousness."[2] While unsure about this assessment of Merleau-Ponty, lived somaesthetic reflection, or what the late Sam Mallin called "body phenomenology"[3]—understood as a meditation on the body reflecting on both itself and the world—is my starting point. Another is John Dewey's bodily theory of perception, augmented somewhat by Merleau-Ponty.

With these starting points, I spent roughly 20 hours with *St. Benedict Restores Life to a Young Monk* (c. 1360), a work of tempera and gold leaf on panel, by Giovanni Del Biondo, active in Italy from 1356 to 1398, on display in the Art Gallery of Ontario's permanent collection.[4] Following Dewey's suggestion that "[t]he eye ... is only the channel *through* which a total response takes place,"[5] meaning that motor, emotional, intellectual and non-visual perceptual capacities become active when we encounter paintings, I describe how the work engaged a range of bodily modalities; and how reflecting on these, in turn, supplied phenomenal articulations of life negating, preserving and enhancing forces important in the culture that produced it, and famously discussed by Friedrich Nietzsche. By virtue of the approach adopted, I also demonstrate Dewey's belief that intimate engagement with art entails a total coordination of one's capacities around the artwork, while simultaneously reinforcing Merleau-Ponty's ideas about perception and how we can find phenomenal articulations of concepts such as the Nietzschean ones just mentioned. While focusing on Del Biondo's painting, my main purpose is to engage in body phenomenology practices, and to show, in the words of Shusterman, how "[w]e might sharpen our appreciation of art through more attention to our somaesthetic feelings involved in perceiving art"[6] and indeed the world.

The Body and Intermodal Perception

"Cézanne," wrote Merleau-Ponty, "declared that a picture contains within itself even the smell of a landscape." A lesson Merleau-Ponty drew is that "a phenomenon" mobilizing only one sense "is a mere phantom."[7] Thus seeing a candle flame might mean seeing something hot, with a waxy smell and intimate emotional resonance. By contrast, to register an isolated yellow flicker disconnected from anything else is not to perceive, but to undergo something like the haloing effects and other phantom sensations that migraine sufferers sometimes endure. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey reiterated this when he urged that total interactions take place through the eye, ear and other organs. So while "[w]e see a painting *through* the eyes," it is mistaken to

[1] I would like to thank Alexander Kremer and Diego Nigro for their helpful suggestions.
[2] Richard Shusterman, *Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 63.
[3] Mallin identified what he came to call "body phenomenology" with his notion of the four perceptual regions—namely, sensory perception, cognition, motility and emotion, including social and visceral feelings—which are modes of being-in-the-world and expressions of our global existence. See Samuel B. Mallin, *Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 15-6.
[4] To view painting, visit http://artgalleryofontario.tumblr.com/post/7155105468/st-benedict-restores-life-to-a-young-monk-late.
[5] John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), 122.
[6] Richard Shusterman, "Wittgenstein and Bodily Feelings: Explanation and Melioration in Philosophy of Mind, Art, and Politics," in *The Grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy*, ed. Cressida Heyes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 212.
[7] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), 318

suppose that visual "qualities … are central if not exclusive."[8]

That perception entails a total coordination means that it occurs through modes other than but also including traditional categories of sense, for motor, intellectual and emotional capacities are also involved.[9] If we consider, for instance, what it means to taste something, we see more than taste buds at play. Smell is involved, as is texture, temperature and therefore tactile senses. But consider also the actions of mouth and tongue when sucking candies, chomping pears or licking ice cream. Notice how we cradle and swirl a snifter of brandy, and how these patterns of activity permeate the overall experience. Picture the undulation of lungs as we blow cooling breath on coffee. Ponder the sights and sounds of food. Food can set an emotional tone and supply a socially integrative medium. Dewey posited that without "interaction between the total organism and objects"—an interaction in which doings and undergoings synchronize around objects and thereby become members of a "single act"—"[objects] are not perceived."[10] And, indeed, we experience food through just such a joint mobilization of capacities. Here hands, eyes, tongue and other organs are "instruments through which the entire live creature, moved and active throughout, operates."[11]

Clearly a rich array of capacities enters taste experience. However, their power to sense does not simply point outward. One capacity works on another, changing its perspective on things, as when an empty stomach makes taste buds delight in plain fair. This further reinforces the notion that in addition to seeing a painting, we may to some extent hear, taste (without licking) or smell it. A second implication is that objects select and pattern our capacities and invite certain perspectives. Hot oatmeal invites blowing, but not dry breakfast cereal. While the tongue is capable of countless movements, it settles into a very particular pattern when it meets an ice cream cone. The body does not sweep over a passive world, but over one that asserts itself.

Initial Experience of Painting

I initially found the painting's pallor sickly. The earth tones hint at melanoma or jaundice. The building to the right is the bruised purple of over-prodded blemishes or the puffy fatigue that shadows eyes. The work appears as if painted on chalk-fine sand that might be swept away by wind.

The piece is old. Faint splotches—perhaps watermarks—smudge its surface; its gild is slightly flecked; its colors dulled. How much of this is age, it is difficult to say, but the aged appearance lends to the overall effect. The painting looks worn, and I feel worn looking at it. The land is barren, or nearly so. One monk's head twists at an angle evoking a hanging. Another lies crushed under brickwork. Benedict clutches his side, marked by the stab-wound of Jesus. The body language of these monks reflects obsequiousness: mouths closed, chests drawn inward, shoulders slumped, three kneeling. The monks cast no shadow; their robes hide their feet, excepting the corpse. Staring at the hems of the standing men, I see no evidence that they are actually on the ground, and the men, especially Benedict, appear to hover like apparitions. They are emotionally detached considering that Benedict has just restored life to the young monk. I wonder why he bothered since there is little to hold one to the barren world of this painting. Indeed, the monks already appear physically detached from the earth, ghost-like, floating up, departing. This work is Christian.

[8] Dewey, 122.
[9] *Ibid*., 22, 53.
[10] *Ibid*., 54; also see 58-59.
[11] *Ibid*., 50.

Counter Reaction

With more time, I arrived at a different reaction to the work. I came to notice, for example, how Benedict's inlayed halo gleams, while the ruined building and collapsed brickwork radiate fleshy salmon pink; and how the lips of the monks shine the same salmon hue, and, to a lesser extent, their cheeks. Once noticed, Benedict's lips stand out as a focal point, which seems appropriate since "Benedict" is Latin for "good speech" or "good word." When my gaze falls on his lips, his face softens, becoming human.

The work is still old—nothing can change that—but its age speaks of strength and substantiality. Indeed, at one point I am genuinely astonished that some of these monks have been planted on their knees for over 600 years. "How could anyone have such endurance?" I ask myself before remembering I am looking at a painting. The monks are alive to me, and I feel a hint of exhilaration and swirling in my belly. The figures are not the emaciated, mutilated horrors common to Christian art. Yes, they seem somber, maybe sad and tired, but also calm, peaceful and so very real. My eyes bob along their faces set at various heights. In some places they waver, then eddy counter-clockwise, held circling around clustered points of interest. My body eases into a rocking, swaying, almost figure-eight of pivoting from the hips, which seems to both follow out of and facilitate the counter-clockwise lilt of my head. The relaxed but constant rocking is in rhythm with the folds of earth that roll like easy ocean swells and resemble patterns of diffused sunlight speckling river beds or shallow ocean floors. A shimmering, vibrating quality ripples at a higher frequency through the men's robes. Rhythms of life animate the composition. It is dominated by earth with only a tiny and easily missed triangle of gold leaf sky. This work is Christian?

Preconceptions and the Painting's Response

To Del Biondo's painting, I carried notions of "life" and "health" largely acquired from Nietzsche. I also carried Nietzsche's feeling that Christianity has "*ressentiment* against life at the bottom of its heart."[12] Not surprisingly, therefore, I first saw the painting as an expression of frailty and impotence. However, as with foods and other things, which invite and resist certain responses, the painting did not yield passively to my perspective, allowing me to superimpose whatever I like. As terrain presses its contours against the press of my body, the painting pressed the weak points in the theoretical perspectives I pressed on it, leading to the second reaction.

At the same time, the two preliminary sketches of the painting, insofar as they are descriptions, are not competing hypotheses. Accepting one does not entail rejecting the other. That the monk is buried under the bricks does not refute the salmon pink hue of the ruined building. There is, however, something theoretical in how qualities are selected and ordered along conceptual lines of health and unhealth, vibrancy and weakness, endurance and fragility. But while the phenomena might have been organized otherwise, the tension itself is a phenomenal quality of the painting. That is to assert: The organization—which results partly from my preconceptions about Christianity—does not manufacture tension but helps to make it evident in a way analogous to how the hand, by virtue of having its own structural organization, reveals aspects of bottles and other things it handles. The first sketch terminates unequivocally: "This work is Christian." The second with ambivalence: "This work is Christian?" The initial reaction is a product of a preconception carried into the encounter: Christianity is hostile to life. But the painting converts the idea to a question.

[12] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguine Books, 1976), 562.

Life from Destruction

An easily overlooked feature is the mound of destruction in the painting's top left corner. The fleshy pink bricks are more organic than jagged, like fat globules or sacks of grain. The pile is shaped like a breast, having even a nipple-like protrusion on top. There is a common thread in these impressions. Breast milk nourishes, and in the Bible symbolizes peace and abundance;[13] the breast itself is associated with fertility and procreation. Fish and grain are staples, both in the context of the Bible and the world; as with milk, grain can symbolize abundance. Fat is a nutritional reservoir—again a sign of abundance, and also of fertility, as in some ancient Venuses. In the Bible oil is an important part of the diet; it is also used to treat wounds, in bathing, ritualistic anointings, the making of perfumes and as lamp fuel.[14]

The destruction fits peripherally into the painting's visual and temporal (narrative) scheme. It is distanced and away from areas of major interest, with dead monk smaller and less detailed. The scene is also distanced in a temporal sense. In the foreground the monk is restored to life, so relative to this, the death and destruction are past events. However, the destruction is not of merely peripheral importance. By the accounts of St. Gregory the Great, the Devil caused the building to collapse, and we see him presiding over the destruction, silhouetted against the gold patch of sky, indeed, the only sky present, suggesting again that the painting is not merely an otherworldly expression. Benedict's antagonist and the event that brings the story to life are therefore in this painting. Without this fleshy mound of destruction, with its undertones of fertility and nourishment, there would be no restoration; hence no miracle and story.

Christianity and Preservation

The Bible views "flesh" with some suspicion, and the body—particularly sexuality—is often seen as unclean. This extends even to birth: Women are unclean seven days after bearing a son and fourteen for a daughter.[15] In more extreme cases, flesh is subjected to real and symbolic violence. Jesus hangs broken upon the cross. Self-flagellation, self-denial and severe asceticism, while not necessarily promoted, enjoy special significance in the art and literature of the religion. Monks are celebrated for depriving themselves of adequate nourishment, bedding, sometimes clothing, basic hygiene and shelter.

All this of course seems antithetical to life, yet when life is falling to pieces, the rigid structure demanded by asceticism may be just the thing to hold it together, to guide it from self-destructive courses. Nietzsche entertained Christianity in this light:

> You will guess what … the curative instinct of life has at least *attempted* through the ascetic priest, and why it required for a time the tyranny of such paradoxical and paralogical concepts as "guilt," "sin," "sinfulness," "depravity," "damnation": to render the sick to a certain degree *harmless*… to *exploit* the bad instincts of all suffers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self over-coming.[16]

Considering the rise of Christianity, especially in the Middle Ages, and how during this time European life was under siege and much of its cultural heritage lost, we can see how the preserving force of Christianity was important to life, indeed, in very concrete senses. After all, it is through Christian scholars and scribes that many great works are preserved to this day. Nietzsche wrote that "[m]an has often had enough; there are actual epidemics of having had enough (as around 1348, at the

[13] John McKenzie, *The Dictionary of the Bible* (New York: Macmillan), 576.
[14] *Ibid*., 625.
[15] Leviticus, 12: 2-5
[16] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1967), 564.

time of the dance of death)."[17] Christianity arguably helped people survive such trials. Yet Nietzsche compared endless preservation, which Christianity stresses with its emphasis on eternality, to embalmment and mummification,[18] and Marin Heidegger, summarizing Nietzsche, wrote that "life that restricts itself to mere preservation is already life in decline."[19] In what remains, I will endeavor to articulate how the painting resolves these competing life affirming and negating themes.

Dry and Wet

Sandy earth predominates the painting. Its tones enter even the flesh of the monks, which is almost the same hue as the earth itself. The vegetation is sparse—lonely scattered scraps, with a slightly denser cluster near the top, and the leaves on these plants are the narrow, fibrous, pale sage-green of arid climates.

"Barren parched earth" is a phrase that keeps tumbling to mind, yet I sense something wrong in this. After all, the painting is also soft, slightly murky. The ripples and folds of the earth appear through variations of color and tone, not hard line. The plants and trees, likewise, look more like brush strokes than outlines filled with paint. Line contributes to certain forms, to be sure, and to rendering delicate details. The hems and folds of the robes are accentuated by line, as are the hands and ears of the monks, building edges, certain facial details and so on. Yet the lines that contribute to these forms and details are soft and diffused, as if painted on a wet surface.

Though these impressions are primarily visual, they are reinforced by other modalities, for there was a moment when I experienced a slight whiff of ocean. The tongue corroborated this with a salty aftertaste of seawater. These were not full-blown sensations, but rather like an echo or afterimage. Yet these impressions are important. They draw attention to repeating patterns within the painting, and they help reconcile antagonisms. With the fish-like bricks and water splotches, the rolling and eddying composition, the ripples of earth resembling light on riverbeds, the blurred lines and liquid shimmerings of the robes and other qualities, the painting positively flows with water. The earth itself cascades like falling water. The terrain recalls sculpted sands on ocean floors. The light is soft and diffused as if carried through water—the men, plants and buildings cast no shadows. The monks, it was said earlier, float like apparitions, but why not like men in water? Indeed, the plants and robes express the sway of gentle ocean currents, as does the rhythmic bob of my body when engaging the painting.

This opens a path of mediation between the painting's thirsty, barren tones and its wet and fleshy alter ego. Thirst in wetness: As there is sand in the painting and thirst in deserts, there is sand on beaches and thirst in the sea. Drinking the ocean's wetness leaves us parched. From fertility to sterility: Irrigating land promotes seed germination and abundant harvests. Yet irrigation also produces "salt lands"—a term often synonymous with "desert" in the Bible—and a means by which ancient Mesopotamian agriculture was destroyed.[20] The ocean—like life itself—can at one moment be calm, peaceful, nurturing and restorative, while at another powerfully destructive, at least from a human perspective. Saltwater reflects how sterility and abundance, thirst and wetness, destruction and procreation are sides of one reality.

[17] *Ibid*., 557.
[18] See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguine Books, 1976), 479-480.
[19] Martin Heidegger, *The Word of Nietzsche*, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 73.
[20] Ronald Wright, *A Short History of Progress* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2004), 77-78.

Final Remarks and Reevaluation

Recall, in the preliminary passages, that sense of awe at the monks kneeling for over 600 years. This reaction implies strength and endurance, and accordingly seems at odds with both Nietzsche and basic facts at hand. Monastic asceticism, at least in its more severe forms, hardly benefits health. Self-impoverishment is what famously ruined St. Francis of Assisi. Asceticism speaks of weakness, decline and hostility to life—or so I had supposed. The painting forced a re-examination of my own assumptions, including my interpretations of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche does consider asceticism in a negative light—a "grimace of overrefinement," "a grotesque perversion";[21] extreme measures such as the mortification of the flesh are a radical cure taken by those too weak to master their impulses.[22] At the same time, Nietzsche believes that one of the highest degrees of power consists in self-mastery. For such reasons, he regards the ascetic as a powerful, strong kind of individual.[23] Yes, the ascetic suppresses and does injury to the body, and the ascetic ideal, according to Nietzsche, is soiled sick with degenerating life. Yet the ideal also "*springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life* which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for existence."[24] By shepherding order into life that has fallen into disarray, "this ascetic priest, this apparent enemy of life, this *denier*—precisely he is among the greatest *conserving* and yes-creating forces of life."[25]

Birth and destruction and life's overcomings are in the painting. They are in a certain sense even essential, at least to the story inspiring the painting. Yet they are not the main focus. The fleshy mound of destruction, with all its procreative coloring, is pushed to the background. The foreground is a relatively barren world occupied only by men—men who have effectively rendered themselves reproductively sterile by renouncing that part of their being. A miraculous restoration is also a subject of the work, so preservation, the restorative movement that allows life to continue, keeps emerging as an issue. The painting is a plurality, but it remains emphatically a Christian work reflecting on an issue central to the religion—namely, preservation.

[21] Walter Kauffman, citing from Nietzsche's *Dawn*, (§113), *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974) 195, 197.
[22] *Ibid*., 245.
[23] *Ibid*., 252.
[24] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1967), 556.
[25] *Ibid*., 556-557.

ARTIST AS TREE: THE ROOT OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ARTIST
IN HEIDEGGER'S *ORIGIN* VIA PAUL KLEE

Hayley Addis
United Kingdom
h.addis@live.co.uk

In Heidegger's essay "The Question Concerning Technology"[1] he writes about how his (and our) society has fallen into the trap of *enframing*,(Gestell) i.e. viewing everything as merely a resource and thus losing the ability to see beings as they are and the appropriate way of interacting with them. Art, he states will be our salvation because it allows us to see the beings of the world in different ways, thus encouraging a return to right-relationship, through an action he terms *disclosure* (Erschlossenheit). In "The Origin of the Work of Art"[2] he develops a phenomenological description of what Art is, but specifically focuses on the artwork as his doorway to Art claiming that;

> "It is precisely in great art – and only such art is under consideration here – that the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge."[3]

In this paper I take the position that his basic conclusions, that *Art* is the *disclosure* of *Truth* (in the technical, non-propositional sense elucidated by Heidegger[4]) and thus capable of combatting the excessive *enframing* of our culture, are correct. On the other hand, his artist-as-passageway premise illustrates a fundamental lack of understanding of Art because, I argue, the ability to encounter artworks as art comes from the nature of *BeingThere*[5] (*Dasein*) - i.e. humans - as art-creators, which is rooted in our particular bodily nature. To dismiss the artist as merely a passageway from the outset is to ignore the key to understanding what Art, as an action, is; *BeingThere* as audience can encounter artworks as Art because *BeingThere* is fundamentally Art-istic. In order to balance Heidegger's position I bring Paul Klee, an artist who wrote on the experience and nature of creation, into the discussion. Through Klee's descriptions of creating it becomes clear that the activity of the artist is both primary and primarily bodily, thus giving lie to the myth that the artist is inconsequential - a position that even Heidegger reluctantly admits and yet avoids recognition of its primacy, when he finds himself forced to discuss the fact that artworks are created beings, and thus the role of the creator is somehow important and a reflection of the disclosure that occurs for the audience. Heidegger begins;

> "The origin of the art work is art. But what is art? Art is real in the art work. Hence we first seek the reality of the work."[6]

There are plenty of definitions of art which use various criteria to identify objects as artworks, for example defining them as created objects of aesthetic experience, or viewing only items accepted by 'the art world' as artworks. Instead of beginning with a search for criteria, Heidegger delves phenomenologically into the function of artworks in relation to *BeingThere*in order to illuminate what art does in our lives. Heidegger argues that artworks, when viewed as capable of

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[1] Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", *Basic Writings*, Ed. D. Krell, (Routledge, 1993)

[2] Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Trans. Albert Hofstadter, (Harper & Row Publishers, 1975)

[3] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art",*Poetry, Language, Thought*, p40

[4] Please see the collection of Heidegger's works called *Basic Writings* for discussions of the technical usage of Truth in Heidegger's philosophical works. In summary, this is not propositional truth but is rather an 'unconcealment' of 'that which is' *and* 'how that which is is'.

[5] Whilst it is common practice to not translate the term Dasein, I find myself agreeing with the comments made by D. Walford in his seminar series in Lampeter (2006-2008) on Heidegger's *Being and Time* describing this as encouraging the English reader to think of Dasein as a noun rather than a state or activity. Using the literal translation of 'BeingThere' is also intended to highlight the nature of the kind of beings we, as humans, are - i.e., already and always *There*. Please refer to *Being and Time* for more detail on this topic.

[6] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p39

speaking to us rather than passed over through familiarity or ignored, present something to us. In doing this they show us beings and relationships which illuminates better how we can approach those beings as valuable in themselves (for example: Van Gogh's shoe paintings, reveal the relationship between the shoes depicted, the earth and the work done in them through the wear depicted on the soles). Artworks, in their disclosure of this, disclose the Being of beings i.e. *Truth* – their nature and the fact of their existence independent of ourselves. This action of artworks is, he claims, their essence and therefore Art, as the essence of artworks, is disclosure. This is the position I will be working from in this paper, rather than debating the merits of Heidegger's suggestion that art is somehow essentially disclosure, I am allowing this to be a foundation on which to build further. It is always possible, for example, that some beings created to be artworks will fail to disclose anything, but here I would make the case that the potential to disclose *Truth* is enough for a created being to be an artwork as the artist is striving for disclosure and this process is what gives the work the essence of Art, although Heidegger did not present this possibility.[7] This disclosure, however, is not necessarily through portrayal or representation of something;

> "A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the whole precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple."[8]

According to Heidegger, Art is also the origin of artists, so the essence of artists must *also* be disclosure. As the artist is one who 'creates' artworks the title 'artist' refers to an action, thus describing the one who creates artworks as 'one who discloses' and specifically 'one who discloses Being'. Therefore the action of creating an artwork is an action of disclosure. However, since any action can fail and one cannot know the outcome in advance, any activity is an attempt at something, and therefore the activity of the artist, in this instance, must be an *attempt* at disclosure, with the potential to illuminate something for the audience, whoever that audience is to be (perhaps even only the artist themselves). The techniques utilised may be different depending on who the intended audience is, writing may be edited differently for a private audience than for a public reading, or for personal reflection.[9] Whatever is potentially to be disclosed the artist wishes to provoke or invoke a response in the audience and this response is a presenting of relationship between beings to the audience. In collaborative works the individual artists could each even intend something different, but there is still the potential for disclosure.

[7] Does what is disclosed have to be the same for every audience member, or the same as what the artist intended? Given that I have already posited that a collaborative piece could have multiple intentions behind it, it is impossible to claim now that the audience must experience the disclosure that the artist intends, so we are left with artworks as the beings created through the bringing together of *world* and *earth* with the intention to disclose something, regardless of what. This disclosure is never an accidental thing, in art, however, as every artwork is presented with the intention that it will be experienced by someone in such a way that it shows them something, inspires, delights, horrifies, illuminates, invokes, provokes or otherwise reveals something to the audience. Klee's work, as with the work of many artists, is titled to clarify the content that the viewer is supposed to find, showing that the artists indeed intend some form of disclosure.

[8] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p41

[9] The occasion of taking something written for personal consumption and presenting it for public viewing is also a point at which the intention of re-presentation and therefore a re-framing for disclosure can occur; whilst the private piece could lack intention to disclose anything, the act of framing it as artwork changes this. I would, however, assert that even the act of writing for oneself only is generally an attempt to disclose something to oneself. This is perhaps a tautology, however, as the act of disclosure happens prior to and during the act of creating the artwork and is not necessarily an event that occurs after the fact.

This disclosure can also occur through both the direct representation of beings and the non-representational artforms, albeit apparently in slightly different ways.[10] In both cases, I would argue, the artist has already had the disclosure, or possibility of the disclosure, disclosed to them. The artist becomes aware of the relationship between the tower and the wind, the material and the form, the shoe and the path it treads and the pigment that depicts it, otherwise the depiction and creation could not occur. This prior disclosure may well be on an non-conscious level, given unthematically through the artist's experience of the *world* – defined by Heidegger as the network of relationships in which we dwell – and the *earth*.

> "The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground."[11]

Earth, roughly, is the raw material of life which ceases to be itself when we try to dissect or explain it, such as colour or marble, 'colour shines and wants only to shine'[12] when we try to define it we can only describe wavelengths, which aren't the colour, or feelings, and so on. It *is* and we experience it as such but we cannot really explain it. Where *world* can be understood through language, *earth* is understood through experience. The dancer can discuss his theories, themes, emotions and intentions, and we understand, but he cannot explain the moving in a way that we can grasp it without having experienced moving, or what it is to be in a body, for ourselves. Artworks are formed of *earth*, they are grounded in it, 'set into it' and they present the *earth* as what it is and this is what Heidegger says allows for the disclosure. The body is present as the body *dancing* in dance, the painting both shows us its content and is present as paint on canvas. When we forget that these are all present and are transported into the content alone, we are transported through the use of the material and it is the material itself behaving in a way natural to it to present itself as other than what it is (such as marble carved to appear ethereal) that allows this transportation.

In the artwork, *earth* and *world* are brought together and the tension between them is what allows the audience to experience disclosure; the impenetrable *earth* holds the ever-unfolding *world* in place to be experienced. This is what the artist does through working the material in the artwork, but before that in herself. However, this still does not bring us closer to the experience of the artist, so we turn to the writings of Paul Klee.

Klee describes the painter as one who "surveys with penetrating eye the finished forms which nature places before him"[13] which can perhaps be shortened to 'one who sees' and this description can translate into other artforms, the musician begins as 'one who hears' and the dancer as 'one who is moved' perhaps?[14] In Klee's writings he describes his process as beginning with lines and building into forms, only eventually becoming something he recognises and then refines into content and finally names. This pattern of working from form to content would appear to contradict the idea that the artist experiences the disclosure prior to creating artworks, and as he says, "any image of complex structure can, with some effort of imagination, be

[10] Representational art discloses through shining a light directly onto the being represented and its relationship to the world. Non-representational art discloses through its relationship to the world, partly through contrast and partly through its own existence as materials formed by an artist into something new.
[11] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Basic Writings*, p168
[12] Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", *Basic Writings*, p172
[13] Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, Trans. P. Findlay (Faber and Faber ltd., 1946) p45
[14] I shall continue to use the visual term 'see' and those that relate to it as a stand in for all the senses because this is the perspective Klee, as painter, utilises, but it is intended as a metaphorical 'see', rather than literally.

compared with familiar pictures from nature."[15] This could also imply that he hasn't really *seen* anything to start with but is merely playing until something emerges. This is not the case, however. Firstly, in order to see the content which emerges, the artist must have *seen* beings already, must be able to recognise them in the patterns and must be able to understand, even instinctively, the relationship between the beings recognised in order to recognise *Truth* and to refine the lines into an image. However, Klee claims;

> "Art does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible."[16]

This reinforces the idea that art is about revelation, about bringing to the awareness of the viewer that which *is*. In the process of making artworks, the artist undergoes the mirror image of the experience that the audience has in viewing them. The line moving into forms and then into content is the disclosure of that content to the artist, the recognition that occurs in the artist is disclosure, and so on. But where does this come from? What allows an artist to set the *world* into the *earth*? What allows the artist to recognise the message in the artwork, or to choose the direction to begin with? What gives the artist the techniques to express their intention in an artwork? *Experience*.

First, the artist *sees*; through their experiences of the world the artist gathers together ideas, understandings, images, sounds, becoming a channel through which those experiences are transformed and poured into the artwork. Truth is disclosed to the artist and then again through the artist:

> "The creation of a work of art – the growth of the crown of the tree – must of necessity, as a result of entering into the specific dimensions of pictorial art, be accompanied by distortion of the natural form. For, therein is nature reborn."[17]

What art thus makes visible is *Nature*,[18] the nature of the world and thus our own nature, as seen by the artist and as channelled through her hands, mind and experience. Artworks, then, are *Nature* reborn through the artist. The artist experiences nature and, acting as nature does, brings together the past experiences with the present materials and relationships. *Nature*, here, is both that which is and how it is experienced by *BeingThere* and the nature of that which is, specifically in terms of the independently directed parts of the world in contrast with the aspects which *BeingThere* makes and controls. In plain language it is the organic world which is self-created and self-directed as opposed to tools and equipment, cities and relationships. As part of the organic world *BeingThere* contains the impulses of *Nature*, taking part in the nature of nature as the grand, self-creating, ever-evolving womb of all.[19]Klee describes how, as part of *Nature*, the artist *looks* at the world and how this leads to the act of creation:

> "The deeper he looks, the more readily he can extend his view from the present to the past, the more deeply he is impressed by the one essential image of creation itself, as Genesis, rather than by the image of nature, the finished product."[20]

The artist, in making visible *Nature*, is both creating an image which makes this visible, and is making visible through the process itself. The perpetual creation of the world by *Nature* is a given, it is not an act of one time, but a process: "Genesis eternal!"[21] Art, then, is born from the eternal Genesis of *Nature*, of the artist's daily living which springs from connecting with the source of creation and which reflects on the artist's experiences of the world. Art is the child of the *artistas part of Nature*. Klee's position allows for all of humanity to manifest

[15] Klee, *On Modern Art*, p31
[16] Paul Klee, *The Inward Vision*, (London; Thames and Hudson, 1958) p5
[17] Klee, *On Modern Art*, p19

[18] 'Nature' here is capitalised and italicised to indicate a technical usage of the largest sense of the word, which would not be out of place described both as 'Mother Nature' and as 'Human Nature'/'Non-human nature'.
[19] Klee, *On Modern Art*, pp 51
[20] Klee, *On Modern Art*, p45
[21] Klee, *On Modern Art*, p45

through the mode of artist – through expressing one's experience of *Nature* in a creative way, as occurs at least in moments throughout human life lived with a degree of freedom, one is transforming nature-experienced into nature-expressed through the creative impulse inherent in all *Nature*. In the broadest sense all human beings are therefore artists and this broadest sense is the foundation of the possibility of the more specific senses of 'artist'. In the same way Klee delineates between artist and non-artist very simply:

> "In the womb of nature... the source of creation, where the secret key to all lies guarded. But not all can enter. Each should follow where the pulse of his own heart leads."[22]

The artist is the one who is drawn to act as *Nature* by 'the pulse of his own heart'. Her rhythms are what lead her to looking at the genesis that is nature and mirroring it. *Nature*, as that which is being how it is, is earth expressed through the world when they are both, ultimately one and the same, i.e. materiality in motion through relationship. As such the urge to create comes from bodily compulsion and the artworks are then shaped by the artist's body; dance, music, words, painting, the rhythm of speech, processing, expression, growth - these are all rhythms within the artist, all coming from the movement and rhythm of the body; the hand's motion, the patterns of speech, the limitations of mortality. As embodied, earthly, beings, and only as such, artists are capable of shaping *earth* to allow *world* to be made visible. As part of *Nature* they share in the creative powers of *Nature*, and due to their experiences are inclined and able to mimic these powers in the particular way that leads to disclosure of what is. Artists look through the now into the genesis of nature, and no doubt other *BeingThere* do too, but only artists feel the urge to replicate this action in such a way that allows others to *see* (or hear, or otherwise experience) what they have *seen*.

[22] Klee, *On Modern Art*, p51

The experience of the audience after an encounter with the artwork has an interesting parallel to the process of the artist as one who sees. John Berger describes it thus:

> "After we have responded to a work of art, we leave it, carrying away in our consciousness something which we didn't have before… What we take away with us – on the most profound level – is the memory of the artist's way of looking at the world. The representation of a recognizable incident… offers us the chance of relating the artist's way of looking to our own…"[23]

This psychological way of describing the process by which an artwork affects an individual transforms the artist from 'one who sees' into one who sees in a particular way, contrasting with the way of the audience. The artist *sees* and then *makes visible* to the audience their way of seeing the world. This new perspective discloses the perspective of the audience to their self, making visible the essence of the world which they inhabit and shifting their relationship to it by providing another viewpoint. As Berger goes on to elucidate, this process has meaning for us because it discloses these relationships which embody a code of 'morality', i.e., how one *should* behave towards other beings in the world;

> "why should an artist's way of looking at the world have any meaning for us? … Because, I believe, it increases our awareness of our own potentiality… a way of looking at the world which implies a certain relationship with the world, and every relationship implies action."[24]

A relationship is a connection between beings manifested through their actions towards one another. Understanding the relationship accurately reveals the mode of being which is appropriate for the individual conscious of this. The artist sees the beings and their relationships and makes them visible to the audience. The artist in the audience then takes that vision and

[23] John Berger, "Introduction", *Permanent Red,* (Butler &Tanner Ltd. Frome and London, 1960) p16
[24] Berger, "Introduction", p16

retells it from their own view whilst the audience who is not-artist applies their understanding of that vision to the world around them and, ideally, to their actions. The experiences of life that the artist draws on unintentionally could be said to be those that have been processed and absorbed into the artist's underlying understanding of the world and as a result of their particular state of being, i.e. mortality. Arguably, then, the Artist can create artworks that disclose *Truth* (what is, that it is and how it is – i.e. world and earth) because they first experience that disclosure of *Truth* themselves. This experience is available to all *BeingThere* and is primary and fundamental for the experience of the audience to occur because, if *BeingThere* was not capable of experiencing *disclosure* in the world they could not experience it in the parts of the world called artworks.

The primacy of the body is a strong current throughout Klee's writings; the channelling of the artwork through the movement of the artist's hands, the transformation of nature 'reborn' from the artist, and the notion of rhythm all speak to this. Speaking of the act of creation, Klee states that: "Genesis as formal movement is the essence of the work of art."[25]This refers to the movement of the point to the line to the plane, which occurs in painting, and which happens through the movement of the artist's body. He also explains how, for an artist:

> "All ways meet in the eye and there, turned into form, lead to a synthesis of outward sight and inward vision."[26]

The experience of *Nature* is through the body and from that sensual input experience is internalised andthrough the motion of the body form flows which becomes something with content - art, *Nature* as creator reborn. Creation is not about form but formation, which occurs bodily. Even in digital art the movement of the body is present, and the rhythm of lived experience shines through all artworks. The experience of the audience is similarly *earthly*. The disclosure of *Truth* for both the artist and the audience thus occurs because we are somatic, bodily.

The essential aspect of Klee's creative process is not concentrated on form but *becoming* based in the movement of the body. An image is built through movements which cause forms to occur. These forms intersect with content to disclose an image containing meaning but without movement those forms could not exist and so Klee's philosophy of art revolves around temporality as becoming.

Despite all his philosophical explorations of the essence of art, Klee was an artist first and foremost and his position on the nature of creativity was clear:

> "The power of creativity cannot be named. It remains mysterious to the end. But what does not shake us to our foundations is no mystery. We ourselves, down to the smallest part of us, are charged with this power. We cannot state its essence but we can, in certain measure, move towards its source. In any case we must reveal this power in its functions just as it is revealed to us. Probably it is only a form of matter, but one that cannot be perceived by the same senses as the familiar kinds of matter."[27]

For Klee creativity, the artist's process, is inherent in every human being as creatures of nature. The artist expresses this creativity in specific ways and, through the creation of artworks, moves towards the source of creativity itself. As one who expresses nature through the process of *nature*, the artist discloses both the process and the *world* which underlies human nature itself. She differs only from the audience in the action of creation which is the act of disclosure, and the rhythm of the body and its ability to shape *earth* in relationship

[25] Paul Klee, *Notebooks, Volume 1; The Thinking Eye*, Trans R. Manhein, (Lund Humphries Publishers Ltd, 2 Oct 1992) p17
[26] Klee, *Notebooks, Volume 1,* p67
[27] Klee, *Notebooks, Volume 1*, p17

with *world* means that whilst all people can create artworks, many people in the kind of culture Heidegger and Klee lived within do not. This is perhaps because we are arguably, as a society, divorced from our own bodies,[28] and thus divided from the pulse of our heart which calls us to respond to the world rhythmically combining our experience and relationships (*world*) with materials (*earth*) in a way that makes visible the particular relationship we are in with the world, and that other beings are in with each other. Or perhaps, rather, the pulse of our heart calls us to express the rhythms of nature inherent within us in a different manner, leading to scientists exploring, doctors healing, teachers lecturing and parents raising.

> "In the work of art, paths are laid out for the beholder's eye, which gropes like a grazing beast... The pictorial work springs from the movement, it is itself fixated movement, and it is grasped in movement."[29]

Ultimately the experience of the artist arises from the bodily compulsion and limitations of our mortality, our temporality. As human, rhythm is in the beat of our heart and the motion of expression, guided by the things we have experienced and processed through the body. Then, driven by a primal urge, we artists pour it upon the page or stage, setting it free, this experience transformed through us, to disclose what we have seen to the world. Like a tree draws on what is around it, transforming it into fruit, so too the artist transforms the world as seen in her particular way and offers it to the audience with the hope that they, too, will see something that changes their world.

When Heidegger, then, describes the artist as merely a passageway he is glossing over the connection which he could not avoid himself;

> "If there is anything that distinguishes the work as work, it is that the work has been created. Since the work is created, and creation requires a medium out of which an in which it creates, the thingly element, too, enters into the work."[30]

Despite this he still ignores the key to understanding the action of art; the primacy of artistic experience and potential for experiencing disclosure is that which allows the artwork to be made and that allows the audience to experience as an artwork. If we were not all inherently artists, *ones who see*, embodied, somatic beings, there could be no audience to experience the artworks and, indeed no artworks at all, created by those *BeingThere* that lay their hands on the earth to marry it to the world and disclose *Truth*.

[28] Here I am primarily thinking about the commodification of the body, the legacy of Cartesian dualism and the impact of Christianity's divorce of the world of the flesh from the world of spirit – and its parallel emphasis on the primacy of the spirit – to name a few examples of the foundation of this denial of the body.

[29] Klee, *Notebooks, Volume 1,*p78

[30] Heidegger, Origin, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p56

TACIT TACT

– THE HIERARCHY, UNAVOIDABILITY, AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF SENSUAL METAPHORS BY GADAMER

Júlia Tóth Czifra
Hungary
toth.czifra.julia@gmail.com

One of the most exciting aspects of both hermeneutics and so-called "non-hermeneutic" trends is that they cannot and do not want to avoid demonstrating their approaches with metaphors borrowed from the fundamental aspects of sensation.The considerable differences in the hierarchy of the organs of sense-perception (especially hearing and touching), however, are not negligible.

If one considers soma-aesthetics as the extensive art of correspondences between bodily experiences and thought (Shusterman 2003, 478–485), one not only can regard Gadamer's hermeneutics from a critical point of view, but also make effective assignations by following Gadamer's own train of thought, without confuting *Truth and Method*. Soma-aesthetics could do it, paradoxically, with a criticism which does not bring Gadamer to book for his relationship to sensual perception or to the role the body plays in aesthetic experience, but which interrogates his use of language. Thus, soma-aesthetics could avoid listing the (aforementioned) shortcomings – (which are consistent within the textual context of *Truth and Method*, since they are irrelevant from a hermeneutical point of view) and instead could raise questionsthat yield highly constructive readings of the text.

In this case, analytic soma-aesthetics should concentrate not so much on the *aesthetic potential of the body* (Shusterman 2003, 469), but rather on the bodily potential of language, which is at least as complex a question as the former regarding body-centered thinking.

It is of crucial importance to keep in mind that all the senses Gadamer brings into his argumentation are metaphorical – as opposed to many non-hermeneutical approaches. Thus, from the viewpoint of *body consciousness, awareness, mindfulness* (see Shusterman 2008), it would be hard to interrogate the text, but we can ask questions regarding the consciousness, awareness and mindfulness of its sensual metaphors, regarding how the metaphors of sight, hearing and touch included in its language help him construct or further his argumentation, as well as how they undermine it.

While investigating Gadamer's metaphors, I also make use of the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics, since the main concern of this line of research is figurative language and the ways in which embodiment underlies it.According to the cognitivist tradition (see the 'cognitive turn', initiated mainly by the work of Lakoff and Johnson), a certain set of cognitive mechanisms, such as metaphor and metonym, inevitably underlie our thinking and understanding. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), it is hardly possible to speak about the non-concrete aspects of our lives without figurative language.Over the years, several approaches to the use of figurative language and its functions in different discourseshave emerged. Metaphorization became a main part of interest, especially highly schematic, general level metaphors thatare deeply entrenched in our thinking and conceptual system and therefore give rise to a large number of specific-level metaphors, metaphors that are highly "influenced by specific subdomains of [sensual] experience" (Traugott 2009, 156, 169) because of the essentiality and the, let's say, relative universalityof these experiences.[1] Regarding the senses and sensual metaphors, cognitive linguists

[1] „Within the theory of conceptual metaphor, the claim has been put forward that metaphors and metonymies are grounded in bodily experience, hence the term embodiment (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987). Since the basic idea behind conceptual metaphor theory is that abstract terms are understood by using more concrete concepts, the body as such appears to be a primary source for this mapping. […]The human body is an ideal source domain for metaphors, since, for us, it is clearly delineated and (we believe) we know it well". (Kövecses2002, 16)

claimthat in most languages terms for seeing and hearing become intellectual terms for understanding, while "the sense of touch is not only linked to general sense: perception, but is also closely tied to emotional feeling" (Sweetser 1991, 37). According to Sweetser, this is because touch requires actual physical contact with the thing sensed, while vision and hearing are "distant senses" (Sweetser 1991, 44). In *Anthropologie der Sinne* [Anthropology of the Senses], Helmuth Plessner also refers to the fact that in the figurative language ofcognition and understanding (and, I think, of making someone understand) there is a hierarchy among the senses. The categories of visuality predominate in thinking because of the false notion of the objectivity of vision, which is due to the distance of the object, whereas the sense of touch should have primacy, since in the case of touch our sensation of ourselves and our sensation of the other are interdependent (Plessner 2003)[2].

Another important aspect is that the text in question (that is, *Truth and Method*) was planned and written. Metaphorizationtherefore functions differently[3] in it than it does in other (spoken, unplanned) discourses.From the perspective of this inquiry, the most significant particularity of the written, planned metaphors is awareness – the fact that Gadamer deliberately chose them as "master metaphors" for his theory.[4] Then the question is the following: how do these sensual metaphors function or how does Gadamer want them to function, and what are the "metaphorical consequences" he cannot keep under control.

According to Gadamer, Being that can be understood is language: "there is nothing that is not available to hearing through the medium of language" (Gadamer 2006: 458). Thus, he works with the dialogicity of interpretation and uses metaphors involving the exaggerated sense of hearing. Gadameralso lays particular emphasis on the thought that being addressed by Being (*belonging* [Zubehörigkeit]) is not optional: "It is not just that he who hears is also addressed, but also that he who is addressed must hear whether he wants to or not" (Gadamer 2006: 458), or: „[...] werangeredetwird, hören muss, ober will odernicht" (Gadamer 2010: 466) – so, *hören muss*: 'must listen to', not *schweigen muss:*'must become silent'. As a matter of fact, Gadamer's intention of improving the strongest metaphor of "the unavoidable" is not fulfilled here, since he is simply mistaken when he supposes that hearing cannot be avoided.[5] Just as we can cause blindness (real or metaphorical), we can just as easily cause deafness. The only sense that we cannot neutralize completely, the sense our perception of which is entirely independent of our will and the sense that we cannot de-activate, is our sense of touch.

Interestingly, in spite of the absolute primacy of hearing as a metaphor in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer does not eliminate tactility and its universality and metaphorical potential entirely,but he makes it part of his argumentation in a more mediated way. However, the fact that he speaks of tact, not of touch [or tactility] does not eliminate sensuality from his metaphorical repertoire entirely. It means merely that language itself has already made a metaphorization: the relationship between the sense of touch and the ability of tact is at least as clear as the one implied etymologically between the sense of sight and the ability of insight.

Among the guiding concepts of humanism, Gadamer devotes pages to descriptions of*tact* [der Takt], which functions in the human sciencesas a "special sensitivity

[2] Which corresponds to the simultaneity of human body as Leib-Sein/Körper-Haben (Plessner 2003, see also Shusterman 2008, 3).

[3] In his 3-way model of functional meaning, Halliday (1994) calls it the ideational function. Boyd (1993) also wrote on metaphors that are useful in the articulation of new theories.

[4] To some extent, of course, heneeds to adopt the metaphors of the tradition of philosophy that he follows.

[5] Nota bene, Plessner tends to arrive at the same conclusion.

and sensitiveness" (Gadamer 2006, 14), but "not simply a feeling and unconscious, but is at the same time a mode of knowing and a mode of being" (Gadamer 2006, 15) that includes Bildung.[6] He concludes as follows: "[…] this sense is not simply part of one's natural equipment, we rightly speak of aesthetic or historical consciousness, and not properly of sense." (Gadamer 2006, 15) Later, however, Gadamer remarks that this cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of a sense, but – as opposed to our natural sense, e. g. the sense of sight – it is *universal* [allgemeiner Sinn], not restricted to a particular field. (Gadamer 2006, 16)

For Gadamer, the main particularity of tact is that it is "tacit and unformulable" and it "helps one to preserve distance" (Gadamer 2006, 15) – that is, *tact*according to Gadamer is a metaphor from the field of tactility characterized, however, from the point of view of audible language and hearing. It is even more striking that Gadamerdoes not later return to the concept of tact. He never relates it to the notion of 'being addressed by tradition'or the hearing-centred argumentation of *Truth and Method*. Whereas Gadamer's metaphorical statement on the unavoidable being-addressed and listening-to, – which demand of unavoidability, as explained earlier in this paper, the sense of hearing itself does not meet – can only remain relevant if the unavoidable sense of touch (in the form of tact as cultivated consciousness) as disposition contributes to it. The tacitnessof tact is what guarantees the compulsory force of "hören muss", of "must listen to". In the disposition of tact, the one who is addressed is already, *a priori* tacit, mute, passive – is in the disposition to listen.

Thus, although in *Truth und Method*'being addressed by tradition' and listening to traditionis passive and unavoidable, its unavoidability rests on the unavoidability of tact as its disposition. Otherwise, the whole metaphorical framework of the sense of hearing could not fulfil Gadamer'sintentions, since he credits this sense with a particularity (namely, unavoidability) that it does not possesses.[7]

Gadamer leaves the two metaphors unconnected despite their potential to strengthen each other and help him attain the goal he has set for his inquiry. As a consequence of the unawareness and inattention to the metaphorical working of these basic-level sensual metaphors, being misaligned, they begin to work against each other. It seems to be anilluminating example to demonstrate the double-edged nature of sensual metaphors in philosophical texts: as master-figures of theories, they provide strong, foundational and almost universal semantic ground, hence they are convincing and easy to understand. Yet, their transparency is not so evident, since at a certain point their bodily determined

[6] On the remaining bodily connotations, see: "Even what earlier usage, with reference to physical appearance, called "'perfection of form' is not so much the last state of a development as the mature state that has left all development behind and makes possible the harmonious movement of all the limbs. It is precisely in this sense that the human sciences presuppose that the scholarly consciousness is already formed and for that very reason possesses the right, unlearnable, and inimitable tact that envelops the human sciences' form of judgment and mode of knowledge as if it were the element in which they move." (Gadamer 2006, 13–14)

[7] What Gadamer calls tact is quite similar to another disposition which has a long tradition dating back to medieval philosophy. In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger turns to a disposition that was marked as 'caritas' by Augustine in the process of interpreting the Scriptures: love is the disposition that is able to let something be, i.e. preserve something in its own essence. "To embrace a »thing« or a »person« in their essence means to love them, to favour them. [...] Such favouring [Mögen] is the proper essence of enabling [Vermögen], which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be." (Heidegger 1998: 241) It is worth recalling the reasoning of Sweetserand her ideas regarding why metaphors of touch – as opposed tometaphors of vision, for example – are rare in intellectual semantic domains: because in touch the physical perception is inseparable from the domain of emotions. In the aforementioned dispositions (tact, love, favouring), emotion seems to play the main role.

nature works against arbitrary abstract thinking. So without strict consistencyand comprehensive awareness of their implications, they begin to live their own lives in the body of text – as decomposing bacteria.

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PRESSING BODIES/PRESSING CONCERNS
– THE "LIVED EXPERIENCE" OF THE NON-HERMENEUTIC IN THE WORKS OF HANS ULRICH GUMBRECHT

Robert Smid[1]
Hungary
rob.smidi@gmail.com

Roughly 25 years ago, when literary scholars started to feel the dissatisfaction with the long-lasting exclusion of the somatic dimension of aesthetic experience, which reached its climax via the regime of reception aesthetics in Germany, the popularity of micro-histories in France, and the emerging success of new historicism in the United States, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht – then freshly transferred from Siegen to Stanford – gave a speech (entitled *The Body as an Issue of Literary Theory*) concerning the connection between losing the somatic dimension of literature and the impossibility of reference when it comes to the work of fiction. Since literary studies sided with history, it may have gotten closer to the socio-historical conditions of aesthetic experience, but instead of accessing the actual experience of historically specific readers or those mediums that had motivated it by producing sense and sensation, it created an incessant chain of abstractions via constructing idealized and (secretly) normative reader-figures as a consequence of distancing itself from the substantial-material conditions[2] of reading, one of which is conceived as "bodily experience." In addition, deconstruction with its definite emphasis on textual materiality failed to deliver a theory, which would overcome the rigidity of aesthetic experience stemming from hermeneutical differentiation that made aesthetic phenomena the surface whilst positioned meaning in the depth;[3] literature institutionalized had, thus, built itself on the practice of meaning-identification as interpretation, and not even deconstruction, with its steady anti-hierarchical ground in its political agenda, managed to turn the tide in this particular question.[4] In

[1] Research assistant, MTA-ELTE Association of General Studies of Literature Research Group. This paper is the product of my research done at the Geman Literature Archive in Marbach, with the generous support of a Marbach Graduate Fellowship from the German Schiller Society.

[2] As for New Historicism's shortcomings on actual materiality from Gumbrecht's point of view, see my essay "In Praise of… Temporality?! On the Hermeneutical Roots of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and the New Temporality of Presence," Asteriskos 3 (2012): 188. Also worth mentioning Wolfgang Ernst's investigation on the phenomenon of "interface-fantasy," whose eminent example of Greenblatt's dialogue with the dead in the archives is interpreted as a phase of missing out on the movements in the *hardware*: Wolfgang ERNST, "Unmasking Interfaces: Archeological Moments of Knowledge" (typescript of the paper "Replacing Faces by Interfaces" presented at the conference *Interfacing Knowledge: New Paradigms for Computing in the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences* at the University of California, Santa Barbara [CA], March 8-9, 2002) [available online @ http://dc-mrg.english.ucsb.edu/conference/2002/documents/wolfgang_ernst.html; 20/01/14]

[3] Cf. Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "The Body as an Issue of Literary Theory" (paper presented at Stanford University, Stanford [CA], November, 1989) [Typescript in Bestand: Gumbrecht; Kästche: 8, Mappe: 3 at Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach a. N., Germany – abbreviating from now on as @ Gumbrecht KxMy Marbach DLA].

[4] It became quite obvious to me that Gumbrecht's attitude towards deconstruction concerning the status of literary studies is rather resentful, to say the least, because it left a mark on the humanities that they cannot easily get rid of (see id., *The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Tradition of (Academic) Literary Studies: Can it set an agenda today?* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2009), 13.) [in his Vorlass, the manuscript of the lecture-series is catalogued among papers, which propagate a new disposition of dwelling linked to aesthetic experience provided by sports @ Gumbrecht K5M4 Marbach DLA]; deconstruction is presumed to have totalized those asocial tendencies of the "linguistic turn" – stemming from linguistic relativism –, which later turned out to be most harmful to the disciplines (see id., *Warum soll man die Geisteswissenschaften reformieren*? (Göttingen: V&R,

his speech, Gumbrecht made it very clear that the only way to grasp aesthetic experience in the new millennium is strongly linked to the task of surpassing the so-called historicist chronotope in all of its aspects. Yet such a response as going back to the paradigm before the foundation of the humanities in the era of Romanticism (the very era that produced the mentioned chronotope) was already discredited by Gumbrecht, as it would result in a no less metaphysical concept of experience reception aesthetics had put forward. According to him, already in the (early) modern age, texts and writings – whose main and dominant forms of usage were connected to "embodiment" – were, however, prepared for only spiritual, bodiless forms of communication. Texts as situational frames, and the roles on which they had been relying as extra-textual phenomena became integrated into the texts themselves, so they carried the very conditions of their own performance;[5] in Gumbrecht's view this illusory somatic horizon, which was still allowed to remain in the institutionalized form of literature, constitutes the feature we still refer to if we use the very word *literature*.

What I hope to achieve with this paper is the drawing out of some points of argument, and ideas from Gumbrecht's various unpublished manuscripts and conference papers of a time span of more than 20 years, and organize these elements around two main areas. The first one is the longing for bodily experience in our contemporary digital culture that one might rather identify with an urge or drive to save the body at all costs – as if it needed saving, anyway. Yet, this self-proclaimed crisis has produced brilliant books in cultural studies so far, like N. Katherine Hayles's *How We Became Posthuman*, and essays like Sybille Krämer's *Does the Body Disappear?*. The second field of interest is the question how sports can contribute to raise self-reflexivity in the humanities. Through philosophical concepts like disinterestedness, unconcealment, and emergence sports can act as a model for the humanities, raising awareness to unpleasant (and inherently political) consequences of a hermeneutical disposition. However alarming the signs are, the symptoms which I will try to sketch out in the end, make up precisely the blind spots of aesthetic experience understood in a hermeneutical way, and that is the reason why "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) – provided most eminently – by sports is brought up as our savior in Gumbrecht's enterprise. Because, despite the fact that there surely is some truth in those voices which claim that Gumbrecht wrote his book on sports (*In Praise of Athletic Beauty*) for – with some euphemism – fame and fortune –, or at least it was written in the way it was eventually written for the sake of popularity –, an intensive philological investigation provides unquestionable evidence of sports playing a characteristic role in his oeuvre as early as the 1980's; when he was still considered to be a "proper German intellectual" by many of those who later criticized him for abandoning "serious literary business."

Disinterestedness and unconcealment in sports

If the pertinence of aesthetic experience is to be preserved nowadays in a way that still contradicts "such ideas as imitation, appearance, irreality, illusion, magic, dream," all of which assume "that art is related to something different from itself: real being," it is exactly not "interpretative" aesthetic experience (*Erfahrung*), which "teaches us that the latter does not think in terms of this relationship but, rather, regards what it experiences as genuine truth."[6] "Interpretative" experience hence does not go beyond the dimension of a semiotic conception of bodily effects since it cannot achieve an actual introduction of somatic experience into reading, but simply provides a means to save the epistemology of hermeneutics through universalization.

2010), 20.).
[5] Id., "The Body as an Issue of Literary Theory."

[6] Hans-Georg GADAMER, *Truth and Method* (London: Continuum, 2006), 72.

Therefore Gumbrecht's project focuses on rehabilitating "lived" experience in order to claim right to presence effects,[7] and finds the horizon within which they could easily be put forward; in the fields of sports. Although, unlike his interpretation of philology (in his book *The Powers of Philology: Dynamics of Textual Scholarship*), in which he resorted to the praxis of handling manuscripts to constitute an ontological disposition, sports in his works serves not as a paradigm, but as a model *in action* so as to reestablish humanities: its effects transcend the limits of understanding, as in the case of the swimmer Pablo Morales who failed to describe his sensation of jumping into the pool after a long pause in his career,[8] but whose experience was nonetheless surrounded by the peculiar aura of disinterestedness. Since being disinterested concerns both the athlete and the spectator,[9] their focused intensity and their being lost in aesthetic experience may converge. That is to say, the eminent effects of sports have to be conceived as something which disconnects the swimmer from anything that is outside the competition.[10] If we apply this peculiar eminence of experience revealed by Gumbrecht to the work of art, it may be stated that the pertinence of art is preserved whereas it has to separate itself from everyday life in order to constitute the field of intensity, as it does so in sports for participants and spectators in the stadium alike. While Gumbrecht recognizes this triggering (i.e. intensifying-resonating) effect the artwork is capable of, he conceives of it according to a different horizon. The double movement of withdrawal and unconcealment most eminently provided by team sports might be interpreted as the spatio-temporal operation of materiality through which Gumbrecht can situate and underpin the experience of "lost in focused intensity" at the border of disconnectedness and pertinence. This is a threshold-crossing which constantly escapes the limitedness of interpretation and meaning. Therefore, if this type of constellation is rendered to the work of art, the dilemma of its relation to the world is more or less suspended as the gap – between its eminent status concerning its fair share from the truth, and its environment as the every-day life – is bridged. Just like the work of art,[11] sports starts to resonate particular parts of life: either temporally, like the Handball European Championship transforms a simple after hours, or spatially, granting a special ontological bias to stadiums.

The unique field that artworks are capable of constructing is, thus, excavated from the experience sports provide in Gumbrecht's.[12] The problem arises at the moment when the status of sports as a form of aesthetic experience is approached on an institutionalized level, if sports are defined as "performance under conditions of arts," since during the game something may come to life in the very sense as

[7] For a detailed description, see Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, *Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey* (Stanford [CA]: Stanford UP), 104.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Id., *In Praise of Athletic Beauty* (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard UP, 2006), 51.
[10] Ibid., 41.
[11] For Gumbrecht's reading of Heidegger's famous essay see: Gumbrecht, *Production of Presence*, 64-78, as well as *In Praise of… Temporality?!*, 192-6.
[12] Although Gumbrecht most certainly proposes a democratic view on aesthetic experience, his enterprise concerns less the reading patterns occurring in popular literature, as he keeps his distance from the apologetic rhetorics of those trends, which endlessly try to legitimize their institutional existence (i.e. answering the question of why humanities are still important) by concentrating on socially integrated aspects of their praxis, so as to raise the prestige of their discipline; considering his academic background, it is hardly a surprise. (For more information on this, refer to my forthcoming essay entitled *Meta-realities & Materialities: Konstanz – Dubrovnik – Stanford*). This does not mean, however, that he would refrain from such attitude, which Shusterman praises so much in Dewey, when the latter suspends the sterility of the work of art (cf. Richard SHUSTERMAN, *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art* (Lanham [MD]: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 21f.).

Heidegger understood the event of unconcealment.[13] The happening of "taking the field" presents its own form(ation) as an event (i.e. unfolding) in the stadium's becoming of the very space where a unique dynamism occurs.[14] At each moment it is quite clear which team is in offense and which is in defense, yet these roles are not only in constant exchange, but due to the oscillation (as a work of negentropy, to create form during an attack, and entropy, to destroy it via a defensive maneuver),[15] something unexpected is also brought forward in the field. At the heart of it lies the phenomenon that the spectator does not "understand" the tactics applied in team-work during the game, he only sees them as pure surface-movements, and does not relate them to the archetypes instructed by the coach.[16] It happens as an event of singularity: it is the emergence of form where the process of emergence itself operates as form.[17] The potential of such events comes exactly form the paradox between the emphasis on bodily movements that actively situate the person in space (of every-day life) while simultaneously provide the athletes the status of demigods, as they ceaselessly put their mental and physical performance to the limits.[18] Sports interpreted this way, rather than as a cultural object, does not only pose the problem of incompatibility between experience and perception, as well as between these two components and the scholarly apparatus trying to grasp and describe them – that is the lack of possibility of total convergence between each element of these two dichotomies –, which had resulted in the founding act of humanities as "a cluster-like, independent, yet on the whole institutionalized and solid form"[19] in the first place, but also points to the inadequacy of the inherited conception of aesthetic experience from the time of this founding act.

Therefore, in order to claim legitimacy to bodily experience based on sports as a model for aesthetic experience, the re-founding of humanities has to be carried out with constant respect to phenomena with this type of borderline-status in order to solve paradoxes that sports (seemingly) offer – conceived of as paradoxes within a hermeneutical context, of course. According to

[13] A new perspective on Heidegger's „gain" from his affiliation with the SA (leaving the three volumes of the "Schwarze Hefte" – published recently – out of consideration, of course, as Gumbrecht's theme is exactly the non-ideological "gain" out of ideology) puts the emphasis on the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, consequently proposing the reading of certain passages from Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* with or through sport events of his time. Cf. Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "Philosophy and Sports" (a course given at Stanford University, Stanford (CA), 2003 Summer Semester) [manuscripts @ Gumbrecht K11M2 Marbach DLA].

[14] Id., "We People Watch Football: Aesthetic Experience Where You Do Not Expect It" (paper presented at the conference *The Role of "Aesthetic Value" in Literary and Cultural Studies*, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, March 21, 1998) [draft @ Gumbrecht K3M2 Marbach DLA].

[15] Gumbrecht borrows this idea from Lyotard, who introduced the concept of negative entropy for the growing complexity of the world since the appearance of humans. Yet human beings never managed to become the motor of this process but remained simply its effect. Cf. Jean-François LYOTARD, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (Stanford [CA]: Stanford UP, 1991), 22.

[16] Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "Präsenz" (lecture delivered in Magdeburg, Germany, October, 1996) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K8M1 Marbach DLA].

[17] A dynamism not dissimilar to Dewey's conception of the work of art; cf. John DEWEY, *Art as Experience* (New York [NY]: Penguin Books, 2005), 189.

[18] Cf. Id., "How Necessary are Violence and Death for the Pleasure of Watching Sports?" [s .l. a. [probably February or November 2005] manuscript @ Gumbrecht K4M2 Marbach DLA]; also see id., "Limits of Athletic Performance" (lecture delivered in Chicago, March, 2004; Moscow, April, 2004; Wuppertal, May 2004; Kyoto, June, 2004; Koppenhagen, September, 2004.) [draft @ Gumbrecht K5M3 Marbach DLA]. The idea of demigods came to Gumbrecht while reading Heidegger's essay *The Thing*, in which a tetrad structure of earth and heavens, and mortals and immortals is posed. Gumbrecht uses demigods as a figure for in-betweens, which via extraordinary performance (of facing death through transgressing mental and physical boundaries) can shed light on the existence of mortals.

[19] Id., "The Promises of a Birth Trauma" (lecture given in Jerusalem, Israel, April, 2005) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K4M2 Marbach DLA].

Gumbrecht, the individual claim of aesthetic experience in the humanities has somehow got lost in their way to institutionalization, "coincidentally" hand in hand with the somatic dimension. In his view, however, it is not by chance, that these two factors were diminished at practically the same time. Hence making the connection motivated between body and individuality explains why sports has turned out to be so vital a subject Gumbrecht's oeuvre during the 80's up to his book on football in 2006. The project of returning to the individual dimension of experience is backed up this way by the scenario of rehabilitating the body in reading (as seen in a non-metaphorical manner in his recent book; *Stimmungen Lesen: Über eine verdeckte Wirklichkeit der Literatur*). It partly stems from the recognition of how conditions have changed due to rapid technological developments, which triggered a radical and ceaseless yearning for the bodily experience of being-together, of bodies piling up; a phenomenon for which the recent protests in Brazil give a perfect example.[20] Yet apart from its relations to contemporary culture, the imperative of individuality supported by the body has become all the more compelling, because by focusing so exclusively on the universal claim of experience, humanities so often became a victim of ideologization, further widening the gap which had already separated them from the sciences, on the one hand, and made them vulnerable – as we have become too familiar with this via several examples from György Lukács through Ezra Pound to Hans Robert Jauß – to extreme leftist and rightist temptations, on the other hand.[21] Moreover, this trait was enhanced by humanities' easy-going adjustment to artistic trends, like High Modernism as a protest to the epistemology-oriented ways of the 19th century against all attempts of radical Avant-garde movements to rehabilitate the fair share of the body.[22] Therefore the paradox of contemporary aesthetic experience eventually goes as follows: "if we generally find inacceptable in the past those positions which try to relate the individual experience of [~~past~~] culture to collective (national) goals (yet we formulate such goals in the present) and the *individualistic* concept of Erlebnis is surrounded by such a massive taboo that any return seems to be impossible."[23]

[20] Personal conversation with Professor Gumbrecht in September 2013.

[21] My examples, though see id., "Anti-Konstanz/Non-Hermeneutic/Presence (About Myself) (lecture given in Moscow, Russia, April, 2005) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K4M2 Marbach DLA].

[22] Although Gumbrecht prefers to refer to the young Bataille of the 30's, who did not actually set the stage for repressed sensuality, rather contributed to the depicting of the longing for such bodily experience (cf. id., "The Present Transformation of the Philological Disciplines in Western Germany: Observations on a Historical Background" (a lecture intended to be given in Budapest, Hungary in 1988 [in fact in 1989]) [typo-script @ Gumbrecht K8M2 Marbach DLA]), I would instead point to the exclusion of the body in literary praxis through the rewritings of Pygmalion's myth (see Jan METZLER, *De/Formation: Autorschaft, Körper und Materialität im expressionistischen Jahrzehnt* (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2003), 127-33), as well as to the difference between the popularity of Freud's case studies in contrast to Alfred Döblin's, which also serves as a fine example of the repression for describing the somatic in a non-narrative framework in high modernism (cf. Wolfgang SCHÄFFNER,"Psychiatrisches Schreiben um 1900: Dr. Alfred Döblin [in der Kreisirrenanstalt] in Karthaus-Prüll [Mit einer Folge von Krankengeschichten, mitverfaßt von Alfred Döblin, 1905-1906.]," Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 35 (1991), 13-4.; for an overall importance of this topic with more emphasis on case studies, see the projects of Nicolas Pethes, esp. his essay "Fakta und kein moralisches Geschwätz," in *Zu den Fallgeschichten im "Magazin zur Erfaherungsseelenkunde" (1783-1793)*, eds. Sheila DICKSON, Stefan GOLDMAN, and Christof WINGERTSZAHN (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011), 13-32.). In addition to all this, I would once more like to pick up Gumbrecht's idea of reading Heidegger together with the atmosphere of the Olympics, which would open up an alternative interpretation of Heidegger's critique on modernity in his *Introduction to Metaphysics, The Question Concerning Technology*, and *What is Called Thinking?*, based on the first-hand experience of the somatic, whose lack would explain modernity's faulty interaction with the *Ge-stell*, and its self-misunderstanding when faced with the material basis of the movement of unconcealment described above.

[23] GUMBRECHT, "Lived Experience?"

Bodily experience through the rhythm of the game

The return to the founding act of the humanities gains its importance because Dilthey based his enterprise on the exact same means of oscillation through thresholds, which Gumbrecht identifies in sports: "Their [i.e. humanities – R. S.] study of language includes the physiology of the speech organs just as much as the theory of the meaning of words and the sense of sentences. […] But there is a tendency in the nature of the group of sciences that we are considering to reduce the physical aspect of processes to the mere role of conditions or of means of understanding."[24] What Dilthey spoke of, is an ambiguity that can no longer be described within the framework of nowadays' aesthetics, and in this manner, Gumbrecht's intention to get humanities back on track again, rests on the premises of spatiality and materiality.[25] As *Erlebnis* originally stood for a *phase* or a *stage* between perception and experience, the practice of interpretation meant the individual mind's focus on a certain segment of sensual perception.[26] The importance of this type of threshold-phenomena returns in Gumbrecht's "materialities" project of the 80's, in which they are defined as elements "constituting the dividing line of our semantic economies between the spiritual and the material."[27] One of these materialities is *rhythm*, whose conventional connection to literature reached such heights that one might think it is impossible to access this phenomenon any other way than through poems, and has too long been regarded as part of the regime of sense and semantics over material presence (e. g. the body).[28] Gumbrecht, however, reappropriates it in Husserlian terms using "retention" and "protention"[29] to identify rhythm as a "time object in the sense proper." It exists in constant transformation, because each sound is surrounded by an echo, as well as by the pre-resonance of the consecutive sound;[30] tones are therefore situated according to their difference from others, while they simultaneously make up continuous chains with one another.[31] And that is how Gumbrecht defines rhythm as form, borrowing Niklas Luhmann's system theoretical approach to compensate for what in Husserlian phenomenology would result in sheer impossibility. Form here is, thus, understood as the "unity of the difference between self-reference and outside-reference,"[32] and *rhythm as form* carries out a twofold action: with its spatial similitude to the stadium

[24] Wilhelm DILTHEY, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (Princeton [NJ]: Princeton UP, 2010), 103.

[25] Although both Shusterman and Gumbrecht make serious attempts to extend the field of pertinence for aesthetic experience, and while they both seem to share the idea of returning to the original meaning of the aesthetic, this way building upon sensory-sensual perception (SHUSTERMAN, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 274.; Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "Perception versus Experience: Moving Pictures and their Resistance to Interpretation," in *Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication*, ed. Timothy Lenoir (Stanford (CA): Stanford UP, 1998), 361.), their aims eventually diverge. Shusterman tries to reformulate the inadequate concept of art, making aesthetic experience partly independent from it (SHUSTERMAN, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 21.) in order to provide more ground for individual experience that would otherwise not fit into the contemporary frame. At the same time he also tries to expand the means and field of interpretation (see his criticism on Sontag: ibid. 119f.). Whereas Gumbrecht uses unorthodox phenomena of aesthetic experience to shake the institutional praxis, which too many times resulted in disastrous consequences whenever humanities were confronted with portions of experience, with emphasis on the somatic rather than on the intellectual; in the end reforming not the concept of art but (the practice and identity of) humanities themselves.

[26] GUMBRECHT, "Lived Experience?"

[27] Id., "Rhythm and Sense" (paper presented at the conference *Materialität der Kommunikation*, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia [Croatia], April, 1987) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K8M2 Marbach DLA].

[28] Ibid.

[29] For his means of using this two termini, see Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "nachMODERNE ZEITENräume," in Id., *Präsenz* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 2012), 51.

[30] Id., "Rhythm and Sense"

[31] This relation later became reinterpreted from a Lacanian perspective in Mladen DOLAR, *A Voice and Nothing More* (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2006), 31.

[32] Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "Charms of the Distisch: About the Functions of Poetic Form in Goethe's "Römische Elegien" [s. l. a., manuscript @ Gumbrecht K5M3 Marbach DLA].

(i.e. via resonance), rhythm, according to Gumbrecht, (hardly) surprisingly does not become paired with music, which exists only in time, but with sports, whose experience constitutes a reference to the world complementary to a recurring expansion, through intensification of space and time. The factor that makes this whole frame operate is rhythm as "the complex stability of a recurrent pattern of transformation," which "replace[s] the elementary stability of a form without movement."[33]

Sports linked to rhythm synthesizes spatial parallelisms and temporal continuities into simultaneity, so that the resulting piling up of processes eventually leads to intensified moments. Having a Möbius-strip-like structure, the moment of singularity made up from simultaneity based on focused intensity due to present effects, equals with the action of folding, topologically speaking. Rhythm as form is therefore; synchronic, operational, and ontological as far as the somatic dimension of aesthetic experience is concerned. As constantly transgressing the threshold between the inside and the outside, and between self-reference and reference to the other, rhythm by its crucial part in the coordination of the body is capable of inducing the feeling in each person that their body becomes part of a collective body.[34] This way the absence of a level of the observer from which one can see the system from the outside (i. e. as being separated), contributes to the ontological status of the stadium during a game;[35] that is the event of an experience constituted by rhythm as its purely material basis. This extraordinary aesthetic experience – stemming from being on the edge – is the being-together, provided by the collective body as a fusion of participants and spectators, carried out by the rhythm of the process of unfolding (of strategies, tactics etc.) throughout the game in the arena, without suspending one's own bodily experience, which he receives from this connection in the taking place of the "lived" experience. Despite the peculiar double-bind – or one might even say, sophism – articulated by this structure, we can confidently state that if a Gumbrechtian reading of Heidegger positions the work of art as a scene where truth has the highest chance to happen, in his own work Gumbrecht regards sports as the field where experience resides in its purest form, lacking any ideological residue.

Against hidden ideological biases: answers to the questions "why to be disinterested?" and "what becomes unconcealed?"

What boosts the importance of bodily experience is not simply the longing for physical contact in contemporary (digital-multimedia) culture in particular, but the alarming consequences of totalizing the so-called spiritual dimension on the whole, so as to emphasize interpretations' claims of universality. It is a process parallel to losing the body *en bloc*. In Gumbrecht's view, the body and the individual cannot be separated against all attempts of hermeneutics to preoccupy itself only with meaning, because its neglect of materiality backfires; now, more than ever.[36] That is the main reason why Gumbrecht's rehabilitation-process focuses on disinterestedness as a concept closely related to "lived" experience. Not only does the oscillation, between collective and individual experience with

[33] Ibid., and also see id., "The Charm of Charms," in *The New History of German Literature*, eds. David E. WELLBERY, Judith RYAN (Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 2005), 6.
[34] Cf. id., "Rhythm and Sense."
[35] The ontology of the stadium in Gumbrecht, however, originates mainly from his project on the concept of "latency" (see id., *After 1945: Latency as the Origin of the Present* (Stanford (CA): Stanford UP, 2013).): cf. id., "The Ontology of the Stadium" (lecture given at Princeton University, Princeton (NJ), March, 2004) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K5M3 Marbach DLA].
[36] For the ambiguity, and supposedly material basis of Heideggerian termini such as Ge*stell* and *Da*sein, see id., "Building, Being, Presence" (lecture given at Princeton University, Princeton (NJ), April, 2007) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K5M4 Marbach DLA]

respect to players and their teams, teams and their fans, and between the game itself and its spectators, cumulated in the happening of disinterestedness due to the special spatial distinction made up by the stadium, make everything outside of this field impertinent during the time of the match (as a temporal horizon of its effect), but due to the stadium's resonating-intensifying ability, the event of oscillation supports the very movement in which aesthetic experience finds (its respective) state. Resonation brings along differentiation as well as insularity; certain functions in society and their corresponding operations gain shape, whilst intrinsic motivations of certain types of interactions (e. g. scoring a goal) set them at a distance from everyday life, where all actions have their motivations.[37]

Therefore the relationship between players and the audience unmistakably alludes to Kant's concept of the "public" in *What is Enlightenment?*. The "Republic of Scholars" has much in common with the area of the stadium, as the space made up by the (through journals, correspondences etc.) well-connected international network of scholars and intellectuals, is based on the very concept that within this scene everybody is supposed to act disinterestedly ("as pure human").[38] Sports – definitely not as a cultural object any longer – on the one hand, provides the conditions (e. g. the space, the oscillation, the rules, the duration etc.), which fuel the reformulation of the concept of the aesthetic, and on the other it also provides a model for the spatial framework *humanities once were*. During the game, the unconcealment, how Heidegger conceived of the emergence of Being, happens through bodies gaining shape out of vagueness,[39] turning the distinguished existential disposition of dwelling into an activity, which most eminently occurs in this type of "lived" experience; as forming space into place. Gumbrecht's aesthetic thought does not subordinate to a performative turn however, but regards any kind of human movement as a potential source of aesthetic experience in which the perception of the spectator is faced with an eruption of action. It is a state where a constant anticipation is at work, a certain *paideia* ('sharpened senses' or 'readiness of senses'),[40] during which the unfolding of tactics behind the movements of (neg)entropy in time and space (i. e. during a match in the field) goes hand in hand with something substantial, as the bodies hold against each other, constituting blocks.[41]

That covered the topic of pressing bodies, but there is something else, which is unconcealed during a game, something which involves humanities *en masse*. And that is the pressing concerns, with the consequences regarding the inadequacy of the conception of aesthetic experience. The limits, whether they refer to the spatial or temporal conditions, or even to the rules of sports, distinguish activities which are encountered *in* and *by* sports, from other types of performance: the field of the stadium, which offers itself to the intensity generated by the people in it, stands as the framework of "lived" experience, intertwining the existential with the aesthetic in its full pertinence to the world. To carry out the interpretation of this type of experience, it no longer suffices to apply the practices of an institution that separated consciousness from the body, and therefore supposed that man can hide his thoughts and intentions

[37] Id., "Philosophy and Sports."
[38] Ibid. It is also a key concept in Shusterman's (Cf. SHUSTERMAN, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 52.), even if its value is radically different in the respective works of the two thinkers; while Shusterman blames the (mis)interpretation of disinterestedness for widening the gap between every-day life and the work of art, Gumbrecht proposes this idea in order to avoid the pitfalls reception theory became a victim of so willingly with its sociological bias.

[39] Cf. GUMBRECHT, "Philosophy and Sports"
[40] Cf. Martin HEIDEGGER, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Frankfurt/M: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) [GA I. 10.], 19.
[41] Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "The More-than-Postmodern Present and the Emergence of the Paradigm of 'Emergence'" [s. l. a., probably delivered at the Helicopter Conferences in the 2000's; draft @ Gumbrecht K5M3 Marbach DLA].

behind the latter by objectivations.[42] Whether with a positive undertone (hermeneutics as "the good will to power"), or with a negative one (like the "hermeneutics of suspicion"), such trends – via the general claim of the praxis of interpretation – can ignore any experience proper to the body, labeling it too individualistic. The two extrema of humanities' reactions to their confrontation with the somatic horizon so far can, thus, be formulated with examples mentioned by Shusterman and Gumbrecht; the former's concerns the disapproval of Adorno and Horkheimer towards the importance and appreciation of the body, which is almost immediately transformed into the question of ideology in their texts (viz. associating beautiful, and well-built bodies with fascism, and making them immaterialized this way),[43] while the latter's raises awareness to the atmosphere of the Olympics, which fueled a dynamic change in Heidegger's termini. And here I would like to refer to Júlia Tóth-Czifra's essay in the present volume, where she differentiates between Gadamer's and Shusterman's approach regarding the somatic dimension, based on which she formulates her own proposal for a more conscious bodily attitude, so to speak. I am not entirely convinced that it would result in us being less willing to make abstractions, as it would just further strengthen our certainty in our business, risking the same vulnerabilities as before, instead of risking our scholarly apparatus. Paradoxically speaking: it is more rewarding to ready and sharpen our senses (instead of our bodily consciousness), as the greater the unexpectedness of the experience itself, the better our chances of avoiding misuse are.

After all, it is not by chance that Gumbrecht has delivered so many courses on the connections between philosophy and sports, and that his most creative readings of Heidegger have never missed to comment on the experience the Olympics of '36 may have offered to the philosopher. Therefore, I would phrase a question on the premises of these manuscripts, which, I believe, deserves some thought, while it might also express the quintessence of Gumbrecht's preoccupation with sports. In case of a philosopher as insightful as Heidegger was, who diagnosed, or even predicted trends long before their time with essays that still feel legitimate in our contemporary culture, like *The Letter on Humanism* and *The Question Concerning Technology*, it is shocking to accept that he could not cope with the atmosphere of the Olympics. Possessing such an enormous conceptual construct, and the ability of highly reflective thinking, how could he not resist an experience so evidently induced by a dangerous, deadly, and inhumane ideology? Or is it not ambivalence at all? If humanities were willing to give up on those laws they so desperately try to compensate for – thanks to their ceaseless self-pressuring of being scientific –,[44] they would also feel less obliged to pose interpretation as a praxis that grants false infinity in opposition to the limitedness of scientific laws, resulting in substituting the general for the individual, and the immaterial for the somatic in experience; as in sports, rules could compensate for the void, which the humanities actually has to answer for: the motivations of our actions under the conditions of disinterestedness.[45]

[42] Cf. Id., "Spanish Inquisition and the Discovery of Interpretation" (lecture given in Minneapolis, Minnesota, October, 1986) [typescript @ Gumbrecht K8M2 Marbach DLA].
[43] Cf. SHUSTERMAN, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 273f.
[44] Cf. Hans Ulrich GUMBRECHT, "Is It Good for the Humanities to be Scientific?" (lecture delivered in St. Petersburg, December, 2007) [manuscript @ Gumbrecht K4M1 Marbach DLA].
[45] Or as Gumbrecht formulated it: "What we have to learn then, is to operate under conditions of 'emergence;' and what we have to learn, as an attitude, is 'Gelassenheit,', i. e. the capacity for 'letting things happen' – without completely abandoning the codes of Subject and Agency." Id., "Limits of Athletic Performance."

III. Some Applications of Somaesthetics

EXTENDED AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY ART

Gizela Horvath
Romania
horvathgizela@gmail.com

1. The narrowed interpretation of aesthetics

Some confusion arises regarding the philosophical discipline of aesthetics beginning from the original use of the term: according to our knowledge, the term 'aisthesis' meant 'sensational perception' and it referred to sight, hearing, touch and all the other senses as well. In spite of this, in 1750 Baumgarten's *Aesthetics*[1] mentions it as the "the science of sense cognition," establishes that it is rather concerned with the beauty, and defines beauty as "the perfection of sensible knowledge" (Baumgarten 1750-8, 14§). Since beauty is present most saliently in art, the "felix aestheticus" (the 'lucky aesthete') is in the position to refine sensual cognition. He claims that the lucky aesthete would be one of the following: „the orator, the poet, the musician etc." (Baumgarten 1750-8, 69§). Evidently, Baumgarten's aesthetics primarily concerns the artist „whose task it is to achieve perfect sense cognition" (Gregor 1983, 377).

This shift became even more prominent after Hegel: aesthetics devoted less and less attention to the sensorial experience (including the experience of beauty), and much more to art. Hegel represented the milestone from which aesthetics was widely regarded as the discipline of the philosophy of art. It is no wonder that James Kirwan sees the discipline of aesthetics nowadays as lacking the aesthetic (*per se*) and questions this concept of "aesthetics without the aesthetic" (Kirwan 2012).

Interpreting aesthetics as philosophy of art entailed reducing the "aesthetical experience" to those senses which are involved in appreciating art: seeing and hearing. The reasons for excluding the other senses from the discourse on aesthetics are the following:

a.) The categorization of senses into lower and higher

Aristotle speaks of five external senses in *De anima* and in *Parva Naturalia*. Even though these senses primarily serve preservation, he highlights as far as rational beings are considered, the importance of the senses is much higher: "in animals which have also intelligence they serve for the attainment of a higher perfection" (Aristotle 1908–52b, 436b, 437a). In one of his later paragraphs, Aristotle claims that among the external senses, seeing and hearing have a distinguished role in cognition. Sight is our primary source of perception, it is "the superior sense," but "for developing intelligence, and in its indirect consequences hearing takes the precedence," since hearing channels verbal communication (Aristotle 1908–52b, 437a). Philosophers followed this route, discriminating between superior, intellectual senses (visual and auditory), and inferior senses (touch, taste and smell). The latter were regarded as means for preservation, but have a lesser contribution to knowledge than the "intellectual senses." Aesthetics, as an independent field of research, was concerned exclusively with the higher senses.

b.) The exclusion of the agreeable

Kant strictly differentiates between the beautiful and the agreeable, which he defines in the following way: "The agreeable is that which pleases the senses in sensation" (Kant 2000, 91). Smell and taste, in turn, cannot be detached from the feeling of pleasantness: we cannot taste or smell without noticing whether it is pleasant or unpleasant (Aristotle 1908-52c, 421a) – whereas this instinctive, immediate judgment is not necessarily present in visual or auditory experience. If we have to detach pleasantness from the beautiful, then smell and taste cannot be considered objects of the aesthetic judgment.

[1] I used the Hungarian translation by Gabor Bolonyai of Baumgarten's work, as it appears in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Esztétika*. Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999.

c.) The spatial (visual) and the temporal (dynamic) arts

As we have seen, aesthetics has turned towards artistic beauty – almost – from the moment it was born, and art is perceived through the two senses of contemplation: vision and hearing. This approach grounds the often-drawn parallel between poetry and painting, a question that is present in Lessing's *Laokoon* as the question of the particularity of artworks which were especially made to be seen and heard (Lessing 1874).

Though its name would suggest that aesthetics is the theory of the whole sensational perception, as we can see, the field has been reduced gradually to its fraction:

- It does not entertain all the sensorial experiences, only the visual and auditory experiences
- Even in these cases it only deals with the experience of beauty
- It does not treat all the occurrences of beauty, but mainly artistic beauty
- Nowadays it is not so much concerned with artistic beauty, but rather with specific issues in philosophy of art (i.e. what is art, what is the ontological status of the artwork, the possibility of critical discourse etc.), which can be answered without involving the issues of aesthetic experience.

As Kirwan puts it, the aesthetic has been leached out of aesthetics, that is, in contemporary aesthetics the aesthetic is "kept on ice" (Kirwan 2012, 181). This type of impoverishment is something that many desire to change by planting the aesthetic back into our daily life, even with the cost of obliterating the demarcation between life and art (Shusterman 2007). Shusterman's work is the beacon in this prospect: he approaches rap music with the rigor and standards of the classical genres (Shusterman 1991), furthermore, he proposes a new discipline, coined somaesthetics: "it can be most briefly defined by its focus on the body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning" (Shusterman 2007, 136).

This paper goes the other way around, and investigates those signs present in today's art world which can be interpreted as attempts to re-capture the global perceptive experience of art. In the following passages I will present cases, which allow for the inclusion of touch, taste and smell into the persisting framework, without changing the narrowed-down definition of aesthetics. I will speak of artworks which require the audience not only to see and hear them, but to employ the other senses as well. I will not speak of interactive works which require some sort of active-transformational action from the audience. The challenge that these artists have taken upon them is to expand the contemplative horizon for the senses deemed inferior until now.

2. The expanded aesthetic experience

a.) The sense of touch

It seems that it is hard to harmonize touch with the contemplative attitude which is proper to the aesthetic reception. The act of touching implies some sort of practical, "work-like" transformative (poietic) situation, while the passive tactile situation can be interpreted as intrusion into the private sphere of the individual. Neither of these situations would qualify as typical for reception of art which traditionally does not include touch.

A queer tactile experience is present in Jacob Dahlgren's work, "Wonderful World of Abstraction" (2009). The „object" is a large cube, constituted by 32000 coloured and densely suspended silk ribbons. The playful-looking artifact is actually a trap. When venturing to go into it, the visitor will suddenly feel lost and trapped: the never ending ribbons would surround one from every angle, become suffocating, capture the sounds from the outside and in the same time create a "jungle" in which somebody or something could appear in front of one

anytime. The smooth and pleasant touch of silk can become frightening in this particular case.

Several other installations are also built on the concept of touch. The visitor does not only navigate in a built-in environment, they are also subjected to some sort of tactile impulses. This effect was very vibrant in Transylvanian artist Zsolt Berszán's site-specific installation, exhibited in MODEM in Debrecen in 2010. The theme of the exhibition was the worm – as the persistent element of a world lacking the humane and the transcendent as well. Next to the exhibited objects the artist constructed a small cave-like environment from black silicone and polyurethane foams, giving the impression that the visitor was inside the worm: he covered the floor with the same soft, elastic and flesh-like material, which gave the terrifying, disgusting and nauseating impression of being captured inside the creature.

Ilona Németh, who exhibited *The Paradigm of Women* in 1996, worked in a similar way: she covered the floor of the gallery with starchy pillows, forcing the visitor to step on them in order to get to the other pieces. The soft but discouraging feeling evoke both pleasure and guilt – since the road of classical art appreciation is paved with the suffering of universal womanhood, symbolized by the pillow, and can only be reached if the visitor stomps on it.

b.) The sense of smell

The olfactory sense is tightly interrelated with our biological survival, it can be pleasant at times, but unfortunately, also very unpleasant on other occasions, thus it cannot be included into the classical art concept. It can be quite difficult to differentiate between smells, and especially to formulate these differences, thus they are hard to be included into our disinterested experience which appeals to our intelligence.

Nevertheless, today smell-art or odor-art does have some representatives.

Berlin-based Norwegian artist, Sissel Tolaas' complex pieces attempt to re-establish smell as a crucial means of communication and of perception. Tolaas calls the Western civilization "smell-blind". She has been dealing with odors for 20 years now, planning the "odor-map" of numerous cities, with the purpose of making people more conscious of their experience of smells. Her odor-archive has approximately 8,000 samples. The German Museum of Military History in Dresden has asked Tolaas to plan the smell of a battlefield. The recreated smell was so authentic, hence disturbing that the museum refused to impregnate its halls with it. The artist has claimed many times that there are no pleasant or unpleasant odors for her, this discrimination is due to a prejudice, and she, as the liberator of smells fights against it. Unfortunately, it seems to be quite hard to fight off our natural liking or disgust of certain smells, and thus it becomes hard to relate to them in a disinterested way.

Hungarian artist Hilda Kozári also works with smells. Through her work she studies the effect of smells on emotions and memories. In *AIR – Urban Factory Installation* she reconstructed the specific smells of Helsinki, Budapest and Paris, which she captured in separate large bubbles, inviting the visitor to step into them. She used the term "nose-vision" for her works. In her *Kitchen and Café* set she used spices in the preparation of her painting.

One of the most interesting projects of the last years has been Sonia Falcone's *Campo de Color.* The Bolivian artist's installation is composed of more than one hundred clay-plates, with heaps of different kinds of pigments or national spices (curry, chili, cayenne, paprika, cocoa, different condiments, etc.). The installation is partly visual: the vivid, joyful composition is placed in a geometric order, replicating the perfect

shape of the circle in a grid-like form. The visual experience can also be transmitted by a computer image. However, something that can only be experienced on the spot is the penetrative harmony of smells, the exciting fragrances that flow into all the pieces of the installation, capture the receiver and create simultaneous allusions of home-cooking and of far-away exotic cuisine. Smelling the odors plays a crucial part in the aesthetic experience of the artwork – the fragrances evoke memories and feelings, nostalgia for the past and allusion of the far-away, more than any visible or audible feature.

c.) The sense of taste

Probably the most problematic task would be the elevation of taste into the artistic contemplation. If we desire to maintain the relevant delimitations between the artistic and the non-artistic, taste will not be integrated easily. It is quite hard to imagine sense of taste in a context that does not require the receiver to eat the object of taste – while one of the main criterions of artistic contemplation is exactly the impossibility of depletion of the artifact. If actual ingestion occurs, it is not quite clear why we speak of fine art and not culinary art.

Rirkrit Tiravanija relies on the sense of taste in his works – usually not objects exposed with the purpose of admiration. He implements situations brought about by the social aspects of food consumption. This is why Rirkrit Tiravanija is one of the salient representatives of the relational aesthetics (Nicolas Bourriaud). In his first 1990 work, he cooked a special Thai dish for the conversing visitors in the vacated Paula Allen Gallery in New York. After the visitors finished their meal, the leftovers were left as documentation of the event. The artist often created similar events. His gestures have a critical aspect: by sharing the food he protests against today's greedy consumerist lifestyle.

Cyprien Gaillard has managed to include taste (through the consumption of alcohol) in quite a curious way into his 2011 work exhibited at the KW Institute for Contemporary Art in Berlin. The *à propos* of his installation named *The Recovery of Discovery* are the embossments and architectural reliefs removed from the Pergamon Altar at the beginning of the 20th century, and brought to Berlin, where they can be seen even today. He ordered 72,000 bottles of Efes beer from Efes, placed the cases of beer in the shape of a pyramid – referring to the dominant architectural shape of ancient times. On the opening day he asked the visitors to feel free to open a bottle of beer and consume its content. The visitors met a quite particular mode of consuming art: the rigorously structured geometric form slowly became an incoherent, repulsive mess, decorated with stinking broken bottles of beer.

In the presented cases the application of non-intellectual senses was crucial to the artistic reception: they can be omitted neither from the perception, nor from the interpretation. The significance of these attempts lies in their ability to show a way in which the established aesthetic contemplative framework could be expanded towards the "inferior" senses by incorporating touch, smell and taste.

3. Troubling issues

If the expansion of aesthetic artistic experience is possible, we need to face the following challenges:

a.) The definition of aesthetic experience

The definition of aesthetic experience is problematic on its own – as Shusterman claims „the aesthetic is obviously a vague, polysemic, contested and shifting signifier" (Shusterman 2006, 243). If we wish to maintain the proper aspects of the aesthetic experience, we need to distinguish it from the wider concept of sensorial experience. The *differentia specifica* of the aesthetic

experience is traditionally seen in its application to the "intellectual senses", furthermore, in providing a "disinteresting pleasure". The enterprises mentioned above try to provoke this *differentia specifica*: apparently, we are forced to allow the less intellectual senses into the realms of aesthetics as well. The second possible *differentia specifica*, namely, the "disinterest" is challenged by pragmatism, which tries to bring art to the ground, and searches for those aesthetic experiences that can be projected to real-life. In turn, if we abandon the criterion of disinterest, as Shusterman suggests (Shusterman 2006), it is worrisome that the aesthetic experience will become the same with the whole of sensational experience, rendering the term superfluous. This would lead to the annihilation of the whole aesthetic discipline, caused by our attempt to enrich it.

b.) The tendency of the concept of art to merge with other fields (gastronomy, art of living)

The inclusion of the inferior senses into art is risky because the distinction between the fine arts and other forms of activities which are figuratively entitled "art" (for example 'culinary art') might disappear. If we want to keep them separate, we probably need to reach back to Kant and his demand for disinterest, and state that 'culinary art' has less to do with contemplation, and more to do with consumption, contrary to fine art, which does not aim at being consumed, even when appealing to taste or smell. The metaphorical term "art" is only present in "culinary art" because it refers to more than just the physical satisfaction of the hungry food-craving consumer. The joy of the sensational experience – similar to art – is given by the momentum of "how." Still, we cannot say that any magnificently constructed culinary masterpiece has 'meaning.'

Due to Kant, even in these problematic cases we can decide whether we are dealing with aesthetic pleasure, or that of the agreeable. If the consumption of a dish is for the sake of taste, we are probably dealing with "culinary art." However, if the consumption of the dish is meant to oppose the spirit of the art market, art collections, auctions or marketability, and at the same time opens a locus for communication, as in Rirkrit Tiravanija's works, it can easily be interpreted as an artistic enterprise. In this case the pleasing aspects of the food – which would be of primary importance in the case of a culinary art – have a secondary role. Though the consumption of the Efes beer was relevant in Cyprien Gaillard's work, the taste itself was not; what counted was the place of origin of the bottles conveyed by the brand. The aesthetic pleasure and sensual joy can be distinguished even in these cases.

The expanded aesthetic experience in contemporary art does not mean the total annihilation of the borders between life and art. It is much more reasonable to interpret these experiments as art's own attempt to outgrow itself. Art is only "useful in life", if it simulates situations, dares to ask uncomfortable questions, while succeeding to stay art. However, challenging these borders is a more than legitimate enterprise.

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WHAT MOVIES SAY ABOUT THE MIND: NEUROSCIENCE, INTENTIONAL ACTION AND ROTOSCOPY

Emmanuelle Glon
France
emmanuelle.glon@gmail.com

Cognitive science, especially neuroscience, has shown more and more interest in art and aesthetics issues in recent years. This interest has manifested itself in a range of topics ordinarily thought of as belonging to human sciences, such as imagination, creativity or aesthetic emotions. The growing body of research in cognitive neuroscience of art aims at providing knowledge about how the brain responds to art techniques. The experience of listening to music or watching movies could then be described in terms of information processing systems, and not just in terms of personal experience, cultural influence or social constraints.

Within cognitive neuroscience, aesthetics is still not considered as a proper domain of research, except in the field of communication research where cognitive psychology is meant to provide empirical resources regarding audiovisual media, including movies. Although much work remains to be done, the investment of cognitive neuroscience in art, even secondarily, contributes significantly to our understanding of the aesthetic mind, by emphasizing what precisely cannot be subject to control. Cognitive science and cinema are, among other things, fantastic ways to recall to us that we see and heard, first of all, with our body.

My aim in this contribution is to examine neuroaesthetics' contribution in the domain of movie studies. Experiencing a film is a true challenge for cognition, given the wide variety of stimuli we have to respond to when watching a film.

Seeing intention through the movies

The essential and the most challenging way in which cognitive neuroscience contributes to the understanding of the mind is to provide explanatory frameworks or, at a minimum, empirically justifiable hypotheses that account for both explicit/controlled mental states and unconscious/tacit ones that are represented in the brain. Yet when watching movies, we are not always aware of what and how we feel. An important part of our aesthetic responses to mediated information are, in some essential way, tacit and uncontrolled responses. In this case, the purpose of cognitive science is roughly to provide information about key aspects of the aesthetic mind, contributing secondarily to improving our understanding of cinema. Conversely, it may appear that cinema – as well as painting, music or dance – can be used as a tool by psychologists and neuroscientists to understand the body's way of experiencing reality.

Research in cognitive psychology has collected interesting data from experiments using moving images to better understand what are the neural and psychological mechanisms that enable us to perform complex social-cognitive tasks, such as mental state attribution. Using techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Mar and colleagues began to visualise brain activities of spectators in response to moving image using partial rotoscopy.[1]

[1] Raymond A. Mar and Neil Macrae, "Triggering the intentional stance," in *Empathy and Fairness,* ed. Gregory Bock and Jamie Goode, Novartis Symposium no. 278, (2006):199-205; Mar et al*.,* "Detecting agency from the biological motion of veridical *vs* animated agents," *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 2 (3) (2007): 110-119.

Picture 1. Example of rotoscoping animation portraying Donna Hawthorne (Winona Ryder) in *A Skanner Darkly* (Linklater, 2006) (© Warner Independent Pictures)

Invented by Max Fleischer around 1914, rotoscoping is an animation technique using digital video or traditional hand drawing: animators trace over each frame of a live-action movie projected onto a frosted glass surface so as to re-create animation that imitates the live action. Movies such as *Renaissance* (Christian Volckman, 2006), *2001: Space Odyssey* (Stanley Kubrick, 1968) and *Star Wars* (George Lucas, 1977) include some sequences in rotoscopy. Now, as far as I know, *Waking Life* (2001) and *A Scanner Darkly* (2006), both directed by Richard Linklater, are the only movies based wholly on rotoscoping. But the greater part of their aesthetic interest comes from the special rotoscoping technique they utilise: *Waking Life* and *A Scanner Darkly* (Figure 1) are indeed based upon partial rotoscoping, so that live action shots and animation partially overlap.

Partial rotoscoped movies, just as *Waking Life*, is a combination with digital images and photographs of real persons and objects. Interestingly enough, the ratio of that combination is not 50/50; the movie consists of a balanced mix between real footage and animation, which slighly varies between frames. Among other advantages, this technique preserves many of the cues from real footage, notably motion kinematics such as velocity, and biological features such as self-propelled movements and facial mimics. Howether, while real footage is incorporated, as it was, in the frames, *Waking Life* remains a cartoon.

(*Figure* 2) Julie Delpy and Ethan Hawke (*Waking Life,* Linklater, 2001) replaying one scene from *Before Sunrise,* directed by Linklater in 1995. In Mar et al.'s experiment, the scene is recreated using alternatively live-action footage and animated footage (© Mar et al. 2007).

The experiment is presented as follows: participants are shown the sequence in which Julie Delpy and Ethan Hawke, seated on a bed, engage in talk. Presented without sound, the video is made from 29 scenes that are each composed of between 1 and 15 shots which alternates between cartoon and real footage.[2] The video furnishes two sorts of perceptual stimuli for social interaction, depending on the specific frame, which keeps changing, althought the representational content remains the same (*Figure 2*). Interinstingly enough, the pictorial variations between the two existing data sets – the animated one and the photographic one – corelates with a change in neural pathways. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the bilateral temporal parietal junction (TPJ), which are selectively involved in the attribution of intentions for behavior and detection of biological motion,[3] show a greater increase when participants watched live-action scenes compared to cartoon scenes. Moreover, the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), another region implicated in social cognitive processing, is also more active during scenes using real footage.[4] By contrast, another area in the brain, the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, shows a greater response in viewers when they viewed the animated footage. Why? How can we interpret these data?

Animated objects are generated mechanically with hand drawing or digitally with computer graphics. The representations that photography gives us are, in some respect, very different from those we get from hand drawing and these differences depend on the ways photography and hand-drawn animation are produced. As opposed to objects in photographs, they don't have ecological counterparts, since there are no causal relations between them and what it is out there, in the real world. Nevetheless, cartoons can be more realistic than photographs. The aliens of the *Alien* film series are highly realistic, even if *Alien* movies don't resemble what they represent, since Alien does not exist. The production of good realistic pictures cannot be reduced to a physical recording – mechanical or digital. To be sure, it becomes harder to distinguish between a living character in a movie and an animated one. But digital images in *Waking Life* have been specifically designed to imitate less realistic traditional hand-drawn animation.

How can using art works, in particular movies, inform interdisciplinary research on human cognition, including a central feature of human consciousness; that is, intentional action?

1. Understanding intentionality with motion perception

Mental states, such as beliefs, thoughts, desires, hopes, wishes, etc. are intentional in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something. In philosophical literature, intentionality has long been regarded as constitutive of the mental.

Intentionality is a specific feature of propositional attitudes, that of being directed upon a object or being about something,[5] and it is currently understood as the causal source of actions. As such, intentionality plays a significant role in so-called "folk psychology" as the basic capacity to attribute intentions and other mental contentful states to others, and is also commonly thought of as the psychological explanation of what they do.[6] Since this aptitude is so deeply anchored in our

[2] Mar and Macrae, "Triggering the intentional stance," 115; Mar et al., "Detecting agency from the biological motion of veridical *vs* animated agents," 202.
[3] Michael S. Beauchamp et al., "Role ambiguity, role efficacy, and role performance: Multidimensional and mediational relationships within interdependent sport teams," *Group Dynamics, Theory, Research, and Practice* 6 (3) (2002): 229-242.
[4] Mar and Macrae, "Triggering the intentional stance," 116; Mar, R. et al., "Detecting agency from the biological motion of veridical *vs* animated agents," 202.
[5] Franz Brentano (1973 [1874]). *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. L. McAlister (ed.), (A. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, & L. McAlister, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press, p. 88.
[6] Alvin Goldman, "The psychology of folk-psychology," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16 (1993): 15-28; Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, "Folk Psychology," in *The*

lives, it is easily extended to targets other than conspecifics. In fact, human beings attribute intentionality to almost anything, be it cars, shadows, geometrical objects or characters in animated films.[7]

There are many ways to describe an agent's behavior: as a specific type of reaction to stimuli, as a bodily movement, as determined by motives and intentions, etc. Firstly, intentional action does not consist simply in moving one's body, but in entertaining mental states about states of affairs, viewed as intended goals, that the action aims to produce. As developmental psychology puts it, people's ability to distinguish between actions that are performed intentionally and those that are performed unintentionally occurs very early in life. Experiments with new born children and non-human primates, because of their pre-linguistic intelligence, furnish good insights in this respect.[8] Secondly, describing my action as intentional means that I am not the object of external causal forces of my environment but the author of the action, in the sense that this action is the distinctive conscious experience that I am the author of the action when carrying out this performance – the "I" responsible of the action, generating questions, for example, about privilege-access and transparency:[9] Do we enjoy first-person authority about our own actions?

How is intentional action neurally implemented, if at all? What are the brain processes causally involved in the intentional control of behavior? Does the process associated with the identification of other's goals and intentions differ from the process associated with the identification of our own? In recent decades, with the growing interest in the use of brain imaging to study cognitive system, the emergence of understanding intentional actions and behaviors has become as much of a theoretical issue[10] as an empirical issue in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. According to the bottom-up approach involved in cognitive neuroscience studies, the feeling of producing events, such as actions and thoughts, through one's own intentional behaviour, does not result from higher-order computations of observational judgments, but originates in neural processes responsible for the motor aspects of action.[11]

Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, eds. Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,2003): 235-255.

[7] See for example the classic experiment: Fritz Heider, F. & Marianne Simmel, "An experimental study of apparent behavior," *American Journal of Psychology* 57 (1944): 243-249.

[8] Maria Legerstee, "The role of person and object in eliciting early imitation," *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 51 (1999): 423-433; György Gergely et al., "Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age," *Cognition* 56 (1995): 165-193; Andrew Meltzoff, "Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children," *Developmental Psychology* 31 (1995): 838-850.

[9] Lynn Stephens and George Graham,When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Patrick Haggard et Sam Clark, "Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction," *Conscious and Cognition* 12 (2003): 695-70; Shaun Gallagher, " Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science," *Trends in Cognitive Science* 4 (1) (2000a): 14-21; " Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification," in *Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience,* ed. D. Zahavi *(*Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000b): 203-239.

[10] Donald Davidson, (1963), "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprinted in 1980): 3-20; Stephen Stich, (1981). "Dennett on intentional systems," *Philosophical Topics* 12, 39-62; John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Daniel Dennett, "Three kinds of intentional psychology," in *Reduction, Time and Reality,* ed. Richard A. Healey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 37-62; Alvin Goldman, "The psychology of folk-psychology," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16 (1993): 15-28.

[11] Christopher D. Frith et al., "Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action," *Brain Research Reviews* 31(2-3) (2000): 357-363 ; Gallagher, "Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science," 14-21; Gallagher, " Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification," 203-239; Sarah-Jane Blakemore et al., "Abnormalities in the awareness of action," *Trends in Cognive Science* 6 (6) (2002): 237-242.

Previous neuroimaging studies suggest that our brain responds differently to intentional movements when compared to accidental ones, and that intentional action is directly caused and controlled by neural processes.[12]

This emerging integrative approach appears to provide convincing evidence as to the neural correlates of something that is a key aspect of social cognition. Intentional action seems to be sustained by specific neural events in the motor areas of the brain, distinct from those involved in artificial movements. What is at stake behind the specific case of intentional action is the more general issue – and crucial one – of how understanding self and others as intentional agents, and to what extent we can have direct access to other's mind and our own.

Now, grasping intentional action involves another – more basic – ability to detect the presence of animated agents in the environment and to discern that sort of agents from artificially animated devices. In other words, we have to distinguish movements caused biologically from those caused mechanically or by accident.

1.2. Sense of agency and schizophrenia

Because this topic cuts across different disciplinary lines, it doesn't appear to be easy to seek a clear consensus on what "sense of agency" means.[13] Broadly construed, the sense of agency for a given action is the sense that one is the author of one's action. From simple perceptual signals, human beings have the capacity to understand and predict the goal-directed actions of others; that is, the complex motives and intentions which guide others' behavior. The sense of agency differs from the "sense of ownership" (or otherwise called "sense of subjectivity") for bodily movements, which is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing the movement; the sense I have that my arm's moving, whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary, means that the action belongs to myself.[14] In the case of unintended movement, these two modalities are clearly distinguished. If I am falling down on the escalator, I may enjoy ownership of my movement – I have the sense that I am the one who is moving but I have no sense of agency for it, since I am not the agent who causes me to fall down. It concerns only my foot bumping solidly into a stair. Thus, the sense of ownership may be consistent with the lack of the sense of agency.[15] There is nothing abnormal in my having a thought or performing an action consciously without feeling to be myself the author of that thought or of that action. Within intentional action, however, the self is experienced immediately and non-representationaly in terms of its agency and its sense of ownership.

1.3. Intentional action and cartoon

Mar and colleagues' experiment is an example of how aesthetic objects – such as movies – can take part in the construction of scientific knowledge, including cognitive neuroscience with regard to embodied cognition and mentalization. Cognitive science provides us in return with fruitful insights about both old and new issues in aesthetics, notably perceptual responses to films.

[12] Benjamin Libet et al., "Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act," *Brain* 106 (1983): 623-642; Christopher Frith and Utah Frith, "Interacting minds - A biological basis," *Science*, 286 (1999): 1692-1695.

[13] Shaun Gallagher, "The natural philosophy of agency," *Philosophy Compass* 2 (2)(2007): 347-357.

[14] See Shaun Gallagher, *How the Body Shapes the Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[15] As for the sense of agency, neuroscientific studies, especially of brain damages, show that the sense of ownership of a body part depends on a subpersonal mechanism. Patients suffering from asomatognosia due to a lesion in the right posterior parietal cortex generally describe one part of their body as no longer their own. Edoardo Bisiach et al., "Remission of somatoparaphrenic delusion through vestibular stimulatio," *Neuropsychologia* 29 (1991): 1029-1031; Shahar Arzy et al. "Neural mechanisms of embodiment. Asomatognosia due to premotor cortex damage," *Archives of Neurology*, 63 (7) (2006): 1022-1025.

The modularity of vision leads to the related idea that different *types of visual scenes* could be correlated with different areas of the neural system. Intentional action involves a characteristic set of brain processes according to which "I" am causally involved in the production of my thoughts and actions. As Mar and colleagues' experiment shows, this functional difference in visual brain affects the way we respond to movies, especially the formal features of visual objects. Viewing moving images depicting either abstract human beings in cartoon animation or photo-realistic ones in live action footage gives rise to the perception of two sorts of action modalities. Now, it is a matter of degrees: more the stimuli presented are "realistic", more the neural responses associated with intentionality are active.

This dichotomous neural categorization of apparent motion and the correlated actions associated with the visual signals in the sequences, either biological intentional ones or abstract non-intentional ones, are consistent with previous studies according to which the neural encoding of motion perception depends on the observer's own body representation.[16]

2. Direct perception and ecological similarity

Mar's study provides clues about how perceivers interact with the outside world. Vision has evolved largely for controlling actions rather than creating internal representations. Implicit in the neuroaesthetic approach, as articulated by Mar and colleagues, is an epistemology which emphasizes the activity of the mind *in the immediate environment*. Following Gibson's ecological theory of perception, vision is conceived as a dyadic relation between the whole perceiving organism, moving around in its environment, and a physical object.[17] Many approaches along these lines have been proposed according to which neither conscious inference, nor internal representation is required for perception but only "invariants": evolutionary law-like patterns and repeated schemes of regular interactions between creatures and physical world.[18]

From that point of view, the intrinsic properties of the scene conforms to what we might called "the principle of ecological similarity". Emphasizing the evolutionary importance of detecting biological motion, Mar's results confirm that there are specific neural mechanisms for distinguishing between people and objects. It follows that the brain perceives others as having a mind, including fictional characters in animated films, if they are similar enough to the original biological pattern.[19]

It might be objected that cinematic motion is not real.[20] In Mar's experiment, as in other experiments using videos, the biomechanically plausible properties of apparent human action are *simulated* properties. Apparent human action is created by displaying a series of static images at temporal rates consistent with the amount of time normally required to perform a "true"

[16] Maggie Shiffrar and Jennifer Freyd, "Apparent motion of the human body," *Psychological Science*, 1 (1990): 257-264; Jennifer A. Stevens et al., "New aspects of motion perception: Selective neural encoding of apparent human movements," *Neuroreport*, 11 (1) (2002): 109-115.

[17] James Gibson J., *The ecological approach to visual perception* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).

[18] For example, Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë's theory of "change blindness' or the "indiscrimminability hypothesis" of James Cutting. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, "What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience," *Synthese* 129 (1) (2001): 79-103; James Cutting, "Rigidity in cinema seen from the front row, side aisle," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 13 (1987): 323-334.

[19] As I conceive it, similarity results from an internal process of recognition, akin to Schier's concept of "natural generativity". Flint Schier, *Deeper into Pictures: an essay on pictorial representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[20] See the debate between Trevor Ponech and Gregory Currie: Trevor Ponech, "External realism about cinematic motion," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 4 (6) (2006): 349-368; Gregory Currie, "Film, realism and illusion," in *Post-Theory: Reconstructing film studies*, ed. David Bordwell and Noel Carroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996): 325-344.

human action.[21] Still, it is about representation of motion, not physical motion in the first place. The central issue is whether or not we should limit the ontology of space to physical objects. If we don't, apparent motion can be a tool for explaining perception of intentional action, as much as physical motion does.[22]

As Christoph Hoerl puts it, apparent motion does not involve necessarily "the visual presentation of something that is moving."[23] Illusory motion is a kind of optical illusion that deceives our mind into seeing motion in a static image. But cinematic motion is not apparent – that is, illusionary – in that sense, "it is part of the phenomenology of our experience that we are visually presented with something that is moving."[24] If we accept that depiction of moving shapes – in cases where there is no moving physical object present – can be actually classed as a genuine instance of motion, than the fact that human motion perception can be studied with devices devoid of physical object becomes understandable.

[21] For an overview, see Randolph Blake and Mary Shiffrar, "Perception of human motion," *Annual Review of Psychology* 58 (2007): 49.

[22] Conversely, it might be objected that there is something physical in the cinematic motion, for, after all, the surface of the picture is a physical component which may interfere with information from the depictive content and thus invalidate the results. However, the surface properties should not be causally effective in cases where that surface is completely transparent.

[23] Christoph Hoerl, "Seeing motion and apparent motion," *European Journal of Philosophy* (2012):19 accessed December 31, 2013 http://philpapers.org/archive/HOESMA.pdf

[24] Hoerl, "Seeing motion and apparent motion," 19.

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RETHINKING FILM MAGIC, A PRAGMATIST APPROACH[1]

Joel Richeimer
United States
richeimerj@kenyon.edu

Introduction

Film magic has many components. Movies have dramatic story lines. There are surprising special effects. There are celebrity actors. Time is compressed. One does not see the characters in films doing mundane things like looking for parking spaces or opening doors (unless it is relevant for the story line). All of those features (and there are many more) contribute to the heightened sense of reality when watching a film. But it is the claim of this paper that there is, in addition, a perceptual factor. This can be seen by considering the camera obscura. The camera obscura has been known since Euclid. Basically, it is a dark room with a pinhole that projects what is outside the room onto a wall. One can often find a camera obscura at science museums. A camera obscura shows nothing more dramatic than the people walking in and out of the museum. It has no plot, no stars, no camera angles, no editing, no special effects, no drama, but people line up to see its visual effect. The world looks remarkably different when seen through a camera obscura - though in ways which are somewhat difficult to articulate. The comings and goings of the museum visitors 'look like a movie'. The camera obscura is, in fact, a movie camera but without the ability to record. What one sees is trivial (museum goers entering and leaving the museum), but there is a heightened sense of reality of what one sees that makes the experience more intense than the ordinary experience of watching people entering and leaving a museum.

The camera obscura is an example of the difference between perceiving an event on film versus perceiving the same event in life. This contrast can be seen in a host of differences.[2] To start, for instance, why does breaking glass in a film not sound like breaking glass? The best way to replicate the sound of breaking glass in life is to break some glass. But that is not true in film. In fact all the sounds have to be modified *to seem real*. Or, for instance, why is acting in a play different from acting in a film? What is it about film that changes how one needs to act? Or, why is music necessary as background in film, particularly in silent films, but not in plays or, for that matter, in life? Or, why wasn't dialogue missed in silent films? Sound was introduced to save money on the music, not for the purposes of introducing dialogue. There was no demand for dialogue in the silent film era. Dialogue was simply not missed. Or how is it that the view of the film screen as seen from *every* seat in a movie theater is skewed and yet this is not noticed by the audience as a problem? And why is it that the only optically correct place to sit in a theater is in the projection booth and, yet reportedly, films lose some of their magic when seen from the only optically correct location? Why is an 'effective musical score' neither heard by the audience nor the characters in the film? Why is a purely subjective film (such as *Lady in the Lake* or *The Russian Ark*) difficult for the audience to track and seems to lose all sense of subjectivity? In other words, why do subjective films lose their subjectivity? What is the sense of reality of film characters? Reportedly, the audience can remember their features better than the people they interact with on a daily basis, including family members. Or why is it that one cannot predict how film would look from the act of filming? There is no dependable trajectory from the act of filming to what

[1] This paper is part of a larger project that attempts to map out the structure of cinematic space, cinematic time, cinematic subjectivity, and cinematic emotions. Most of my work has been on cinematic space. I am using this seminar as an opportunity to work on this draft for an introductory theoretical chapter.

[2] This appears to be the same claim made by formalists (as opposed to realists) in classical film studies. But formalists are making a normative claim. Film *should* not try to copy reality. I am not making any recommendations on how to make a film. I am making a descriptive claim. Film *can't* copy reality. But this does share with the formalists a contrast between ordinary perception and film perception, but without their obsession over the nature of art.

appears on the screen. There seems to be an ineliminable element of trial and error. For instance, it is a necessary ritual in film production to watch the dailies after a film shoot. It is not sufficient to be on the set and watch the performance to be able to know what the scene would look like on film. The same story is true in photography. For instance, in fashion photography, thousands of photographs have to be taken to find one suitable photograph. Yet fashion photographers are at the top of the field of photography, seasoned professionals, with years of experience photographing professional models. The lack of predictability of the outcome of the photographic process is another indicator that we are dealing with a kind of 'an island', an island of how things appear, within our world, or, if you wish, we are dealing with a different 'world'. This list is very far from complete.

What these contrasts reveal, among other things is that the reality *sense* of a film is not the same as the reality *sense* of the world.

Initially we can say that this contrast between ordinary perception and film perception points to two obvious claims. The first obvious claim is that film and photography (for the moment I am not going to distinguish photography from film) give the viewer a sense of heightened reality. There is a significant difference between walking to where you have read this document and watching a film of you walking. The latter is more dramatic. And no doubt this is part of the explanation for the public obsession to photograph all events, including trivial ones.

The second obvious consequence in the comparison between ordinary perception and film perception is that it raises a question about the usual approach in film studies. The standard approach in film studies is to compare film to other arts (such as theater, novels, painting, etc.). A pragmatist approach would, on the other hand, compare film to ordinary life, not to theater or painting. Since all of the arts are non-ordinary experience though in dramatically different ways.

Perceptual constancies

We can begin with a specific problem of how film perception differs from everyday perception. This might give us some understanding of how film heightens our sense of reality. In everyday perception, we experience, what psychologists call, the "perceptual constancies". The so-called constancies come in all varieties: size, shape, color, brightness, etc. For instance, given size constancy, what we perceive does not change in size in spite of the radical changes of the size of the object on our retina. If we saw what was actually on the retina, shapes, sizes, colors, etc. would vary wildly. They vary far less than one would expect from the laws of optics. But constancy is not perfect. There are plenty of exceptions. Constancies break down (e.g. when looking from an airplane window, cars and houses don't look far away, rather they look closer, but as unreal and toy like).

More to the immediate point, constancy breaks down in photography and film. Every amateur photographer knows this. The amateur photographer takes a picture of his friend sitting on a couch and if photographed from a low angle, the photograph will show the friend's legs as disproportionately large. It certainly did not look that way to the photographer at the time of taking the picture.

The problem

Now here is the problem. The brain corrects the optical information reaching the retina in ordinary life. What appears on the retina is skewed, ever changing, etc. But we don't see that. We see a corrected version, hence the constancies. *Then why doesn't the brain do that for a photograph (or for a film)?* Your brain corrects the size of the perceived leg in life, but not in the photograph. If you stand in the same place as the camera, the

situations are *optically identical*. There is no difference in what hits the eye. In terms of film, if you stand on a train platform and watch a train approach, it is not the same perceptual experience as watching a film of the same train filmed from the *same* location. The film version will show the train approaching faster and larger. Why doesn't the brain correct for what we see in photographs and films?

The pragmatist theory

Broadly speaking, the pragmatic framework pushes perception away from consciousness and closer to action. Perception is biologically tied to action. Perception evolved as a way to avoid predators, finding prey, avoiding obstacles, seeking shelter, navigating through cluttered and dangerous environments. We obviously did not develop perception for the sake of looking at films or pictures. But nor did we develop perception for simply looking. Perception is tied to action.

Perception as a form of action was explicitly conceived by John Dewey (1896) as a kind of interaction.[3] Dewey recommends that we don't treat perception as an experience or as a photograph or as an image or even as a conscious event, but as a continuous (informational) interactive loop with the world. Successful perception (i.e., perception that terminates in an action) consists of feedback loops, where there is continuous adjustments to achieve the goal. Perception is typically part of a goal directed activity. For instance, in the traditional (non-interactive) view of perception, we conceive the task of parking a car in a parking lot, as if it is a two stage operation. We see the parking space and then we drive the car to fill the space. It is as if we were taking a photograph: one aims and then we drive. But if Dewey is right that is not what we do – as we drive the car we make continuous adjustments. We used our vision to continuously control our driving. The trajectory of the car is constantly being adjusted from the continuous visual input. The driving directs the visual task. If we were doing something akin to taking a photograph, then we should be able to park the car by looking at the parking space as if it were a photo, *closing our eyes* and then drive. All of the information should be there. But to park a car under those conditions would be very difficult.

Dewey's point is this: if perception is to guide action, it needs to be interactive. There needs to be a continuous feedback loop. So Dewey -- in effect -- is drawing a distinction between interactive perception (that which is tied to action) and non-interactive perception (where perception is not part of action). For Dewey, the difference is a matter of degree. A good example of non-interactive perception is watching a movie.

Peirce's disruption thesis

Typical perception, interactive perception, is what we do all of the time. We don't take note of it. Under normal circumstances the agent is able to retrieve sufficient information to achieve the task at hand, such as walking, keeping balance, avoiding obstacles, driving a car, etc. Typical perception can be maintained when there is sufficient information for the agent to act habitually. Typical perception is perception without awareness or without much awareness. These routine perceptual feats free consciousness to deal with more pertinent and interesting issues. So, we can think about a math problem and walk at the same time. Under this view, *being conscious of one's perception ("perceptual consciousness") is an intermittent phenomenon*. It comes and goes. One is aware of the topic of conversation, what is on one's mind, and a host of other things. We don't bother under normal conditions to be aware of what we perceive.

[3] To be precise, Dewey is not talking about interaction, but about transaction. The difference matters, but not in this context.

Charles Peirce, writing in the mid-19th century and made popular by William James as the "psychologist's fallacy"[4], claimed that if you disrupt these normal, habitual, everyday interactions (if you break the feedback loops) you become perceptually conscious. Perceptual consciousness is a *solution* to disrupted perception. Non-interactive perception makes you perceptually conscious, aware of what you are perceiving.

Under this view, perceptual consciousness, being aware of what you perceive, has a function, a Darwinian function. When information is sufficient, there is no reason to (consciously) 'think'. There is no reason to be aware. One just walks. One just avoids obstacles. One is aware of other things. It is typically the case in evolutionary evolved situations that the information available for the agent is sufficient: in fact, it is usually redundant, for routine tasks.

But when there is *insufficient* information (and there are many ways in which the information necessary for an action, such as walking, can be insufficient), consciousness kicks in to help solve the problem[5]. So, for instance, under normal circumstances, if driving, our consciousness might be directed to what is on the radio or to the conversation to the person in the passenger seat. But, of course, we are still perceiving. We are successfully driving. If we enter a dangerous intersection, the driver's consciousness shifts from the conversation to the situation at hand. The driver initially was perceiving without much perceptual consciousness and her consciousness was directed to the conversation. Then as the driver enters the dangerous intersection, the driver's consciousness shifted to what was being perceived. Consciousness for a waking person is not intermittent. But perceptual consciousness is. We simply don't need to be aware of the pressure of the chair against our back if all is going well.

[4] James (1890).
[5] This leaves open the problem what it is about consciousness that can solve this problem, i.e. why one needs to be conscious.

This, as pointed out, shifts perception from being a type of consciousness to being part of the action cycle. Under the pragmatist view, perception – under normal circumstances -- does not require awareness or, at least, a great degree of awareness. If this is true, then that explains the long and endless debates in philosophy and psychology over what we see. For instance, empiricism, Wundtian introspectionism and phenomenology all attempted to describe ordinary perceptual experience. None of these research programs could come to any consensus, even within their own programs, on a description of what we perceive. In fact, I would argue that these research programs – in practice – abandoned the program of describing perceptual experience. But that makes sense if one is only intermittently aware of what one perceives.

Perceptual constancies revisited

Perception is a type of exploration. If that exploration is disrupted, then we don't get the information we need and we rely on other non-perceptual sources to compensate. If you walk into a familiar dark room and perception does not provide sufficient information to find your coat, you might use your memory to find your coat. In short, you become perceptually conscious. By making us conscious, a number of transformations occur. The relevant one here is that we lose the constancies. This is simply because one now has to notice what one sees. One does not normally do that. There were a number of Renaissance inventions (many depicted by Durer) which immobilizes the viewer so that they can notice what they perceive. And of course what one notices is that the shape, brightness, size, etc. does not remain constant. Photographs and films prevent interaction. They immobilize the viewer. They prevent perceptual exploration.

Typical mundane perception as a kind of exploration can be seen in a range of other phenomena. For instance, when filming with a movie camera or camcorder, the filmmaker can rapidly move the camera in any which way. The rapid movement does not disturb the person filming. But if one watches that very film, it can cause nausea. This is simply the contrast between perception as interaction (where one controls what one sees) and perception as non-interaction (where one does not control what one sees). The same explanation is at work for the contrast between being a driver of a car and a passenger. The driver of a car does not get carsick, only the passengers do. Perception is interactive. It is tied to control and feedback. [6]

The difference between perceiving photographs and perceiving films

Once one acknowledges the role of interaction in typical perception, it is a small step to see that film and photography are specific and different kinds of disruptions of habitual, mundane interactive perception. They prevent in different ways the viewer from exploring. By restricting the flow of information, the agent relies on her resources to make sense of what is seen. The viewer becomes perceptually conscious.[7]

There are two different contrasts being drawn here: film vs. photographs and films vs. ordinary perception. Perhaps the most salient feature of films is that they move. They are, after all, the 'movies', the 'motion pictures', 'moving pictures', etc.

While this contrasts strongly with photographs, it does not seem to contrast much with ordinary life. Ordinary life moves too. But we now have the concepts to make the contrast. In ordinary life, when an event occurs you can reflect on what has happened. For instance, consider engaging in an important or compelling conversation. You were engaged and you were perceptually alert. But now you leave the room. You open the door, you walk down the hall, but you are still thinking about the conversation. You are not thinking about opening the door or walking down the hall. You are still obviously perceiving. You simply shifted from perceptual consciousness (being conscious of what you are perceiving -- the conversation) to non-perceptual consciousness (thinking about the conversation while of course still perceiving).

But when watching a film, you can't do this (unless the film is boring and you are not watching it). *Watching a film is being in a state of perceptual consciousness.* While one *looks* at a photograph, one *watches* a film. When looking at a photograph, you can shift your awareness from the photograph to your thoughts about the photograph. The photograph remains. Perceptual consciousness is intermittent when looking at a photograph. Perceptual consciousness is not intermittent when watching a film. With photographs there is still some interaction, less than life but more than film. One can scan the photograph. One can concentrate on one part of the photograph. Perceptual interaction and perceptual exploration are a matter of degree. Photographs limit interaction too. They do not completely abolish it.[8] Photographs put you in a reflective mode, but they don't prevent you from reflecting.

[6] This points to another research avenue: comparing watching a film to playing a video game. If this analysis is right, they are not visually equivalent.

[7] While there is little consensus on what is being perceived during normal (interactive) perception, there is considerably more consensus in the cases of non-interactive perception, such as a perceiving a photograph. This also applies to the output of machines that don't record, such as Renaissance perspective machines, camera obscura, etc. Broadly speaking, everyday perception is indeterminate. Pictorial perception is relatively speaking more determinant.

[8] Strictly speaking, there is some interaction even when watching a film. There are some head and eye movements. But relative to photography or everyday life, it is highly restricted. Film makers attempt to restrict it even more by various techniques such as "center-of-interest editing". They keep what matters in the center of the screen. That is designed to minimize head movements. Movement of one's head introduces some, albeit minor, voluntary movement.

Watching a film is different. Film watching does not stop. Normal perceptual consciousness is intermittent. But perceptual consciousness when watching a film is not intermittent. This, I contend, opens the door to understanding many of the features of film magic.[9] This is part of the heightening of reality of a film. You are 'pure' perceptual consciousness. In life, this is rare. [10]

But there is something more. One is not just perceptually conscious. One becomes perceptually conscious but without the ability to stop and reflect. We now have reached the central research recommendation of this project. *Films put you in a reflective mode but without the time and without the ability to reflect.* From a Deweyian perspective, perceptual consciousness kicks in for the consummation of an action. (We don't perceive for the purposes of perceiving. We perceive in order to act.) Perceptual consciousness has the function of providing information when there is insufficient information in the flow of information for action. But film consistently frustrates this process. In situations where information is insufficient, where our movements can't gather more, we are in a state of perceptual readiness to gather more information. *For Dewey, one's awareness is heightened when one is looking to complete an action.* Film, as such, is an evolutionary anomaly. Film continually frustrates the perceptual process. The research recommendation here is that this is transformative of perceptual experience.

The test of this thesis, of course, depends on its explanatory power. The question is does it help clarify the nature of cinematic space, cinematic time, cinematic emotions, cinematic subjectivity, etc.

Revisiting the world of film

This begins to give us some grip on the metaphor that there is a 'world' of film or the metaphor that film provides a different 'sense of reality'. There is an intuitive feel that when watching a film one is entering a different 'world'. Such terminology, as mentioned earlier, is ambiguous. Philosophers, in particular, tend to be dismissive of such metaphors. But I think that is mistaken if we can flesh out the ins and outs of the world of film. Film transforms how we experience. It does so by preventing the natural everyday interaction we have with events and objects. We are temporarily disabled.[11] It makes us a kind of tourist. It adds a clarity to life that life itself lacks.

From this point of view, we can begin to understand why the foley artist who needs to add the sound of walking in snow simply does not record the sound of walking in snow. The foley artist adds the sound, not one that a normal perceiver would hear, but one that a hyper-conscious person would hear.

From this point of view, we can begin to understand why purely subjective films (such as *Lady in the Lake*) don't work. If film puts you in a hyper conscious mode, then a subjective film gives you a very specific, very atypical subjective experience. For instance, in ordinary life, when opening a door, one does not watch one's hand reach for the doorknob. But in these films, you do. You see the hand stretch out and grab the door knob. We don't experience opening a door in that way. These films create a self-conscious subjectivity. [12]

[9] There are of course films in which this does not happen. There are boring films, in which one does not pay attention. But then one is not really watching the film. One is thinking about something else. There are also films that invite reflection. Andy Warhol's *Empire* is a 7 hour film without camera movement showing the Empire State Building. From the point of view expressed here, *Empire* does not have the properties of a typical film. It is more like a photograph, so it is no surprise that the viewer drifts in and out of perceptual consciousness. The test of this claim is whether Warhol's *Empire* has the other features of a non-reflective act of reflected perception. I predict it doesn't.

[10] One can, for instance, observe a dramatic event, such as a car accident. It is often said that such events appear in 'a kind of slow motion'. These events are sometimes described as 'just like a movie'.

[11] Another area that needs exploration is how certain disabilities, such as anosognosia, change visual perception. In many of these cases, there is no evidence that the visual cortex is damaged.

[12] I am not claiming that this is the primary explanation

From this point of view, we can begin to understand why 3-D films are different perceptually than ordinary life. In normal perception, we always see in depth. Even two-dimensional displays have some degree of depth (as demonstrated by Gestalt psychologists).[13] So for instance, the letters on this page seem to be on the page, not in the page. Seeing in depth is the norm. But in 3-D films, we don't see in depth, we see depth itself. Seeing depth (itself) is a very conscious act.[14]

Film becomes its own perceptual island. There is a world of film. Film does generate a specific sense of reality. The shape of that world of film can only be uncovered by examining the range of transformations that occur in the cinematic experience.

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for the failure of these films. A deeper reason is provided by Kant: subjectivity cannot be sustained without objectivity. These issues are discussed in the chapter on Cinematic Subjectivity.

[13] Arnheim (1954/1974).

[14] Depth perception in non-3-d films gets a very different analysis.

THE VARIETIES OF MUSICAL EXPERIENCE[1]

Brandon Polite
United States
bpolite@knox.edu

Many philosophers of music, especially within the analytic tradition, are essentialists with respect to musical experience. That is, they view their goal as that of isolating the essential set of features constitutive of the experience of music, *qua* music. Toward this end, they eliminate every element that would appear to be unnecessary for one to experience music as such. In doing so, they limit their analysis to the experience of a silent, motionless individual who listens with rapt attention to the sounds produced by either musicians a on stage, a stereo, or a portable device.[2] This approach is illustrated in recent work by Nick Zangwill. Drawing on essentialist assumptions, Zangwill concludes that properly musical experience is effectively disembodied and radically private.[3] While this seems plausible when we consider the essentialists' paradigm case, Zangwill's conclusion seems odd once we consider the wide variety of ways that people experience music. One's body and social situation seem ineluctably enmeshed within the experience of, e.g., hot jazz played in a nightclub, where listeners bob their heads and dance to the music, cheer on the musicians, and socialize with their fellow concertgoers. The question this paper aims to answer is: should we consider this and similar experiences of music properly "musical"? I maintain that we should. Using the silent, motionless listener as the model, I argue, has in fact shaped the account of musical experience that essentialist philosophers of music have constructed. It is simply question-begging to assume that these other experiences are not properly musical just because they do not fit the essentialist model. In what follows, I show how our account of musical experience changes once we look at different ways of listening to and engaging with music. Far from the world of pure music that Zangwill and others relegate properly musical experience,[4] I conclude that our musical experiences are fully enmeshed within the somatic, affective, and interpersonal dimensions of human life.

The Limitations of Essentialism

Zangwill's account of musical experience rests on a distinction between what we can call *pure listening* and *impure listening*.[5] "[L]istening that has a social or political aspect," Zangwill writes, "is not really musical listening at all, but another kind of a listening, or it is a mix of proper listening and something else."[6] This

[1] Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Ninth Cave Hill Philosophy Conference, held at the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados in November 2013, and the Aesthetic Experience and Somaesthetics Conference, held in Budapest, Hungary in June 2014. I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers and audiences of both conferences, especially Ed Brandon and Alexander Kremer, as well as Knox College's Committee on Faculty Research for funding my travel to them. I also thank Krista Thomason and Eric Chelstrom for helpful comments on prior drafts of this paper.

[2] See, e.g., Peter Kivy, *Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jerrold Levinson, *Music in the Moment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). In contrast to this trend, see, e.g., Kathleen Marie Higgins, *The Music of Our Lives* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Philip Alperson and Noel Carroll, "Music, Mind and Morality: Arousing the Body Politic," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 42:1 (2008): 1–15; and Jesse Prinz, "The Aesthetics of Punk Rock," *Philosophy Compass* 9:9 (2014): 583–593.

[3] Nick Zangwill, "Music, Essential Metaphor, and Private Language," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 48:1 (2011): 1–16, and "Listening to Music Together," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 52:4 (2012): 379–389.

[4] Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*, 489; and Zangwill, "Listening to Music Together," 389.

[5] This distinction has parallels in the theories of both Kant and Hanslick. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153 (Ak. 5:271); and Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution Towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 15, 50–54.

[6] Zangwill, "Listening to Music Together," 382.

impure kind of listening is constitutive of experiences of music that are not properly musical. In contrast, when one experiences music purely, or *acousmatically*, one listens to it as if it were autonomous—that is, without regard for where, when, how, or by whom it is produced, or with whom it is heard. According to Zangwill, this is the only way to attend to and thus experience music properly, *qua* music. He writes, "[S]eeing music as a human product, as people playing instruments, achieving goals, and as historically and politically situated is all a misunderstanding and devaluation of the awesome elevation that musical experience can be."[7] Because impure listening is responsive to more than music per se—particularly, to the somatic, affective, and interpersonal dimensions within which the experience of music is usually situated and away from which pure listening abstracts—Zangwill denies that it is conducive to properly musical experience.[8]

Zangwill also deems the experiences of music afforded by impure listening impoverished compared with those that pure listening affords us. In his view, the sounds that musicians produce are not themselves music; instead, the aesthetically sensitive listener transforms those sounds' auditory properties into musical ones in the act of listening.[9] To listen purely to those sounds is thus to *musicalize* them fully. By restricting one's attention solely to the auditory properties of the sounds to which one attends, one can appreciate their full aesthetic and thus musical potential. In contrast, various ways of listening impurely musicalize the sounds one hears to comparatively lesser degrees. Attending to what oneself or others are doing during a performance (or while a recording plays), because it removes one's attention from the sounds one hears, does not allow their aesthetic properties to manifest fully. Because one does not experience the full musical potential of those sounds, one's experience is less than properly musical.

If we were to accept Zangwill's distinction, then most of our experiences of music would not count as properly musical. Indeed, listeners in most of the world's musical traditions would likely never have had a properly musical experience and would be worse off as a result. To listen to music purely is to treat it as an end itself. But the ways that one listens to the music while attending a punk rock show, singing with friends along to a pop song on the radio, and dancing with a partner to swing music, to mention just a few examples, is bound up within other activities—such as dancing, singing, and socializing—and is directed toward ends beyond merely appreciating how the music sounds—such as working out one's aggression, reinforcing social bonds, feeling connected to the musicians, and dancing well. These other activities and concerns direct one's attention away from what Zangwill considers the proper object of musical listening: the aesthetic properties of the sounds they hear. The object of one's experience, therefore, is not the music itself, but the larger, social activity within which the music is a constituent. Since additional, nonmusical ends constitute the experiences of music that these examples describe, they are not properly musical by Zangwill's lights.

Zangwill's view entails that for an experience of music to be properly musical we must remain wholly spellbound by the sounds we hear, our attention fixed upon and transfixed by their aesthetic properties. Anything that breaks the spell, that significantly shifts our attention away from the music and onto whatever the musicians, our fellow listeners, or we ourselves are doing, however momentarily, will produce a comparatively impoverished

[7] Zangwill, "Listening to Music Together," 389. He agrees with Scruton, who, in *The Aesthetics of Music*, writes: "The acousmatic experience of sound is precisely what is exploited by the art of music" (3).
[8] Of emotions in particular, Zangwill, in "Against Emotion: Hanslick Was Right About Music," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44:1 (2004): 29–43, exclaims: "[They] are a *distraction* from musical experience!" (33).
[9] Zangwill, "Music, Metaphor, and Emotion," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65:4 (2007): 391–400, 398.

experience.[10] Consider the audience at a punk rock show. They do not attend exclusively to the music. They also attend to the spectacle it calls into existence: the sea of bodies set into tempestuous motion by the snarling performers thrashing away on stage. The audience also participates in that spectacle and, together with the band, co-constitutes it. All of this, combined with the nonmusical desires and goals that ground the audience's participation—to be in the band's presence, to hear a particular song live, to connect with their fellow fans, and so on—causes their listening to be impure and renders their experience less than properly musical. The musical element, it would seem, cannot be inalterably extracted from the other aspects of an audience member's experience of the concert, as it both transforms and is transformed by those other aspects. This appears also to be true, *mutatis mutandis*, of singing along to a pop song, swing dancing with a partner, and indeed of most of our experiences of music. In Zangwill's view, it consequently follows that one's body and the social situation within which one hears the music make no significant *aesthetic* contribution to one's experience of music, *qua* music. He thus considers properly musical experience to be effectively disembodied, occurring wholly within the private concert hall between one's ears.

The cases just discussed contrast sharply with those in which concertgoers listen to the music being performed quietly, motionlessly, and perhaps with their eyes closed, such as a typical concert of classical music. Such cases are paradigmatic of properly musical experience, in the essentialists view, because it appears that everything but the sounds and the individual listener's responses to them can be eliminated from her experience of the music. But I contend that this appearance is deceiving. In the paradigmatically "pure" concert space, concertgoers deliberately cooperate with each other, in terms of not so much what they do overtly as what they refrain from doing. Refraining from acting in a given way is itself a type of acting. It is the exercise of self-restraint. The norms regulating the behavior of concertgoers within the classical and other musical traditions specifically require them to refrain from distracting each other and the performers. Concertgoers tacitly agree to listen stilly and silently to the sounds emanating from the stage and to respond overtly to them only after they have ceased sounding or at other sanctioned moments—e.g., at a jazz concert, after the solos. In other words, concertgoers respond to each other continually and systematically, although covertly—in line with norms prevailing within the relevant listening practice—in order not to distract and thereby prevent each other from having the sort of elevating experience of music that Zangwill considers to be particular to pure listening.[11]

Of course, concertgoers within these musical traditions sometimes do have occasion to correct other listeners, and even themselves, overtly during a performance should they transgress the prevailing norms. Someone having a coughing fit, e.g., will either be shushed or silently excuse herself. Individuals who are humming too loudly, or too vigorously tapping their toes, bobbing their heads, pretending to conduct, and so on, will be requested to restrain themselves or forced to leave. As rock musician David Byrne writes, specifically of the classical tradition: "Nowadays, if someone's phone rings or a person so much as whispers to their neighbor during a classical concert, it could stop the whole show."[12]

[10] Zangwill, "Listening to Music Together," 382.

[11] Zangwill, in "Listening to Music Together," writes: "Listening to music is an isolated and lonely encounter with another world, a disembodied world of beautiful sound, far from the world of human life. […] Only by receding away from the human world, from the Other, can we go beyond humanity, to a world of pure music. To humanize music is to desecrate it. Music is inhuman, and awesome because of it, like stars in the night sky" (389). See also his "Against the Sociology of the Aesthetic," *Cultural Values* 6:4 (2002): 443–452, 448–449.

[12] David Byrne, *How Music Works* (San Francisco: McSweeney's, 2012), 22. See also Alex Ross, "Why So

When listeners actively engage with one another during such a concert, their attention will be diverted from the music in a way that will have an appreciably deleterious effect on their musical experiences. Zangwill's view is consequently correct in these cases. However, I argue that his view's correctness is limited to only these cases.

Total stillness and silence, as Byrne notes, is demanded in classical (and other) performance venues so that listeners can attend to the "[the] quietest harmonic and dynamic details and complexities" of the music being performed.[13] But not all music possesses such aesthetic properties. Punk rock, pop, and swing music rarely do. To dance to or sing along with such music does not necessarily distract one's attention from its salient aesthetic properties. Quite the contrary. By slam dancing to a punk song—i.e., by repeatedly hurling themselves into each other—those members of the audience embody its most salient properties: its raucous rhythm, aggression, and reckless abandon. Slam dancing can thus serve as a public manifestation of one's appreciation of punk music, *qua* music. It can also shape how one appreciates the music, as one's responsiveness to and pleasure in the aspects of the music one embodies is amplified, intensified, and modified by embodying them together with other fans in the band's presence.[14] As a result, rather than providing an impediment to experiencing the music properly, *qua* music, as Zangwill would have it, the nonmusical features of the experience—most especially, one's active and reactive body—can positively contribute to it.

This is not to say that every experience of which music is a part ought to count as properly musical. If the slam dancers at the punk show become too aggressive and unruly, they would certainly embody the aggression and reckless abandon of the song being played. However, their embodiment of these aesthetic properties would be largely coincidental to the music and, thus, unmusical. This is because they would be responding far more to each other than to the aesthetic properties of the sounds they hear, which would likely be on the furthest periphery of their attention. To slam dance musically, rather than unmusically, thus requires responsiveness to what is actually happening in the music—just as to sing along musically to a pop song on the radio requires one to stay mostly on key and in time with the music.

As the preceding discussion indicates, Zangwill has a reasonable claim where one accepts his asserting something along the line that some people misjudge music on the basis of a misplaced attention on aspects of a performance other than the music itself. But his further assertion that attention on these nonmusical aspects is always misplaced, I argued, is false. Our bodies and social situations sometimes are constituents of a properly musical experience. Zangwill goes wrong specifically in assuming that because so-called impure listening encompasses *more* than what is essential to engender a properly musical experience that it necessarily affords us experiences that are *less* than properly musical.

What it is to listen to and thereby experience music properly, I suggest, varies from tradition to tradition, genre to genre, and style to style. Proper musical attention depends primarily upon the norms regulating the listening practices within whatever tradition, genre, or style of music to which one happens to be listening. To slam dance at a punk show, dance with a partner to a piece of swing music, or sing along to a pop song, rather than purely listening to the music, does not necessarily mark a failure to treat the music properly, *qua* music. Instead, to respond to the music in overtly somatic, affective, and interpersonal ways is simply what it is to

Serious?" *The New Yorker* (September 8, 2008).
[13] Byrne, *How Music Works*, 22.
[14] In support of these claims, see, e.g., Joel W. Kruger, "Enacting Musical Experience," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 16:2–3 (2009): 98–123, and "Doing Things with Music," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 10:1 (2011): 1–22.

attend to and thereby experience music of these types properly.

Music in the Flesh

Consider the case of swing dancing. To dance well together, a pair of swing dancers must be receptive and responsive to both the music and each other. Each dancer has the complex task of coordinating her bodily movements to certain of the music's salient aesthetic properties—for instance, the vivacity of its rhythm or the playfulness expressed by its melody—and to her partner's similarly coordinated movements. Audition, vision, proprioception, affective response, self- and other-awareness, and overt, often vigorous and sometimes technically demanding, bodily action are all integrally bound up within the dancers' shared activity. Swing dancing thus involves reacting somatically, affectively, and interpersonally to the sounds the musicians produce, rather than contemplating them disinterestedly as one who listens to them purely does. Zangwill recognizes that dancing to music well requires understanding and appreciating it as music. He further recognizes that dancers will often mirror the music's salient aesthetic properties in their bodily movements, which publicizes her musical understanding and appreciation.[15] But he appears to reject what I take to be this claim's principal implication: that by mirroring a piece of music's aesthetic properties, dancers become appropriate site of properly musical attention.

Because swing, similar to most dance music, most often lacks the subtler sort of aesthetic properties that demand pure listening to be appreciated—it is made to be danced to, after all—there is nothing, in principle, to prevent one from fully understanding and appreciating it while dancing to it. Listening to music, regardless of how purely or impurely one may do so, involves selective attention. One attends more closely to certain features of the sounds one hears than to others and, in doing so, musicalizes them more fully than those that have receded to the perceptual background. These latter features, of course, will modify how one hears the former ones. Dancing to music is similarly selective. A swing dancer may embody, e.g., the vivacity of a particular tune's rhythm more than she does the playfulness of its melody. Through embodying these salient aesthetic properties, the dancer becomes them for their duration. In responding in kind to her movements, her partner is thus responding to the music in the act of becoming it himself. To watch them dance together, therefore, is to watch the music come to life in a very real sense. A viewer can thus gain a deeper appreciation of the music than listening to it purely would likely afford. Of course, this is also—and especially—true of the swing dancers themselves. Since watching and responding to one another focuses their concentration upon and heightens their sensitivity to the aesthetic properties of the sounds to which they are dancing, the dancers' respective musical experiences will almost certainly be intensified and enriched.

It is worth mentioning that while listening and dancing both involve selective musical attention, the process of selection will not always be consciously directed. It will more often be somatic or affective. Consider a listener at a classical concert being made aware by an annoyed neighbor that she has been tapping her toes for quite some time. Here, the music's rhythm and tunefulness are so compelling that they infect the listener, take possession of her foot—or, at the very least, animate it—and cause her to act in a way that she knows she ought not to act.[16] Music can also be so infectious as to take full possession of one's body. This fact has been well known since at least the ancient Greeks. It is what

[15] Zangwill, "Listening to Music Together," 388.

[16] For more on musical infection, see Stephen Davies, "Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion," in *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*, Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 134–148.

motivated Plato to place such severe restrictions on the sorts of music to which the citizens of his ideal city could listen. With most types of dancing, though, the aspects of the music the dancers embody is normally selected through the dialectical interplay of conscious direction and musical infection. This is especially true when some amount of choreography is involved and the dancers are well practiced, as is usually the case with swing dancing. As the dancers practice their routine together, their explicit propositional knowledge of how to move to the music is increasingly transformed into tacit bodily dispositions, which are activated by the music. The ultimate achievement would be to reach the point where, instead of needing to think about what movements they must execute to dance to the music well, the music will just flow through their movements. At this point, the dancers would be thinking through their bodies, as Richard Shusterman would put it, rather than with their heads.[17]

What is true of those who dance to music is also true, *mutatis mutandis*, of those who make music. Any musician worth her salt knows that she plays with her hands—or the body parts relevant to her instrument—more than she does with her head. She normally has to concentrate on what her hands are doing only when they flub a note or when the actions they must execute are especially technically demanding. Similar to dancing, playing music need not distract a musician's attention from the music she (and her fellow musicians) produce in such a way that, as Zangwill would have it, her experience is rendered less than properly musical. It simply depends on the particular sort of music that she is playing. For instance, she might not be able to both play trumpet in a symphony orchestra performing Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring* and also attend to the most subtle and complex aesthetic properties of the sounds that she and the rest of the orchestra are producing. But this would be possible with many other pieces of music across a wide variety of traditions, genres, and styles—especially those lacking the subtler and more complex aesthetic properties that most classical music possesses.[18]

Similar to a dancer, a musician can embody the salient aesthetic properties of the music she produces and have a deeper, more intense musical experience as a result. Her body can also become an appropriate site of properly musical attention for those of us in the audience. Think of the grimacing bluesman, the thrashing punk guitarist, the possessed fiddler or jazz trumpeter, and the impassioned diva. Rather than causing our experience to be less than properly musical, as Zangwill claims it must,[19] attending to the drama of the musician or musicians on stage and bearing witness to the thought and feeling they pour into the music opens us to aspects of the music we might have missed had we been listening purely, leading to a deeper, richer musical experience than we otherwise might have had.[20] Not only do we feed off of the musical energy that

[17] Richard Shusterman, "Thinking Through the Body, Educating for the Humanities: A Plea for Somaesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 40:1 (2006).

[18] To take another example, there is nothing, in principle, to prevent the experience of singing along with others to a pop song on the radio from being a properly musical one. The object of aesthetic attention in this case is not the studio recording itself, but instead the music the singers are producing together with it. These individuals are effectively accompanying the singer on the recording, and the object of their musical attention is, for better or worse, the resulting aesthetic whole.

[19] Zangwill, "Against Emotion," 33. Compare to Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 48–49.

[20] Vincent Bergeron and Dominic Lopes, in "Hearing and Seeing Musical Expression," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78:1 (2009): 1–16, similarly argue that the mixture of pure listening with the various so-called "impure" modes of attending to music often enhances our musical experiences, especially by making us more sensitive to music's emotional properties. This point appears to have been confirmed by Chia-Jung Tsay, "Sight over Sound in the Judgment of Music Performance," *PNAS* 110:36 (2013): 14580–14585. Tsay's research demonstrates that, when asked to judge which of a number of performers won a given music competition, "both expert and novice listeners privilege visuals above sound, the very information that is explicitly valued and reported as core to decision making in the domain of music" (14583).

musicians often exude. Musicians in many folk and popular traditions just as often feed off the energy we give back to them through our overt shows of our musical understand and appreciation. As a result, musician and audience can reciprocally elevate each other's musical experiences. In bobbing our heads, dancing, and so on, to the musicians' activities and their sonic results, we similarly embody some of the music's salient aesthetic properties. With smooth jazz, one sways with the musicians to the groove; with hot jazz and swing, one dances vigorously in time with the bass, brass, and drums; with blues, one taps one's feet and moves one's head along with the guitarist's fingers, often grimacing empathetically to the pain she wrings from the strings; with heavy metal, one bangs one's head together with the guitarists; with rock, pop, and hip hop, one sings along with the singer during the chorus; and so on. As attentive audience members responding to and embodying the music in these ways, we show our appreciation not just *of* the music, but also *for* the musicians for affording us the opportunity to experience it, in two senses of *appreciation*: the first aesthetic, the second interpersonal. In doing so, our musical experience appreciates in a third, axiological sense of that term: its aesthetic value increases. These three senses of *appreciation* cannot be separated as easily as Zangwill and other essentialists believe they can be.

Finally, consider the music director, conductor, or bandleader: an individual of whom Zangwill makes no note, but who is usually given a position of prominence in the listener's visual field at classical and some jazz concerts. The music director's role is not merely to direct the (other) performers' actions. She also directs the audience to concentrate upon certain aesthetic properties as the musicians produce them. She does so both by gesturing to the site of their production in the band or orchestra and by mirroring with her baton or hands the properties those musicians are producing—the melodic flow, the rhythmic pulse, the dynamic swell, and so on. By embodying aspects of the music, the music director becomes them for their duration and is thus an appropriate site of musical attention. From watching the music director alone, one can get a minimal sense of what is going on in the music. This is also true of the musicians she directs, especially of a featured soloist, whose physical separation from the rest of the band invites listeners to pay careful attention to both the actions she performs and their sonic results.

In general, there is little apart from the willful exertion of self-restraint to prevent a musician from embodying salient features of the music they make. Where self-restraint is not exercised, the musicians become proper sites of musical attention. There is also little apart from closing our eyes that can prevent those of us in the audience from witnessing the musical drama unfold on the stage. As a result, the musical experiences we have in most classical concerts halls and many jazz halls, which are paradigmatic sites of pure listening in Zangwill's view, can be fuller-bodied than he and other essentialists allow. Moreover, I suggest that we ought to allow these musical experiences to be at least somewhat fuller-bodied than the current listening practice, which traces back to the late nineteenth century, allows them to be.[21] This is because, as I have argued, (first) attending to aspects of the performance other than just the sounds can enable us to concentrate more fully upon the aesthetic properties of the sounds we hear, and (second) embodying some of those properties ourselves—by gently tapping our toes, softly swaying or bobbing our heads, and so on—can deepen and intensify, if even just slightly, our understanding and appreciation of them.[22]

[21] For an in-depth examination of the history of the current listening practice within the classical (and bebop jazz) tradition, see Alexandra Hui, *The Psychophysical Ear: Musical Experiments, Experimental Sounds, 1840–1910* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).

[22] On the likely multimodality of musical experience, see Bruce Nanay, "The Multimodal Experience of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 52:4 (2012): 353–363. On the advantages of seeing a performance live, rather than just listening to a recording through speakers or headphones, see Christy Mag Uidhir, "Recordings as performances," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 47:3 (2007):

Conclusion

In the first section, I demonstrated the limitations of essentialism with respect to musical experience through a critique of a recent, sophisticated, and compelling instance of the view—namely, that of Nick Zangwill. In the second section, I explored the implications of one part of that critique: that certain ways of listening to music involve the embodiment of its aesthetic properties in human action. Throughout this discussion, we noticed the varieties of properly musical experience; the body's centrality within them, as well as its own musical possibilities; the role of emotions, and the way the audience and musicians can feed off of each other and enhance each other's musical experiences. Ultimately, what we noticed is pure listening is not the only mode of attention productive of intense and aesthetically valuable musical experiences.

My aim in this paper has not been to argue that we cannot, in principle, have the sort of musical experience that Zangwill claims is properly musical—even if I did suggest that we might not want to have them. My central claim, instead, has been that a theory of music ought to make sense of our actual lived experiences with music, in all their variety, and capture the ways in which they can rightly be said to be musical. But with the possible exception of those afforded by pure listening, Zangwill's view does not satisfactorily capture our musical experiences. Contrary to Zangwill and others, there simply might be no single set of features essential to every properly musical experience. Instead, a wider set of features, at least some of which must be present in the way an individual attends to a given piece of music, might be constitutive of properly musical experiences.[23] The investigation into what those features might be, however, must be left for another occasion.

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[23] It might even be the case that the object of a properly musical experience need not be music. That is, an individual could possibly have a properly musical experience in the complete absence of musical sound—e.g., while viewing a painting by Wassily Kandinsky or Stuart Davis, watching a music-less dance performance, reading a Thomas Mann novel, or enjoying a meal or a walk through the woods. While consistent with my view, and highly suggestive, I do not have space to examine this possibility in this paper.

A PHILOSOPHY OF TRIATHLON

Tamás Seregi
Hungary
seregitamas@gmail.com

In this paper I will try to conceptualize what we call *endurance sports*, with a special regard to triathlon, that is, a sequence of swimming, cycling, and running. The perspectives I propose are twofold: 1, how does the body function in these sports, 2, what kind of (human) beings do we become during these activities? In order to make my thesis more conceivable I will begin with a brief description of three other branches of sport respectively: soccer, gymnastics, and athletics (track and field).

Soccer is a complex and complete system – it consists of a bunch of regulative and constitutive rules one needs to obey if wants to play it. This makes soccer work like an institution. It is built up by codified rules, which are designed to close the whole system of playing unto itself in order to give each and every act within it a specific meaning. These acts are meaningful and functions only within this system. Apparently, soccer is a kind of play – we play with a ball, and experience pleasure when try to kick, head, or pass that ball. But beyond being a game, soccer is also a true model of interpersonal, human world. The pitch is not a neutral field, on the contrary, it is a territory that has to be *possessed* by the respective teams. Each defend their own territory and fight for the opposing team's. That is why playing soccer is a par excellence political activity, and what is more, resembles its most elementary and ancient version: war. A soccer match is an action-picture, as Gilles Deleuze would say.

A soccer team is not comprised of a homogenous set of players either. In each team there are positions that are defined prior to the players and have spatial and functional determinations. Each position has to be *filled* by a player, and, in turn, they must fill it with their whole character. During a match the players have to activate their whole beings, including their bodies, mind and soul: the players have to inhabit an interpersonal network, they have to be aware of the other players, have to recall previous matches, have to conceive their motivations and believes, calculate their intentions, sense their emotions, predict their actions, understand their strategies, and so on. In this, of course, the players use their bodies to act but they are always beyond their corporeal existence at the same time, and are immersed in a complex situation where the body just makes a part, however important, of a complex intentional system. Games rely on strategy, i.e. a series of actions consisting of causes, motivations, intentions, mediation, tools, partners, aims, and the like. The body is only one of the tools used in these actions, and it must be habitualised if one wants to concentrate to the actions of others and the situations that may occur. One has to leave itself and become part of a meaningful interpersonal world outside him- or herself. Soccer, just like every other game, is a somatic activity, but not a somatic sport. Here the body must be defined as Jean-Paul Sartre defined it: "The body is what I nihilate. It is the in-itself which is surpassed by the nihilating for-itself and which reapprehends the for-itself in this very surpassing."[1]

If this is so, then how can we conceive any sports as somatic? How can anyone be reduced to its body without becoming a pure object? To answer these questions we must clarify how the body might be conceived in the first place. First of all, the body is treated, most frequently in the scientific discourses, as an organic compound of various subsystems: the vascular system, the digestive system, the skeletal system, the nervous system, the muscular system, the immune system, and so on. This conception represents the most in-itself existence of it. In everyday life, however, we do not have much experience of this organization, and usually cannot, and need not, control its subsystems. And even if we can control them, the so called mind–body relation arises from another level of experience, where the mind can or must re-flect to the

[1] Jean-Paul Sartre 1978 (1943): *Being and Nothingness.* Washington: Washington Square Press, p. 309.

body. That is, where the mind can or must come back from the "outside", from the outer world, not to the body as a thing, but to the relation of the body and the world, that is, to the body as a being-in-the-world or as an embodied mind.

This kind of experience can be realized in a direct and in an indirect way. In the indirect way we experience our body as a surface. In this case, surface doesn't refer merely to the outer surface, that is, a face-to-face relation to the outside world. There are surfaces both *on* and *within* the body. In addition to the perceptions of the skin, the surface *on* the body, we receive surface-sensations when chewing, swallowing, feeling replete, taking a breath, having pain in the head, or sensing our heartbeat etc. Somatic affections and sensations are always localized even when they saturate the whole body (e.g. dizzying), or even when they take place in a phantom-body as in the case of phantom-pain. On the other hand, emotions are not somatic experiences, because they transcend the body in an "outward" direction, either to space or time (in the past of memories or in the future of expectations), or to the self as a transcendental psychological entity. When feeling good we do not have a good feeling *somewhere* in the body. Emotions might have somatic causes or symptoms but they are not somatic phenomena themselves.

Therefore, the body is localized both in its parts and as a whole. It has a volume and a mass, it is an extension, takes place and fills a space in the world by folding or even compressing its surface. Nevertheless, extension, volume, mass, and surface only define the borders of the body. It means that they define extrinsic frontiers that can be experienced only from the outside, in an indirect way. The numerous techniques of transgressing and transforming these borders range from torture and cosmetics to aesthetic surgery and diet, but none of these can reach the virtual, that is, the real border of our somatic existence. I will call these "virtual borders" the limits of the body which are always invisible to the subject, even if under particular circumstances they can be experienced. These limits are demarcated by our bodily capacities, our skills and physical conditions, remaining invisible because they take place too close and too far from us at the same time. *Too close* as they cannot be observed but only experienced, and *too far* in the sense that the subject can never know their exact locations, partly because they are always moving. Moving in one direction that is to say they are approaching me till I push them back again, but even when approaching me they remain absorbed by a wide, blurred zone within which they still cannot be caught and tied down. I surely know that I'm able to run as long as 42 km, and I also know for sure that I'm not able to run 400 km, but I will never know how exactly long I would be able to run. In a similar fashion, I will never know how high I could jump, what moves I would be able to perform, or how long I could sustain without sleep. The limits of my body are the limits of my abilities. This is what phenomenologists call the dimension of *ich kann* or *je peux*. Unlike localization, what takes place in these cases is a particularization by and through the body: I am particular because I am able *and* not able to do certain things.

The only sports that can be characterized as truly somatic are those which manage to cut off the body from all the ties created by the praxis of being-in-the-world, and make its limits apprehensible in a positive way. Athletics and gymnastics might be the best examples: the former foregrounds the transcendental dimension of the body, the latter the immanent one. In athletics the body is to transcend itself in two ways – it either has to have something out of itself (throwing, lifting), or has to have itself out (jumping, sprinting). In these cases, targeting (taking aim) is unnecessary and, for that matter, contra-productive, for trying to hit a target is not transcending *the body* but transcending *away from* it. As for the immanent dimension, gymnastics builds up the body out of its most immanent sense, the sense of balance. Gymnastics aims to make

the body as independent and free as possible in a movement in and around itself. There is a crucial difference in the function of jumping: in athletics the aim of a jump is to get the body off the ground as highly or as far away as possible, in gymnastics it is to let it move freely in the air. Athletes use the whole of their bodies to execute these moves, but execution is not the same thing as action. It doesn't need the framework of motivations and intentions that in the everyday world would turn a move into a meaningful action. In their competitions, athletes and gymnasts are not in interpersonal situations. In principle, the gymnasts' floor is not a closed world, but an open field that provides opportunity for the most accurate and precise executions. The equipment the gymnasts use is not like genuine tools either: their function is not to accomplish something but to let the body do whatever it wants and can do. In principle, again.

Unlike a soccer player, an athlete or a gymnast is not a person. He or she does not need his or her personality for the execution. On the contrary, she or he must get rid of it and purge all emotions and memories because they can distract his or her concentration. That is why a gymnast has to meditate before the exercise, and keep up his or her concentration all the way. One might say that athletes and gymnasts are individuals without a personality. Their bodies turn into individual beings as well, not more and not less: they become localized (by proprioception) and particularized (by ability). As their skills improve, the world disappears.

Scholastic philosophers were right in this respect: being a body makes an individual. Locality and particularity together turn the body into an individual being. Individualization, however, is not equal to singularization, because it provides us only with a numerical identity. The body does not make me unique (only occasionally, in the case of my fingerprints), it merely *localizes* (a function even a dead body can perform) and *particularizes* me (for this a living body is necessary). That is why an athlete or a gymnast is but *one* man or woman. That is also the reason why in these sports there is no place for uniqueness or individual style. If something original or unique shows up in the gym or on the athletic field and proves to be successful, then it immediately becomes obligatory for every other contester. In gymnastics and athletics there are only ready-made exercises which athletes practice during the training, but they are remembered and reproduced only by their bodies. In this sense accuracy refers to the effort of making the body remember the exercises, but it is not the person of the athlete that executes them. In athletics and gymnastics there are no situation to act in, no events (only in the cases of inaccuracy), therefore there is no world. and there are no others either, consequently there are no selves. It must be a great pleasure.

GREEN – GREEN – BLUE, GREEN – GREEN – BLUE, GREEN – GREEN – BLUE – swimming in a huge lake. The shore is in the distance, I can barely see it from here. The surface is waving. There is nothing around apart from a close dense space below, sinking into darkness, and a distant glaring space above, with a shining little disk somewhere up there (I cannot see it but merely feel its heat) and some odd things above me, the rudimentary objects after chaos, the clouds. I do not know how far they are. Below me everything is moving, above me nothing is moving. I am unable to observe anything. I cannot focus on any point, partly because I am moving myself. All I have is snapshots from above, and the same vibrating but still picture from below. I cannot see, smell, taste, hear or touch anything as I usually can, and cannot confirm what I perceive. Nothing is happening. The posture of my body is unusual, so are all the movements and functions: I have to take deep breaths, blow the air slowly out, and hold the balance. My body feels like a solid object levitating in a fluid substance, and consuming another substance, air. Some say that when we swim in a lake or in the sea, we are in nature, but this nature does not seem natural at all. In this state, I might be free *from* many things, but not free *for* almost

anything. I am not one with this world. It is not some kind of a being-in-the-world, but – to use Sartre's phrase – a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. My body has become not a somatic but a material being, something similar to the substances around me, although still extraneous to them.

What kind of world is this? For it surely must be one. I am not *away from* the world as I am when playing a game in an artificial world, and not *out of* the world as the gymnasts and athletes are when being enclosed to their bodies. This world overwhelms me, mainly through my sense of touch. I cannot grasp anything but the world touches me on the whole surface of my body, and penetrates me by the heat of the sunshine and the cold of the water. I feel unable to make the distance necessary for representing and understanding the world, or perceiving the things around me as a world, as a meaningful whole. Gaston Bachelard would say that this is the world of substances, that of the four elements (arkhai). But, to be precise, the elements are not the same as physical substances. The main difference is that the elements do not constitute a world, for they are not ontological beings. Elements build up the so called material imagination.

What makes up then the physicality of the world in which I swim? First of all, we've got two substances here. By a closer observation, however, we realize that these two substances, the water and the air, are not on the same phenomenological level. The air we breathe is a real substance, while the water is not a substance but a medium: when immersed in it we utilize its resistance by taking advantage of its density in order to move on. There is also a permanent spatial relation between the two: one is above, the other is below. The light always comes from above, and the pressure increases downward. And finally, there is a surface that separates and sometimes merges the medium and the substance. What kind of world is that, again? The answer is: an ecological world. James J. Gibson writes in his famous book on ecology: "According to classical physics, the universe consists of bodies in space. We are tempted to assume, therefore, that we live in a physical world consisting of bodies in space and that what we *perceive* consists of objects in space. But this is very dubious. The terrestrial environment is better described in terms of a *medium, substances,* and the *surfaces* that separate them."[2] Let me add that substances can function both as materials and mediums. In the remainder of this paper I will try to show that what functions under certain circumstances or for certain species as a substance, can easily become a medium under different conditions. This is exactly what a triathlete experiences when he or she leaves the water and comes ashore.

But before we turn to the way the world is given to a cyclist, and, more generally, to the different experiences provided by the three fields of triathlon, we must specify the ecological character of this world as compared to an ordinary ecological experience. I'll limit the discussion to the two main characteristics.

First, this world is a very abstract one. I am fully aware that abstraction does not sound good in contemporary philosophy. By abstractness, however, I do not refer to something general, universal or absolute, something absolved from experience and from sensory perception. Abstractness simply means something that is not concrete, i.e. that is not defined and determined. That is why abstract experience very often coincides with sensual experience, that is, an encounter with the material world or with emptiness. What is usually called abstract painting clearly shows this. In ordinary life abstractness is not an immediate and natural form of experience. Our experiences are always mediated by objects, actions, situations, stories, and by other people, so what is needed to get to the immediate is precisely a special kind of mediation.

[2] James J. Gibson 1986 (1979): *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.* New York: Psychology Press, p. 16.

The other main characteristic of this world is its infiniteness. As Erwin Panofsky quoted Ernst Cassirer in his famous essay on the renaissance perspective: "The perception doesn't know the concept of infinity".[3] Well, the perception doesn't know it, that is for sure, but the moving body does. Even if it is just a kind of infinity similar to that of the renaissance space: a linear, projective and quantified endlessness – the infinity of further and further, the infinity of more and more. I've got too many friends who decided to quit running after a marathon or an ultramarathon race, only to meet me on the running track a week later. Because there is always something further and there is always something more. This very infinity provides the specificity of this ecological world. Unlike what Timothy Morton calls "bonsai ecology", the ecology of shelter and locality where we feel at home, this ecology is global, that is, not total but open and endless.

But let us leave the water now and turn to cycling. When a triathlete comes ashore and starts riding his or her bike, he or she seems to enter a completely different world. Almost everything has changed: the posture of the body, the way of breathing, the speed of the motion, the temperature, the spatial references, and last but not least, the organization of his or her whole sensual perception. However, by a closer observation again, one realizes that it is not a new world where she arrived (this would be the case if she started to play a game), only a new arrangement of the same components. What previously worked as a medium (the water) now becomes a substance. What was a substance (the air) now turns into a medium. The only crucial change is that what was formerly invisible (the bottom of the lake), now came close to us and turn into a tactile surface, the ground. And from now on, having turned into a cyclist, we can witness the transformation of our ecological existence as well: from a solid thing immersed in fluid (the swimmer in the lake) we ourselves become fluid and start flowing on a surface (that is cycling), or turn into something gaseous or aerial and fly above the ground (that is running). And now we recognize the two fundamental laws. First, that one way or the other everything must be connected to a surface (this is the ecological law). Second, that without mediating or at least extending the body we cannot leave this surface. And even if we do, it is possible only by recreating it. We must take the surface with us even to an airplane or a spaceship (this is the anthropological law). All that can possibly come from mediation and extension by new technologies are nothing else than new kinds of appropriation, that is, new kinds of humanizing the world.

The bicycle is not an extension of the body, and not even prosthesis. It is not an attachment or a supplement to make it longer, stronger or less vulnerable. It does not substitute or replace parts of it while leaving other parts unchanged. Instead, it creates a new inorganic whole to which I must accommodate myself through my body. It is not the bicycle that I must tame like I tame a horse, but the whole of my body. During this process I will never manage to restore that independent organic whole that the body is in gymnastics. Not because I am always beyond it, like when playing games, but because I am *prior* to it.

This priority to my body entails at least two different things. The first is that during a bicycle race I am always part of a bigger whole called bikes field which is the only thing in a race that properly qualifies as an individual. Leaving this field usually coincides with leaving the race. Inside the bikes field there are no individuals. It is rather a physical and psychological force field maintained by its own cohesion that pulls me and to which I must contribute myself by pushing it forward in order to maintain its immanent dynamism without which it would fall into pieces. No independent parts, no hierarchical

[3] Ernst Cassirer 1955 (1925): *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* vol. 2: *Mythical Thought.* New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 83; Erwin Panofsky 1991 (1955; 1927): *Perspective as Symbolic Form.* New York: Zone Books, p. 30.

structure and no prefigured positions to fulfill by my unique personality. The whole flows in the shape of a drop until its inner forces reach a level where the fluid starts to boil, evaporates and then one of the molecules shoots away and wins the race (sometimes only by a photo-finish). That is the only event in the whole race, hardly to be recognized from the outside. (Except for the sporadic attempts to escape during the race, the majority of which are destined to fail. It's horrible to watch).

The second aspect of this priority to the body is concerned with its inner being. Here I refer back to the first definition I gave above: the concept of the body as a compound of subsystems. In endurance sports the participants are too open to form an organic, enclosed, self-containing whole. The different parts of the body are separately connected to the physical and material world by their respective external senses, by their respective senses of balance, by their respective reactions to the changing temperature of air or water, and so on. And while doing these sports one is aware of all the subsystems at work: I have to pay attention to my breathing, to my pulse, to my blood's glucose level, to the acidification of my muscles, to the actual condition of my ligaments, cartilages, tendons and even my bones. My mind tends to be distracted by these local catastrophes increasingly overwhelming my body. Unlike gymnastics, here we are not one with our bodies for we are too beyond and too within it to have a proper somatic existence. A triathlete does not have an organic body but an assembly of separate parts which always tend to disintegrate. At triathlon it is not enough to build up a sequence of meditation and concentration: we must do both at the very same time. This is why the mind cannot become embodied, but has to turn itself into an act of pure attention, a quickly circulating virtual focus-point. And this is why, again, the endurance sports are not somatic activities. The only reward we get for these all is a manifold and immediate connection to the world.

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AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
A VIEW FROM THE MANDARA MOUNTAINS[1]

James H. Wade
United Kingdom
jamesh_wade@yahoo.co.uk

"The body is our general medium for having a world." Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
The Phenomenology of Perception

"Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun."
Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*

"We know not through our intellect but through our experience." Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
The Phenomenology of Perception

"All aesthetic judgment is really cultural evaluation." Susan Sontag,
Reborn: Journals and Notebooks, 1947-1963

"The flesh is at the heart of the world."
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*

"I think it's more accurate to think of aesthetics as a key ingredient in a recipe, as opposed to the icing on the cake."
Stephen P. Anderson, *Seductive Interaction Design: Creating Playful, Fun, and Effective User Experiences*

"The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art"
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*

"I argue that art is a part of man's quest for grace; sometimes his ecstasy in partial success, sometimes his rage and agony at failure."
Gregory Bateson, *Style, Grace and Information in Primitive Art*

"It is only during the last two centuries that the terms "Art" (with an implied capital A, connoting an independent realm of prestigious and revelatory works) and "aesthetics" (as a unique, and even reverential, mode of attention toward such works) have taken on their present elitist meanings and become unavoidably intertwined"
Steven Brown and Ellen Dissanayake,
The Arts are more than Aesthetics: Neuroaesthetics as Narrow Aesthetics

[1] All references are to works written in, or translated into, English. In other ways also, what follows may well be glaringly Anglo-Saxon.

There is evidence for what we deem to be 'art' from at least 40, 000 years ago (Cook 2013) and it is reasonable to suggest that the lives of members of the species Homo Sapiens, and perhaps those of other hominid species, were enriched by experiences we call 'aesthetic' in millennia earlier still.[2] We may assume that philosophical and anthropological discussion of both art and aesthetics dates from a somewhat later period. That observation is not meant to be merely flippant for while the discourse/s with which we are here concerned are individual-centred, the products of *Gesellschaft* thought, the deep history of the aesthetic, and 'art' is rooted in *Gemeinschaft* worlds, community-centred. Our understanding of 'aesthetic experience' should neither ignore, nor relegate to secondary importance, almost the entire history of such experience[3]

Mandara Mountains? That must seem an obscure place from where to ponder the notion of 'aesthetic experience', so a few words of personal introduction. I began teaching in a town close to the Mandara

[2] The recent British Museum exhibition *Ice Age art: arrival of the modern mind*, the occasion for Cook's book, displayed 250 artefacts of aesthetic interest, each transcending the purely instrumental, in age ranging from 42,000 to 10,000 years ago, all from Europe and almost certainly of Homo Sapiens fabrication. These mesmerising objects clearly fall within our conception of 'art'. Since the publication of Cook's book where she reiterated the view that Homo Sapiens had not significantly inter-bred with Homo Neanderthalensis, the opposite has been convincingly demonstrated and there is evidence suggesting Neanderthal aesthetic behaviour. More controversial claims for earlier 'art' have been made, extending as far back as pre-Homo Sapiens times, even to an astounding 200,000 years ago. Be these latter claims as they may, 42,000 years encompasses many, many generations; the aesthetic clearly cannot be ignored in our understanding of cultural-genetic co-evolution.

[3] In his last, posthumously published book (Gellner 1998), philosopher-anthropologist Ernest Gellner reminded us that "There are two fundamental theories of knowledge" that "represent two poles of looking, not merely at knowledge, but at human life. Aligned with these two polar views of knowledge, there are also related, and similarly contrasted, theories of society, of man, of everything." His opening chapters are an extended, and witty, discussion of these contrasting poles, the individualistic/atomistic and that of the organic vision.

Mountains[4] in the mid-1960s. These rugged but relatively low granitic mountains form the borderlands of Cameroon and Nigeria towards their northern reaches. Into the montagnard villages I went, with certain expectations. I suppose my personal pre-disposition inclined me to be enraptured by the beauty and wonder of it all. Anyway, enraptured I was, and I have ever since, in a very on and off way, pursued the ethnography of a smallish ethnic cluster known these days as the Fali.[5]

As I delved into Fali culture, I became perplexed at what I felt was a glaring discrepancy. On the one hand indigenous aesthetics and the very word 'beauty' were, in the literature, conspicuous by their absence, and at least one prominent anthropologist described the encompassing area as being art-impoverished[6]. On the other, I was surrounded by people manifestly concerned with the creation, deployment and celebration of beauty at apparently all sorts of key points in their life-world. Intrigued, I devoted some of my research to this issue during those later years in which the Fali world was transformed almost beyond recognition. The aesthetic component, once so conspicuous, has faded and been degraded almost to oblivion. One must wonder why such a vigorous aesthetic could prove to be so fragile.

The rest of this paper is largely devoted to the explication of Fali aesthetic experience as I understand it to have been in the earlier years of last century, and to more general observations provoked by what I think I understand. To modify a favourite expression of anthropologists, the Fali are definitely 'good to think with'. In trying to make sense of Fali aesthetic ways, and determined to avoid any form of sociological reductionism, I have rummaged among what I take to be some of the relevant notions of aestheticians and philosophers.

My intention is to try and make sense of what I, an observer, take to be the aesthetic dimension in Fali life, to interpretive understanding rather than explanation, but of course from my own general perspective. I think it indisputable that we are *Homo Aestheticus* (Dissanayake 1995), a species with a profoundly 'humanising' *Art Instinct* (Dutton 2009) and that we may rather precisely be described as *The Artful Species* (Davies 2012). With Dissanayake[7], Dutton and Davies I see the aesthetic, 'art'

[4] There are three excellent websites for those desiring an introduction to the historical ethnography of the Mandaras: Gerhard Muller-Kosack's *Mandara Mountains Homepage* (http://www.mandaras.info/); Nicholas David's *Sukur; a culture of the Mandara Mts.* (http://www.sukur.info/) and James H. Vaughan's *The Mandara Margi: A Society Living on the Verge* (http://www.indiana.edu/~margi/) . That of Vaughan is the most personal, evocative and straightforward of these. Judith Sterner's *The Ways of the Mandara Mountains* (Sterner 2003) examines the main socio-cultural themes that characterise the region. Most evocative of all are the much earlier black and white photographs of the late René Gardi, published in, most notably among several books, *Kirdi: Parmi les peuplades paiennes des monts et des marais du Nord-Cameroun* (Gardi 1957).

[5] Each politically autonomous Fali community-chiefdom was until very recently, certainly until colonial times, a classic *Gemeinschaft*, a nucleated settlement complex occupied of a few thousand, characterised by a strong sense of common identity, close personal relationships, and an unquestioned attachment to tradition, that is to both cognitive and affective ancestrally-sanctioned structures. Socio-cultural life was both highly ritualised and aestheticized, but notably produced almost nothing in the way of the figurative carving that has pretty much defined 'African Art' in the canon constructed by European art historians, dealers and collectors.

[6] The place of art, of aesthetics in 20th century anthropological writing, its frequent absence, has not gone unnoticed and undiscussed but still strikes one as extraordinary. On its publication in 1964, John Beattie's *Other Cultures* became the best introduction to British social anthropology, a clear and confident survey of the field. It contained, however, no chapter on art/aesthetics and within its single reference to art we are told that "This is not the place for a discussion of primitive art…" (Beattie 1964: 205). The marginalization of the aesthetic often persists in ethnography.

[7] I was particularly attracted to Dissanayake's notion of art 'making special (1995, Chapter 4) beyond the purely instrumental, and of course an aura of the special attaches to those embellished artefacts, already referred to, speaking to us, in whatever idiom, across 40,000 years or so, as well as it does to the locations of early parietal art, sites often dramatic, imposing, exceptional,

if you will, not against the backdrop of human evolution but as part of that very process, and cannot conceive of any explanation for this most marvellous phenomenon except in broadly Darwinian terms. However, within this credo there is plenty of room for argument, as among the authors I have just invoked[8]. Many millennia of cultural-genetic co-evolution have resulted in our innate aesthetic propensity; however, aesthetic phenomena and experiences, material and immaterial, cultural and of nature, are almost certainly, at one or more levels, socially constructed.

Our perception of African aesthetics has been bedevilled by the European category Art, with that capital 'A'. When numerous mere 'curiosities' rather rapidly became aesthetically admired creations, in other words 'art', much of sub-Saharan Africa was found to be devoid of 'painting' as Euro-centrically conceived, but enormously rich in sculptures easily absorbed into, indeed famously influencing, a new vigorous modernist aesthetic. Masks and figures, both human and animal, were favoured in the process by which these chosen items were removed, often with the barest contextual information, often with none at all. Their indigenous semantic status was seemingly irrelevant; all was in the eye of the (be)holder. Sometimes exotic, colourful multi-media creations, wildly out-of-step with any conceivable European genre were pared down to their basic form and given the status of 'classic', echoing perhaps what had earlier happened to many sculptures of Middle Eastern and Classical antiquity. Others, whose power resided in their secrecy, objects of a twilight zone, were likewise torn from their context and placed in the glare of a new day, de-contextualised and then re-contextualised in alien environments, in a sense utterly transformed. Much twentieth century energy in the art and museum worlds was expended upon the issue of whether 'primitive' art and its creators were more demeaned by exhibiting as 'pure', i.e. decontextualized 'art' ignoring use and significance which usually cannot be inferred from objects per se, or were more demeaned by a contextualising process that implied an ethnographic rather than an aesthetic gaze, thereby relegating said objects to a second class, not really 'art', status. All this is, or should be, so much water under the bridge**,** and you will be familiar with the history of 'the primitive' and 'Primitivism' in twentieth century art history[9], in the history of both anthropology and ideas

idiosyncratic, or deeply hidden far from natural light at imposing locations none-the-less. But 'making special' is of course more widely what we do, and dates from when our ancestors first spun those threads of arbitrary meaning, the webs that provided unprecedented cohesion to proto-communities, and distinguished them from others. As Geertz famously said "Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun" (1973)
Cognitive structures, of significance, of meaning, *per se*, would have been, if in isolation, 'cold'. I suspect their survival, success depended upon the sense of empowerment they engendered, and that such would have been energised by an associated affective structure of feeling. While proto-ritual and proto-aesthetics had limited instrumental value in a world literally without meaning, within the new world, seemingly that of Homo Sapiens, ritual and 'art' probably played a decisive role in the construction of 'hot' embodied structures of feeling, underpinning, energising, the associated 'cold' structures of meaning. The sense of empowerment that ensued we can only guess at, but all of subsequent human history is testimony to its consequences.

[8] According to Dissanayake (2000) the evolved ways in which the human mother and her helpless infant respond to each other are rhythmically patterned vocalizations and exaggerated face and body movements that she calls rhythms and sensory modes. Dissanayake goes on to theorise that these rhythms and modes gave rise to the arts, societies everywhere elaborating these pre-dispositions as music, mime, dance, and display, in rites which inculcate and reinforce socio-cultural norms, including beliefs. Just as rhythms and modes bond the mother-infant pair, in ritual-aesthetic behaviour they bring advantageous cohesion to a group. Dutton, on the other hand, argues that our 'art instinct' is derived from the evolutionary process of sexual selection. Davies is less wedded to any one particular mechanism in the earliest development of our aesthetic propensity, our 'artification' behaviour. In reviewing *The Artful Species*, Peter Godfrey-Smith (2013), in criticising Davies, carries forward this debate in an interesting (re)formulation of his own.

[9] While *Primitivism in 20th Century Art* (Rubin 1984) remains the key text, others of significance include *The Myth of Primitivism* (Hiller 1991), *Primitivism and Modern Art* (Rhodes 1994), *Prehistories of the Future* (Barkan and Bush 1995), and the documentary

more widely, as well as in a partial transformation of Euro-American sensibility. Most closely related to my argument/s here has been the related art/artefact debate (Danto 1988).

Fali Aesthetics

Elements of ritual and of aestheticization, adornment and beautification, often the aestheticized components within rites, are among those aspects of a largely shared culture that most clearly distinguish one Fali community from another. However, for present purposes I shall conflate my data and refer simply to 'Fali' aesthetics, which *in toto* distinguishes Fali communities from others.

Fali aesthetic practice is best seen as a dimension of Fali life rather than an autonomous activity, and aesthetic experience best understood as being largely a shared, collective one. For the ethnographer the issue of projecting his own sensibility rather than apprehending indigenous perception is mitigated by an explicit aesthetic semantic field. And I have to add that, as far as I can recall, I never experienced a marked discrepancy between Fali aesthetic judgement/preference and my own. Briefly, there are two words for 'beauty', one of which has a female connotation while the other is of more general application, both very much used as is the English word 'beauty. A third word *fwari* (Bahuli Fali) refers more narrowly to the added, decorative component, which in some contexts distinguishes from the everyday. A person's *fwari* is their mode of adornment worn on special occasions, such as attending a funeral, but without having to wear a particular, signifying costume. The word *fwari* is also used in connection with such prescribed signifying costumes, with its qualified, more specific nature expressed or simply understood. Notable *fwari* ensembles include those of initiates, and of the dead at funeral rites, between whom there is a symbolic equivalence. Artefacts may also have their *fwari*. For example, the pyro-engraved designs applied to gourds are their *fwari* as are the colour schemes applied to the fittings in women's rooms; even the slight temporary ochre applications to hoe blades, to attract market sale, are referred to as their *fwari*.

A more precise quasi-aesthetic vocabulary of course also exists with reference to skilfulness, whether displayed in forming a pot or in the exuberance of a dance, also to qualities such as the shine of a burnished pot, the perfect balance manifested in a well-made basket or the admired intricacies of richly decorated items. Whether the perceived functions of an object include beautification or not, its aesthetic quality per se, as well as its demonstration of skill or lack of skill, can always be discussed, the artefact in effect decontextualized, appraised simply qua object. Mundane objects, without material modification, sometimes viewed in a quasi-aesthetic way, can also resonate with significance, often with pride; the garden fence in the case of the Baruya of Papua New Guinea (Lemonnier 2012), the arrangement of firewood among the Fali.

Brass casting, a relatively recent addition to their repertoire of technical skills, proved deeply satisfying to a people with a marked socio-cultural disposition towards innovation, notably the elaboration of cultural forms and practices. Seventy or so different, named brasses constituted the corpus[10]; all can be thought of as personal prestige items, many for use in ritual contexts

Primitivism and Twentieth Century Art (Flam and Deutch 2003). In a different, distinctly postmodern vein are the provocative writings of Sally Price (*Primitive Art in Civilized* Places(Price 1989), and *Paris Primitive: Jacques Chirac's Museum on the Quai Branly* (Price 2007), also of Marianna Torgovnick (*Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives* (Torgovnick 1990).

[10] Prominent were an array of bracelets, armlets, and, anklets; also knife handles, beads, smoking pipes, snuff holders, bags and bowls, waist-bands, hats and hoes, finger rings, 'medicine' holders, an seemingly endless variety of bells, stirrups and other horse brasses, even the occasional quiver, and, most especially, contrasting male and female ceremonial dance 'axes'.

but also many for routine personal adornment, a wonderful addition to a person's *fwari*. Nearly all of these were skeuomorphs, based on a remarkable range of prototypes of every material from grass to clay, from leather to iron. In their new, shiny and easily decorated material these artefacts embodied two extra layers of significance; on the one hand they demonstrated wealth and on the other they were more beautiful. As such, brasses were used joyfully, a cause of pride, a prestige marker, something to make the beautiful body even more beautiful. Many brasses were considered primarily as items of beauty, with some implication of wealth taken for granted; others, few and very highly regarded, were associated with a small category of recognized rich men, *brbn*, and demonstrated wealth above all else. Few only were primarily social signifiers, restricted to wear by royals for example, and very few had magical efficacy. I would argue that the desire for aesthetic elaboration was 'a', if not 'the', prime motivating force behind the flowering of a significant local artistry.

Socially-constructed time and space reflected, in Fali idiom, the central fact of Fali life, the mutual-dependency of the indisputable 'good' that is children and the equally indisputable 'good' that is sorghum[11]. Life-cycle time was structured vis-à-vis seasonal time, on the basis of twelve/thirteen-month years with ritual, initiatory, and non-ritual, non-initiatory years alternating[12]. Elaborate aestheticized ritualization rendered 'special' both trajectories in series of numerous, inter-connecting rites.

The complete repertoire of Fali life-cycle rites, distinct ritual behaviours, male and female, including those pertaining to special categories of person such as twins, both large communal affairs and those more narrowly based, those pre-birth and those post-death, altogether these number many scores. Life –cycle rites, complex in themselves, were further inter-connected with a cumulative process of cicatrisation that also extended over many years. From the moment of birth when mother and child are rendered colourful and shiny, covered in red ochre-enriched mahogany oil, to the final removal of the *fwari nga mlan* (*fwari* of the dead) just prior to internment, the human body is of course treated as a cultural artefact, also, I would suggest, as a work of art[13]. Even a cursory overview of that life-cycle is beyond the scope of this paper. It is enormously elaborate and richly aestheticized, particularly so in the series of initiation rites, only slightly less so in the series of mortuary rites, where a number of symbolic equivalences, correspondences to those earlier initiation rites, are played out. Central to Fali aesthetic experience are the body and the trope of the harvest. A full life is

[11] I once asked an old Fali man, Kthlab, a long-time acquaintance but not one of my regular informants, what he knew of his community's history. After a thoughtful few moments, he replied "We are sorghum farmers". And that was it, and in a sense he had been profound, he had said it all.

[12] Northern Fali communities have numerical calendars, in this being typical of many Mandaran peoples, the year commencing with the first rains. The southern ones, commencing similarly, have months named descriptively, each referring to the season, directly or indirectly, or to a life-cycle event in the home, or even in a neighbouring, settlement.

[13] This of course is nothing exceptional, and the literature on the human body as art, its adornment and modification, is enormous. Once largely restricted to the exoticism of the 'other', this literature is now at least as much devoted to home-grown exoticism as Western, including Japanese, sub-cultures have taken to 'tribal' body schema in projecting their alternative identities. In a more down-to-earth idiom, tattooing, body piercing, and more extreme practices are all the rage, and have now become commonplace among 'ordinary' individuals. Ironically, in much of Africa, and elsewhere, such practices have become not only unfashionable, often despised, but are frequently made illegal. Among coffee-table books, *Africa Adorned* (Fisher 1984) is a serious delight; there are innumerable others, outstandingly those of Leni Riefenstahl, *The Last of the Nuba* (1976a) and *The People of Kau* (1976b) Notable academic studies include *Nuba Personal Art* (Faris 1972) *Self-Decoration in Mount Hagen* (Strathern and Strathern 1971), *Nomads Who Cultivate Beauty* (Bovin 2001) and *Reading the Skin* (O'Hanlon 1989), as well as Rubin's compendium, *Marks of Civilization: Artistic Transformations of the Human Body* (Rubin 1988). A striking look at the recent scene is provided by *Return of the Tribal: Celebration of Body Adornment, Piercing, Tattooing, Scarification, Body Painting* (Camphausen 1999).

twice harvested, at the transformation to adulthood, and at death, the metaphor of the harvest being quite explicit at both. At initiation emphasis is upon the immediate ripeness of the initiates[14], the assurance of fecundity and community regeneration. Initiates are praised for their beauty at prescribed ritualized moments and informally by passers-by. On different occasions within the rites the young men and women are both judged and acclaimed for their beauty. Several years later, at his father's behest and expense, a young man may be carried, danced, paraded through his community, and extravagantly adorned as the very epitome of male beauty.

The other, at first sight less obvious, trajectory is that annual one of the sorghum, the grain of life. It begins when the 'Guardian of the Calendar' announces that planting may commence, continues into first, second and third weedings, communal affairs energised as much by song, beer and conviviality as by the prospect of the harvest. A first climax is reached when the fresh, young, tender corn is celebrated in the field with a dance-centred rite. Later when the grain is eventually harvested, threshed and winnowed, it is brought to granary amidst much song and dance, food and beer, all a joyful celebration. All of this has its aesthetic dimension, in common with harvesting in traditional societies most everywhere. Less common I suspect is the creation on the threshing floor of a work of art from the soon-to-be-threshed heads. Sorghum comes in a range of earth colours, from white to rust. Stacked in layers and fastidiously arranged this cupola-shaped construction crowned with a bunch of heads from the full range of colours is an arresting sight[15]. Beyond celebration, pride and beauty, there is, I think, something more to this, perhaps an assurance of successful harvests yet to come, and I was once asked not to photograph such in case by so doing I spoilt its efficacy. The grain granaries, elegantly constructed and arranged in a man's privileged compound upper section are adorned with small nodules of glittering white quartz and worn down hoe blades. If full, a granary may be crowned with a ceramic roof finial of complex and distinctive shape. Finally, this finial, one of several in the case of a successful farmer, is placed upon the owner's grave; having signified one type of harvest brought to fruition, it now does so for the final harvest of that other great trajectory. While granaries are prominently located in the male upper section, it is in one of a wife's rooms that the grain is finally ground prior to cooking, and it is to her rooms that more aesthetic energy is devoted. Many of her clay fittings including the base of her grinding surface are coloured with the black, white and red of the African aesthetic[16].

It is perhaps difficult in our commoditized world to appreciate how very much more a crop can be than a mere food item. Ground sorghum, cooked into a sticky, stodgy heavy 'mash', served as a single large dollop, with which the chosen soup/sauce is eaten, is the basis of

[14] At least in recent years, it is not uncommon for the long primary marriage process to come to fruition, the girl moving to her husband's compound, the very day after the central initiation rite is completed.

[15] The Nuba of the Sudan apparently celebrated their harvests in similar fashion, as part of their own exceptionally powerful aesthetic universe (Faris, 1972: colour plate 13, facing p39)

[16] There is a certain irony here, as these rooms of the wives were generally speaking much less permanent than those of the husband, the compound head. The prevailing 'secondary marriage' system (Smith 1953), whereby women were able to leave their husbands, and immediately establish other, secondary marriages, meant rooms abandoned, temporarily or permanently. This is not polyandry, rather serial marriage with the right of return, and no institutionalized divorce. These secondary marriages were in addition to the initial, primary marriage, the latter the culmination of a long ritualized process and of great importance whether or not cohabitation persisted. . The rooms of a compound's upper, more private male section, though the permanent physical heart of the household, were, with the exception of the sorghum granaries located there, much less obviously decorated than the lower rooms of the wives. (However, many of these upper sections were beautifully constructed and fastidiously maintained. Some of the old men I knew well were aesthetes by any measure.)

every meal, every day. The two types of beer, the everyday one and the 'ritual' one, are both made from sorghum, and I can think of no rite, or 'occasion', where beer is absent. Offerings to ancestors and to a multiplicity of shrines, as well as gifts to innumerable categories of the living and the immediate dead, all these centre upon sorghum, raw or cooked, ground or unground, as beer or food, as the case dictates. Of particular power is that moment on initiation's climactic day when beer, prepared by the guardian of the main community shrine rather than by a woman, is 'ritually' consumed by the boys while it is 'ritually' sprayed from the mouth upon the girls, as both sets dance within the sanctum, to ensure fecundity and thereby the community's future. Prayers, entreaties, to local spirits and to the otiose high god, never fail to implore that women should bear many, healthy children and that the coming harvests should be equally fecund. Without presenting an exhaustive ethnography of sorghum, I hope I have established its instrumental and symbolic centrality to these montagnard farmers, and given some idea of how it permeates pretty well every aspect of significant life.

When I speak of 'significant life' I refer to that shared meaningful life lived within Fali idiom and categories, the life that identified them to themselves and to others. Among the Fali that life is, or rather was, highly ritualized and aestheticized and, not only relative to the world we here in large measure share, but also to other subsistence farming communities, including many at no great distance from themselves. We may ask if there could be a structural explanation for this, or at least an enlightening perspective along structural lines, as opposed to an historical-particularist one. Fali community chiefdoms are strongly bounded, the primary source of an individual's identity, not only vis-à-vis other communities, these always at some distance, but also internally along 'positional' and caste lines, and can thus be approximated to 'strong group' societies. At the same time a 'strong grid' quality is evidenced by the vast ego-centred matrix of personal relationships, constraining and enriching each and every life, those of kinship, those established through marriage, often many marriages, those of neighbourhood, those of both formal and informal friendship, those of ritual obligation, those generated by the dynamics of economic and ritual association and service, and very much those brought into being during rites of initiation when in effect each initiate becomes a member of not one, but three age sets. Such societies are regarded (Douglas 1986)[17] as being disposed to extensive ritualization, and, I argue, also to marked aestheticization. Further, along with several other Mandaran groups, Fali are casted, with each community having around 3-5 per cent of its population belonging to an endogamous caste, of common ethnicity, often referred to as *forgerons* (Sterner and David 1991, van Beek 1991). Called by the Fali *mihin*, (Wade 2012) they, male and female, serve the wider community as craftspersons, diviners, musicians, healers, sacrificers, ritual specialists, cicatrizers, midwives and morticians. So doing, they handle what is perceived to be unclean, of blood, of fire, dangerous. As you would expect all is underpinned by a strong pollution concept. Now, in a tightly-knit, nucleate settlement, occupied by a highly ritualized, strong group, strong grid, though essentially egalitarian community, characterised by an ethos of competitive individualism, with such a caste of multi-specialists close to hand, we have a situation favourable to cultural innovation and elaboration, both material and non-material (Wade 1989)[18]. A rich, and enriching, aesthetic dimension to life

[17] Douglas altered her grid/group theory more than once over many years (Spickard 1989). It is her first, 1986 formulation that I find the most useful, and to which my discussion here refers.

[18] West African montagnard societies were long regarded by many as quintessentially 'primitive' and static, 'cold', this view embodied in two theoretical formulations, the 'hill refuge'(Tambo 1978) and the 'palaeonegritic' (Froelich 1968). They were far from being so. I have personally witnessed several innovations, material and behavioural, entirely within traditional domains, having nothing to do with the socio-cultural impact of modernity.

was, I think, one of the more obvious products of this situation.

Ruminations

Pondering my experience of Fali aesthetics, and aesthetic experience, for this occasion, I shall try to draw some Fali-specific conclusions and then make a few observations of wider resonance.

Fali aesthetically-informed practices and products were 'used' to assert both intra-community and inter-community identity, and were in both their material and non-material forms notable and exploited forms of cultural capital[19]. Their aesthetic experience, in both ritual and non-ritual domains, was effective in embodying, and inculcating a common structure of feeling. In the 'truth' by which Fali lived, both the human body and the sorghum sustaining that body were both beautiful as well as 'good'; aesthetic experience centred upon the recognition, elaboration, refinement and cultural embodiment of that essential truth, with manifest emphasis upon the aesthetics of the body. Ethos and the aesthetic were the two sides of the Fali coin. With absorption into the quasi-modern *Gesellschaft* that is contemporary Nigeria, with the attendant commodification of almost everything including sorghum, and with the inevitable abandonment of many traditional beliefs, feelings and practices, the once joyful and powerful aesthetic dimension of Fali life has shown little resilience. Market kitsch, often baroque, now calls the shots while neither the 'true' nor the 'good' remain unproblematic.

Perhaps most significantly, Fali aesthetic experience was, I always sensed, conducive to a heightened sense of being, at individual, kindred and multiple community levels. What my old informants, sophisticated in the ways of their predecessors, would have thought of the notion of contemplative disinterestedness I shall never know, for sadly I never asked them; had I done so I just might have been surprised.

Finally I should like to suggest that the rhetorical question asked earlier can be answered. The strength of the Fali aesthetic lay in it being so embedded, in its capacity to empower and delight within shared structures of meaning and feeling. Later, its strength became its weakness. As the Fali worldview was undermined, their aesthetic, lacking any autonomous resilience, also collapsed.

Concluding Thoughts

To the outsider, philosophical aesthetics, the mainstream European sort (Wicks 2013), often seems to be extraordinarily narcissistic, obscure, and remote from the 'real' world. Looking beyond the comfortable confines of the anthropology of art and aesthetics, to try and make greater sense of my ethnographic experience, it was only when I read of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics that I experienced a visceral response of 'yes, that's how it is!'[20]

[19] The *mihin*, male and female, especially benefited, not only as craftspersons but also as healers and diviners, both within their home communities and also when called to practice and reside in others. Communities were not isolated and fame could spread.

[20] In the words of John J. Compton (1992), "At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is an attempt to recapture in experience (and to analyse) what it is like to encounter the world in a 'primordial' way-that is, prior to describing and explaining it in objective, scientific terms. Drawing on the gestaltists, he proposes that one's primordial experience is to exist towards things through a living (perceiving, feeling, and acting) body. It is to struggle to achieve an equilibrium with things against the background posed by the global environment, on the one hand, and one's 'body schema', one's developed repertoire of perceptual-motor skills and habits, on the other. Through this reciprocal interplay, as he sees it, one's way of being in the world and the primary perceptual world itself become formed and instituted. Since the environment includes others, one becomes an embodied social being and one's perceived world becomes a social world as well. Each bodily movement, each object one sees and responds to. Each performance

Fortunately, beyond mainstream philosophical aesthetics there has emerged a plethora of sub-disciplines. These I imagine enliven philosophical aesthetics and they are certainly of interest across a wide range of disciplines, perhaps especially at their intersections. The anthropology of art and aesthetics (Coote and Shelton 1992, Morphy and Perkins 2006) refreshes, and is refreshed by, cultural anthropology, art history and aesthetics. Everyday aesthetics (Saito 2007, Leddy 2012) is now both well-known and the subject of lively debate. Eco-aesthetics and the closely related Environmental aesthetics have, together become an enormous and pervasive field[21]. The contributions to evolutionary aesthetics of Dissanayake (1988; 1995), Dutton (2009) and Davies (2012), all writers of significant introductory studies, have been alluded to at length above. Introductions to the rapidly developing field of neuroaesthetics are provided by Skov and Vartanian (2009) and Lauring (2014). There is also of course the subject of this conference, somaesthetics, with Shusterman providing the seminal texts (2000, 2008, and 2012). Inter-connections, among these sub-disciplines, are plain to see and each sub-discipline gains from all the others We might also note that John Dewey's *Art as Experience* (1934) appears to have been a significant influence across several of these fields.. The overall momentum is exciting and of great interest to many of us way beyond the confines of professional philosophy.

Acknowledgements

To Alexander Kremer I am doubly indebted, both for the pleasures of a stimulating and enjoyable conference, and, more personally, for his unrelenting encouragement. To my wife, Márta Galantha, my gratitude for her sympathetic but sharp-eyed reading of a draft of this paper; if verbosity has been avoided, to Márta goes much of the credit.

one carries out is thus, in a sense, an aesthetic achievement-an expression of the meaning of one's individual style within a concrete situation. The involved, living body is to be understood as an expressive medium, and every perception, feeling and action as a work of art."

[21] Berleant (1970, 1992, 2010) and Carlson (1999, 2009), are both professional philosophers who have done distinguished work in this field. David Abram (1996, 2010), himself directly influenced by Merleau-Ponty, writes for a wider audience as does Robert Harrison (1992). Barry Lopez (1978, 1986) and the late Peter Matthiessen(1978, 2001) have been for many years major influences. A tone of restrained and persuasive aestheticism pervades much of the 'new' nature writing, exemplified in the books of Robert Macfarlane (2003, 2012), Roger Deakin (2007), Mark Cocker (2008) and Jeremy Mynott (2009). Saito, who serves on the editorial board for *Environmental Aesthetics*, contributes to this field as much as she does to everyday aesthetics.

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COVER DESIGN AND PAINTING (title: 'Dance of Spring') **BY** *Susanna Kremer*

DESIGN AND TYPESETTING BY *Thomas Kremer*


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