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





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THE CENTRAL-EUROPEAN
PRAGMATIST FORUM - CEPF

Editorial & Advisory Boards

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INTRODUCTION

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Volume number 2 of 2010 presents the key papers delivered at the one-day international conference held in Bratislava, Slovakia, at Comenius University, on June 7, 2010 on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Central-European Pragmatist Forum (established in June 2000 at its 1st conference in Stará Lesná, Slovakia) under the title "The Philosophy of Pragmatism Today". This celebratory as well as working event was generously sponsored by the United States Embassy to Slovakia and the Fulbright Commission in Bratislava and hosted by the Department of Philosophy and History of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts at Comenius. The Dean of the Faculty, doc. Anton Eliáš, provided all comfortable facilities to make this conference a worthy event. Part of it also was a small exhibition of books (donated by the grant of the US Embassy as well as some of the authors present at the conference), recently published by various international publishers. All these publications have become part of the Central-European Pragmatist Forum Library (CEPFL), which thus has been established as part of the Department of Philosophy and History of Philosophy as well as the Central-European Pragmatist Forum (CEPF) itself to serve the studies in pragmatism and American philosophy at this institution. Logically and truly, here is the place to thank all the sponsors and hosts mentioned above who made all this possible. Last but not least, the official launch of the CEPF online journal *Pragmatism Today* was also the part of this particular event.

The meeting was officially addressed by Professor Miroslav Marcelli, the Department Chair, who stressed its importance and relevance to the current philosophical scene in general, and for philosophy in Slovakia in particular. In their presentations, both CEPF co-chairs, Emil Višňovský and John Ryder reflected on the ten years of successful history of this international philosophical community of scholars and students of pragmatism and American philosophy in their broad contemporary contexts. The practical results of this history include six bi-annual international conferences held at various places over Europe (Slovakia 2000, Poland 2002, Germany 2004, Hungary 2006, Czech Republic 2008, Spain 2010) with dozens of participants presenting their papers and some eminent key-note speakers such as Joseph Margolis, John McDermott, John Lachs, Hans Joas, Charlene Seigfried, and Herman Saatkamp. The next bi-annual conference has already been scheduled for Russia (St. Peterburg, 2012) with the central theme "Ethics and Aesthetics: Pragmatist Perspectives". So far four volumes published by Rodopi Publishing House—*Pragmatism and Values* (2004), *Reconstruction and Deconstruction* (2004), *Education for a Democratic Society* (2007), and *Self and Society* (2009)—have been presented to the international readership. The next two volumes, *Identity and Social Transformation* and *Democracy: A Pragmatist Approach*, are under preparation and shall appear in 2011 and 2012, respectively. However, the most important outcome of the first decade of the CEPF activities can certainly be considered the formation of an international network – actually a sort of international community – of collaborating philosophers and scholars who discuss and exchange their views on and in pragmatism regularly; many of them have established their working contacts almost on daily basis. This international group has included for all those years as its active participants (and enthusiastic supporters) such important pragmatist scholars as Larry Hickman, Charlene Seigfried, Jim Campbell, Sami Pihlström, Vincent Colapietro, the late Mike Eldridge, to name but a few of a larger CEPF international group by no means restricted to Central

Europe. But again, here is the place to thank, for their mutual inspiration, all those colleagues who as active participants have contributed more than once to the conferences mentioned above and published volumes as well as far beyond. With such a contribution there is great hope that the CEPF will continue and expand further into the next decade to come.

Pragmatism is not just a North-American school of philosophy today. Even the philosophical roots of pragmatism are not exclusively North-American: they are also general or Western, or European, that is „ours“: the seeds of the kind of philosophy pragmatism and neopragmatism are have been planted by such diverse schools of philosophy as the ancient Greek sophists and Epicureans, the British empiricists and Darwinians, the German Hegelians and Nietzscheans, French Bergsonians and postmodernists, and, perhaps surprisingly, but perhaps not so much, also by Central-European positivists (mostly after they had resided in the US); these latter have been almost equated with pragmatists here for some time, for example by so far the greatest Slovak philosopher Igor Hrušovský (1900-1978).

Today pragmatism has become international, and perhaps we might say – global. It has the potential to be one of the most important philosophical currents in the 21st century and there are plenty of reasons for all of us, not only in Central Europe, to study this philosophy, which is why the CEPF has been established and continues to be active.

The present volume of *Pragmatism Today* opens up with a clarification of pragmatism “then and now” given by Susan Haack – who was the special invited speaker at the CEPF Anniversary Event in June 2010 – in her interview with Sun Yong of China. Vincent Colapietro takes very cognizant stok of what Peirce means for us today. A similar task, in a somewhat shorter version, has been undertaken by Don Morse concerning James and in the form of a synopsis by Jim Campbell concerning Dewey. That pragmatism can hardly be understood, not to say accepted, in Europe, unless we comprehend its links with some coryphaeus European figures such as Kant, has been the incentive for Sami Pihlström to outline these links in his paper. The next two papers, written by Slovak authors, focus on some aspects of pragmatist philosophy: František Mihina and Juraj Žiak elaborate on Peirce's notion of abduction, and Tatiana Sedová on Rorty's conception of redescription. Alas, some of the other papers presented at the conference, have not been, for various technical reasons, included. As a standard item, a book review by Alexander V. Stehn of a recent publication of R. Bernstein in Spanish is, additionally, included.

PEIRCE TODAY

Vincent Colapietro

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Introduction

As difficult as it might be to prove, it seems reasonable to suppose that C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) is as widely read and carefully studied today as at any time in the past.[1] His name is quite broadly recognized, his writings intensely studied.[2] Hardly any serious student of philosophy is completely ignorant of him, having read at least one or two essays by Peirce (more likely than not, "The Fixation of Belief" [1877] and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" [1878]). His name is indeed familiar to many outside of philosophy. Though such a matter is hard (if not impossible) to ascertain, especially with accuracy and certainty, it is likely he is now better understood than ever before. It may even be that, alongside of this, his ideas are also more fundamentally misunderstood and irresponsibly deployed than they ever have been in the past. The reception, comprehension, and appraisal of a thinker by later generations tend never to be of one piece. Even so, this singular genius is truly a living presence on the contemporary scene, in the sense that many of his most central ideas have shaped and continue to shape our intellectual outlook. Despite his influence and stature, there are questions regarding the *availability* of his philosophy (questions to be addressed in this essay). I am using this word broadly, to include the availability of Peirce's voluminous manuscripts, in the form and order in which they were at the time of his death in 1914[3]; that of his thought in the spirit in which it was out forth; and (closely related to the sense just noted) that of his thought in its inherent power to facilitate intellectual transformation.[4]

Given the many-sided character of Peirce's intellectual life and also given fundamental disagreements among even his most insightful interpreters, the task of portraying Peirce today is a daunting one.[5] Any attempt to sketch a portrait of C. S. Peirce today, especially within the limits of an essay, must be highly selective

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[1] This paper grew out of at presentation at the 10th meeting of the Central European Pragmatist Forum (CEPF) at Comenius University (Bratislava, Slovakia) on June 7, 2010. I owe a debt of gratitude not only to Emil Visnovsky for the invitation to offer this sketch of Peirce but also the other participants for their thoughtful responses to this presentation (above all, John Ryder, James Campbell, Sami Pihlström, Susan Haack, and Emil). If this paper is better than that talk, it is in large part because of their questions, suggestions, and criticisms. In addition, Alexander Kremer's encouragement, patience, editorial skills, and philosophical pluralism were critical in transforming this presentation into an essay for this journal.

[2] Since I take it as part of my task to provide contemporary readers, especially ones who might have little familiarity with Peirce's thought, with both an orientation toward this pragmatist and a sense of the intimate connections among Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, I will take care to call attention to what I judge to be some of the most illuminating treatments of Peirce, also some of the connections among these pragmatists. Most of this will be done in footnotes.

[3] See Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Mistunes of the Peirce Papers" in *Signs of Humanity,* volume 3, edited by Michel Balat and Janice Deledalle (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), pp. 1259-1268.

[4] From a Peirce perspective, signs (and thus texts) inherently possess the power to evoke and, in some measure, evoke and even sustain attention and solicitude. No one has written more insightfully and convincingly on this topic than Joseph Ransdell. See especially "Semiotic and Linguistics" in *The Signifying Animal: The Grammar of Language and Experience,* edited by Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 135-185.

[5] To take an example of this, consider the often quite fundamental disagreements among Mats Bergman, Risto Hilpinen, Christopher Hookway, Felicia Kruse, James Liszka, Helmut Pape, Joseph Ransdel,l and T. L. Short regarding Peirce's theory of signs. See "Symposium: *Peirce's Theory of Signs* by T. L. Short" in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, volume 42, number 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 601-693. Also, consider the controversy regarding whether Peirce was in any sense a foundationalist. See, e.g., C. F. Delany, *Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study of the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993); Susan Haack, "Reflections of a Critical Common-sensist," *Transactions*, 32, 3 (1996), pp. 359-373; T. L. Short, "Was Peirce a Weak Foundationalist?" *Transactions*, 36, 4 (2000), pp. 503-528; and Michael Forest, "Peirce and Semiotic Foundationalism," *Transactions*, 43, 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 728-744.

and somewhat idiosyncratic. My own inclination is to interpret Peirce's writings in light of their upshot, the most mature phase of his intellectual development (roughly, from 1898 until 1914).[6] This is the phase in which his thought is most profoundly pragmatist, formally semiotic, and still undeniably experimental.[7]

With respect to pragmatism in general and Peirce in particular, the emphasis on today seems appropriate.[8] This is true especially if the present is conceived as the site of an intersection between "a stubborn past and an insistent future,"[9] the temporally thick expanse *through which* we are moving (one containing within itself to some degree that *from which* the present has come and also that *toward which* it is moving).[10] The "living present" is, to quote Peirce's "Issues of Pragmaticism,"[11] "that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate."[12] Attempting to situate Peirce in the present accordingly involves seeing him as an integral part of just such a nascent state. There is in this figure something determinate with which we must come to terms, a degree of secondness resisting our efforts to make this thinker into our puppet or plaything,[13] but also

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[6] On the issue of selective emphasis, no pragmatist – indeed, no philosopher with whom at least I am familiar – is better than John Dewey. In *Experience and Nature* (1925), he stresses: "Selective emphasis, choice, is inevitable whenever reflection occurs. Deception comes only when the presence and operation of choice [or section] is concealed, disguised, denied. Empirical method finds and points to the operation of choice as it does to any other event. Thus it protexts us from conversion of eventual [or emergent] functions into antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philosophic fallacy …" All references to this work are to the critical edition, i.e., *Later Works of John Dewey,* volume 1 (Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 1988), hereafter cited as (LW 1, followed by page number of text cited). In this instance, *LW* 1, 34. The critical point is to acknowledge the selective emphases structuring and directing specific interpretations, inquiries, or more generally engagements. In my own case on this occasion, this means acknowledging the emphasis on Peirce the pragmaticist, commonsensist, phenomenologist, and experimentalist who was minutely attentive to the pervasive role distinct types of signs play in cognition, query, and indeed experience.

[7] Let one example for a list to which Peirce scholars might add indefinitely. In 1912 (i.e., two years before his death), writing with an infirm hand, Peirce. In *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), T. L. Short stresses, Peirce "was never satisfied with his own statements of the doctrine [of signs]; he was never finished any statement of it. Peirce wrote philosophy 'like a scientist,' setting out ideas not intended as final but to be applied and developed, perhaps by others" (p. xii). The expression quoted here by Short ("like a scientist") are those of Victor Baker, a geologist, offered in conversation with Short. They are the nub of Baker's attempt to explain (in Short's words) "why he [Baker, a trained and practicing scientist] found reading Peirce more rewarding than reading other philosophers" (p. xii, note 3). Short confesses: "This got me thinking. I think it explains why philosophers find Peirce's writings frustrating, and I think it indicates *how Peirce ought to be read"* (ibid; emphasis added). My purpose in detailing this that Short's reflections bring into focus a point I want to stress throughout this paper – Peirce was, in philosophy and everywhere else, first and foremost an experimentalist. He ought to be read (as Short suggests) as such.

[8] Richard J. Bernstein, *Philosophical Profiles* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), p. 272. Also see my "Entangling Alliances and Critical Traditions: Reclaiming the Possibilities of Critique" in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* volume 12, number 2 (1998), pp. 114-133.

[9] John Dewey, "Philosophy and Civilization," *Later Works of John Dewey (*Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 1988), volume 3, p. 6. Hereafter cited as *LW* 3: 6.

[10] As Dewey puts it in "Events and the Future," "every event, or going-on, has a phase of pastness, presentness, and futurity about it." This essay was originally published in the *Journal of Philosophy,* volume 23 (13 May 1926, pp. 253-258, and reprinted in *The Later Works of John Dewey,* volume 2 (Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 1988), pp. 62-68 (hereafter cited as *LW* 2). I am citing the critical edition: *LW* 2, 68. See Bertrand Helm, *Time and Reality in American Philosophy* (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985).

[11] It is significant that in "Issues in Pragmaticism," an essay following the lecture in 1898 ("Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results") given at Berkeley by William James, Peirce focuses on time. In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878), he considered hardness, weight, force, and reality as matters calling for pragmatic clarification – more precisely, as illustrations of how the pragmatic maxim itself *works*. But, in "Issues in Pragmaticism," he notes: "A good question, for illustrating the nature of Pragmaticism, is, What is Time?" (*CP* 5.458). It is in the context of addressing this question that Peirce offers the characterization of the present quoted above.

[12] Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* volume 5 ("Pragmatism and Pragmaticism") edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1934), paragraph #459. Also in *The Essential Peirce* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), volume 2 (1893-1913), edited by the Peirce Edition Project (PEP), p. 358. Cited hereafter as *EP* 2.

[13] In *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), Richard Rorty

something indeterminate, above all a philosophy *in the making* – thus, one calling for the conscientious exercise of our own theoretical imagination. What is generally true of the living present then is keenly true of the philosophical present – say, a philosopher *today*: "The consciousness of the present … is that of a struggle over *what shall be;* and thus … it is *the Nascent State of the Actual"* (CP 5.462; emphasis added).[14] The topic of Peirce today therefore translates into the question, what shall Peirce become here and now? This is only partly a question of what we are able to make of him, for it is also a question of what he is able to make of us.[15] The distinctively pragmatic prefix *re-* is almost certainly appropriate here,[16] for it is far more a case of Peirce re-making than simply making us. How might the study of Peirce re-make our approach and orientation to philosophy?

If at the end of his life William James was working on a book (*Some Problems of Philosophy*) modestly subtitled *A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy*, then it is even more appropriate that I at this juncture offer what is most accurately described as an attempt at a sketch of a portrait of Peirce. Such a sketch can only be essayed from one angle of vision. I highlight this point not to give myself license to present only my interpretation of a figure about whom so many others have written insightfully. For one thing, my interpretation is deeply indebted to various other expositors, including especially my elders Max H. Fisch, Murray G. Murphey, John E. Smith, Richard J. Bernstein, Carl R. Hausman, Joseph L. Esposito, Sandra Rosenthal, Susan Haack, Joseph Ransdell, and above all T. L. Short.[17] The work of

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advocates "strong misreading." Someone committed to such an approach "simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own purpose. He makes the text refer to whatever is relevant to that purpose. He does this by imposing a vocabulary … on the text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and seeing what happens. The model here is not the curious collector of clever gadgets taking them apart to see what makes them work and carefully ignoring any extrinsic end which they may have, but the psychoanalyst blithely interpreting a dream or a joke as a symptom of homocidal mania" (p. 151). My own approach to interpretation (or "reading") is markedly different from that of Rorty, though I too am disposed to argue that adopting insights from an author for purposes are than those animating this individual can be a fruitful and, hence, legitimate procedure. Cf. Justus Buchler, "The Accidents of Peirce's System" in *The Journal of Philosophy,* volume 37, number 10 (May 9, 1940), pp. 264-269, especially p. 269.

[14] Insofar as the continuity between past and future is predominant, the consciousness of a struggle is muted; but insofar as there is conflict, hence a sense of rupture and discontinuity, this consciousness is heightened and intensified. In the intellectual world, at least as it is configured in our historical epoch, the sense of conflict tends to be focal.

[15] The situation here is analogous to the one described by Peirce himself when he is offering an account of the "man-sign" (in particular, when he is responding to the objection that we make language, language does not make us: "Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some men"): "But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols [i.e., by symbols in principle capable of being made public or intersubjective], these [words] might turn round and say: 'You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.' In fact, men and words reciprocally educate each other …" These texts are to be found in "Consequences of Four Incapacities" in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* volume 5, edited by Charles Hartshore and Paul Weiss (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1934), paragraph #313; also in *The Essential Peirce,* volume 1, edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 54. Signs and thus texts exert *an agency of their own.* They are not so much inert stuff into which we, as divine creates, breathe semiotic (or intelligible) life.

[16] Think of such central words in the pragmatist lexicon as reconstruction, reparation, renovation, renewal, recovery, retrieval, reform, remediation, and reconciliation. Of course, the prefix *trans-* is equally central to pragmatism (e.g., transition, transaction, transformation, transfiguration, transitive, and translation)

[17] Max H. Fisch, *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism,* edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986); Murray G. Murray, *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), though originally published by Harvard University Press in 1961; John E. Smith, *Themes in American Philosophy: Purpose, Experience, and Community* NY: Harper Torchbooks, (1970), *The Spirit of American Philosophy* [Revised Edition] (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1983), *Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism* (1984), *America's Philosophical Vision* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), etc. Richard Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), also his edited volume

Douglas Anderson, Nathan Houser, James Liszka, André De Tienne, Cornelius de Waal, and others too numerous to mention (for not doing so I apologize). For another thing, I do not take my interpretation to be simply mine. It squares in most respects, if not here and there in that of emphasis, with those of other interpreters, for the most part the very best of these (e.g., Smith, Ransdell, Short, Hausman, Haack, and Rosenthal). For yet another, a keen sense of alternative interpretations should inform the delicate task of the responsible interpreter.

However flawed or deficient is my work as an interpreter, the exemplar of such an interpreter has guided this work for more than four decades.[18] For such an interpreter, the overarching ideal is obtaining what Peirce himself calls "an interior understanding."[19] As unfashionable as the ideal of such understanding might be in some circles today, the desirability and simply the possibility of grasping an author in accord with that individual's textually inscribed aims, assertions, and arguments virtually define the demanding role of the responsible reader. Obtaining an interior understanding of Peirce's characteristically intricate writings poses formidable challenges. "To read Peirce is," as John E. Smith asserts, "to philosophize, for to follow his arguments it is necessary for the reader himself to be wrestling with the problems Peirce envisaged."[20] Put differently, the reader can be nothing less than a co-inquirer. Peirce is quite explicit about this: the reader "must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration with a congenitally blind."[21] Thus, more than typically is the case, readers of Peirce are drawn into a process of thinking wherein they must

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Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) *The Pragmatic Turn* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). Vincent G. Potter, *Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals* (NY: Fordham University Press, 1997), originally published by the University of Massachusetts Press in 1967, also *Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives,* edited by Vincent M. Colapietro (NY: Fordham University Press, 1996); Joseph L. Esposito, *Evolutionary Metaphysics: The Development of Peirce's Theory of Categories* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980) and his articles in the *Transactions*; Sandra B. Rosenthal, *Speculative Pragmatism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986)*, Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994); Christopher Hookway, *Peirce* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), also his *Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism* (Oxford University Press, 2000); Carl R. Hausman's *Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Joseph Ransdell's various articles, not least of all "Semiotics and Linguistics" (cited above); T. L. Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (Cambridge, 2007) and numerous essays. The work of younger scholars such as Douglas R. Anderson, Michael Raposa, James J. Liszka, Felicia Kruse, Andre De Tienne, Cheryl Misak

[18] In fact, I self-consciously espoused two actual interpreters of American philosophy as exemplars of philosophical interpretation – John E. Smith and Richard J. Bernstein. It was relevant to me that both were careful students of Western philosophy, going back to the ancient Greeks, also that both devoted attention to such pivotal figures as Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein and a host of others. As a young scholar, Smith's *The Spirit of American Philosophy* and Bernstein's *Praxis and Action* were especially important and instructive to me. In sum, they have served as my models, hermeneutic but also philosophical. In an important essay on Dewey – "John Dewey: Philosopher of Experience – included in *Reason and God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Smith suggests: "It is impossible to expound or interpret philosophical ideas without giving at least implicit critical judgment; but implicit criticism is not enough; appraisal of a more positive [or at least explicit] sort is called for" (p. 107). He concludes this essay with a rhetorical question and then an emphatic assertion, "what better tribute to a distinguished philosopher can one offer than the attempt to think his thoughts after him and thus become engaged in a critical way with the problems he faced?" "We respect most those philosophers," Smith immediately adds, "we take seriously enough to criticize" (p. 114). The task of the interpreter, pragmatically conceived, is accordingly to make the work of an author *available* for judicious critique and creative appropriation. This is at least what I have learned from the example of Smith and Bernstein.

[19] *Peirce's Contributions to the Nation,* edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech Press, 1975), volume I, page 33.

[20] John E. Smith, Foreword to Vincent G. Potter's *C. S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals* (New Fordham University Press, 1997), p. xxv.

[21] *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* volume 1, edited by Charles Hartshore and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1931), paragraph #286. Hereafter this and all other volumes of the Collected Papers will be cited, as is customary, by CP 1.268 (volume 1, paragraph 286).

exercise a degree of phenomenological attention and logical acumen comparable to that of the author. The verbal argument is at most only stage setting; the heart of the drama is the invocation of experience and, indeed, the attempt to register accurately the felt force of relevant experience.[22]

In this sketch of Peirce, then, I hope to convey some sense of a vast, intricate terrain, quite apart from my favorite haunts and habitats within this expanse. But, in addition to conveying some sense of the actual terrain of Peirce studies, I will exercise my philosophical judgment regarding what remains most promising and fruiting for the ongoing appropriation of Peircean pragmatism. Peirce's abiding relevance to the intellectual (not just the philosophical) world is a point about which thinkers and commentators who disagree about much else agree. His relevance cannot be gainsaid.

In addressing the topic of Peirce today, I am addressing both the current state of Peirce studies and the thought of Peirce itself.[23] I do not take my task to be simply surveying the work of commentators, champions, and critics. Such a survey must always refer back to the writings of Peirce, not hesitating where instructive to highlight those respects in which they have been faithful to his texts and those others in which these texts have been slighted, distorted, or in some other way ineptly or unfairly handled.

Before doing so, however, allow me a word about the context of philosophy today, the context in which my reflections on Peirce today must be situated. From a Peircean perspective, even the best philosophy today is an excessively verbal enterprise.[24] We certainly cannot dispense with words, but words ought to be used by philosophers principally as invocations of experience, occasions for observation. Moreover, philosophy is, despite encouraging developments within the analytic tradition, still an unduly ahistoric (at times, anti-historical) discipline,[25] especially when one considers not simply the narrow history of philosophy but the inclusive history of culture.[26] So, too, it tends to be too insular a discipline. Professional philosophers read in an extremely selective manner, very rarely paying serious attention to anyone outside of the hothouse tradition in which they were trained, even more infrequently taking notice of what is going on in other disciplines. What

[22] In *Peirce's Theory of Signs,* T. L. Short astutely points out that: "The same is true of Husserlian phenomenology and Descartes' *Meditations*. These are not forms of philosophy that consist in verbal argumentation; rather words are used to direct the reader to his own experience, and it is that experience, and not the words themselves, which carries the burden" (2007, 71).

[23] Douglas Anderson, "Old Pragmatisms, New Histories," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* volume 47, number 4 (October 2009), pp. 489-521; also Sami Pihlström, "Peirce's Place in the Pragmatist Tradition," *The Cambridge Companion to Peirce,* edited by Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 27-57. For an assessment of the latter collection in general, however, see Risto Hilpinen, "Notes on the *Cambridge Companion to Peirce," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, volume 41, number 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 740-761.

[24] See T. L. Short, "Pierce on Science and Philosophy" in *Philosophical Topics* (2008). 2007; 2008

[25] It is significant that the editors of *Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997) – Nathan Houser, Don Roberts, and James Van Evra – selected as an epigram for this collection of essays Augustus De Morgan's claim, "All the men who are now called discoverers, in every matter ruled by thought, have been men versed in the minds of their predecessors, and learned in what had been before them" (*A Budget of Paradoxes,* volume I, p. 5). Though this claim might need to be qualified, it is generally (if in a strict sense universally) true. In any event, it is manifestly true of the logician on whom the essays in this volume are focused. It is certainly noteworthy that, in "Charles Sanders Peirce," Josiah Royce (with W. Fergus Kernan), a scholar of vast erudition, two years after Peirce's death and the very year of his own, considered Peirce to be a philosopher who united very wide knowledge of the history of philosophy with a generally fair-minded disposition to a discriminating criticism of philosophers, and with a capricious, though generally very well restrained interest in philosophical polemic, whose arts he regarded with a general skepticism and pursued with a usual moderation" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* volume 13 [1916], p. 701).

[26] A book such as Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), the exception which proves this rule, makes this painfully clear. He connects philosophical history not only with the broader intellectual currents but also the fine arts, religious developments, political upheavals, and even subtle shifts in everyday life.

Michel Foucault observed in 1968 is, at least, as true today as it was then (more precisely, as true of philosophy in the United States and in countries significantly influenced by the dominant paradigm of Anglo-American philosophy now as it was of philosophy in France then): "Philosophers are generally very ignorant of all other disciplines outside their own."[27] Finally, it is a discipline in which a love of truth is far from being manifest. To many within this discipline,[28] the idea (let alone the ideal) of truth is not infrequently something of an embarrassment.[29]

It is far from certain whether Peirce would be more successful in the contemporary academy than he was in that of his own day. It is equally uncertain whether his style or manner of philosophizing would be more congenial or acceptable to our contemporaries than his own. Neither of these points necessarily speaks against Peirce. He was and remains an unsettling philosopher even more than a difficult personality.[30] In honestly confronting the challenge of his thought, we realize that continuing with business as usual is in many respects unjustifiable. As much as anything else, it means taking up anew the task of instituting a cooperative inquiry in which selfless concern for attaining a rational consensus about difficult questions is more than an irrational hope.[31] In light of such considerations, we are forced to conclude that the institutions and disciplines of our own day are likely no more welcoming to Peirce than those of his own. We might conclude from this, so much the worse for these institutions and disciplines!

But, then, Peirce did not seek disciples. He sought co-inquirers, philosophers who were animated by a contrite sense of their own fallibility but also a high sense in the possibility of *our* efforts to attain knowledge.[32] Such

[27] Michel Foucault, *Foucault Live: Interviews 1966-84,* edited by Sylvère Lotringer (NY: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agent Series, 1989), p. 41,

[28] In his own time, Peirce observed: "Science and philosophy seem to have been changed in their cradles. For it is not knowing, but the love of learning [the passion to discover what we do *not* know], that characterizes the scientific man; while the 'philosopher' is a man with a system which he thinks embodies all that is best worth knowing. If a man burns to learn and sets himself to comparing his ideas with experimental results in order that he may correct those ideas, every scientific man will recognize him as a brother, no matter how small his knowledge may be" (*CP* 1.44).

[29] T. L. Short, "Pierce on Science and Philosophy" in *Philosophical Topics* (2008); also Susan Haack, *Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and Its Place in Culture* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), especially chapters 7, 9, and 10.

[30] For informative about, and insights into, Peirce's character and personality, see Joseph Brent, *Charles S. Peirce: A Life* [Revised and Expanded Edition] Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). As helpful as Brent's biography is, it tends to allow a preoccupation with the difficult and unattractive aspects of Peirce eclipse the admirable and even heroic ones. For Peirce's commitment to discovery was, in my judgment along with those of many others, was nothing less than heroic.

[31] In a late manuscript, included as an Appendix to volume 1 of the *Later Works of John Dewey,* that pragmatist sagely observes: "The adoption of an empirical method is no guarantee that all the things relevant to any particular conclusion will actually be found or pointed to. …But the empirical method points out when and where and how things of a designated description have been arrived at. It places before others a map of the road that has been travelled; they may accordingly, if they will, re-travel the road to inspect the landscape for themselves. Thus the findings of one may be rectified and extended by the findings of others, with as much assurance as is humanly possible of confirmation, extension and verification. The adoption of empirical, or denotative, method would thus procure for philosophic reflection something of that cooperative tendency toward consensus which marks inquiry in the natural sciences" (*LW* 1, 389-390). Whether or not this is sufficient to transform philosophy into a science in any recognizable or acceptable sense, it certainly does insure that might come to embody "something of that cooperative tendency toward consensus" characteristic of sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy, and biology.

[32] In *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, volume 1, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1931), we read as the conclusion of the Preface pieced together from several manuscripts by the editors: "Indeed, out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my philosophy has always seemed to me to grow …" (*CP* 1.14). Earlier in this Preface, we read, "in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution as the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers" (*CP* 1.7). Such an endeavor marks a radical breach with the dominant tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition in which apodictic certain and

faith is just that – faith – and in order for it to flourish it must be conjoined to hope and love. The texts in which Peirce expounds this doctrine are worthy of quoting at length. In his judgment,

> logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of being s with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the world, is, as seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle.[33]

In addition to this but also to our faith in our colleagues and, indeed, the possibility of our efforts and sacrifices converging with theirs to further our common undertaking, "there is nothing in the facts to forbid out having a *hope*, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community may last beyond any assignable date" (*CP* 2.654; also *EP* 1, 150). There is nothing in the facts to preclude the hope that our communal endeavor will approximate its defining objective before all potential members of this inclusive community are obliterated. Of course, Peirce is aware of how odd or even implausible his position must sound, especially to tough-minded thinkers. He readily concedes: "*It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments*, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in an unlimited continuance of intellectual activity, *as indispensable requirements of logic*" (*CP* 2.655; also *EP* 1, 150; emphasis added). But, he argues, this becomes plausible when we consider logic in the light of its service to inquiry (indeed, logic as a theory of inquiry, more precisely, as a normative theory of objective investigation[34]):

> Yet, when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which as it terminates, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt [i.e., other modes of investigation] fail on account of the social impulse [see, e.g., "The Fixation of Belief," specifically CP 5.378-381, also in EP 1, 116-118], why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasonings?[35]

The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity[36] are thus transfigured by Peirce into logical sentiments indispensable for the conscientious pursuit of

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demonstrative arguments tend to be defining ideals of this extensive tradition. On this point, Peirce is explicit – better, he is emphatic: "Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be done is simply to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers" (ibid.).

[33] "The Doctrine of Chances" in *Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* volume 2, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1932), paragraph #654 (*CP* 2.654); also in *The Essential Peirce,* volume 1 (1867-1893), edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 149 (*EP* 2, 149). What is especially salient in terms of the point being made is that Peirce argues for these points in the context of an otherwise highly technical discussion of induction.

[34] By *objective inquiry* I simply mean that process of discovering what we do not know, ranging from the discovery of singular facts (e.g., where I misplaced my keys or who broke into my house) to that of laws. We not only undertake such inquiries but also we are in countless instances successful (I occasionally do find my keys, scientists sometimes hit upon the laws governing what we observe).

Arguably the most succinct and accurate overview of this part of Peirce's contribution to philosophy is Elizabeth Cooke's *Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: Fallibilism and Indeterminacy* (London: Continuum, 2006). Of course Cheryl Misak's *Truth and the End of Inquiry* and other writings as well as Susan Haack's expositions are very valuable resources, but better known ones – hence, my desire to make a point of stressing the value of Cooke's study

[35] See Chapter 10 ("Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry" in Christopher Hookway's *Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[36] Peirce explicitly takes not of the correlation or coincidence (i.e., co-incidence): "It interests me to note that these three sentiments seem to be pretty much the same as the famous trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, which, in the estimation of St. Paul, are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts. Neither Old nor New testament is a textbook of the logic of science, but the latter is certainly the highest existing authority in regard to the dispositions of heart which a man ought to have" (*CP* 2.654; or *EP* 1, 150-151).

experimental inquiry (the only form of inquiry in which our way of proceeding exposes itself to the radical risk of fundamental error). The pursuit of knowledge and even knowledge itself are accordingly definable only in reference to an array of virtues.[37] In this respect as so many others, Peirce anticipated later developments, not least of all what is called today "virtue epistemology."

Ideally, the reality of community – hence, that of the community of inquirers – is the concrete, growing embodiment of nothing less than faith, hope, and *caritas*. Actually, the community of inquirers is never anything more than a motley association of more or less companionable antagonists disposed to challenge, question, and refute one another. On countless occasions, however, the exchanges of these antagonists exemplify the exercise of the virtues requisite for discovering the truth. But the danger is always that such an association will provide little or nothing more than occasions for displays of cleverness, at the expense of others. When the youthful Peirce wrote of "the inhumanity of the polemical spirit."[38] (W 1, 5), it is likely he wrote with a fuller wisdom than he consciously or personally possessed. When motley associations of companionable antagonists degenerate into predominantly polemical affairs, we witness not only the degradation of humanity but also the disfigurement of inquiry, at least in the Peircean sense. This most tough-minded of philosophers was also a tender-hearted person: he was, in his own words, a sentimental conservative.[39] The work of inquiry is, for such a conservative, indissociable from the cultivation of certain sentiments, indeed from the acquisition of certain virtues.

If the technical, formal side of Peirce is allowed to eclipse the human, moral side, then Peirce in his unsettling otherness, his irreducible singularity, will be unavailable to us today, above all, to us in our efforts to re-institute philosophical investigation as an experimental undertaking in which the discovery of novel truth is the soul of the entire endeavor. Unquestionably, the technical, formal side of this thinker deserves painstaking, critical attention. For the most part, it is almost certainly the side most worthy of our consideration (the theoretical or intellectual obstacles, as distinct from the emotional and cultural ones, are here the most formidable). Given the inherent difficulty of the intricate issues with which Peirce was preoccupied (e.g., continuity, meaning, and reality), also given his novel approach to these challenging topics, this side ought to be one to which minute scholarship and philosophical imagination are devoted. My only caution is that our understandable fascination with the theoretical intricacies and challenges of this side of Peirce not be allowed to thrust completely from view Peirce the avowed sentimentalist.

The simple fact (albeit for some the uncomfortable fact) is Peirce was an avowed sentimentalist and, in attempting to sketch his portrait, this aspect deserves to be highlighted, especially at a time when sentimentalism is among philosophers and other intellectuals in such disrepute.[40] His sentimentalism is an attempt to give

[37] "The most vital factors in the method of modern science," Peirce insists, "have not been the following of this or that logical prescription – although these have had their value too – but they have been the moral factors" (*CP* 7.86; cf. *CP* 2.82). It is instructive to recall what Peirce judges to be foremost among these factors: "First of these has been the genuine love of truth and conviction that nothing else could long endure" (ibid.). Cf. Susan Haack, "The First Rule of Reason" in *The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce,* edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 241-__' also her "Concern for Truth: What It Means, Why It Matters" in *The Flight from Science and Reason,* edited by Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt, and Martin W. Lewis (NY: New York Academy of Sciences, 1996), pp. 57-63.

[38] *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), volume 1, p. 5. Hereafter cited, as is customary, as *W* 1, 4.

[39] Christopher Hookway, *Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism.* Also Haack

[40] The same might be argued regarding Peirce's commitment to anthropomorphism. See especially *Collected Papers,* volume 1 and 5 (specifically CIP 1.316, 5.46-47, 121, 212, and 536).

sentiments, emotions, and feelings their due,[41] to grant in our philosophical accounts the affective dimension of human life the status and indeed centrality this dimension exhibits in our experience and practices.[42]

A Philosopher's Philosopher

The strictly philosophical stature of Peirce today is more secure, his influence more pervasive and profound, his leading ideas more carefully explicated and accurately understood, than at any time before our own. The publication of a critical edition, although far from completion, has contributed greatly to this state of affairs. Especially since the time of the founding of the Charles S. Peirce Society in 1965, there has been a cumulative growth in the critical understanding of this singular genius. This is not to slight the work prior to the founding of this Society. Indeed, work published prior to the establishment of this organization richly rewards the careful reader, most notably Justus Buchler's *Charles Peirce's Empiricism* (1939),[43] Thomas Goudge's *The Thought of C. S. Peirce* (1950), W. B. Gallie's *Peirce and Pragmatism* (1952), Manley Thompson's *The Pragmatic Philosophy of C. S. Peirce* (1953), and above all Murray G. Murphey's *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy* (1961). Both the First Series (1952), edited by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, and the Second Series (1964), edited by Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin, of *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce* contain essays worthy even today of careful attention.

In addition, the sesquicentennial celebration in 1989 of his birth did much to focus and solidify this growth, while the forthcoming centennial commemoration in 2014 of his death promises to accomplish nothing less than this with respect to the developments since 1989. A number of volumes were generated by this congress,[44] certainly not least of all a collection of the plenary sessions – *Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries* (1995), edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner.[45] At the risk of slighting equally noteworthy scholars, allow me simply to list a number of individuals who in various disciplines, or from different countries, have contributed so significantly to the study of Peirce today: Milton Singer, Valentine Daniel, Eugene Halton, Hans Joas, Anne Freadman, Drude von der Fehr, Fernando Andatch, Dmitri Shalin, Anne-Lise Middelthon as well as younger scholars such as Susan Falls, Paul Kockelman, and Torill Strand.[46]; also of course Gerard Deledalle (France), Klaus Oehler (Germany), Winfried Nöth (Germany), Helmut Pape (Germany), Santaella (Brazil), Umberto Eco (Italy), Teresa de Lauretis (Italy and the US), Susan Petrilli (Italy), Augusto Ponzio (Italy), Sami Pihlström (Findland), Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (Findland), Mats Bergman (Findland), Torjus Midtgarden (Norway). In sum, the thought of Peirce is alive and well and living in philosophy and other disciplines.

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[41] See David Savan, "Peirce's Semiotic Account of Emotion" in *Proceedings of the Charles S. Peirce Bicentennial Congress* (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech Press, 1981), edited by K. L. Ketner et al, pp. 319-333; also chapters 9 ("Sentiment and Self-Control") and 10 ("Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry") in *Hookway, Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism.*

[42] In one place, he goes so far as to assert, "those things which are own hearts assure us are true, – such as the doctrine of love" (*MS* 862).

[43] It is rarely the case where an original philosopher in his own right also proves himself to be such a penetrating expositor of another thinker. But this is manifest true of Buchler vis-à-vis Peirce.

[44] These include *Peirce and Value Theory: Peircean Ethics and Aesthetics,* edited by Herman Parrett (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1994); *From Time and Chance to Consciousness: Studies in the Metaphysics of Charles Peirce,* edited by Richard S. Robin (Oxford: Berg Publishers, Ltd., 1994); *Peirce's Doctrine of Signs: Theory, Applications, and Connections,* edited by Vincent M. Colapietro and Thomas Olshewsky (The Hague: Mouton de Gruter, 1996).

[45] *Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries* (1995), edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner (NY: Fordham University Press, 1995). A number of other volumes were generated by this sesquicentennial conference, including *Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce,* edited by Nathan Houser, Don Roberts, and James Van Evra (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997);

[46] Milton Singer's *Man's Glassy Essence: Explorations in Semiotic Anthropology* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984); E. Valentine Daniel, *Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), also his *Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Even so, it is likely that Peirce will remain for the most part a philosopher's philosopher. Dewey's characterization of Peirce as such a philosopher deserves to be recalled here. Indeed, Dewey is in general a very insightful interpreter of Peircean pragmatism. In a review in *The New Republic* (1937) of volumes 1-6 of The *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, he suggested Peirce

> flung abroad many stones, sometimes pebbles, sometimes boulders, when he was sowing germinal ideas. … He united … a disciplined mind and an undisciplined personality. The combination is an unusual one. Its product is the appearance in his writings of not only such difficulties as may be expected when a thinker is breaking new fields, but of perplexing contradictions and multitude of starts that get almost nowhere. Moreover, there is hardly any subject that he did not touch …[47]

This worked against Peirce's accessibility to most of the readership of *The New Republic.* At least this is Dewey's conclusion: "In consequence, Peirce will always remain a philosopher's philosopher. His ideas will reach the general public only through the mediations and translations of others."[48] (*LW* 11, 480). In truth, Peirce's availability even to other philosophers depends significantly upon the mediations and translations of those who have made his writings a focus of study.

A philosopher's philosopher is nonetheless a theorist's temptation. Accordingly, theoretically inclined representatives of other disciplines and discourses (e.g., sociology, anthropology, linguistics, history, literary theory, and cultural studies) have been and will continue to be inclined to enlist Peirce's services in advancing their fields of study. The uses to which Peirce has been put will not necessarily accord with either the spirit of the letter of his writings.[49] But the uses most in accord with Peirce's aspirations and aims are not necessarily those determined by philosophers, in particular, by contemporary philosophers (and, among these, by philosophers who all too often all too slight and superficial acquaintance with the history of their own discipline). Consequently, philosophers have in this context no right to be proprietary (at least to be presumptively proprietary), especially since Peirce was always more than a philosopher. Peirce does not belong to them. There is in my judgment no better characterization of him than that of experimentalist: he was a thinker devoted to trying out new ideas, thus to testing ideas in terms of their experimental consequences. As a result, he was more interested in opening fields of inquiry (think here of his study of signs or logic of vagueness) than in presenting in systematic form the certain conclusions of past investigations. He designed his classification of sciences as an *instrument* of inquiry. The same must be said of his theory of signs. Indeed, this is as true of any of his doctrines. Consider, for example, his *synechism* or doctrine of continuity. Synechism is first and foremost a principle of methodology.[50] In other words, Peirce's principal

[47] John Dewey, *Later Works of John Dewey* (Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 1991), volume 11, p. 479-480. This review of volumes 1-6 of the *Collected Papers* originally appear in *The New Republic,* 89 (3 February 1937), pp. 415-416. It was preceded in *The New Republic* (30 January 1935), pp. 338-339, by a review of volume 5 ("The Founder of Pragmatism"). This is reprinted in *LW* 11, pp. 421-424. Other insightful treatments by Dewey of Peirce are "Peirce's Theory of Quality" and "Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning." The former originally appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy,* volume 32 (1935), pp. 533-544, and was reprinted in *Later Works of John Dewey,* volume 11, pp. 86-94. The latter first appeared in also in the *Journal of Philosophy,* volume 43, pp. 85-95, and was printed in *Later Works of John Dewey*, volume 15, pp. 141-152.

[48] *LW*, 11, 480.

[49] Short generated something of a firestorm when pronounced, at the outset his book: "Peirce's theory of signs, or semeiotic, misunderstood by so many, has gotten in amongst the wrong crowd. It has been taken up by an interdisciplinary army of 'semioticians' whose views and aims are antithetical to Peirce's own, and meanwhile it has been shunned by those philosophers who are working in Peirce's own spirit on the very problems to which his semeiotic is addressed" (*Peirce's Theory of Signs,* p. ix).

[50] In a characteristic pronouncement, Peirce asserts: "Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and

preoccupation was with the logic of discovery, not the logic of exposition – truths not yet known, not truth already captured and tagged. He judged philosophers in this own day to be excessively antiquarian – insufficiently inquisitive.

Though I have stressed that the formal, technical side of Peirce ought not to be allowed to eclipse the human, sentimental side, the former deserves sustained, systematic, and painstaking study. One reason for Peirceans to be encouraged today is that just this side of Peirce's contribution to philosophy has increasingly solicited such study. Peirce tended to identify himself simply as a logician[51] and Peirce the logician has been carefully studied by a number of trained and indeed gifted logicians, most prominently Jaakko Hintikka, Risto Hilpinen, Don Roberts, Randall Dipert, Robert Burch, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, and Susan Haack. Peirce also was keen to identify himself as a scientist, insisting that he had his mind molded by his life in the laboratory" (*CP* 5. 411; also in *EP* 2, 331). *Peirce's Scientific Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Chance Law, and Evolution* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002) by Andrew Reynolds is one of the most important contributions to Peirce scholarship in recent decades. But the "laboratory life did not prevent the writer [i.e., Peirce] … from becoming interested in methods of thinking" (*CP* 5.412; also in *EP* 2, 332). Quite the opposite, such a life made of Peirce above all else a philosopher preoccupied with questions regarding methods of inquiry, though hardly indifferent to the specific discoveries made concerning substantive issues. He characterized himself as "a life-long student of reasonings" (*CP* 3.415). This specific facet has also received considerable attention by some of his very best expositors (e.g., Haack, Short, Ransdell, Ketner, Delaney, and Hookway). In this regard, the work of Cheryl Misak and Peter Skagestad is also helpful. There is however a tendency on the part of analytically trained philosophers to fit Peirce to contemporary concerns and debates rather than re-envisioning the possibility of transforming contemporary philosophy in light of Peircean ideas. Misak mostly avoids doing so, but not entirely. The bid to make Peirce respectable to mainstream philosophy is, at once, admirable and risky: he certainly deserves a hearing from those who are part of what is in obvious respects are the best trained and most rigorous professional philosophers today, but *he* deserves a hearing (i.e., he does not deserve to be trimmed to the fashions of the day). This invites us to reflect on what I am inclined to identify as the availability of Peirce's philosophy.

The Availability of Peirce Today

For reasons quite apart from Peirce being a philosopher's philosopher, his thought is still not optimally available to us today. As paradoxical as this might sound, I want to stress the degree to which Peirce's philosophy is unavailable to us at present. It is illuminating to explore why this is the case. In framing the matter in this manner – in focusing on the availability of Peirce's thought – I am following the example of an essay by Stanley Cavell ("The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein"). "It is a vision as simple as it is difficult. … To attempt the work of *showing* its simplicity [and thereby its difficulty] would be a real step in making available Wittgenstein's later philosophy."[52] (Cavell, 52). What Cavell asserts regarding Wittgenstein I am disposed to claim regarding Peirce: "The first thing to be said in accounting for his style is that he *writes*: he does not report, he does not write up results." (70). "Nobody would forge a style so personal [or so

examined" (*Collected Papers,* volume 6, #173 [*CP* 6.173]). But since he does not shy away from offering hypotheses in the context of metaphysics, it turns out that Peirce commits himself not only to the reality of continuity (continua *are* real) but also the more or less seamless character of countless realities. Even so, synechecism is for him first and foremost a methodological counsel, not a metaphysical doctrine.

[51] This is somewhat misleading since what he meant by *logic* is wider than what is customarily designated by this term. In Peirce's writings it often signifies nothing less than the theory of signs (or semeiotic) in its entirety. Cf. Fisch, *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Peirce.*

[52] Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* [Update Edition] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 52.

forbidding] who had not wanted and needed to find the right expression for his thought" (ibid.). If anyone supposes that this comparison to the later Wittgenstein is strained or implausible, that individual should consider Peirce's self-revelation: "what I write is done in the process of forming a conception" (*MS* 339).[53] In other words, writing was for Peirce, as it was for Wittgenstein, not a means of reporting what he had discovered, but a process of discovery.

First of all, Peirce's writings are still not available to us. Despite the herculean effort of the Peirce Edition Project for a number of decades, the boxes of manuscripts acquired by Harvard University in 1914 from his widow Juliette[54] are now in greater disarray and incompleteness than they were at the time of that acquisition. Put otherwise, the manuscripts acquired by Harvard in 1914 are not exactly those possessed by us today.

Beyond this, Peirce's thought is not optimally available to us. The principal reason is that (to invoke the counsel of Emerson) the spirit in which his texts are to be interpreted is the same spirit from which they flow.[55] This spirit is experimentalism, one inclusive of fallibilism.[56] But professional philosophers tend to hanker for deductive argumentation and conceptual closure far more than experimental proof and heuristic fecundity. Another reason is that the love of truth tends so often to be displaced by the love of notoriety or that of vainglory. Yet another reason is that the work of philosophers is carried out at too great a distance from the work of scientists (and this implies not only at too far a remove from the spirit of science but also a detailed familiarity with some of the best work in contemporary science). Professional philosophy is too often marred, if not destroyed, by vainglorious polemics.

The gulf between mainstream philosophy and the Peircean project, however, is not as wide as these considerations might be taken to imply. As Short notes, "there are deep affinities of aim and method between Peirce and analytic philosophers: each identify [sic.] philosophy as a cooperative mode of inquiry rightly dividing into numerable specialized studies, usually highly technical."[57] "Neither is," he immediately adds, "interested in amusing or in edifying a popular audience." "All the same, Peirce was not an analytic philosopher." The main reason is that he did not identify philosophy "with verbal argument or with finesse and finality of verbal formulation."[58]

Making Peirce's thought available to us today practically means exposing ourselves to the radical risks of experimental inquiry. It means according observation, experience, and experimentation a much more prominent role in philosophical discourse than they tend to exhibit today. It involves being open and willing to learn to ask different questions than the ones we are

[53] Cf. Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs,* p. 182.
[54] See Victor F. Lenzen, "Reminiscences of a Mission to Milford, Pennsylvania." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 1, 1 (Spring 1965), 3-11. This is the first article in the inaugural issue of this important journal. It is an account of Lenzen's visit to Milford, Pennsylvania, in behalf of Harvard to acquire Peirce's papers and library from Juliette.
[55] "Whatever cumulative growth there has been in the stream of classical philosophy has been achieved," Justus Buchler contends in "the Accidents of Peirce's System," "not by modifying a ready-made system, but by the partial or limited acceptance of a given philosopher's work through discriminating selection, and this is where the homogeneity [or coherence] of the previous system was far greater than in Peirce" (*The Journal of Philosophy,* volume 37, number 10 (May 9, 1940), p. 265. "To strain principally for the conservation of his picturesque architectonic [as Paul Weiss does in "The Essence of Peirce's System"] will scarcely be to provide the corrective which he [Peirce] lacked while alive. It would be better," Buchler adds, "to honor him in the act, learning from the rich conceptions and potentialities of his thought by intelligent discrimination rather than by the esthetic contemplation of their dubious unity" (p. 269).

[56] The heart of fallibilism is no better identified than by William James in *The Will to Believe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), a book dedicated to Charles S. Peirce: "Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf. At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empirical [or experimental] philosopher" (p. p. 25).
[57] Short, "Peirce on Science and Philosophy," p. 275.
[58] Ibid.

accustomed to raise far more than seeking in his texts answers to our questions. The history of philosophy *is* a resource for insights and even answers to contemporary questions. But its deeper value is to explode the insular present, exposing our contemporary modes of query[59] to the potentially disorienting forces of alternative perspectives.

A candid look at the actual history of American pragmatism reveals something startling. Pragmatism was even in its inaugural phase more than an American philosophy. After all, the role accorded by Peirce to the Scottish psychologist Alexander Bain is quite telling here. On more than one occasion, Peirce recalled that "a skillful lawyer"[60] and spirited member of the Metaphysical Club, Nicholas St. John Green, urged upon Peirce and the other members "the importance of applying Bain's definition of belief, as 'that upon which a man is prepared to act.' From this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him [Bain] as the grandfather of pragmatism" (*CP* 5.12).[61] Also, his genealogy of pragmatism is instructive. In one place (and there is no possibility of here quoting anything but one text), Peirce acknowledges: "Socrates bathed in these waters. Aristotle rejoices when he can find them. They run, where least one would expect them, beneath the dry rubbish-heaps of Spinoza" (CP 5.11). Here he also mentions John Locke, Immanuel Kant, George Berkeley, and Auguste Compte. Of equal importance, pragmatism in its Jamesian re-inauguration in 1898 was very quickly an international movement. Pragmatism today is as vibrantly represented in Finland, Italy, Germany, and other countries as in US.

Peirce today is as much as James, Dewey, and Mead an international figure. More or less contemporaneous with this gathering,[62] André de Tienne is lecturing in Japan on Peirce. This coincidence is hardly insignificant, for in a small way it points to a fact of large importance. So, to repeat, Peirce today is an international figure. A number of scholars from a number of countries find in his writings resources for addressing contemporary issues or reorienting contemporary debates.

To repeat, Peirce today is an international figure. For me, this is an occasion for celebration. One reason for this is that Peirce provides invaluable resources for developing a non-reductive naturalism. No one has done more to make these theoretical resources available to the contemporary world than T. L. Short. Short's efforts, following the lead of Peirce, to show how thoroughgoing mechanism is inadequate to explain some of the most prominent phenomena in the natural world are, at once, deeply Peircean and philosophically innovative in terms of the details of his argumentation.[63]

[59] Justus Buchler has proposed to use the word query in a very broad sense so that it encompasses not only inquiry in the Peircean and allied senses but also other forms of probing and interrogation (e.g., that of the composer at the piano playing now this, now that, as a means of exploring possibilities for the piece on which s/he is working). See his *Nature and Judgment* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1955), also *Toward a General Theory of Judgment* [Second, Revised Edition] (New York: Dover, 1979).. In order for Peirce's theory of signs to attain the generality he sought, it might be necessary to make query rather than inquiry the central concern.

[60] It is noteworthy that today the resurgence of pragmatism includes a number of trained lawyers who are also legal theorists, most notably Richard Posner, Michael Sullivan, and Kory Spencer Sorrell. Of these, Sorrell is the one most deeply acquainted with Peircean pragmatism and indeed indebted in his own thinking to this particular pragmatist.

[61] Alexander Bain, *The Emotions and the Will* (Third Edition), chapter 11, p. 505.

[62] As I noted at the outset, this essay grew out of a presentation at a meeting of CEPF taking place on June 7, 2010. As a way of keeping a sense of the contemporaneity of this sketch, I am retaining this occasional reference. On June 18, 2010, André De Tienne presented at Kyoto University a talk entitled "Peirce's Conception of What Is Fundamental in Philosophy." This is obviously but one example of Peirce's international stature, but an illuminating one nonetheless (a scholar originally from Belgium, who now is Director of the Peirce Edition Project, lecturing at a major university in Japan being a noteworthy fact).

[63] In addition to the relevant sections (most obviously Chapter 5 – "Final Causation") of *Peirce's Theory of Signs,* consult at least "Teleology in Nature" and "Darwin's Concept of Final Cause: Neither New nor Trivial." The former appeared in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, volume 20, number 4 (October 1983), pp.

Another reason why Peirce's international stature is an occasion for celebration is that his philosophy invites – indeed, demands – interrogation of the limits of the naturalism for which his voluminous writings provide such indispensable resources. As unfashionable or embarrassing as Peirce's traditional theism makes many of his contemporary followers or readers (that is, *us* today), it helps us avoid being smug or, worse, militant naturalists who paint religion as never anything but malicious folly and who portray believers as (at best) benighted fools. Matters are, at least from a Peircean perspective, more complex and undecidable than this.

Conclusion

In many circles, the resurgence of pragmatism has not entailed a renewal of interest in Peirce.[64] Critics of neo-pragmatism as often as neo-pragmatists themselves can be quite dismissive of Peirce. Peirce's "contribution to philosophy was," in Rorty's judgment, merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated James."[65] Leaving a session of the annual meeting of SAAP, a friend of mine who is a Peircean caustically characterized the Society as a congregation of Dewey-eyed pragmatists[66] who at best suffer the presence of Peirceans. He was simply tired of being dismissed or patronized by Deweyans who were out to save the world. I can still hear him grumbling about these self-congratulatory Deweyans actually knowing quite little about Dewey and far less about the world.[67] Saving the world is unquestionably a praiseworthy undertaking. Undertaking to do so by talking to other philosophers however hardly seems to be the most effective way of achieving or even simply approximating one's objective. The charge by my friend was unfair, even if the frustration is not altogether unreasonable. But the outburst of irritation is emblematic of how more than a few Peirceans often feel about their treatment by other pragmatists. So, the growing community of Peirce scholars runs mostly, at least strikingly, parallel to the contemporary resurgence of the pragmatist perspective. There are of course intersections. Richard J. Bernstein is, for example, a contemporary pragmatist who is intimately knowledgeable of the main currents in contemporary thought, including neo- and paleo-pragmatism. While the main focus of his concern tends to be social and political philosophy, he is anything but dismissive of Peirce. Indeed, one of the best essays in recent years is Bernstein's "Experience after the Linguistic Turn."[68] The turn toward language need not entail the jettisoning of experience. Contra Rorty, we cannot do everything – and more – with the Wittgensteinian notion of language-game that the pragmatists were trying to do with experience. In no small measure, Bernstein here makes the case for retaining the pragmatist conception of human

311-320, the latter in *Biology and* Philosophy, 17 (2002), 323-340.

[64] This is of course not true of Richard J. Bernstein, from whom I have borrowed this expression. See "The Resurgence of Pragmatism," *Social Research* 59, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 813–40. For my critique of Bernsterin's re-narration of the development of American pragmatism, see "Engaged Pluralism: Between Alterity and Sociality" in *The Pragmatic Century: Conversations with Richard J. Bernstein,* edited by Sheila Greve Davaney and Warren Frisina (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), pp. 39-68

[65] *Consequences of Pragmatism,* p, 161. This passage is found in "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," Rorty's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society. "Peirce never made up his mind what he wanted a general theory of signs *for,* nor what it might look like, nor what its relation to either logic or epistemology was supposed to be." From Rorty's perspective, Peirce "remained the most Kantian of thinkers – the most convinced that philosophy gave us an all-embracing ahistorical context in which every other species of discourse could be assigned its proper place and rank" (p. 161).

[66] This caustic characterization of Deweyan pragmatists seems to have been coined by the historian John Patrick Diggins. In this regard see his *The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994) but especially his contribution ("Pragmatism and Its Limits") to *The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture,* edited by Morris Dickstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

[67] In a recent issue of *The Nation,* Dewey was identified as one of the fifty most important progressives in the twentieth century (to be precise, he was ranked fifth, after in order from first downward Eugene Debs, Jane Addams,

[68] This is Chapter 6 of *The Pragmatic Turn* (Polity Press, 2010), pp. 125-152.

experience by means of Peirce's categories. It is a nuanced and (in my judgment) compelling argument.

Peirce today invites us to read him not so much as a contemporary but as a contributor to philosophy the day after tomorrow.[69] If we are to go beyond Peirce, we first have to catch up to him.[70] Peirce today is still a philosopher who outdistances us, one whom we are yet trying to overtake.

Peirce was in some respects benighted and arguably even worse.[71] But he was also a philosophical genius and (in some respects) heroic individual, a thinker more profoundly a *pragmatist* than many pragmatists today realize or appreciate.[72] One way in which this is evident is in terms of one of his principal philosophical preoccupations, the clarification of meaning. In what might strike some students of pragmatism as surprising, Peirce insists:

> When one seeks to know what is meant by physical force, and finds that it is a real component acceleration of defined amount and direction that would exist whatever the original velocity, it is possible to press the question further and inquire what the meaning of acceleration is; and the answer to this must show that it is a habit of the person who predicates an acceleration, supposing him to use the term as others do. *For ordinary purposes, however, nothing is gained by carrying the analysis so far;* because *these ordinary commonsense concepts of everyday life,* having guided the conduct of men ever since the race was developed, *are by far more trustworthy than the exacter concepts of science;* so that when great exactitude is not required they are the best terms of definition. (*EP* 2, 433; emphasis added)

His writings from 1898 to his death in 1914, many of them not yet available in print, reveal as thoroughgoing and subtle a form of pragmatism as anyone has to date articulated and defended. He was moreover more radically an *experimentalist* than most philosophers today acknowledge or even glimpse. His indefatigable efforts to institute philosophy as a cooperative inquiry have done little to help transform the discipline of philosophy into a science. But is such a transformation either possible or even desirable?[73] Even if philosophy can never be transformed into a science – even if philosophy must always be an unruly family of barely coordinated discourses – it might nonetheless become more deeply and minutely experimental than it is today. Finally, Peirce was more of a *philosopher* than most contemporary philosophers are, since he was devoted to

[69] "As philosophy finds its footing in this new millennium, there is," Nathan Houser wrote in 2005, "some reason to suppose that Peirce will play a larger role in setting its course than anyone would have expected during most of the half-century that followed the 1951 publication of Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'" ("Peirce in the 21st Century" in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, volume 41, number 4 [Fall 2005], p.729. Friedrich Nietzsche. Stanley Cavell, *Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow* (Harvard University Press).

[70] In the Preface to *Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries* (NY: Fordham University Press, 1995), K. L. Ketner astutely notes: "While the ideas of honoring pioneers ad of seeking further progress surely appeal to all scientific intelligences, it is poor economy of research to dash ahead without being fully aware of the progress made by one's ancestors. That is to say, how can we go beyond Peirce if we have not yet caught up to the waypoints he reached? That Peirce was ahead of his time, and in some respects is still ahead of our time, is a theme one finds recurring in serious Peirce scholarship" (p. xi).

[71] Even given the standards of his day, it is impossible for me not to cringe when I read in one of his letters to Victoria Lady Welby: "Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and necessarily nothing can appear to be sillier than rationalism; and folly in politics cannot go further than English liberalism. The people ought to be enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone can maintain their rule." *Semiotics and Significs,* edited by Charles S. Hardwick (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 78. The same is true when I read: "f they were to come to know me better they might learn to think me ultra-conservative. I am, for example, an old-fashioned christian, a believer in the efficacy of prayer, an opponent of female suffrage and of universal male suffrage, in favor of letting business-methods develop without the interference of law, a disbeliever in democracy, etc." etc. (MS 645).

[72] Before I die I intend to write an essay entitled "Peirce *Was* a Pragmatist," addressed primarily to those pragmatists who disparage Peirce *as a pragmatist.*

[73] Vincent M. Colapietro, "Transforming Philosophy into a Science: Debilitating Chimera or Realizable Desideratum?" in *ACPQ*, volume LXXII, number 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 245-278.
Mats Bergman. Also Short, "Peirce on Science and Philosophy"

offering nothing less than a comprehensive account of the empirical world. For him such an account should take the form of an evolutionary cosmology.[74] But, as pursued by him, it involved an indefatigable effort to bring to methodological self-consciousness the most effective procedures by which the most reliable account of the empirical world is attainable.

But Peirce truly was a pragmatist, in a principled and profound sense. The last years of his life his mind was on fire.[75] The oxygen feeding the blaze flowed from the various windows thrown open by a tireless investigator animated by a pragmatist sensibility. "The effect of pragmatism here is," according to Peirce, "simply to open our minds to receiving any [relevant] evidence, not to furnish evidence" (*CP* 8.259). While Peirce was more than a pragmatist, everything else he was must be interpreted in reference to his pragmatism. He was a thoroughgoing anti-reductionist, so it would be especially ironic to reduce Peirce to nothing more than a pragmatist. But it would be equally ironic to deny him the title he more than anyone else deserves. What he wrote of semeiotic (he declared in a letter to Victoria Lady Welby that he was *a convinced Pragmaticist* in Semeiotic) might with equal justice be written of his other doctrines and undertakings.

From Peirce's perspective, theory is a form of practice but it has an integrity and character of its own, so that it is not identifiable with (or reducible to) what we ordinarily call "practice." [76] Though often not recognized, the deconstruction of the dualism between theory and practice is as much a part of Peirce's project as it is of those of James or Dewey. There are without question occasions when he appears to draw an excessively sharp distinction between theory and practice, but what is all too seldom noticed is that he is doing so in order to protect the integrity of theory as an especially precarious and vulnerable form of human practice (all the more so in a culture deformed by its worship of "business" and practicality. In any event, Peirce in his own way grants primary to practice. Our loftiest theories presupposes instinctual attunement to the natural world: they are rooted in, and hence grow out of, our practical involvements, even though they in critical respects secure a functional autonomy from these immediate entanglements.

In the writings of Peirce, then, we encounter not only a nuanced formulation of the pragmatist position but also finely elaborated approaches to nothing less than phenomenology, a normative theory of objective inquiry, a theory of signs, and an at evolutionary cosmology. In addition, we find a subtle defensible of traditional theism and, what is likely to be of greater interest to contemporary philosophers, invaluable resources for articulating non-reductive naturalism in accord with recent developments in various sciences. Whether these doctrines cohere is of course a matter of ongoing debate. But philosophy today might benefit from more fully confronting Peirce in at least some of these respects.

This becomes manifest when we candidly assess where we stand today. Our understanding of nature is even today rather superficial and fragmentary.[77] In addition,

[74] In "The Architecture of Theories" (1891), the inaugural essay in a series of articles in *The Monist* outlining his cosmology, Peirce asserts, "philosophy requires thorough-going evolutionism or none" (*Collected Papers,* volume 6, #14 [*CP* 6.14]). While Peirce was a thoroughgoing evolutionist, he was in some respects a half-hearted Darwinian. See Philip P. Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*

[75] I borrow this expression from Robert D. Richardson's biography, *Emerson: The Mind on Fire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). But it is as applicable to Peirce, especially during culminating phase of his intellectual life, as to Emerson.

[76] See H. S. Thayer, *Meaning and Action: A Critical Study of Pragmatism*; also Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs*; Bergman, "Experience, Purpose, and the Value of Vagueness," *Communication Theory,* 19, 248-77; and Douglas R. Anderson, *Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1995)

[77] Peirce was disposed to stress just own minuscule and fragmentary is our knowledge of nature and all else, including our individual selves. "But, in point of fact, notwithstanding all that has been discovered since

our comprehension of our own status as natural beings is no less so. Finally, the question of God remains, as a question, at least as elusive and controversial as it has been in previous epochs of our intellectual history. There are nonetheless evident at every turn various attempts to address questions concerning nature, humanity, and divinity in a manner akin to Charles Peirce's experiential approach to philosophical issues. Those engaged in these queries might benefit from the hypotheses put forth by Peirce. But, in order to do so, these hypotheses and the context in which they make sense need to be made more available than they are today. Peirce today remains not only a somewhat elusive genius but also a somewhat unavailable author. His unavailability is, in part, the result of historical contingencies,[78] in part that of his own personal shortcomings,[79] and arguably in largest measure the result of *our* intellectual biases. We presume to have surpassed our ancestors.[80] We tend to judge them by our standards and achievements, not stopping long enough to consider whether we on occasion ought not to subject ourselves to judgment in light of their norms and accomplishments. But this presumption is, in the case of a thinker such as Peirce, unwarranted. This tendency to judge others,[81] without subjecting ourselves to their judgment, is in this instance worse than arrogant. It can only result in our impoverishment or worse – our stultification.

Of course Peirce's thought is today not completely unavailable to us (far from it), especially if we are willing to interpret it in the spirit in which it was put forth and, in addition, if we are industrious enough to consult his unpublished manuscripts.[82] This practically means that his thought will be available to the community of inquirers "only through the mediations and translations"

Newton's time, his saying that we are little children picking us pretty pebbles on the beach while the whole ocean lies before us," Peirce urges, "remains substantially as true as ever, and will do so though we shovel up the pebbles by steam shovels and carry them off in carloads" (*CP* 1.117). To underscore the paucity of our knowledge, in his estimation, he adds: "An infinitesimal ratio may be multiplied indefinitely and remain infinitesimal still" (ibid.)

[78] See Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Mistunes of the Peirce Papers" in *Signs of Humanity,* volume 3, edited by Michel Balat and Janice Deledalle (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), pp. 1259-1268.

[79] See Paul Weiss, "Biography of Charles S. Peirce," *Perspectives on Peirce,* edited by Richard J. Bernstein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 1-13 (especially pp.9-10); also Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* [Revised and Enlarged Edition] (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). Also see Richard J. Bernstein, "Action, Conduct, and Self-Control" in *Perspectives on Peirce,* pp. 90-91.

[80] In *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), Rorty writes: "The pragmatist … thinks that the quest for a universal human community will be self-defeating if it tries to preserve the elements of every intellectual tradition, all the deep 'intuitions' everybody has ever had. It is not to be achieved by an attempt at commensuration, at a common vocabulary … Rather it is to be reached, if at all, by acts of making rather than of finding – by poetic rather than Platonic achievement. The culture which will transcend, and thus unite, East and West, or the Earthlings and the Galactics, is not likely to be one which does equal justice to each, but one which looks back on both with *the amused condescension typical of later generations looking back at their ancestors"* (p. xxx; emphasis added).

[81] Regarding this tendency, it is not inappropriate to recall Peirce's own sage remark: "But a stay-at-home conscience dos the most to render the world inhabitable" (*CP* 8.163).

[82] The insistence upon interpreting Peirce's thought in this spirit does not beg the question at the center of the dispute between Paul Weiss and Justus Buchler. One the one hand, we must strive to interpret Peirce in terms of his architectonic aspirations. On the other, we must take with equal seriousness his focused effort to address specific problems. In the letter to William James, quoted by Ralph Barton Perry in *The Thought and Character of William James,* volume II (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1935), Peirce proclaimed: "The only thing I have ever striven to do in philosophy has been to analyze sundry concepts with exactitude; and to do this it is necessary to use terms with strict scientific precision" (p. 438; cf. Buchler, "The Accidents of Peirce's System," p. 267). Whereas James might exclaim, "*Technical* writing on *philosophical* subjects … is certainly a crime against the human race!" (op. cit., p. 387), Peirce would contend that the failure to write in this manner about such topics is a sin against philosophy. In fairness to James, however, it is imperative to recall here that, in *Pragmatism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), he acknowledges at the out of this series of lectures, after noting "the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter," being "our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means," "yet here I stand desirous of interesting you in a philosophy which in no small measure *has to be technically treated"* (pp. 9-10; emphasis added).

of those who have devoted themselves to interpreting Peirce in the manner in which he most fervently desired to be read. If we can elevate ourselves to such a hermeneutic, then his presence as a co-inquirer can increasingly become a critical force and the relevance of his writings to our undertakings can acquire an ever sharper cutting edge. And if we can do *this* then the possibility of transforming philosophy and, more generally, advancing inquiry in a number of fields becomes neither infinitely distant nor utterly fantastic. Peirce today is, as much as anything else, a set of questions – not least of all, the question of what his thought shall yet be and, inseparably tied to this, the question of how our encounters with his writings might re-make us in surprising ways (that is, the question of who *we* might yet become).[83] Given the cumulative growth of our understanding and appreciation of Peirce's singular accomplishment, however, we have some sense of how these questions should be answered. If Peirce is taken to serve as an exemplar for how to conduct our inquiries, then we ought to strive to conjoin "speculative audacity"[84] and contrite fallibility, logical rigor and unembarrassed sentimentalism, self-control and self-surrender,[85] the cultivated naiveté of aesthetic perception[86] and the disciplined generalizations of mathematical imagination,[87] the demand for experiential concreteness and the need for formal classification, the precision of abstract definition and the greater adequacy of pragmatic clarification, finally, painstaking treatment of particular questions and an orienting sense of the intimate connections among our various endeavors.

[83] At the conclusion of "Consequences of Four Incapacities," the second article in the cognition series published in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* Peirce insists: "The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by his ignorance and error, *so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be,* is only a negation" (Collected Papers, volume 5, #317; emphasis added [CP 5.317]). But individuals insofar as they are members of communities and, moreover, are beings whose futures hold possibilities of growth are more than this. Like life, philosophy is as much, if not more, in the transitions and transformations as anywhere else (cf. James).

[84] See Dewey, "Philosophy and Civilization" (*LW* 3, 10). Though the phrase is Dewey's it seems even more applicable to Peirce than to him.

[85] See my *Peirce's Approach to the Self* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 95-97.

[86] See John Dewey, *Experience and Nature. Later Works of John Dewey* (Carbondale, IL: SIU Press, 198_), volume 1, p. 40. Again, while the expression if Dewey's it applies at least with equal justice to Peirce.

[87] See Peirce's Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) – *CP* 5.42 (also in *EP* 2, 147-148).

WILLIAM JAMES TODAY

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Introduction

William James remains relevant today for many reasons. Some thinkers, like Mark Johnson, see him as an essential forerunner to today's Embodiment Movement, which draws heavily on the cognitive sciences.[1] Other thinkers see James, along with Dewey, as "better guides to the end of modernity than Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger," and emphasize James's relation to, and relevance for, Continental philosophy, and to our times.[2] Even James's theory of truth, which has always been the brunt of a good deal of criticism from analytic philosophers, nonetheless finds important friends nowadays coming from that tradition, like Hilary Putnam.[3] There is also continued interest in James's philosophy of religion, as exemplified, for instance, in the recent work of Sami Pihlström.[4]

That James is still relevant today should not be doubted; at least, I do not doubt it, and indeed it would be very difficult to give an exhaustive account of all the scholars upon whom he has had a vital impact today. What I would like accomplish in this paper, in any case, is a more modest task than giving such an account, namely to problematize at least *one* of the ways in which we might think that James continues to be relevant. I have in mind James's relevance to our existential condition of having to die. I agree with William Gavin when he claims that James in *Pragmatism* is concerned with death.[5] However, I disagree that James's approach should be touted as a virtue.[6] What I would like to argue is that James's response to death is not helpful and should be rejected for relying too much on modernism and its emphasis on the individual. Today, when modernism is (rightly, in my view) on the defensive, James's continued relevance for significant questions such as how to die is too problematic. William James, I will argue, is not the best guide available to us for confronting our mortality.

I should say upfront that the basis of my criticism is that James is not a stoic, whereas I believe that Stoicism has a better answer to this question, and in maintaining this I draw on John Lachs's remarkable essay, "Stoic Pragmatism."[7] But I would like to go further than Lachs, who recommends changing our understanding of pragmatists like James and Dewey to see them as similar to the Stoics (and changing our understanding of Stoicism to see it as similar to pragmatism).[8] I would like

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[1] Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 2008), 71; 86-110.

[2] James Livingston says that James gets rid of "modern subjectivity" in his "essays on radical empiricism." I focus on James's pragmatism, not his radical empiricism, and argue that James's ideas here do not sufficiently overcome the modernist self. See James Livingston, "Pragmatism, Nihilism, and Democracy: What Is Called Thinking at the End of Modernity," in *100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy,* ed., John J. Stuhr (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2010), 144.

[3] See Hilary Putnam, *Pragmatism: An Open Question* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 5-26.

[4] Sami Pihlström, *"The Trail of the Human Serpent is Over Everything:" Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and Religion* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2008).

[5] William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death: Method vs. Metaphor, Tragedy vs. the Will to Believe," in *100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy*, ed., John J. Stuhr (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 81.

[6] Gavin explains James's resistance to death, his emphasis on the irretrievable loss of "the personal," as preferable to Dewey's acceptance of death, or at least "as the truly pragmatic" way of life. I take almost the exact opposite approach. See William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death," 93; 90-91.

[7] John Lachs, "Stoic Pragmatism," in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, New Series, Volume 19, Number 2 (2005): 102-103; 105.

[8] Ibid., 96. I believe Dewey's thought resembles the Stoic position more than James's thought does. Lachs discusses Dewey's ability to give in to events in his footnote referencing a comment made by Larry Hickman. See John Lachs, "Stoic Pragmatism," 105, n.1. But I would go further and argue that, for Dewey, not merely "acceptance," as Lachs says, but "submission" and "being conquered" by the larger whole of the universe are crucial and essential parts of Dewey's philosophy of religion, to draw on Dewey's own terms

to maintain that a better approach is to move to Stoic philosophy altogether, not to Lach's synthesis of the two philosophies.[9] So, while I draw on Lach's unique referencing of Stoicism and pragmatism, I do not wish to endorse his resolution of the tension between the two, at least not in the case of James, and I would say instead that we should consider going over to the position of the Stoic, which I think is more relevant for us today than is Jamesian pragmatism or, for that matter, Stoic pragmatism.

I begin with an account of James's response to death. I then argue that it is still too modernist (or too individualistic), generating a deeply problematic expectation about life in our times. Lastly, I propose that Stoicism might be of more service to us in this regard than James.

James's Response to Death

What is James's response to the problem of death? William Gavin has rightly pointed out that this theme is at work in *Pragmatism.*[10] But I would like to take a slightly different approach than Gavin, setting aside the examples of, and metaphors for, death in James's book that Gavin uncovers so well, and instead focusing solely and explicitly on James's view of truth. I would like to show that this theory is itself, in its very nature, a response to death, something which Gavin also indicates,[11] but which I would like to stress and to make a point of emphasizing.

That James's theory of truth emerges in a context of a deep, existential concern[12] is often missed by those who only analyze in detail the mechanics of that theory. But a surrounding look at how and when the theory of truth emerges shows that James's theory is concerned, in fact, to demonstrate that individual human beings have some power in the face of reality. They are not simply the victims of Fate, even in death, but have the power of helping to create what becomes true about themselves and the world.

When James introduces pragmatism, he embeds it in a discussion of what our fate would be like if matter alone directed events without our slightest input. James says,

> For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of man's importance. The result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic or positivistic feeling. Man is no lawgiver to nature, he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman tho [sic] it be, and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the vision is materialistic and depressing.[13]

These words require little comment. The material universe is winning the day over the human self and this is depressing, because it means that man is not important. At best, we can only "submit" to what the universe does; and James finds this to be a problem.

James unpacks the idea further, and apparently gives it its appropriate emotional content, when he quotes another author: "'The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish.'"[14] To which James comments:

here. See John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), 16; 20. For independent confirmation of a connection between Dewey and Stoicism, see Frank McLynn's comment that "Students of philosophy, incidentally, will be able to link Dewey's quasi-Hegelian holism with similar ideas in Marcus's thought," referring the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius. See Frank McLynn, *Marcus Aurelius: A Life* (Cambridge, M.A.: Da Capo Press, 2010), xiv.

[9] John Lachs, "Stoic Pragmatism," 104.

[10] William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death," 81.

[11] Ibid., 81; 88-91.

[12] Ibid., 81.

[13] William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Dover Publications, 1995), 6.

[14] Arthur James Balfour as quoted by William James, *Pragmatism*, 40.

> That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, tho [sic] many a jeweled shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be dissolved—even as our world now lingers, for our joy—yet when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely *nothing* remains, to represent those particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an echo; without a memory; without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for similar ideals.[15]

It seems to be a terrible thought that science leaves us with, that we are at the mercy of "the cosmic weather,"[16] much like the thought that paralyzed James in his youth: "Something hitherto solid within my breast gave way entirely," James says in the form a letter writer, but which many suspect is him,

> and I became a mass of quivering fear. I awoke morning after morning with a terrible dread at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before…I remember wondering how other people could live, how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of life.[17]

What James is referring to is his sudden realization that he, too, could become mad like the madman he had once seen in an asylum—in other words, that he was at the mercy of matter. He was not free to prevent himself from becoming mad; his body, in effect, would make that choice for him.[18] What James feared was that we *could be* only matter going through its mechanical operations without any real human touch to it. The truth could be nothing else but "cosmic weather,"[19] the utter indifference of things.

But the artist in James, the side of him that is the creator, resists the idea of being utterly determined by matter; and the philosopher in him finds a method of accommodation. The solution to this very real human predicament of how to cope with being made of matter is James's theory of truth, a solution that is simple and direct, but also, for that reason, very powerful. What if "truth," to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty, "was made rather than found"?[20] What if truth consisted of those beliefs about reality, which reality lets us make about it? Then, as James says, the truth "not *being* reality, but only our belief *about* reality, it will contain human elements."[21] If truth functions in this way, as those beliefs humans are entitled to make about reality, then we really would have "a fighting chance."[22] Our account of reality, *our* truths, personal and plastic, would then be permitted, just so long as reality permits them. We could then understand reality, in effect, as being able to accommodate many of our human truths.

And here we arrive at James's ultimate solution to the problem of life. Truth can be made, which means that, even though everything may be destroyed in the end, nonetheless we can still create our own truths about reality until the end comes. As James puts it, "Though the *ultimate* state of the universe may be its vital and psychical extinction, there is nothing in physics to interfere with the hypothesis that the penultimate state might be the millennium…In short, the last expiring pulsation of the universe's life might be, 'I am so happy and perfect that I can stand it no longer.'"[23] The thought here is that, until the end comes, which is not yet now, the living can always still work with reality. Reality can be bent and shaped always still to some extent, maybe even shaped into perfection. And this crucial feature of reality, that we can still shape the truth of it to come, should give us enough courage and fortitude to press on.

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[15] William James, *Pragmatism*, 40-41. Gavin also cites parts of this passage in William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death," 88-89.
[16] William James, *Pragmatism*, 40.
[17] John J. McDermott, ed., *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition* (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), 6.
[18] Ibid., 6.
[19] William James, *Pragmatism,* 40.
[20] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
[21] William James, *Pragmatism,* 96.
[22] Ibid., 112.
[23] Horace M. Kallen, ed., *The Philosophy of William James: Selected from His Chief Works* (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.), 326.

For precious human meanings can still always be achieved. Indeed, it may well be, as James says, that God, as some kind of ideal not yet made real, actually depends for his realization on our efforts: "God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity."[24] This would mean that our efforts to shape reality may actually count toward helping to realize our deeper religious truths and needs, perhaps even somehow our need for immortality, for a life after death.

For James, in short, "There belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote."[25] Not that mind can achieve everything, or even a massive amount. But it can achieve some things, "the only restriction is that the world resists some lines of attack on our part and opens herself to others, so that we must go with the grain of her willingness, to play fairly."[26] We must respond to real conditions, but in our response we can alter things. We can bend them, sometimes, to our needs. And so we must try mightily to alter reality where we can in order to achieve what good we can.

To live in this hope that matter can always still be shaped by us is to live in what James calls "active tension," with an "attitude" that "involves an element…of holding my own, as it were, and trusting outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but without any *guaranty* that they will."[27] In active tension, there is supposedly a wonderful feeling, "intensely blissful," as Linda Simon says,[28] a feeling of being fully in the fray, so to speak, and embracing the anxiety and stress of having to relate to a world without assurances. As Linda Simon has characterized this feeling, drawing on the same passage from James that I have above,[29] active tension is "this moment of tension…this moment of thrilling aliveness."[30] What is going on, it seems, is that the world acts as if it is supporting us in all of our endeavors, but we do not know for sure that it is; and we act anyway as if we should be allowed to assert ourselves in the face of the world, as if we were entitled to do so. We live in relation to reality as if our truths could be made real. James would have us live on to fight on, and has even said that for many people there can be no greater point to living than to see "one's heel set on the tyrant's throat."[31] James allows us to be the creator, even against impossible odds, and that is why he might be regarded by some as relevant to us in matters of life and death.

Is James's View Still Relevant?

That James might still be relevant to us in matters of life and death can be seen by the influence he has had on Richard Rorty, one of the most important philosophers of recent years. Although he made the linguistic turn, Rorty nonetheless shares with James the fundamental insight that we help to make the truth; and, for Rorty, too, this insight is grounded in our response to death. Rorty maintains that "the world is out there" and that "the world may cause us" to hold beliefs, but he says that our "descriptions of the world are not" out there and that we have some creative ability in how they are applied to the world.[32] He further claims that our ability

[24] William James, "Is Life Worth Living?" in William James, *On a Certain Blindness of Human Beings, Great Ideas,* Volume 75 (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 64.
[25] William James, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence," in *William James: The Essential Writings,* ed., Bruce W. Wilshire (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 24.
[26] H.S. Thayer, ed., *Pragmatism: The Classic Writings* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1982), 133. The quote is from an interview with James.
[27] Horace M. Kallen, ed., *The Philosophy of William James: Selected from His Chief Works*, 155.
[28] Linda Simon, "Active Tension," in *100 Years of Pragmatism: William James's Revolutionary Philosophy,* ed., John J. Stuhr (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 178.
[29] Ibid., 177-178. Although note the differences in James's spelling in the text referred to by both Simon and me: it could be that the editor of the volume I used has changed or corrected James's original spelling in the letter. See Horace M. Kallen, ed., *The Philosophy of William James: Selected from His Chief Works*, 155.
[30] Linda Simon, "Active Tension," 178.
[31] William James, "Is Life Worth Living?" 52.
[32] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity*, 5.

to describe the world is the last small bit of "power" that we have in the face of events: "The world can blindly and inarticulately crush us," Rorty says.[33] It can kill us; it can cause our deaths. Without our descriptions of the world, in fact, there is only "brute power and…naked pain;" but *with* our descriptions of the world, we exercise "the only sort of power over the world which we can hope to have."[34] We achieve something that, in effect, makes life worth living. We achieve our *own* truth about things and about who we are. We attain "self-creation."[35] This idea is Jamesian to the core. And I would add that part of the force of Rorty's philosophy lies in its being an antidote to our glorification of science and its vision of the world, which, in denying the truth of our human descriptions, leaves us defenseless in the face of the world, defenseless in the face of "brute power and… naked pain."[36] Without a Jamesian approach, it seems, or something like it, we are only raw nerves waiting to be hurt by the overwhelming power of the universe.

However, Rorty develops his pragmatism in an important way beyond James, which helps us to begin to see the limitation of James's approach. Whereas James believes (like any modernist) that the individual self has the power to help to create its truths, Rorty recognizes that, in fact, we must be willing to devalue the self more, that is, to have a "de-divinized" sense of self in our postmodern world.[37] For example, Rorty insists that nobody chose to create the new "Galilean" truth about the world when that truth was created. "Rather, Europe gradually lost the habit of using certain words and gradually acquired the habit of using others."[38] Belief in the self's independent creative powers is, for Rorty, still the result of the "temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence."[39] It is only an additional way that we are un-pragmatic and assume that there is some essence out there, or what Rorty also calls "The One Right Description."[40] But we must go further than this today and reject granting any essence to the self just as we reject granting any essence to the world.[41]

As Rorty's position suggests, someone like James, with his emphasis on the creative power of the self, cannot be said to have gone far enough in the advance beyond modernism, with its similar insistence on the unique importance of the self. Gavin, for example, lets us see that, for James, when all is said and done, since the individual self is lost, our death can only be "inexplicable, perhaps 'tragic.'"[42] The loss of self would be the loss of everything. Bruce Kuklick echoes a similar point when he says that, on James's view, "as the dark closed in on the spirit, it was left alone with its naked courage."[43] The individual stands alone against the indifferent world, opposed to it with the expectation that the self should, after all, live forever. But, if Rorty is correct, this individualist stance is passé; for James has, in effect, made a minor deity out of the self,[44] giving it the expectations of the gods, to be eternal and blessed, whereas postmodernism urges us to go further and to get rid of all gods, that is, to "try to get to the point where we no longer worship *anything,* where we treat *nothing* as a quasi divinity."[45] James seems to be in the unfortunate modernist position of making too much of the self in a postmodern age.

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[33] Ibid., 40.
[34] Ibid., 40.
[35] Ibid., 27.
[36] Ibid., 40.
[37] Ibid., 40. See also 6; 21-22.
[38] Ibid., 6.
[39] Ibid., 6.
[40] Ibid., 40.
[41] If we attain self-creation, for Rorty, this is not the result of our own doing, but "is dependent on the kindness of all those strangers out there in the future," who take up our ideas, Ibid., 41. Or, to put it another way, we attain self-creation only when our "idiosyncrasies…just happen to catch on with other people—happen because of the contingencies of some historical situation." Ibid., 37.
[42] William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death," 93.
[43] Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 178.
[44] See James's strong endorsement of Papini's pragmatism, in which, according to James, as "a creative being," "man becomes a kind of god." Given this new self-image of man as a god, James asks, "Why are the most utopian programs not in order?" William James, "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* Vol. III, No. 13: June 21, 1906, p. 340.
[45] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 22.

John Lachs helps us to see a similar problem with James's conception of the self, or something like it, in his essay, "Stoic Pragmatism," namely that it can get carried away with its own sense of power and become unreasonable in its demands. [46] Lachs believes that "Nature checkmates us in the end, and when that becomes plain, it is unbecoming to knock over the board in anger and pointless to play out every move. At that stage, the stoic teaches us to smile, to say it was a good game and now goodnight."[47] But this is precisely what James, as I read him, will not truly accept, insisting that a person always still has "a fighting chance."[48] While I believe that ultimately we cannot answer for others in these matters of life and death (we can only offer suggestions), for myself at any rate I believe that James may be wrong on this point, and that Lachs may be right. When the end comes with certainty, resistance will be in vain; instead of resisting, I should simply assent—although, of course, this must be easier said than done, and I would in no way find fault with or blame anyone else who would die differently. Alongside courage, tolerance and the acceptance of others are also important Stoic virtues.[49]

So, I agree with Lachs for myself, that I should try to accept my own death when it comes, but I also do not think that Lachs goes far enough in maintaining his general point, at least not for me. Lachs wants to preserve some semblance of James's pragmatism by combining it with Stoicism, a position that he calls "Stoic Pragmatism."[50] The idea is that some element of choice about how to shape reality is still possible with us, save for in intractable situations; other than in these situations, we can always "seek a better life."[51] It sounds good to me as far as it goes, but underlying this conception may still be the idea that the self is a power unto itself that can control nature and transform reality, even if within prescribed limits. I worry that such a conception, if promoted excessively, might lead us to expect too much, namely that we can succeed in overpowering anything. I am afraid that retaining the conception of self that Lachs wishes to retain may train us to expect to have control over nature and reality as such, which will in turn lead us to experience the inevitable anxiety and frustration that comes when we realize we cannot, in fact, control all things, least of all the fact that we must die. In my view, Lachs's halfway approach, granting us power over nature here and there, is not, to use Socrates's words, the proper "training for dying."[52]

To be more specific, I am not sure that a life spent in seeking control over life where we can get it is the best preparation for confronting those aspects of life that we cannot control. I worry that, in this kind of life, our habits of expectation of control will override us in the end and lead us to demand the impossible in death, and therefore lead us to be profoundly disappointed. I suspect that it is not so easy to know how to deal with those cases that are not in our control simply by acknowledging them; intense training and practice may be required, as the Stoics well understood, but the pragmatists, it seems, did not.

Turning away from the pragmatist orientation altogether, Stoicism proper may open up to us a better perspective. Marcus Aurelius, in particular, may present a better response to death, and indeed to any of life's problems, when he reminds us that:

> Nature gives all and takes all back. To her the man educated into humility says: 'Give what you will; take back what you will.' And he says this in no spirit of defiance, but simply as her loyal subject.[53]

[46] John Lachs, "Stoic Pragmatism," 102-103.
[47] Ibid., 105.
[48] William James, *Pragmatism,* 112.
[49] See, for example, Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, trans. Martin Hammond (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 10.
[50] John Lachs, "Stoic Pragmatism," 96; 104.
[51] Ibid., 104.
[52] Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 16.
[53] Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, 98-99.

Nature is the All in which we are embedded and to which we owe our allegiance. There is a certain trust and loyalty that we should show to nature, above all by accepting what nature commands of us. The Jamesian self, on the other hand, resents the fact that it must "submit" to reality, as we have seen.[54] In a fit of despair, James writes: "Every individual existence goes out in a lonely spasm of helpless agony."[55] And this characterizes his position: resistance to death, continued self-assertion in the face of reality. Yet, according to the Stoics, we have the ability to be rational and can, through practice and training, come to accept "willingly" what must inevitably be.[56] Or we can resist nature and become resentful, expecting more for ourselves than is possible. Stoicism teaches us that it is better not to resist and better not to be resentful; we should accept our Fate and even be happy with it. For the Stoics, we should learn to approach our own deaths, when they become inevitable, with a calm and tranquil state of mind, which is not to say that this is easy (perhaps it is the most difficult thing of all).

With so much, Lachs might agree (except that he does not say enough about how to train for death). But the problem is in believing we have the ability to *master* reality at all. We are not just speaking of giving up control over our inevitable death and other intractable situations. Every belief in the self's power over reality as such only inflates the self that much more. And an inflated self will breed resentment, for the inflated self will always eventually be disappointed. As Marcus Aurelius again says,

> The soul of man harms itself, first and foremost, when it becomes (as far as it can) a separate growth, a sort of tumour on the universe: because to resent anything is to separate oneself in revolt from Nature, which holds in collective embrace the particular nature of all other things.[57]

Jamesian Pragmatism (and, indeed, Lach's own selective Stoicism) may contribute to this tumour, to this spirit of revolt, by encouraging us to believe there is a great deal that we can creatively add to the world, to external reality, when, if the Stoics are correct, there actually is not. All things are locked in place and constrained. [58] What folly, then, to try to break off from what is and to become something separate. What frustration must then await you! But this is precisely the Jamesian view.

On the Jameisan view, we keep resisting where we can, with the expectation that reality will give in somewhere. In fact, we never really submit; we only try different lines of attack when something does not work. In a certain sense, the Jamesian self always sees reality in opposition to the self. For James, death, for example, always defies us; and reality in general is but a malleable, plastic substance that can accept much of what we would will of it. James can never accept the natural world as it is: "To such a harlot," he says, "we owe no allegiance; with her as a whole we can establish no moral communion."[59] Such a view, however, in which the world is always opposed to the self, only encourages the spirit of simmering resentment and revolt, teaching the self to be unhappy with what results when it goes against our efforts. For the self is still the thing, still made too much a part of the equation, more than a rational view of the universe can maintain. The Jamesian self would

[54] William James, *Pragmatism,* 6. Here James laments that we can only "submit" to nature.
[55] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*, ed., Martin E. Marty (Middlesex/New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), 163.
[56] Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* 101. Readers of the full passage here could perhaps find some evidence that Stoicism does not essentialize the world, for here nature is presented as what occurs, not unlike "the nonlinguistic" in Rorty's philosophy. See Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity,* 40.
[57] Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, 14-15.
[58] This does not mean that ethical action becomes impossible for the Stoics. On the contrary, as Lachs rightly observes, Stoicism demands ethical and socially-minded action. See John Lachs, *Stoic Pragmatism,* 99-100. The Stoics would say we are fated to be ethical or, as Marcus Aurelius puts it, "We were born for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth." Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* 10.
[59] William James, "Is Life Worth Living?" 46.

transcend nature if it could and become all, but since it cannot, it claims to delight in resistance for its own sake, to delight in "active tension,"[60] but in the end, because it hopes for so much and achieves so little, it becomes resentful and despairing, dying in "helpless agony," in a state of futile resistance.[61]

If the Stoics are right, however, it may be better to accept Fate cheerfully, even in small particulars, than to goad the self on to demand too much from itself, and hence to become saddened and disappointed with life. The voice of Reason should calm James, gently leading him to accept the inevitable. As Epictetus says,

> All things obey, and are subservient to, the world; the earth,
> the sea, the sun, and other stars, and the plants and animals of
> the earth. Our body likewise obeys it, in being sick and well,
> and young and old, and passing through the other changes,
> whenever that decrees. It is therefore reasonable that what depends
> on ourselves, that is, our judgment, should not be the only rebel to it.
> For the world is powerful, and superior, and consults the best for us,
> by governing us in conjunction with the whole. Further: opposition,
> besides that it is unreasonable, and produces nothing except a vain
> struggle, throws us likewise into pain and sorrows.[62]

James's pragmatism may be viewed as an unfortunate hold-out of the rebellious modernist self, a position that will not listen to the voice of Reason that Epictetus urges upon us above. Unreasonable, overly insistent, the Jameisan self encourages anxiety and restlessness by always resisting reality, by always trying to find a way in which reality will allow our separate meanings to occur, in defiance of Fate, in defiance of the inevitable logic of what must occur.[63]

None of this, of course, proves the correctness of Stoicism over pragmatism. "Stoicism," as Pierre Hadot has pointed out, "is a philosophy of self-coherence, based upon a remarkable intuition of the essence of life," an intuition that must get worked out at the technical level.[64] I only intend here to give expression to this competing intuition. And I add that this intuition may seem to fit better with an age like ours, which has given up on (or at least should give up on) modernism. If the anxiety of life is ever to go away, if its "active tension"[65] is ever to cease, we must learn to come to terms with life as it is, not continue to believe, with James and the modernist tradition that, as Bruce Kuklick puts it, though "bitter dregs always remained at the bottom of the cup," nonetheless somehow through our efforts "we shall overcome."[66] By insisting that we can still always overcome, James and modernism put too much pressure on the straining self; it is asked to achieve the impossible;[67] and we may even sense this at the collective level, since we have already begun to lose faith in the modernist credo as we pass over into postmodern times. Insofar as this is correct, in any case, and we have,

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[60] Horace M. Kallen, ed., *The Philosophy of William James: Selected from His Chief Works,*155.

[61] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* 163.

[62] Epictetus, *Moral Discourses/Enchiridion and Fragments*, trans. Elizabeth Carter (London/ New York: Everyman's Library, 1966), 296.

[63] For Marcus Aurelius's conception of defiance, see the passage already quoted from Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* 98-99 (n. 53 of the present paper). As a Stoic, he might conceive of any refusal to accept Fate as act of opposition or defiance. For his conception of being separate, see the passage already quoted from Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* 14-15 (n. 57 of the present paper).

[64] Pierre Hadot, *The Inner Citadel: The* Meditations *of Marcus Aurelius,* trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 75.

[65] Horace M. Kallen, ed., *The Philosophy of William James: Selected from His Chief Works*, 155.

[66] Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000*, 178.

[67] Gavin recognizes this feature of un-tenability in James's philosophy, but sees it as a kind of virtue, almost a form of heroism like Nietzsche's affirmation of life. I would argue, however, that this untenable aspect of James's position overly romanticizes the struggle of opposing reality and that, of course, we all want peace of mind when it comes to life and death. As Gavin puts it, "James here seems to admit that too much is being asked." See William J. Gavin, "*Pragmatism* and Death," 91.

in fact, lost touch with the modernist self, with its insistence on the vital power of the individual, then we should perhaps once more heed the words of Marcus Aurelius and begin to work out a new and proper understanding of life, for time is running out for each one of us (it always is):

> Your death will soon be on you: and you are not yet clear-minded,
> or untroubled, or free from the fear of external harm, or kindly to all
> people, or convinced that justice of action is the only wisdom.[68]

Today, when our illusions are shattered, and the modernist self is no longer tenable, we should focus on attaining a clear-head about what life is really like and what we can expect from it. Before it is too late, we should come to terms with our lives. We should stop resisting. We should rather say, with Marcus, in response to the still anxious voice of James within us: Be calm. Be happy. "Gladly surrender yourself to Clotho: let her spin your thread into whatever web she wills."[69]

[68] Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, 30.

[69] Ibid., 30. I presented a previous version of this paper at the conference, "The Philosophy of Pragmatism Today," held at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, June 2010. I would like to thank Emil Vishnovsky for the suggestion of the title of this paper as part of the conference theme. I would like to thank Vincent Colapietro for helping me to problematize James's approach to death by arguing for its one-sidedness and "hyper-masculinity." I am aware that James's response to my position would be to criticize me for being "afraid of life" and seeking to "fall on our father's neck, and be absorbed into the absolute life as a drop of water melts into the river or sea." See William James, *Pragmatism,* 112-113. This would strike me as an *ad hominem* argument, though. It seems to me that such a falling on of the neck is inevitable, whether we accept it or not, and that the important thing is how we will fall; or as Epictetus reminds us in the form of a prayer:

Lead me, Zeus, and you too, Destiny,
Wherever I am assigned by you;
I'll follow and not hesitate,
But even if I do not wish to,
Because I'm bad, I'll follow anyway.

See Epictetus, *The Handbook*, trans. Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Co., 1990), 29.

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JOHN DEWEY TODAY

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My consideration of the contemporary status of John Dewey's thought consists of two parts.

I - The first part is the assertion that we are living in a Golden Age of Dewey Studies. The reasons that I would offer for Dewey's special appeal to the contemporary philosophical audience are diverse. Let me list just a few. Dewey rejects excessively intellectualized academic philosophy and directs his attention to the problems of men and women as they attempt to negotiate their complex lives. His long-term interest in such issues as education, social and economic problems, and political questions indicates his understanding of philosophy as a tool for addressing social problems, rather than for advancing the discipline. Dewey's frequently expressed goal of integrating scientific practice and social values continues to appeal those those who seek a naturalistic and organic sense of human welfare.

As a further justification for the claim that we are living in a Golden Age of Dewey Studies, I would present two brief glimpses into the in the history of publications by and about Dewey. The first is the Dewey bibliography assembled by Richard J. Bernstein for Paul Edwards' *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1967). It contains only six items.[1] The second glimpse is the update of this bibliography, as prepared for Donald M. Borchert's revised edition of the same *Encyclopedia* (Macmillan Reference, 2006) by John J. McDermott. This far richer listing, hinting at the great change that had occurred in less than four decades, contains fourteen new entries.[2] As a further expansion of this latter bibliography, let me offer the following list of eleven more books exploring Dewey's ideas on education, environmentalism, democracy, ethics, internationalism, etc., that were published just between 2000 and 2010.[3] Dozens of other volumes could have been selected.

[1] These six items are: Milton H. Thomas, *John Dewey: A Centennial Bibliography* (University of Chicago Press, 1962); Paul A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (Northwestern UP, 1939); Richard J. Bernstein, *John Dewey* (Washington Square Press, 1966); George R. Geiger, *John Dewey in Perspective* (Oxford UP, 1958); Sidney Hook, *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait* (Day, 1939); Robert J. Roth, S.J., *John Dewey and Self-Realization* (Prentice-Hall, 1962).

[2] The fourteen new items are: Jo Ann Boydston, ed., *Works of John Dewey*, 37 volume critical edition (Southern Illinois UP, 1969-1990); Larry A. Hickman, ed., *Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952*, 3 CD-Roms (InteLex, 1999-2005); Larry A. Hickman and Thomas Alexander, eds., *The Essential Dewey*, two volumes (Indiana UP, 1998); John J. McDermott, ed., *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (University of Chicago Press, 1981); James Campbell, *Understanding John Dewey* (Open Court, 1995); Larry A. Hickman, *John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology* (Indiana UP, 1990); Larry A. Hickman, ed., *Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation* (Indiana UP, 1998); Jay Martin, *The Education of John Dewey C A Biography* (Columbia UP, 2003); Steven C. Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (Columbia UP, 1991); Paul A. Schilpp and Lewis E. Hahn, eds., *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, 3/e (Open Court, 1989); John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality* (Vanderbilt UP, 2000); Ralph S. Sleeper, *The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy* (Yale UP, 1986); Jennifer Welchman, *Dewey's Ethical Thought* (Cornell UP, 1995); Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Cornell UP, 1991).

[3] These books would be: Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy and John Puckett, *Dewey's Dream: Universities and Democracies in an Age of Education Reform* (Temple UP, 2007); Neil W. Browne, *The World in Which We Occur: John Dewey, Pragmatist Ecology, and American Ecological Writing in the Twentieth Century* (University of Alabama Press, 2007); Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille McCarthy, *John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of Hope* (University of Illinois Press, 2007); William J. Gavin, ed., *In Dewey's Wake: Unfinished Work of Pragmatic Reconstruction* (SUNY Press, 2003); Larry A. Hickman, Stefan Neubert and Kersten Reich, eds., *John Dewey between Pragmatism and Constructivism* (Fordham UP, 2009); Colin Koopman, *Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity in James, Dewey, and Rorty* (Columbia UP, 2009); Todd Lekan, *Making Morality: Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory* (Vanderbilt UP, 2003); Gregory Fernando Pappas, *John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience* (Indiana UP, 2008); Naiko Saito, *The Gleam of Light: Dewey, Emerson, and the Pursuit of Perfection* (Fordham UP, 2005); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey* (Penn State UP, 2001); Sor-hoon Tan and John Whalen-Bridge, eds., *Democracy as Culture: Deweyan Pragmatism in a Globalizing World* (SUNY Press, 2008).

(It is also true, of course, that we are living in a Golden Age of James Studies, and Peirce Studies, etc. The evidence for this further claim would be similar to the evidence that I have just offered: their abilities to function in our current situation, and the expanding bibliographies of their work.)

II - The second part of my consideration of the contemporary status of Dewey's thought is the attempt to offer some explanation for the present Golden Age of Dewey Studies. I have a number of possible reasons that I would like to consider. Readers will, no doubt, develop additional ones.

A) I would like to begin with what I suppose would be the most "popular" answer: the Rorty Factor. As the familiar story goes, Richard Rorty (1931-2007) "reintroduced" Dewey to the American philosophical community and then to the world. At the risk of seeming ungrateful for the important work that Rorty did do, I would like to offer here another understanding of his contribution to the contemporary Golden Age of Dewey Studies.

Rorty had a special platform — largely created by himself — that few others had, and he used this platform to promote his understanding of Dewey. And there is no doubt that for at least some American philosophers Rorty *was* the direct cause of their (re)consideration of Dewey. He offered them a reason, and perhaps even some protection, for exploring a figure whose value many in the profession had discounted. Moreover, on the international stage, the Rorty Factor in the rehabilitation of Dewey was even stronger.

The version of Dewey that Rorty advanced, however, was flawed. Early on C in such influential volumes as *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton UP, 1979), and *Consequences of Pragmatism* (University of Minnesota Press, 1982) C Rorty presented a non-idiomatic account of Dewey's work that advanced his own philosophical project rather than Dewey's.[4] Rorty's slipshod (or, if that is unkind, impressionistic) approach to Dewey, and to Pragmatism in general, might have increased interest in Dewey's thought; but I do not believe that it lead to a greater understanding of it. In fact, Rorty's version drew people away from such essential Deweyan values as cooperative inquiry and social reconstruction because of his own focus on such themes as "edification" and "play."[5]

Still, it is perhaps true that there is no such thing as bad publicity; and, once Rorty had induced people to read some Dewey, many went on to find great value there. Moreover, in Rorty's later work C in such volumes as *Achieving Our Country* (Harvard UP, 1998), *Philosophy and Social Hope* (Penguin, 1999), and *Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies* (Prickly Paradigm, 2002) C he was advancing a more accurate Dewey: a social reformer and theorist of democracy. (Perhaps Rorty had even induced himself to read more Dewey.) I still maintain, however, that our present Golden Age of Dewey Studies is largely independent of Rorty's efforts.

B) Far more important in the resurgence of interest in Dewey was the developing corpus of work by many others, some of whom I have pointed to above. This cooperative work included the interlocking contributions of the staff of the Dewey Center at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, other editors of Dewey's writings, and the authors of the numerous volumes of secondary literature. Also important in the development of the current Golden Age of Dewey Studies were the ongoing efforts by the members of such international societies as: the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, the John Dewey Society, the Central European Pragmatist Forum, the Nordic Pragmatic Network, the Italian Pragma, et al.

[4] See also Rorty's AComments on Sleeper and Edel, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XXI/1 (Winter 1985), 39-48.

[5] For an elaboration of this evaluation of Rorty, see my essay: A Rorty's Use of Dewey, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XXII/2 (Summer 1984), 175-187.

C) Another possible reason for the current Golden Age of Dewey Studies is the recent decline of approaches to philosophizing other than Pragmatism. Thus, while Dewey's approach might initially seem to be a weak competitor C without the "scientific" bells and whistles of analysis (equations, symbolics, etc.), and without the angst, dread, inauthenticity, etc., of much of continental philosophy C his philosophy still offers readers tools for recognizing and addressing contemporary philosophic problems. Further, Dewey's thought, although chastened, has fared relatively well under recent applications of race, class, and gender methodologies.[6]

D) Another possible reason for the current Golden Age of Dewey Studies is the departure from current debates of those Deweyans who tried to affiliate him, either positively or negatively, with the conservative agenda that was developing in the 1960s. Some of these figures came from the political Right, e.g., Sidney Hook (1902-89), and saw Dewey primarily as a bulwark against Soviet Communism[7]; others came from the New Left, e.g., C. Wright Mills (1916-62), and saw Dewey's work as inadequately progressive.[8]

E) Another possible reason for the current Golden Age of Dewey Studies might be the availability of new technologies C for example, the CD-Rom and the internet C for making Dewey's ideas available. The efficiency of these tools, especially when compared with earlier generations' need to haunt used bookstores, is extraordinary; and I suspect that its influence will increase in the future. Still, greater familiarity with Dewey's writings alone would have mattered little had his ideas not been useful to contemporary readers.

Others would no doubt suggest other factors for consideration. Let me offer two final points. First, most of these reasons, suitably modified, would have a place in any parallel consideration of the current Golden Age of James Studies, or Peirce Studies, etc. Second, although I have listed these reasons individually, any adequate analysis of our contemporary situation would have to consider all of them as co-contributing factors to the current Golden Age of Dewey Studies.

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[6] See, for example, Cornell West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *Pragmatism and Feminism* (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[7] See Gary Bullert, *The Politics of John Dewey* (Prometheus, 1983).

[8] See Mills, *Pragmatism and Sociology: The Higher Learning in America*, ed. I. L. Horowitz, (Oxford UP, 1964). See also Walter Feinberg, The Conflict between Intelligence and Community in Dewey's Educational Philosophy, *Educational Theory*, XIX (Summer 1969), 236-248; N. C. Bhattacharya, ADemythologizing John Dewey, *Journal of Educational Thought*, VIII (December 1974), 117-123; and Clarence Karier, AMaking the World Safe for Democracy: An Historical Critique of John Dewey's Pragmatic Liberal Philosophy in the Warfare State, *Educational Theory*, XXVII (Winter 1977), 12-47.

PRAGMATISM, THEN AND NOW:[1]

Sun Yong[2] Interviews Susan Haack[3]

SY: Professor Haack, thank you for accepting my interview request. You are well known in philosophy circles in China, not only for your books *Philosophy of Logics*[4] and *Evidence and Inquiry*[5] but also for your research on pragmatism and your anthology *Meaning and Action: Selected Writings on Pragmatism Old and New.*[6] It is six years since Professor Chen Bo interviewed you in *World Philosophy*;[7] and I'm hoping that in this interview I can learn more about your views both on the classical pragmatist tradition and on pragmatism today.

SH: I'm happy to talk with you, and grateful for the opportunity to clarify some issues for Chinese readers. May I suggest that we begin with the classical pragmatist tradition, and then move on, through developments in pragmatism and neo-pragmatism during the twentieth century, to the present and even prospects for the future?

SY: Yes, let me begin, as you suggest, by asking you to clarify some issues about the history of pragmatism. In his *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*[8] (a book which has had considerable influence in China), Thomas English Hill tell us that Peirce declined the honor of being regarded as the originator of pragmatism; that Peirce did not, like James, apply the pragmatic maxim to the concept of truth; and that many of Peirce's major contributions are irrelevant to, and some actually incompatible with, pragmatism. But you write in *Pragmatism, Old and New* that it was Peirce who first introduced the word "pragmatism," and that the spirit of pragmatism pervades even his early anti-Cartesian papers. How *should* we assess Peirce's position and role in American pragmatism?

SH: What I will call "the classical pragmatist tradition" was a late-nineteenth-century movement in American philosophy that grew out of discussions between C. S. Peirce and William James at the Metaphysical club in Cambridge, Mass., in the early 1870s. Both Peirce and James stressed that pragmatism should be thought of, not as a body of doctrine, but as a method, the method embodied in the pragmatic maxim of meaning.

And this, the core *idea* of classical pragmatism, was first articulated in Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"[9]

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[1] This interview has been presented (by Prof. Haack) at the Peirce Edition Project, Indianapolis University/Purdue University; the LOGOS Group, Universitat de Barcelona, Spain; and the meeting of the Central European Pragmatist Forum held at Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak Republic.

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[4] Susan Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). (Chinese translation by Lo Yi (Beijing, P. R. China: Commercial Press, 2003).)

[5] Susan Haack, *Evidence and Inquiry*: *Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 2nd, expanded edition, under the title *Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009). (Chinese translation by Chen Bo, Zhang Li Feng, and Yiu Ye Tao (Beijing, P. R. China: Renmin University Press, 2005).

[6] Susan Haack, Chen Bo, and Shang Xin Jian, eds., *Meaning and Action: Selected Writings on Pragmatism, Old and New* (Beijing, P. R. China: Renmin University Press, 2007). An English version (with associate editor Robert Lane) appeared under the title *Pragmatism, Old and New: Selected Writings* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006).

[7] Chen Bo, "Intellectual Journey of an Eminent Logician-Philosopher—An Interview with Susan Haack," *World Philosophy*, October 2003. An abridged version of this interview appears in English in Cornelis de Waal, ed., *Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), pp.17-37.

[8] Thomas English Hill, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (New York: Ronald Press, 1961), 295. (I note that this book has not had, in the U.S., the influence it seems to have had in China.)

[9] C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and (volumes 7 and 8) Arthur Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938-51), 5.388-410 (1878). [References to the *Collected Papers* are by volume and page number.] The section headings in this article (which *do* use the words "pragmatism," "pragmatic maxim," etc.), were supplied by the editors of the *Collected Papers*; they were not in the original.

published in 1878; an article he would later describe as "a little paper expressing some of the opinions I had been urging [at the Metaphysical Club] under the name of pragmatism."[10] But the *word* "pragmatism," in its new philosophical meaning, did not appear in print until 1898, when James used it—fully acknowledging Peirce's role—in "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results."[11] Peirce did not take his bows as founder of pragmatism until a 1903 lecture at Harvard, in which he wrote that, though the dove he had sent forth in 1878 had never returned to him, "of late quite a brood of young ones have been fluttering about, from the feathers of which I might fancy that mine had found a brood."[12]

Peirce later explained that the reason he hadn't used the word "pragmatism" in 1878 was that he didn't dare use it in print in its new, philosophical sense, for fear of confusion with its everyday meaning.[13] In ordinary English today, "pragmatism" means "practical, concerned with expediency rather than principle"; at the time Peirce was writing, the primary meaning of "pragmatism" in ordinary English was even more off-putting: "officious meddlesomeness."

As this brief history reveals, much of what Hill says requires correction. For example, Peirce did *not* "decline[] the honor of being regarded as the originator of pragmatism."[14] The idea that he did is, perhaps, the result of a misreading of the well-known passage from 1905 where—famously hoping that *this* word will be "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers"Peirce introduced a new term, "pragmaticism," to refer to his specific variant of pragmatism. But Peirce's purpose in this passage, as he quite clearly indicates, is not to disassociate himself from James or Dewey, or even from the radical British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller, but to distance himself from the abuses of the word "pragmatism" then rife in the literary journals.[15]

Furthermore, Hill is mistaken in thinking that, while James applied the pragmatic maxim to the concept of truth, Peirce did not. Both Peirce and James saw the maxim as the heart of the pragmatist method in philosophy: to be used not only negatively, as a way of dissolving meaningless metaphysical disputes, but also positively, as a way of explaining the meaning of hard philosophical concepts. And both applied it to the concept of truth: James in *Pragmatism*[16] and *The Meaning of Truth*;[17] and Peirce, much earlier, in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," where he writes that "[t]he opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth."[18]

And then, apparently, Hill compounds these mistakes by first identifying pragmatism with views associated with James, John Dewey, and C. I. Lewis, and then claiming that Peirce's views were "anti-pragmatist" where they diverged from these. This is seriously misleading. The fact that Peirce's philosophical ideas views differed from James's doesn't make them "anti-pragmatist" except on the assumption—which, as I have already explained, is false—that James was a real, acknowledged pragmatist, but Peirce was not. It would be far better, recognizing the commonalities as well as the differences, to say, rather, that Peirce gradually developed a more realist, and James a more nominalist, style of pragmatism.

But Hill's biggest problem, it seems to me, is that he thinks of pragmatism as exactly what Peirce and James insisted it was not: a body of philosophical doctrine.

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[10] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.13 (c.1906).
[11] William James, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," *University Chronicle* (University of California, Berkeley), September 1898: 287-310; reprinted in James, *Pragmatism* (1907; ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 355-70.
[12] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.17 (1903).
[13] *Ibid.*, 5.13 (c.1906).
[14] Hill, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (note 8 above), p.295.
[15] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.414 (1905).
[16] James, *Pragmatism* (note 11 above), 95-113.
[17] James, *The Meaning of Truth* (1909; eds Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
[18] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.407 (1878).

What the classical pragmatists—among whom I would include Peirce, James, Dewey, and George Herbert Mead—had in common was, rather, a congeries of philosophical *attitudes*: a distaste for dogmatism and for false dichotomies, a naturalistic disinclination to philosophize in a purely *a priori* way, a tendency to look to the future rather than the past, an interest in social aspects of language and of inquiry, and a willingness to take evolution seriously. Giovanni Papini's well-known analogy makes the point vivid: pragmatism was "like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees praying for faith; in a third a chemist investigating a body's properties ... . They all own the corridor, and all must pass through it."[19] We should expect that pragmatists will share a broad approach to philosophical questions and certain broad philosophical attitudes; but we should also expect them to diverge both in the kinds of philosophical questions that most interest them, and in the substantive philosophical claims they make.

SY: Pragmatism says that truth is essentially verification, and describes it as "the expedient in our way of thinking." But surely the fact that a belief is expedient or has good consequences is not sufficient for its being true; and doesn't James's account of truth (as Hill suggests) lead to subjectivism and even solipsism?

SH: The first thing to say is that, while there are clear continuities, there are also significant differences between Peirce's ideal-realist account of truth as the Final Opinion that would be agreed were inquiry to continue indefinitely, James's more nominalist account of truth as verifiability, and—to anticipate a little—Dewey's instrumentalist conception of the "tried and true." The second thing to say, perhaps, is that Peirce, James, and Dewey all agree that while it is not false, exactly, to say that truth is correspondence to the facts, it is unhelpful; it gives us no real insight into the concept of truth; that is to say, no *pragmatic* insight, no understanding of what difference it makes if a proposition is true. Each of them tries, in his own distinctive way, to supply what is lacking.

Peirce distinguishes three grades of clarity: the first requires only the ability to use a term; the second requires only the ability to give a verbal definition; but the third, pragmatic grade is reached only when one grasps what the experiential consequences of the concept's applying would be. Truth-as-correspondence, Peirce says, is only a "nominal" definition, reaching only the second grade of clarity. And his accounts of the concepts of truth and reality at the third, pragmatic grade of clarity quite explicitly rely on the idea of the community of inquirers: the opinion that will be agreed at the end of inquiry is the truth, and the real is the object of that final opinion.[20]

Of course, this account is not without difficulties; in particular, it faces what Peirce calls the problem of Buried Secrets: that there might be particular propositions about the past (e.g., that Cleopatra sneezed seven times on her eighth birthday) which seem on their face to be clearly either true or else false, but the truth-value of which could never be settled however long inquiry continued. Peirce replies that we underestimate what it might be possible to find out; and suggests that, if the truth-value of such a proposition really couldn't be settled, then the proposition lacks pragmatic meaning.[21]

[19] As reported by James in *Pragmatism* (note 11 above), p.32.

[20] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.407 (1878). Notice that here Peirce writes in the indicative ("the opinion that *will* be agreed...") rather than in the subjunctive ("the opinion that *would* be agreed..."). See note 21 below.

[21] *Ibid*., 5.409 (1878). In the following paragraph Peirce suggests that whether we say that a diamond that was never rubbed is hard is a matter purely of the arrangement of language, of linguistic convention. Later, he changes his mind: the diamond really is hard, even if it is never tested, if it *would not* be scratched if it *were* rubbed. 5.457 (1905) (the state of things that constitutes the hardness of the diamond consists in "the truth of a general conditional proposition. ... . [I] a substance of a

But this reply seems to many less than fully satisfying (for one thing, the last clause suggests that "pragmatic meaning" will turn out, like the "cognitive meaning" of logical positivism, to diverge significantly from "meaningful" in the ordinary sense of the word).

Now, to return to your question: Truth and reality, in Peirce's account, are characterized in terms of a hypothetical, indefinitely long-run consensus of a hypothetical community of inquirers.[22] (This stress on the community is of a piece with Peirce's early Cartesian papers, where Descartes is roundly criticized in part for what Peirce calls the "pernicious" individualism of his criterion of truth.)[23] But Peirce can, and does, acknowledge without reservation that the truth "is SO, whether you or I or anyone believes it is so or not,"[24] and that the real is what is independent of how you, or I, or anybody, believes it to be.[25] So there is nothing subjectivist or solipsistic about *Peirce's* conception of truth.

Your question, however, seems to rest on a misinterpretation—albeit a very common misinterpretation[26]—specifically of *James's* account of truth. James distinguished concrete truths (i.e., propositions, beliefs, etc. that are true) from abstract truth (i.e., the property of being true). He identified abstract truth with verifi*ability* but, as one might expect from someone of his nominalist leanings, he paid more attention to concrete truths, which he described as *becoming* true, as being *made* true, when they are verified.[27] Of course, this account is not without its difficulties either. For one thing, one is bound to ask: what does "verifiable" mean but "can be shown to be *true*"?—when truth is the very concept supposedly being explained. But this is not the place to explore these and other problems.

The passage responsible for the interpretation of James that you have picked up is, I assume, his observation that "*[t]he true ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking*"; but that it is a *mis*interpretation becomes apparent as soon as you finish the paragraph, which continues: "[e]xpedient ... the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience ... has ways of *boiling over*, and making us correct our present formulas."[28] James is clearly *not* suggesting that whatever it is expedient for someone to believe to believe its true; he is stressing that what is good about having true beliefs is that they will hold up even over the long run of experience. If James *had* simply identified truth and expediency then, indeed, the question would arise, "expedient for whom?"; but the idea that James's account of truth is subjectivist or solipsistic falls away once we repudiate this misinterpretation.

In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938) Dewey describes Peirce's definition of truth as "[t]he opinion that is fated to be agreed by all who investigate" as "the best definition."[29] But, much like James, he tends to stress particular truths over truth-as-such, and actual verification over potential verifiability. In a series of lectures given in 1911 he had presented himself as charting an intermediate course between "realist" (i.e., roughly, correspondence) and "idealist" (roughly,

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certain kind should be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certain kind of sensible result *would* ensue ...).

[22] *Ibid*. 5.407 (1878).

[23] *Ibid*. 5.265 (1868).

[24] *Ibid*. 2.135 (1902).

[25] *Ibid*. 5.405 (1878).

[26] G. E. Moore, "William James's Pragmatism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 8, 1907-8: 33-77; and in Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), 97-146. Bertrand Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth" (1908), in Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (New York: Longman's, Green & Co., 1910), 112-130. See also Alexei Trusov, *An Introduction to the Theory of Evidence* (Russian edition, 1960; English-language edition Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p.18: "according to James, the 'true' is only the expedient in the way of our thinking. An idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives."

[27] James, *Pragmatism* (note 11 above), p.97.

[28] *Ibid*. p.106.

[29] John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), p.345 n. The quotation from Peirce is from *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.407 (1878).

coherence) conceptions of truth. Like James, he speaks of our making propositions true by verifying them; unlike James, he explains that to make a proposition true is "to modify and transform it" until it is able to withstand testing. In this context he writes of truth as "co-respondence," a kind of mutual adjustment between truth and reality.[30] This still conveys nothing of subjectivism or solipsism; it does, however, suggest that Dewey's conception might involve some element of idealism or constructivism—which leads us to your next question.

SY: Dewey was the pragmatist who had the greatest influence in the outside world. Basic to everything Dewey writes about knowledge is we should think of knowing in the setting of inquiry—a kind of contextualism. But his ontological position seems questionable, apparently denying the full objectivity and independence of the material world. How *should* we think of Dewey's epistemology as relating to his ontological views?

SH: In *The Quest for Certainty* (1929)[31] Dewey offers a historical diagnosis: the philosophical theory of knowledge came to us from ancient Greece, from Plato and Aristotle. In this culture, purely intellectual reflection was the prerogative of the few, and physical work, with all its uncertainties and dangers, was relegated to slaves. The resulting denigration of the physical, the practical, the uncertain, he continues, has endured through the epistemological tradition from Plato to Descartes to his own times. The theory of knowledge, he continues, still, in his day, bears the marks of its origin: in its insistence that the only real knowledge is *certain* knowledge; and in its disdain for the merely probable, relegated to the realm of opinion. The result, Dewey believes, is a theory of knowledge at odds with the true character of modern, scientific inquiry. There is an urgent need, therefore, for an epistemology that acknowledges that uncertain, fallible knowledge is a good deal better than no knowledge at all, and that gives a proper role to experiment, to interacting with the world to see what happens, changing *this* to see the effect on *that*. By contrast with the "spectator theories" of the past, Dewey proposes what one might describe as an *activist* conception of knowledge.

In this context Dewey writes that "special theories of knowledge differ enormously from each other. Their quarrels fill the air. The din thus created makes us deaf to the way they all say one thing in common. They all hold that the operation of inquiry excludes any element of practical activity."[32] What he means by this is in part, I believe, that we learn about the world not simply by means of passively received input, but more importantly by active observation and experimentation (i.e., seeking out, and in the case of experiments, creating, the circumstances in which we expect to be able to make the observations we need to resolve some question); and that we must then actively devise appropriate classificatory concepts in the light of our experience, in a kind of virtuous spiral in which experience and reasoning (or as Dewey prefers to say, "intelligence") work intimately together.

But what he meant seems to have also been, in part, that by knowing the world we somehow change it; and this, apparently, in a strong sense: it is not just that it becomes true of the world that we now know this about it, but that somehow the act of knowing an object changes it substantively. I conjecture that part of what is going on here is that Dewey is trying to persuade us out of the idea that only the physical characteristics of physical objects (or their primary qualities, as an older empiricist would have said) are really real, and into the

[30] John Dewey, "The Problem of Truth" (1911), in Larry M. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds., *The Essential Dewey* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), vol. 2, pp.101-130.

[31] John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1929).

[32] *Ibid*., p.22.

idea that moral and aesthetic qualities are no less real.[33] So I am not certain whether he is really committed to a kind of idealism. But if he *did* intend to defend the idea that physical objects are somehow constructed by us, my reaction would be much like Peirce's: "There are certain mummified pedants who have never waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object changes it. They are curious specimens of humanity, and ... I am one of them."[34]

I would not, however, put this, as you do, in terms of the objectivity of the "material world." For, like Peirce, I acknowledge that, besides physical (or as he would say "external") things, events, and phenomena there are also mental ("internal") things, events, and phenomena. The ideas before my mind as I write this, and before our readers' minds as they read it, for example, are real; and so too is the dream I had last night – even though the events of that dream never really happened. Similarly, a work of fiction is real, and there really are fictional characters portrayed in it—even though the people whose doings it narrates never existed, and the events never really happened. The real, in other words, cannot be identified with the mind-independent,[35] nor can reality be limited to the material.

SY: How do you see Quine as fitting into the evolving history of American pragmatism? Could you comment specifically on Quine's work in logic, and his ideas about truth, ontological commitment, and analyticity?

SH: C. I. Lewis is sometimes classified as the last of the classical pragmatists; and Quine, who was Lewis's successor as Edgar Pierce Professor at Harvard, is sometimes thought of as the key link between the classical pragmatist tradition and contemporary pragmatism. But this picture of Quine's place in pragmatism is misleading; as I see it, Lewis's place in the pragmatist tradition is distinctly ambiguous, and Quine's best described as tenuous.

The theory of knowledge Lewis offers in his *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*[36] is a variant of strong, infallibilist foundationalism, and so quite far from anything in the classical pragmatist tradition. But it seems possible that Lewis (who was originally to be editor of Peirce's *Collected Papers*, but dropped out after two years) drew some ideas for his work in modal logic from Peirce's "gamma graphs" of 1903.[37] Mostly, though, Lewis's claim to be a pragmatist rests on his account of the "pragmatic *a priori*": the thesis that the choice of concepts, and hence what propositions are knowable independently of experience, is a pragmatic matter—a matter, that is, of finding the most convenient and smoothly workable conceptual framework. This understanding of "pragmatic" is, however, closer to the ordinary-language meaning of the word than to its sense in the classical pragmatist tradition.

To clarify Quine's relation to pragmatism, let me take the topics you raise—logic, truth, ontology, and analyticity—in turn. As you are aware, Quine's earlier contributions were largely in formal logic. And I assume you know that Peirce (who developed a unified propositional and predicate calculus a few years year after, and quite independently of, Frege),[38] was one of the founders of modern logic. Quine reviewed volumes 2, 3, and 4 of the

[33] See, for example, John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925: New York: Dover, 1958), p.18.
[34] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 5.555 (1903).
[35] *Ibid.*, 5.406 (1878). See also Susan Haack, "Realisms and Their Rivals: Recovering Our Innocence," *Facta Philosophica*, 4.1, March 2002: 67-88, and *Defending Science—Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), pp.161-163.

[36] C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (La Salle, IL: Open Court), 1946.
[37] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 4.510-529 (1903).
[38] See Peirce, "On the Algebra of Logic" (1880), and "The Logic of Relatives" (1883), in *Collected Papers* (note 9 above) 3.154-251 and 3.328-58; and Peirce's student, O. H. Mitchell, "On a New Algebra of Logic," in *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1883), 72-106 (a book edited by Peirce, though his name does not appear). Frege, *Begriffsschrift* (1879), reprinted and translated in *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*, ed. Terrell Ward Bynum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 101-203.

Collected Papers,[39] which include some of Peirce's most important logical innovations; but unfortunately he seems to have been so put off by the untidiness of Peirce's logical work, the gradual, ragged steps by which he improved on George Boole's work to arrive at a wholly new and much more powerful calculus, that he didn't really appreciate its significance. Many years later, Putnam observed that Quine's understanding of the history of logic would have been greatly enriched had he grasped, for example. that, while Russell had learned quantification theory from Frege, Whitehead had learned it (indirectly) from Peirce.[40] Shortly after that, we find Quine recognizing Peirce's contribution: writing in 1985 that "[general quantification theory … is what distinguishes logic's modern estate. Charles Sanders Peirce arrived at it independently four years after Frege."[41] Later, in 1989, Quine writes that "Peirce and not Frege was … the 'founding father' of quantification."[42] There is really nothing distinctive about Quine's logical, however, work to justify classifying him as a pragmatist.

On truth, one thing is clear: Quine quite explicitly rejects Peirce's conception. In fact—if you will allow me to interject a personal note—to the best of my recollection it was Quine's dismissive remarks about Peirce's definition of truth in the first chapter of *Word and Object*[43] that first prompted me to got get Peirce's *Collected Papers* and begin seriously studying the philosophers of the classical pragmatist tradition.

Beyond this, Quine's understanding of truth seems to me far from clear. He expresses sympathy with Tarski's semantic theory; but, very confusingly, seems to run Tarski's account together with the "disquotationalist" theory.[44] But this can't be right; there is unambiguous evidence that Tarski would have emphatically rejected the disquotationalist idea. Tarski treats "true" as a semantic predicate of sentences, and defines truth as satisfaction by all sequences of objects. Disquotationalism, by contrast, treats "true," not as a predicate of sentences, but as a device of disquotation: meaning, for example, that what "'Snow is white' is true," amounts to is, simply, "Snow is white."

The confusion arises, I suppose, because there is a superficial resemblance between Tarski's Material Adequacy Condition on definitions of truth, that any adequate definition should entail all instances of the "T-schema": "S is true iff p" (where "S" on the left-hand side names the sentence that appears on the right-hand side of the equivalence). But Tarski insisted that a quotation-mark name of a sentence, such as "'snow is white,'" is a new, unitary expression, of which the sentence itself is not semantically a part; and quite explicitly denies that it is possible to generalize the T-schema to obtain a definition of truth along the lines of "(p) ('p' is true iff p)." For this, according to Tarski, is just nonsense; p is a sentential variable, but "p"is the name of the 16th letter of the English alphabet.[45] In any case,

[39] W. V. Quine, Review of Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. 2, *Isis*, 19, 1933: 220-229; review of Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vols. 3 and 4, *Isis*, 22 , 1935: 285-97 and 551-553.

[40] Hilary Putnam, "Peirce the Logician," *Historia Mathematica*, 9, 1982: 290-201. In fact, it appears, Russell knew more about Peirce's work on quantification than Putnam realized; see Irving Anellis, "Peirce Rustled, Russell Peirced: How Charles Peirce and Bertrand Russell Veiwed Each Other's Work in Logic," *Modern Logic*, 5.3, 1995: 270-378.

[41] W. V. Quine, "In the Logical Vestibule," *Times Literary Supplement*, July 12, 1985, p.767; reprinted in W. V. Quine, *Selected Logic Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, enlarged edition, 1995), 251-57. In this paper Quine notes that Guiseppe Peano built on Peirce's work, but that Frege's work was conducted independently.

[42] Quine, "Peirce's Logic" (1989) in *Selected Logic Papers*, enlarged ed., 1995 (note 41 above), 258-65, p.259.

[44] The muddle is epitomized in *Pursuit of Truth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990; 2nd ed.,1992), p.80, where Quine writes:

> [T]here is some underlying validity to the correspondence theory of truth, as Tarski has taught us. Instead of saying that "Snow is white" is true if and only if it is a fact that snow is white we can simply delete "it is a fact that" as vacuous, and therewith facts themselves. ... Ascription of truth just cancels the quotation marks.

[45] Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" (1931), in Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics*, ed. J. H. Woodger (Oxford, 1956), p.187.

[43] W. V. Quine, *Word and Object* (

whether or not, in the end, it is possible to make any coherent sense of Quine's observations about truth, I think it is abundantly clear that there is nothing particularly pragmatist about them.

We can understand Quine's views on ontology by reference to two of his best-known philosophical slogans: "to be is to be the value of a variable" (his criterion of ontological commitment) and "no entity without identity" (his extensionalist stance).[46] The first of these makes no substantive ontological claims; it just indicates how to determine the kind of entities to the existence of which a theory is committed. Spelled out more fully, what it says is that a theory is committed to the existence of whatever entities are required as values of variables bound by an existential quantifier in statements which are logical consequences of the theory. The second principle rules out as unacceptable certain kinds of theory, those with ontological commitment to such things as meanings, propositions, or properties, which cannot be identified and individuated by extensional criteria. Spelled out more fully, what it says is that no theory should be accepted that is committed to the existence of a type of entity for which no satisfactory criteria of identity can be given; and what Quine means by "satisfactory" here is "extensional."

Both principles are quite at odds with key ideas of Peirce's ontology. Quine insists that "is, exists" has only one meaning;[47] Peirce distinguished existence (the mode of being of particulars) from reality (the mode of being of generals).[48] One consequence of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is that, if he acknowledged them, he would have to construe properties, propositions, possibilities, etc, as abstract particulars, and not, as Peirce would have said, as real generals.[49] Moreover, as Peirce's realism matured, he acknowledged that there are not only real kinds and laws, but also real possibilities, including real unactualized possibilities.[50]

As I noted earlier, James's approach could fairly be described as nominalist in tendency; that's why he seems more interested in specific, particular truths than in truth-as-such, the property of being true. But, after an early paper written jointly with Nelson Goodman[51]—a kind of nominalist manifesto—Quine seems to have backed away from a nominalist repudiation of abstract objects generally to an extensionalist tolerance for those abstract objects, such as numbers, that can be satisfactorily individuated. So there is nothing particularly pragmatist about Quine's ontological ideas, either.

Still, one might think of Quine's repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction as an expression of pragmatism: after all, his campaign against "untenable

University Press, 1956), 152-278, p.159. It is worthy of note that at once time Quine agreed with Tarski – the enclosed expression is not semantically a part of a quotation-mark name; see W. V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic* (1940; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p.26. See also Susan Haack, "Mentioning Expressions," *Logique et Analyse*, 17, 1974: 277-294.

[46] W. V. Quine, "On What There Is" (1948), in Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (1953; 2nd ed., Harper Torchbooks, 1961) 1-19; see also Susan Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (note 4 above), pp.43-49.

[47] W. V. Quine, "Logic and the Reification of Universals" (1947), in *From a Logical Point of View* (note 46 above), 102-129, p.105. See also Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (note 4 above), p.48.

[48] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 6.549 (c.1901) ("existence ... is a special mode of reality"); and 6.495 (c.1906) ("I myself always use *exist* in its strict sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment.' ... I define the *real* as that which holds its characters on such a tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may have *thought* them to be .... but the real thing's characters will remain untouched."

[49] See Susan Haack, "Extreme Scholastic Realism: Its Relevance to Philosophy of Science Today," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XXVIII.1, 1992: 19-50.

[50] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 6.486 (1908) ("there are ... Real habits (which really *would* produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to get actualized, and are thus Real generals"); and 8.216 (1910) ("the *will be's*, the actually is's, and the *have beens* are not the sum of the reals. There are besides *would be's* and *can be's* that are real").

[51] W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman, "Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism," *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 12, 1947: 105-122.

dualisms" is one of Dewey's most famous pragmatist themes (and Peirce had written that Kant's understanding of "explicatory," that is, analytic, propositions is very narrow, "owing to his knowing nothing of the logic of relatives").[52] But when I compare Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction with the critique his colleague Morton G. White had published shortly before in "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism,"[53] White's seems much closer to the spirit of classical pragmatism than Quine's; in fact, while the title of White's paper evokes a theme from Dewey, the title of Quine's reveals his preoccupation with a different tradition altogether, the logical empiricist.

In the concluding paragraph of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine writes:

Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms ...; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary, I espouse a more thorough pragmatism.[54]

The first thing to notice about this passage is that, while Lewis has some (fairly weak) claim to having inherited something from the pragmatist tradition, Carnap has none.[55] And all Quine is saying here is, in effect, that he sees an element of choice, of convention, in all our theory-choice; and there is really nothing genuinely pragmatist, in the sense that concerns us, about this.

Straying a little from your question, I will add that the first half of Quine's "Natural Kinds"[56] is in some ways reminiscent of Peirce's conception of real "generals," and that his "Epistemology Naturalized"[57] might also be thought of as having some affinity with pragmatism. But in the second half of "Natural Kinds" Quine seems to take back most of what he had said in the first; and on the subject of naturalism, Sidney Hook's earlier "Naturalism and First Principles"[58] seems to me sounder, less ambiguous, and much more clearly pragmatist in spirit. Indeed, as I see it Hook has a stronger claim than Quine to be thought of as a key transitional figure in the pragmatist line of descent.

SY: In your 2003 interview with Chen Bo, you criticized Richard Rorty's new pragmatism, which you see as far removed from the old pragmatist tradition. Rorty presents himself as following Dewey and, like Dewey, connecting pragmatism and democracy; but he also repudiates the projects of metaphysics and epistemology, traditionally seen as at the very heart of philosophy. Do you think that Rorty's "vulgar pragmatism" (as you call it) is a consequence of inner difficulties within pragmatism itself, that there is some lack in pragmatism that was bound, eventually, to lead to such radical, quasi-postmodernist conclusions? Or do you think that Rorty's radical conclusions stem, not from pragmatism itself, but from the ways in which

[52] Peirce, C.. S., *The New Elements of Mathematics*, ed. Carolyn Eisele (the Hague: Mouton, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976), vol. IV, p.84.
[53] Morton G. White, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," in Sidney Hook, ed., *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom* (New York: Dial Press, 1930), 316-30.
[54] W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1952), in *From a Logical Point of View* (note 46 above), 20-46, p.46.
[55] There is a further complication with Quine's allusion to Carnap. Quine identifies Carnap's distinction of internal vs. external questions with the analytic/synthetic distinction; but this is clearly a mistake. See Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 4, 1950: 20-40; reprinted in Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1956), 205-221. W. V. Quine, "On Carnap's views on Ontology," *Philosophical Studies*, 2, 1951: 65-72; reprinted in Quine, *Ways of Paradox* (New York: Random House, 1966), 126-134. Susan Haack, "Some Preliminaries to Ontology," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 5, 1976: 457-474.
[56] W. V. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 114-138.
[57] W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (note 56 above), 69-90.
[58] Sidney Hook, "Naturalism and First Principles," in Hook, ed., *American Philosophers at Work* (New York: Criterion Books, 1936), 236-68.

James's and Dewey's variants diverged from Peirce's pragmatism?

SH: The short answer to your question here is: neither of the above. Vulgar pragmatism is *neither* the inevitable result of some inner flaw in pragmatism as such, *nor* the inevitable result of the ways James's and Dewey's versions of pragmatism diverge from Peirce's. It was, rather, Rorty's own (disastrous) invention—dressed up with tendentious efforts to tie it to the classical pragmatist tradition. Because pragmatism is the only philosophical tradition, thus far, native to the United States, the word "pragmatism" has real resonance for many Americans: resonance which Rorty exploited, very shrewdly, in the "marketing" of his ideas. But now it is time to get down to details.

I will start with Rorty's critique of the legitimacy of the traditional projects of epistemology,[59] since it was here that my engagement with Rorty's (anti-)philosophy really began in earnest. As I argued in *Evidence and Inquiry*,[60] this critique is a mass of confusions. It relies on systematic equivocations on the several meanings of "foundationalism" – which may refer (i) to a family of theories of epistemic justification; (ii) to the idea that epistemology is an *a priori* enterprise underpinning the legitimacy of scientific inquiry; or (iii) to the idea that standards of stronger and weaker evidence are objective, rooted in the relation of justification and truth – to create the illusion that arguments against foundationalism in the first or second of these senses are also arguments against foundationalism in the third sense, the only sense relevant to the legitimacy of epistemology.[61] And in the end Rorty's only argument against foundationalism in the third, relevant sense turns out to rest on a grossly false dichotomy: *either* truth is correspondence to Things in Themselves, *or else* it is nothing more than "what you can defend against all conversational objections."

Rorty hopes that the unattractiveness of the first option will be sufficient to persuade readers to adopt the second. But, to repeat, the dichotomy on which this relies is stunningly false—especially stunning coming from someone like Rorty, who likes to present himself as a follower of Dewey; these are not the only options. It should not escape notice that Rorty's "conversational" account of truth in effect strips Peirce's definition—which appeals to the hypothetical consensus of the community of inquirers at the end of inquiry, the Final Opinion that could withstand all experiential evidence and the fullest logical scrutiny—of everything that connects it to the world; so that all that remains in Rorty's *erzatz* conception of truth is here-and-now agreement. It should not escape notice, either, that Dewey's response to what he saw as the deficiencies of the "spectator theory of knowledge" was not to abandon epistemology, but to develop a new, thoroughly fallibilist, activist approach. Rorty's "pragmatism" is indeed very far from Peirce's; but it is also far from Dewey's[62]—and, I would say, from James's too.

One of the things that distinguished classical pragmatism from the earlier positivism of Auguste Comte was, precisely, that while Comtean positivism repudiated all metaphysics as meaningless, pragmatism proposed to

[59] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1989.

[60] See Susan Haack, "Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," chapter 9 of *Evidence and Inquiry* (note 5 above).

[61] In *Evidence and Inquiry* (note 5 above), chapter 9, I labeled these, respectively, foundationalism, *foundationalism*, and FOUNDATIONALISM.

[62] In a symposium on Rorty's *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), responding to critics well versed in Dewey's work, Rorty acknowledged that "practically everyone in this room has read more James and Dewey than I have, and read them more recently," and that "[p]erhaps it would have been better not to taken Dewey's name, or the term 'pragmatism,' in vain." Richard Rorty, "Comments on [Ralph] Sleeper and [Abraham] Edel," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XXI.1. 1985: 39-48, p.39. (I believe this symposium was held at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, though the published version does not say so.)

reform and renew it:[63] think of Peirce's agapism and tychism in cosmology, or his objective idealism in philosophy of mind;[64] of James's "pluralistic universe" and his radical empiricism; of Dewey's efforts to articulate the relation of experience and nature. But Rorty dismisses the traditional metaphysical projects, and assures us that he has no more time for the idea of "the way the world is"[65] than he has the idea of objective truth.

On this last point, perhaps you will again allow me a personal anecdote. Once, at a conference in Brazil, I found myself obliged to make polite small talk with Rorty while we waited for the lecture room in which we were both to speak to open. Thinking the topic suitably neutral, I asked whether his wife had come with him on this trip. No, Rorty replied, she hadn't; they were bird-watchers, he continued, and Mary only accompanied him when he was going to places where there were birds they had never seen before. I was on the point of exploding: "but, look, you say you don't believe in 'the way the world is'; so what could you possibly *mean* by 'places where there are birds we have never seen before'?" But luckily, our conversation was interrupted by a pure black hummingbird flying by, and we were able to chat politely about that instead.

Now let me turn to the question about philosophy and democracy, where it might seem that Rorty really is quite close to Dewey. But once again, I would say, the appearance of agreement is quite misleading. Yes, Dewey associated philosophy and democracy; and yes, there are affinities between the fallibilism of his epistemology and the gradualism of his political philosophy, and between the social aspects of his epistemology and democracy specifically. But there is really all the difference in the world between Dewey's social philosophy and Rorty's. For Dewey is very clear that if we are to improve society we need to know what the present situation is, what different situation would be preferable, and what means might get us from here to there; while Rorty, who denies that there are any objective epistemological standards, and even that there is such a thing as the way the world is, can acknowledge none of this. If it is intended seriously, Rorty's anti-philosophical stance leaves his rhetoric about democracy entirely hollow.

SY: Professor Haack, what is your assessment of the prospects for the development of pragmatism? Would you take the pessimistic stance that traditional pragmatism is nearing extinction? Or do you harbor a hope that we can rescue pragmatism from its seemingly inevitable demise? What do you see as the future of pragmatism in the United States?

SH: Let me begin with some thoughts about the present situation. There is, first of all, a continuing stream of scholarship on the pragmatist tradition—mixed in quality, inevitably, but some of it very fine indeed. There are, also, philosophers whose work shows the influence of the pragmatist tradition – among whom, besides Putnam, Rescher, and others, I would include myself. My *Evidence and Inquiry*,[66] for example, offers a reconstruction of epistemology steeped in the ideas of that tradition, and specifically trying to transcend the raft of false dichotomies that have bedeviled twentieth-century epistemology; my *Defending Science—Within Reason*[67] offers an account of the place of scientific inquiry within inquiry more generally thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Peirce's synechism; my papers on logic in the law[68] and on jurisprudence[69] draw on Holmes and

[63] See Susan Haack, "The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant's Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce's to Philosophy Today," *Polish Journal of Philosophy*, 1, 2007: 29-43.
[64] Peirce, *Collected Papers* (note 9 above), 6.287-317 (1893) (on agapism); 6.47-65 (1892) (on tychism); 6.24-25 (1894) (on objective idealism).
[65] Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost" (1972), in Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (note 62 above), 3-18.
[66] Haack, *Evidence and Inquiry* (note 5 above).
[67] Haack, *Defending Science—Within Reason* (note 35 above); see also Haack, "Not Cynicism but Synechism: Lessons from Classical Pragmatism" (2005), in Haack, *Putting Philosophy to Work* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 79-94.
[68] Susan Haack, "On Logic in the Law: Something, but not All," *Ratio Juris*, 20.1, 2007: 1-31.

on the other old pragmatists. And there are many outside philosophy, also, whose work is influenced by pragmatism: the "institutional economists" who look to Dewey's social philosophy, for example, the legal theorists who appeal to Peirce's idea of abduction, the semeioticians who acknowledge Peirce as a founder of their discipline, the Deweyan literary theorists looking to the interaction of reader and text, the "symbolic interactionists" in social science who look to Mead; and so on.

I have the impression—of course, it can be *only* an impression—that, since Rorty's death in [year], the influence of his work in the U.S. has declined quite sharply; more so, probably, than elsewhere in the world. I also have the impression that, even before this, the neo-analytic party (which is still dominant in the profession, though intellectually close to exhaustion) had already begun to colonize and domesticate previously outlaw territory: so that we began to see blandly analytic variants of such formerly-radical projects as feminist epistemology, social epistemology – and of pragmatism. For example, Robert Brandom's so-called "analytic pragmatism" seems to have acquired something of a following—perhaps in part because of the tangled obscurity of Brandom's writing, which makes it a tempting target for Ph.D. students in search of a topic; and perhaps in part because of Brandom's having won a spectacularly large grant. So far as I understand it, however, Brandom's exercise seems better described as a neo-later-Wittgensteinian project in the pragmatic underpinnings of language than as a descendant of the classical pragmatist tradition.[70]

I find myself extremely reluctant, however, to predict what the future of pragmatism will be; there are just too many contingencies involved. Who could possibly have imagined, when I was starting out in philosophy, that someone like Brian Leiter would by now have so extraordinary an influence on the profession? At that time, after all, the internet did not exist; and it would have been close to inconceivable that a single individual might set up a ranking of philosophy graduate programs that, in a decade or so, would become so influential that it could distort departments' (and even universities') priorities, skew hiring decisions, and contribute to the coarsening and corruption of the entire profession. By now, Leiter's influence is such that when he edits a book on *The Future for Philosophy*[71] there will no doubt be many who look to this as somehow authoritative; in fact it may, even, to some degree influence what the short-term future of philosophy *is* – a most unfortunate upshot, in my opinion.

I will, however, venture to say what I *hope* the future of pragmatism will be. The classical pragmatist tradition, in all its variousness, was an extraordinarily fruitful one; moreover, it was in some ways ahead not only of its own time, but also of ours. My hope is, simply, that there will continue to be those who learn from it and to develop the insights to be found in it in new and fruitful ways—and, of course, those who see ways to marry pragmatist insights with others from other traditions.

[69] Susan Haack, "The Pluralistic Universe of Law: Towards a Neo-Classical Legal Pragmatism," *Ratio Juris*, 21.4, 2008: 453-80.

[70] Robert Brandom, *Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). I note that while in this book Brandom occasionally alludes to Dewey, none of these allusions is anchored by a specific reference; and that he makes only one casual reference to James, and none to Peirce or Mead.

[71] Brian Leiter, ed. *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

KANT AND PRAGMATISM

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Introduction

Several papers in this conference[2] are devoted to investigating the ways in which the pragmatist classics are studied and are philosophically relevant *today*. Mine might seem to be more historical, as I will focus on the relations between pragmatism and Immanuel Kant. However, I believe it is precisely the "Kantian" nature of pragmatism, as well as the ability of pragmatism to critically reinterpret and transform Kantian ideas, that makes pragmatism a highly valuable philosophical approach today – in discussions of realism and idealism, ethics and values, religion, and many other topics.

William James famously wanted to see philosophical progress as going "round" Kant instead of going "through" him.[3] However, pragmatism – even James's own pragmatism – shares several crucial assumptions with Kant's critical philosophy, to the extent that Murray Murphey was justified in calling the classical Cambridge pragmatists "Kant's children".[4] I have previously examined the Kantian background of pragmatism and the affinities between pragmatism (both classical and more recent) and transcendental philosophical methodology on a number of occasions.[5] In this presentation, I can hardly do justice to the richness of the question concerning the pragmatists' relation to Kant – either historically or systematically. I do try to shed light on this topic, however, by exploring this relation through the threefold structure of Kant's critical philosophy.

Kant summarized his three *Critiques* in terms of three central questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? These questions can be regarded as opening up Kant's critical philosophy with respect to (1) *epistemology and metaphysics* (i.e., the core areas of "theoretical philosophy"), (2) *ethics* (i.e., "practical philosophy"), and (3) *philosophy of religion*, respectively.[6] Both classical pragmatists – especially Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey – and late twentieth century neopragmatists – such as Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty – have significantly contributed to all these fields of philosophy. If I had time to comment even on these five thinkers in any detail here, we might think of this paper as an attempt to fill in a 3x5 matrix: three "critical" Kantian questions and five

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[2] I want to thank Emil Visnovsky for his kind invitation to present this paper in the CEPF 10th Anniversary conference, at Comenius University, Bratislava, on June 7, 2010. For valuable comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Vincent Colapietro, Don Morse, and John Ryder, in particular. I am also drawing on some material I presented at a plenary panel on American philosophy from non-American perspectives at the SAAP meeting in Charlotte, NC, on March 13, 2010; comments by Douglas Anderson were particularly helpful on that occasion. Finally, some parts of the paper were also presented in the 3rd Nordic Pragmatism Conference at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, on June 1, 2010, and again (with the title, "Pragmatism and Metaphysics") in the Finnish-Russian Philosophy Symposium at the University of Helsinki, on June 14, 2010.

[3] William James, "The Pragmatic Method" (1898), in *Essays in Philosophy*, eds. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 138-139.

[4] Murray Murphey, "Kant's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 4 (1966).

[5] See, e.g., the following relatively recent works of mine: Sami Pihlström, *Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books, 2003); *Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005); "Synthesizing Traditions: Rewriting the History of Pragmatism and Transcendental Philosophy", *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 23 (2006), 375-390; and *Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology* (London: Continuum, 2009).

[6] I must ignore aesthetics here, though it is a central concern in the *Third Critique*. Moreover, Kant's and the pragmatists' (especially Dewey's) approaches are perhaps more divergent in aesthetics than in any other fields of philosophical inquiry. By no means do I wish to claim that the pragmatists would have followed Kant in all areas of philosophy – that would be stupid and preposterous.

major pragmatist philosophers responding, or at least reacting, to them, sometimes in more and sometimes in less Kantian ways. This could in a more comprehensive study easily be expanded into a 3xn matrix, adding other pragmatists' views.

As is well known, Kant sought compromises to various philosophical controversies of his times, critically synthesizing, e.g., rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, determinism and freedom, as well as nature and morality, among other problematic dichotomies. Similarly, pragmatism has often been put forward as a critical middle ground between implausibly one-sided extremes. For instance, for James, pragmatism is a mediator between various extreme positions that may contain some truth but are as such too narrow, in particular between the conflicting temperaments of the "tough-minded" and the "tender-minded". It is in this reconciliatory spirit that we should also undertake the task of finding some common ground between Kant and the pragmatists.

1. What can I know?

In epistemology and metaphysics, virtually all the classical pragmatists attempted to walk the middle path between strong *realism* and *idealism* (or what would today be called *constructivism*). The objects of experience and inquiry are not "ready-made" but are in an important sense constructed, or at least shaped, by us in the course of our inquiries. The neopragmatists have shared this attempt by attacking metaphysical realism and aiming at something like "pragmatic realism" instead. However, a deep tension between realism and idealism (constructivism) seems to characterize the pragmatist tradition. One key problem here is that the pragmatist view according to which reality is our pragmatic construction faces a dilemma: it seems to be *either* exciting but obviously false (if causally, empirically, or factually interpreted), *or* true but trivial and unexciting (if it just amounts to the thesis that we construct the concepts we use for categorizing reality).[7] What I am suggesting is *not* that pragmatist attempts to deal with this problem should just be reduced to Kant's, nor that pragmatists should start using the Kantian "transcendental" vocabulary, but that this problem will receive a considerably enriched and nuanced "redescription" (in a quasi-Rortyan sense) when it is rearticulated in a Kantian way, distinguishing between the *transcendental* and the *empirical* levels – even though *this* distinction itself must eventually be softened ("naturalized", hence also redescribed) according to the truly pragmatist Kantian thinker.

We may start this task of redescription by noting that several philosophers – not only pragmatists – have argued that the existence and/or identity of things (entities, facts, or whatever there is taken to be in the world) is in a way or another relative to, or dependent on, the human mind, linguistic frameworks, conceptual schemes, practices, language-games, forms of life, paradigms, points of view, or something similar. Among the historically influential advocates of key variations of this "dependence thesis" – starting already from the pre-history of pragmatism, including figures only marginally involved in pragmatism, and ending up with neopragmatism – are, in addition to Kant himself (for whom the empirical world is constituted by the transcendental faculties of the mind, i.e., the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts or categories of the understanding), thinkers like James (whatever we may call a "thing" depends on our purposes and selective interests), F.C.S. Schiller (we "humanistically" construct the world and all truths about it within our purposive practices), Dewey (the objects of inquiry are constructed in and through inquiry, instead of existing as "ready-made" prior to inquiry), Rudolf Carnap (ontological questions about whether there are certain kinds of entities can only be settled within linguistic frameworks, "internally", whereas "external" questions concern the pragmatic criteria for choosing one or another linguistic

[7] See Susan Haack, *Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), especially ch. 9.

framework), W.V. Quine (ontology is not absolute but relative to a theory, language, or translation scheme), Ludwig Wittgenstein (the "essence" of things lies in "grammar", thus in the language-games we engage in, instead of transcending our language-use and "form of life"), Putnam (there is no "ready-made world" but only scheme-internal objects), Nelson Goodman (we "make worlds", or "world versions", by employing our various symbol systems), Thomas S. Kuhn (different scientific paradigms constitute different "worlds"), Rorty (our "vocabularies" constitute the ways the world is for us, and we must "ethnocentrically" start from within the vocabularies we contingently possess), possibly even Wilfrid Sellars (the best-explaining scientific theories are the "measure" of what there is and what there is not), and others – not to forget, however, Donald Davidson's famous critique of such forms of relativism and the implicated distinction between a conceptual scheme and its allegedly scheme-neutral content, or other noteworthy criticisms of conceptual and ontological relativism.[8]

In their distinctive ways, these and many other philosophers have suggested that there is no absolute world *an sich* that we could meaningfully conceptualize or cognize; if there even is such a world, as Kant held, it is a mere limit of our thought and experience, a problematic *Grenzbegriff*. What there is *for us* (*für uns*) is a world we have constructed, and are continuously constructing, relative to our schemes of categorization and inquiry. Pragmatists, however, generally follow – or at least *should* follow – Kant in embracing something like *empirical realism* (and naturalism) within a broader pragmatist position comparable to Kantian *transcendental idealism*. The pragmatist should not simply opt for antirealism or radical constructivism and relativism in ontology but, rather, seek a moderate pragmatic realism compatible with naturalism. The problem we now face is how to combine the (transcendental) scheme- or practice-*dependence* of entities[9] with their pragmatically postulated scheme-*independence* (at the empirical level) in pragmatist metaphysics. This is, essentially, the pragmatist version of the Kantian problem of maintaining both empirical realism and transcendental idealism – both the empirical

[8] See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/1787), ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990); William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907), eds. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1975); F.C.S. Schiller, *Pragmatism and Humanism: Selected Writings 1891-1939*, eds. John R. Shook and H.P. MacDonald (Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books, 2008); John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study on the Relation between Knowledge and Action* (1929) (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1960); Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology" (1950), anthologized in (e.g.) Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (eds.), *Metaphysics: An Anthology* (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); W.V. Quine, "On What There Is" (1948), in ibid.; Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958); Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face*, ed. James Conant (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1990); Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978); Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970 [1st ed. 1962]); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). For Davidson's seminal critique of the scheme–content distinction and the resulting conceptual relativism, see Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974), in Davidson, *Inquiries into Interpretation and Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); cf. also, e.g., Ilkka Niiniluoto's vigorous attack on cognitive relativism in his *Critical Scientific Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[9] I am assuming an *ontological* sense of both dependence and independence here. Roughly, an entity *a* is ontologically dependent on another entity *b*, iff *a* cannot exist unless *b* exists, that is, *b*'s existence is required for *a*'s existence. This must be distinguished from *causal* (in)dependence (and of course *logical* (in)dependence). A table is causally dependent on its maker's activities, but when made, it is ontologically independent of them (at least according to realist metaphysicians), because it could remain existing even if its maker disappeared from the world. For more detailed discussions of ontological dependence and independence, see E.J. Lowe, *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); and Lowe, *The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).

independence of things and their transcendental dependence on the ways we construct them through our practice-embedded schemes, which for pragmatists are *not* unique and universal (as in Kant) but more varied and reinterpretable. For Kant, spatio-temporal objects in the empirical world are really "outside us" (*ausser uns*) and in this sense exist empirically speaking mind- and scheme-independently. Nevertheless, they are transcendentally dependent on us, because the spatio-temporal and categorial framework making them possible as objects of experience (appearances) arises from our cognitive faculties (i.e., sensibility and understanding). Replace the latter with human cognitive and conceptualizing *practices*, and you have the pragmatist issue of ontological (in)dependence.

Yes, there *is* such a thing as "pragmatist metaphysics"; it was not an accident that I just used that phrase. Acknowledging this is an important element of acknowledging the pragmatists' Kantianism. Instead of understanding metaphysics as an inquiry into Being *qua* Being, the pragmatist may understand it as an inquiry into the fundamental – yet historically changing and reinterpretable – features of the human world, as it emerges in and through human practices (including the practices of inquiry itself). Pragmatists such as Putnam join, at least implicitly, Kantians like Henry Allison in insisting (with Kant) that we cannot know, or perhaps even form a coherent conception of, the world as it is in itself, independently of the *conditions* of human cognition and representation.[10] Metaphysics in the form practiced by metaphysical realism, assuming what Putnam calls a "God's-Eye View" on the absolute structure of the world, is therefore impossible, according to these pragmatists and Kantians. Contrary to what is often assumed, however, this approach does not renounce the possibility of an ontological inquiry into the structure of the (human) world, while it does require us to fundamentally reinterpret that inquiry. There is room for a *critical* conception of metaphysics within a more inclusive understanding of its status and tasks – of metaphysics reconceived as an examination of the basic features of a humanly categorized reality, of the practice-embedded conditions necessary for us to be able to experience an objective, structured world. It is (only) this human world, which for us is the only world there is, that we may hope to be able to metaphysically investigate.

It can be argued that pragmatism, when developed as an inquiry into the structure of the "human world", ought to be seen as a naturalized and thereby reconceptualised form of Kantian transcendental philosophy (several pragmatists' own reservations notwithstanding), and that both transcendental philosophy and pragmatism (and their combination, "transcendental pragmatism", as one might call it)[11] are metaphysically relevant, that is, not simply critical of metaphysics (though they are that, too). Pragmatism, thus modified, provides us with a *perspectival* approach to ontology, highly critical of metaphysical realism (and antirealism), yet affirming the seriousness of ontological inquiry into the ways the world must be taken by us to be, from within our practices. Such an ontologically serious pragmatism should not be reduced to a merely methodological perspective or constraint on inquiry; it is a method of inquiring into the way(s) the world (for us) *is*. The pragmatic method, developed by Peirce and James in their somewhat different ways, seeks to determine the true core of metaphysical disputes and theories by examining their conceivable practical results. According to pragmatist metaphysics, objects – and ontological categories or structures generally – emerge from human categorizing practices, just as they may in more

[10] See Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, Revised and Enlarged Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004; 1st ed. 1983).

[11] Note, however, that my "transcendental pragmatism" is not directly connected with the transcendental pragmatics of language and communication familiar from Karl-Otto Apel's and Jürgen Habermas's writings, which, of course, have done a very important job in (re)connecting pragmatism and transcendental philosophy in the European context. See, e.g., Apel, *From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

traditional forms of transcendental philosophy be claimed to emerge from, or to be constitutively based upon, the conditions of possible experience (Kant), the transcendental structures of consciousness (phenomenology), or language-games embedded in forms of life (Wittgenstein).

The classical pragmatists' relations to these more obviously transcendental ways of thinking would of course require much more detailed scrutiny than is possible in this article. In any event, I hope it has become clear that it is primarily in the context of the *realism debate* – the on-going dispute concerning objectivity, truth, and reality – that pragmatism and the Kantian transcendental approach are natural companions, critically integrating a moderate form of realism with a full acknowledgment of the human constructive contribution in shaping the world into what it is for us.

2. What ought I to do?

Now, if we cannot expect metaphysics to be able to deliver a view of the world in itself, as assumed by metaphysical realists, we must carefully consider how exactly we humans contribute to "constituting" the world, to "structuring" it into what it is for us. If we take seriously the Kantian claim that our very notion of reality is, ineliminably, a function of our ways of constituting reality, extending this view to cover historically transformable categories instead of fixed a priori structures of cognition, in particular our human practices and habits of action – as pragmatists since James and Dewey have suggested – then the crucial question to be asked is to what extent these world-constituting practices involve not only semantic, conceptual, and epistemic but also *moral* elements.

With James, in particular, we are led to the relatively radical claim that metaphysics might not be possible at all without a connection to, or entanglement with, ethics. This is to say that we cannot arrive at any understanding of reality as we are able to experience it without paying due attention to the ways in which moral valuations and ethical commitments are constituents of that reality, insofar as it is humanly experienceable. Now, as the (Jamesian) pragmatist maintains that, when dealing with the world in any manner whatsoever (however theoretical), we are always, at least implicitly, making ethical choices, engaging in moral valuations, formulating our categorizations of reality from perspectives or standpoints always already laden with ethical ideals and assumptions, s/he should also maintain that reality *is*, for us, inevitably value-laden. A general question concerning the relations between metaphysics and ethics arises here, and the distinctness of these fields of inquiry cannot be taken for granted by the pragmatist metaphysician. The issue goes much deeper than the rather uncontroversial idea that different metaphysical positions may have different ethical implications. Our question is whether metaphysics, in the critical sense inherited in pragmatism, might be *grounded* in ethical considerations, or based on ethical premises, rather than vice versa.

In contemporary pragmatism, this topic is approached in terms of the *fact-value entanglement*. There are, according to Putnam, no value-independent facts (nor, for that matter, fact-independent values), but facts and values are, for us, deeply entangled.[12] A being with no values would have no facts either, as Putnam puts it. On the other hand, Putnam arguably goes too far in the antimetaphysical direction, possibly as a result of his original logical empiricist inheritance (as a pupil of Carnap and Reichenbach), when he suggests that pragmatists should develop "ethics without ontology".[13] The upshot of the pragmatist tradition in metaphysics,

[12] See Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); cf. Pihlström, *Pragmatic Moral Realism*; as well as Sami Pihlström, "Putnam's Conception of Ontology", *Contemporary Pragmatism* 3:2 (2006), 1-13 (with a response by Putnam in the same issue).

[13] Hilary Putnam, *Ethics without Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

ranging from Peirce, James, Dewey, and others to the Putnamian critique of the metaphysical realism inherent in contemporary scientific realism and naturalism, is that we need not abandon metaphysics but must reinterpret in a pragmatic and, hence, inescapably value-laden manner. The value-ladenness of facts is, moreover, not just a contingent feature of the empirical world but a Kantian-like quasi-transcendentally necessary precondition for us to be able to *have* a world at all.

The pragmatist hoping to retain metaphysics in a revised and reinterpreted form may easily join Putnam in his defense of the fact-value entanglement, while rejecting his antimetaphysics. Metaphysics itself is a deeply valuational activity. Like the empirical world in general, our metaphysical problems and concepts come to us "screaming with values". It is not just a value-neutral matter whether there are, say, human minds or cultural entities like institutions (or values, for that matter) in the world. Such metaphysical issues are valuational and call for an active interplay of theoretical and practical philosophy. Indeed, a reinterpretation of the traditional Kantian distinction between theoretical philosophy, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, etc., and practical philosophy, including ethics as well as social and political philosophy, ought to be seen as a key pragmatist contribution to twentieth (and twenty-first) century metaphilosophy.

The fact-value entanglement does not exhaust the pragmatist contribution to a (naturalized) Kantian understanding of the nature of morality and values. Pragmatism is, among many other things, an attempt to understand both scientific and non-scientific rationality as parts of our human, inevitably ethically problematic existence. It adopts an agent's perspective on our experience, thinking, and reason-use, reminding us that it is only through our practice-laden being-in-the-world that we may fully appreciate our cognitive and rational capacities. Thought – or language, or the mind – is not a "mirror of nature", as Rorty put it,[14] but arises out of our worldly engagements with our natural surroundings, being constantly in the service of human interests and needs.

This irreducibly practical starting point not only makes pragmatism a most significant framework for contemporary discussions of rationality, knowledge, morality, and value, but also again reconnects it with Kant's critical project of understanding humanity's relation to the world through the distinction (albeit *not* a pernicious dualism or dichotomy) between the perspectives of natural science and moral reasoning. Thus, the problem of how our scientific and ethical perspectives on the world ought to be reconciled is, in an important way, both a Kantian problem and a pragmatist one. Kant maintained that we must limit the scope of knowledge in order to make room for faith. In a manner strikingly similar to the later pragmatists, he wished to make sense of both scientific experience, which is the basis of reliable, empirically testable theories of nature, and moral experience, which leads to ethically motivated action (or at least ought to do so). Kant showed us how to make sense of our empirical cognitions of an objective world without giving up the objectivity (or at least rationally binding intersubjectivity) of ethical value judgments; the pragmatists have continued this project. Very much like Kant, most pragmatists insist – or should insist – on viewing human beings in a "double light", *both* (empirically) as naturally emerging elements of the natural world *and* (transcendentally) as free, autonomous agents, whose agency, however, arises from that same nature while continuously (re)shaping it.
In sum, while it is probably correct to say that when it comes to moral philosophy most pragmatists have been consequentialists of some kind, usually quite far from Kant's deontological ethics, there are deeply Kantian aspects to be found in pragmatist ethical reflections, including James's continuous concern with the meaning

[14] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

and value of human life and even Dewey's project of overcoming the nature vs. culture dualism. For James, in particular, ethics was the driving force of philosophical inquiry. Everything, including metaphysics, had to be examined from an ethical point of view. In more recent pragmatism, especially Putnam, this ethical grounding of metaphysics is examined by means of a devastating critique of the fact-value dichotomy, as we briefly saw. Accordingly, we may say that no pragmatist has been a proper Kantian in moral philosophy, but many of them have attempted to acknowledge the *seriousness* of our moral perspectives on the world in a manner not very dissimilar from Kant's, while also endorsing and further developing the Kantian double vision of human beings as both natural (i.e., parts of the causal structure of the natural world) and free or autonomous (i.e., morally responsible denizens in the "kingdom of ends").

3. What may I hope?

In the philosophy of religion, we may also speak about the Kantian aspects of pragmatic approaches to the problems of theism vs. atheism and evidentialism vs. fideism.[15] For virtually no pragmatist can religious faith be said to be a strictly evidential issue on a par with scientific hypotheses. Evidence can play only a marginal role in religion. Rather, religion has to do with the way in which one understands and relates to one's life as a whole. Both James's and Dewey's criticisms of the dogmatic religious (and anti-religious) outlooks of their times and Putnam's Wittgensteinian defense of some insights in Jewish philosophy are examples of this, even though the explicit connections with Kant are scarce here. In Kant as well as pragmatism, religion must be intimately connected with morality. We can have a moral theology, no theological ethics.

The proposal I want to explore and go some way toward defending in this section is a reconceptualization of the theism vs. atheism and evidentialism vs. fideism issues in an explicitly ethical manner – though obviously only some selected perspectives on such an enormous task can be taken up here. Indeed, both evidentialism and fideism, arguably, turn out to be insufficiently ethical responses to the problem of theism vs. atheism. The traditional alternatives themselves – that is, theism and atheism, when characterized as opposed metaphysical standpoints regarding the question of God's existence – suffer from the same insufficiency. Philosophical debates over these matters have unfortunately often ignored the ethical, hence pragmatic, aspects of the problem of God's existence; or, more precisely, philosophers of religion have traditionally been interested only in the ethical implications theism (or atheism) might have, instead of considering whether theism (or atheism) might itself be grounded in ethical premises, or whether such metaphysical issues might in the end be inevitably entangled with ethical ones. It is to these ethical issues at the heart of the theism debate that I suggest we should turn our attention. This suggestion, as we will see, amounts to a Kantian – and pragmatist – rearticulation of what the question is ultimately about.

I believe we can employ both Kantian and pragmatist insights in order to argue that the theism issue is not exhausted by the narrowly intellectual (evidentialist) considerations one might advance in favor of either theism or atheism. Accordingly, theism should not be reduced to the mere metaphysical theory that God exists. This is because we need the resources of what Kant called practical reason – the kind of ethically driven use of reason that James, Dewey, and the other classical pragmatists saw as (in a certain sense) pervading human reason-use more generally – in order to arrive at any humanly acceptable solution to this problem. It is, in short, not only philosophically narrow-sighted but downright *unethical* to leave the ethical aspect out of such a major metaphysical problem as the one of (a)theism. Theism *might*, I will be suggesting, be rationally acceptable in terms of practical reason, or more generally from the standpoint of the vital human

[15] See Sami Pihlström, "Kantian Aspects of Pragmatic Theism", forthcoming in *The Pluralist* 6 (2010); see also Pihlström, *Pragmatist Metaphysics*, chapter 7.

needs and interests embedded in our practices of life, and this *is* a kind of rational justification for it; nevertheless, it is very different from the kind of justification standardly aimed at in evidentialist philosophy of religion. Moreover, justification in terms of practical reason – fully taking into account the pragmatic aspects of the theism issue – might be the *only* rational justification available for the religious believer. From a Kantian and pragmatist point of view, the religious believer's faith in God need not be made scientifically acceptable, or warranted in terms of religiously neutral criteria of reason (that is, either empirically verifiable or epistemically justified in a broader sense), because it is ultimately not a matter of science or reason (at least not primarily); the important thing is to make it *ethically acceptable* in the face of evil and suffering that we, believers and unbelievers alike, experience in the world we live in.

We are not here interested in the details of Kant's own religious and/or theological views, nor in his Christian (specifically Protestant) background, but in his *postulates of practical reason* (namely, the freedom of will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul). It is, in particular, from the perspective of my proposal to (re-)entangle ethics and metaphysics in the philosophy of religion (and elsewhere) that this Kantian topic deserves scrutiny. We may ask, for instance, whether the postulates are defended by Kant (in the second *Critique*) by means of a *transcendental argument*, and if so, how that argument differs from the arguments defending the categories and other "epistemic conditions"[16] of objective cognition (as presented in the first *Critique*). Even more importantly, we should ask whether the defense of the postulates in the Dialectics of the second *Critique* leads to a metaphysical position according to which God exists. I want to approach this question by suggesting that Kant's postulates are, again, *both* metaphysical *and* ethical – indeed, in a way in which their metaphysical and ethical aspects are inextricably intertwined.

Even a paradigmatic case of a metaphysics built on ethics can be found in Kant's doctrine of the postulates of practical reason. Although this is not Kant's own way of putting the matter, we might say that this doctrine presupposes transcendental idealism: the world is not absolutely independent of us but is responsive to our ethical (or more generally valuational) needs and interests, or "in the making" through such needs and interests – to put the matter in Jamesian terms.[17] *We* structure reality in terms of what the moral law in us requires; there is no pre-structured, "ready-made" world that we could meaningfully engage with. Notably, what I am here labeling transcendental idealism is a broader doctrine than the one defended in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, because I am not merely following Kant in regarding space and time as properties of appearances (rather than as properties of things as they are in themselves) but more widely

[16] Although I am employing Allison's notion of epistemic conditions here (see Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, especially ch. 1), I am not implying that I would agree with him that the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience, cognition, or representation that Kant is examining are *merely epistemic* in the sense of being *non-metaphysical*. Rather, I would once more urge that the critical philosophy, even in its core areas such as transcendental idealism, is (partly) a metaphysical project, though of course not "metaphysical" in the sense in which traditional pre-critical metaphysics was firmly rejected by Kant. Allison and some other interpreters – including, e.g., David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) – in my view tend to read Kant too anti-metaphysically, construing transcendental idealism and transcendental philosophy more generally as merely methodological or epistemological views.

[17] Peter Byrne, in his *The Moral Interpretation of Religion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), explicitly compares Kant's moral argument for God's existence with James's "will to believe" argument (see ch. 7). My approach is quite different, though, because I do not focus on "The Will to Believe" (but, rather, on *Pragmatism*) and because I view James's own ideas "transcendentally". Furthermore, a critic might point out that Hegel (as well as, possibly, the opposition between Hegel and Kierkegaard) would have to be taken into account when moving from Kant's philosophy of religion to James's. Again, I must simply note that not everything can be done in a single paper; the role played by Hegel at the background of pragmatist philosophy of religion deserves a separate study.

suggesting that the reality we find ourselves living in, is structured by us – not merely by our "cognitive faculty" but also by our various practical interests and purposes.[18] But *is* this structuring really metaphysical, or should we simply confine ourselves to an ethical, "merely pragmatic", account of the Kantian postulates? Is there "really" a God, or are we just entitled to act "as if" there were one?

I cannot examine in any close detail the way in which Kant constructs his famous moral argument for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the "Canon of Pure Reason"[19] and in the Dialectics of the second *Critique*.[20] Rather, I will directly take up the question concerning the metaphysical status of Kant's postulates. It is clear that, as mere ideas of pure reason ("transcendental ideas"), the concepts of God and the soul lack "objective reality". At best, these ideas can be employed *regulatively*, not *constitutively*. This, however, is only the point of view that theoretical, speculative reason offers to the matter. From the perspective of practical reason – which, famously, is ultimately "prior to" theoretical reason in Kant's system[21] – there is indeed some kind of "reality" corresponding to these concepts (or ideas). The epistemic status of these concepts, when transformed into postulates of practical reason, is, to be sure, quite different from the status of the actual constitutive, transcendental conditions of any humanly possible experience, such as the categories of understanding and the forms of pure intuition (space and time), explored in the "Transcendental Analytic" and the "Transcendental Aesthetic". The latter kind of conditions necessarily structure, according to Kant, the (or any) human, experienceable, cognizable world, that is, any objects or events we may conceivably encounter in this world. There would be no world of objects at all, at least no world we would be able to cognitively represent, in the absence of such structuring principles and categories. However, the postulates of practical reason also structure – in an analogical though definitely not identical manner – the human world as a world of ethical concern, deliberation, and action. The key idea here is that this "structuring" is not "merely ethical" but also metaphysical. Another key idea is that this structuring is, because of its uniquely ethical and metaphysical status, also transcendental.

The metaphilosophical status of the issue of theism must, hence, be thoroughly rethought in terms of this metaphysics–ethics entanglement. To paraphrase Kant, a theistic (or, indeed, atheistic) metaphysics without ethics would be blind, whereas a merely ethical reconceptualization of the issue – in which the metaphysical element is totally lacking – would be empty. From a pragmatist point of view, as much as from the Kantian one, ethics and metaphysics are profoundly entangled here. Religion, or theism, is pragmatically legitimated as a postulate needed for morality, for our ethical life and practices. Yet, no theological ethics in the style of, say, divine command theory can be rationally accepted by a critical moral philosopher. It would amount to putting the cart before the horse to hold that ethics could be grounded in or based upon theology (or religious revelation). What we need, according to both Kant and James, is *moral theology* – a theology based on ethics, rather than vice versa. Any attempt to base ethics on theology, or religion, would (in Kantian terms) be an example of heteronomy instead of autonomy, but the only critical

[18] Or, to put the point in a more properly Jamesian manner, these needs, interests, and purposes are always already at work within our cognitive faculty itself; there is no pure cognition independently of practical orientation in the world. This is pretty much what pragmatism is all about: all experience, cognition, or representation is inseparably embedded in human practices, or habits of action.

[19] See Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A795/B823ff.

[20] See Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), in Kant, *Werke in Zehn Bänden*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), A223ff.

[21] Cf. ibid., A215ff. Here, the word "ultimately" – my word in this context rather than Kant's – is crucial, because we can observe the priority of practical reason only after having done some work of theoretical reason, that is, after having become convinced of the futility of the speculative theistic proofs and having thus seen the need for a different, pragmatic, approach. I will briefly revisit this "priority thesis" toward the end of this paper.

and rational way to provide a basis for theology is the ethical way.

There is a problem here, though. Is theism here practically (pragmatically) legitimated a priori, by reason's capacities only (as it definitely is in Kant), or does it receive its legitimation empirically or psychologically, as an attitude de facto "energizing" moral life, because we are the kind of beings we are (as the matter seems to be in James and perhaps other pragmatists)? My suggestion here is that just as Kantian transcendental (critical) philosophy more generally synthesizes the pre-critically opposed epistemological doctrines of empiricism and rationalism, and just as pragmatism, as we have seen, attempts to bridge the gap between facts and values, we should try to reconcile Kantian (transcendental) and Jamesian (pragmatist, empirical, psychological) ways of justifying theism ethically. I am not saying that such arguments will inevitably or immediately succeed; that would be a much more ambitious claim. What I am suggesting is that the Kantian perspective on theism needs pragmatic rearticulation, and that the thus rearticulated pragmatic aspects of theism must not be thoroughly disconnected from the Kantian transcendental work of practical reason. Both the Kantian and the pragmatist view theism as, primarily, a problem of human life. For both, the ultimate question is the moral basis of metaphysics. For neither can the theism issue, or other issues in the philosophy of religion, be resolved in total absence of ethical considerations.

Any "Kantian" or "pragmatist" philosophy of religion worth the name must, then, be an inseparable mixture of metaphysical and ethical commitments – or, better, it must be an ineliminably metaphysical position defended (and in the end only defensible) by means of ethical considerations starting from our moral practices and from the requirements morality sets us (that is, the moral law and the highest good, in Kant, and the need for a strenuous moral mood, in James – though none of this requires us to commit ourselves to the particular moral philosophies defended by these philosophers).[22] It is from the perspective of the synthesis of ethics and metaphysics that I hope we might be able to view theism as a rationally justifiable option for a genuinely religiously inclined person in her/his individual life circumstances. This "aspectual" justification a believer might arrive at is very different from the kind of justification the evidentialist hopes to be able to provide. Theism can never be justified or rationally defended in terms of the same religiously neutral, fully objective general criteria of rationality that are used, for example, to ground our scientific theories about the empirical world. Theism can only, if at all, be "justified" from within the moral life.

This insight does not lead us to any unproblematic happy end in our reflections, of course. If it is only from within a life already experienced as morally demanding or challenging that we can so much as hope to reasonably defend theism (or *any* serious view in the philosophy of religion), then one might argue that only someone already committed to something like theism (in a Kantian or possibly Jamesian sense) can be sufficiently open to the arguments I have sketched. If morality is possible for beings like us only within a framework colored by the theistic assumption, then it might seem that anyone who really takes morality seriously will already have to be a theist, in which case the argumentation referring to the moral status of the theistic world-view would be futile. If, on the other hand, the argument is to be relevant from the perspective of a non-believer, then we must at least agree that the non-believer can take life morally seriously – even struggle to achieve the morally strenuous mood in her/his own secular way – in which case it is simply not true that

[22] Because I want to maintain the metaphysical element of theism, though only through ethics, my remarks are implicitly oriented against the currently popular postmodern and "post-onto-theological" attempts to defend a form of religion completely independent of metaphysics. See, e.g., the essays in Mark A. Wrathall (ed.), *Religion after Metaphysics?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), featuring work by leading anti-metaphysical thinkers such as Rorty, as well as Gianni Vattimo.

theism is required for serious moral life, after all. This problem is closely connected with the problem of *relativism* in the philosophy of religion – a vast issue not to be further discussed here.

Our picture of Kantian pragmatism in the philosophy of religion would have to be supplemented in many ways, by taking into account, say, Dewey's naturalized philosophy of religion, the concept of hope as elaborated (somewhat differently) by James, Dewey, and Rorty, or the Wittgenstein-inspired reflections on Judaism that Putnam offers in his recent work.[23] Here, however, I have mainly focused on James, only as an illustrative case of the interpenetration of pragmatist and Kantian aspects of the issues of theism. No detailed readings of any pragmatist thinkers have been given in this sketchy presentation.

Conclusion

Had I been able to discuss the five most influential pragmatist figures at more length, we might summarize what has been said (but has now largely been left unsaid) by drawing, for example, the following table:

Question/ Philosopher	**What can I know?**	**What ought I to do?**	**What may I hope?**
Charles Peirce	realism & idealism: the truth is the "final opinion" of the scientific belief-fixation by the ideal community of inquirers; reality is the object of that opinion	sentiment, conservatism; ethics as a normative science	God's reality: "neglected argument", natural inclination; evolutionary love (as a piece of scientific metaphysics)
William James	pragmatic constructivism: reality is shaped by our practical interests and purposes; objects exist in relation to our purposeful practices	consequentialism, yet a Kantian aspect; the worry about the reality of the ethical – overcoming ethical nihilism – as an overarching issue (connected with the need to acknowledge other individuals' otherness); even metaphysics based on ethics	God's reality as ethically "energizing"; the "moral salvation" of the world, through a joint effort of human and superhuman powers
John Dewey	naturalism & (limited) constructivism: science studies natural phenomena, yet scientific objects are constructed through inquiry instead of existing as "ready-made" prior to inquiry	naturalized, experimental ethics	naturalized religious experience; criticism of institutional religions (dogmatism, supernaturalism)
Hilary Putnam	pragmatic realism & critique of metaphysical realism: no "ready-made world", but no radical relativism or constructivism either	overcoming the fact-value dualism: moral values at work in all encounters with reality	religion is not an evidential issue, not to be confused with scientific ones: religion is a way of life (cf. Judaism, Wittgenstein)
Richard Rorty	rejecting the "world well lost" of realists; hence antirealism, with language shaping reality – or perhaps, rather, physicalism, with language itself as a physical phenomenon?	no ethical theories (very far from Kant!) but imaginative literature & creative reconstruction of "vocabularies"	Deweyan naturalism; private vs. public religion; "romantic hope"

[23] See Hilary Putnam, *Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). Cf. also Sami Pihlström, "Dewey and Pragmatic Religious Naturalism", forthcoming in Molly M. Cochran (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

In this table, some boxes are quite strongly "Kantian", others are not. For example, Peirce's views on realism and idealism, James's views on ethics and God, and Dewey's ideas on hope might together yield a considerably "Kantian" form of pragmatism, while obviously non-Kantian combinations of views drawn from the pragmatists are also possible.

Most of what I have said is extremely simplifying. We must keep in mind that in many cases the pragmatists have *not* followed Kant's ideas. This is most obvious in the case of Rortyan neopragmatism, but also Dewey's version of classical pragmatism and pragmatic naturalism is in many ways very far from Kant. Yet, I hope I have been able to show, through exemplary case studies, that the pragmatists have shared, if not Kant's views or doctrines, at least his central problems. In particular, the realism vs. idealism tension we find at the core of pragmatist metaphysics, with important implications to ethics and philosophy of religion, is undeniably profoundly Kantian, and so is the double perspective needed to understand our fully natural lives as genuinely ethically committed and responsible creatures.

Finally, two metaphilosophical issues need to be briefly clarified. First, the intimate relation between metaphysics and ethics, taken up above, should be seen as one unifying feature of pragmatism. In various ways, both classical and more recent pragmatists have argued that metaphysical (and epistemological, as well as religious) pursuits must be guided by ethical values: we cannot just settle the metaphysical issues first and then see how the ethical ones fall into their place; on the contrary, our ethical perspectives are always already at play when we engage in metaphysical (or any) reflection on our place in the world. This corresponds to Kant's insistence on the primacy of practical reason in relation to theoretical reason. The ultimate task of human reason is practical, and even when reflecting on and ultimately deciding whether a given issue belongs to the realm of theoretical reason-use or to the realm of practical reason-use, we are operating at the level of practical reason. This "primacy of practice" – with practice understood in a deeply ethical sense – is a key combining characteristic of pragmatism and Kantian critical philosophy.[1]

Secondly, and finally, Kant believed that his three questions – the questions that have structured this paper – can be summarized as one question: "What is man?" In the end, then, there is a sense in which Kant's entire philosophy amounts to philosophical anthropology, to an attempt to understand human existence in its various dimensions (theoretical, practical, religious, aesthetic, and others). In a strikingly similar way, all pragmatists are "philosophical anthropologists", investigating human life in a deeply human world, from an agent's perspective.[2] While the pragmatists have always wanted to steer clear of anything like the Kantian notion of a *transcendental subject* – a topic I have also avoided in this paper[3] – the *reflexivity* crucially characterizing that Kantian subject, manifested in human reason's self-critical turn toward its own activities, possibilities, and limits (ultimately guided by a practical interest), is something that pragmatism again shares with Kant. Or perhaps it is safe to say that a recognizable dimension of the pragmatist tradition, if not all pragmatists, does so. This reflexivity is itself an ethical process, something that real living human beings engage in. This, roughly, is what I mean by saying that both Kant's and the pragmatists' projects ultimately come down to philosophical anthropology.

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[1] The primacy of practice in this sense is, of course, completely different from the naïve and crudely utilitarian or instrumentalist interpretations of pragmatism as a mere ideology of "cash value". This need not be pointed out to pragmatism scholars, but it is something that might have to be pointed out to some more orthodox Kantians.

[2] See Sami Pihlström, *Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our Human Life in a Human World* (New York: Peter Lang, 1998).

[3] See, however, Sami Pihlström, "Pragmatism and Naturalized Transcendental Subjectivity", *Contemporary Pragmatism* 6:1 (2009), 1-13.

TOWARDS RORTY'S ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHY AS A REDESCRIPTION

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Richard Rorty called by David Hall a prophet and a poet of neo-pragmatism is probably the most famous and popular American intellectual in Slovak academic intellectual life.[1] However, I am not sure where we should look for the roots of his popularity; whether it is a reaction to his ideas such as liberal utopia, romantic polyetism, rejection of truth, ethnocentrism, emphasis on solidarity rather than on objectivity of knowledge. Or whether the attraction of Rorty´s ideas is related to his style of writing, irony, self-description as a postmodern bourgeois liberal, although that this self-desription was supposed to be a joke? Of course, his influence in many fields like social and poltical theory, literary theory, and theory of historiography is obvious, and I am not going argue against this. Nevertheless, I take the liberty to state that Rorty´s fame is not a reaction to pragmatism[2] as a vital source in contemporary thought, because American pragmatism is among Slovak scholars a quite unknown subject and nobody was explicitly steeped in pragmatic tradition. Marxist philosophy as such in so-called communist countries tended to be hostile to American pragmatism. Anyway, a question about Rorty´s fame in Slovak academic life is a very interesting topic.

Among Rorty´s followers and interpreters of Slovak academics I have to mention mainly L. Habova, thanks to her translation of the path-breaking work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (2000). Further connoisseurs and interpreters of Rorty are E. Višnovský, F. Mihina, E. Gál, P. Michalovič and others. Rorty´s work that came to definite end in 2007 has been also the subject of several master and doctoral theses. It seems to me a bit odd that contrary to Czech and Polish languages in particular, the most important works of philosophy, e.g. those by Leibniz, Descartes, Hegel, Hume, are still missing in Slovak translations despite the hitherto underestimated edition *Filozoficke odkazy (Philosophical Heritages)* and *Antologia z diel filozofov, (Antology from Philosophers´ Works),* Rorty´s publications have been extensively interpreted and reviewed. For example the publishing house Kalligram has published *Philosophical Orchides*, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in the 90s, the publishing house *Archa* published three relevant essays, the journal *Kritika and Kontext* published several papers and interviews with Rorty and significant articles by Rorty appeared in Czech language, too. Rorty himself visited Bratislava twice, in 1993 and recently in 1996. So, why has Rorty sparked this remarkable interest among Slovak scholars who mostly have not been aware of the genealogy of American pragmatism?

It seems to me that the popularity of Rorty´s thoughts in Central Europe and fast spreading of them has something to do with the hidden heritage of Marxism, despite the fact that Rorty, who declares himself a socialist, dislikes Marxist philosophy. He states e.g. the following: "…Marxism always struck me as a perfectly reasonable criticism of capitalism, imbued with a lot of philosophy. However, compared to Hegel and Heidegger, Marx seemed to me third rate. Marx was good for economics" (*Kritika and Kontext*, No. 34, 2007, p. 19). In my view his attitude to Marx is unjust just like that of Popper towards Hegel. If we take into account some aspects of the Marxist philosophy, Rorty´s echo in

[1] Today pragmatism is treated as an important bridge between European social thought and American pragmatism with its commitment with American theory of democracy. See e.g. *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 7, No 3, August 2004, p. 287.

[2] Yet in 1998 the first publication under title *Malá antológia filozofie 20. storočia* (*Short Antology of the 20th Century Philosophy)* with translations from publications by Ch. S. Pierce, W. James, J. Dewey and R. Rorty has been published in publishing house IRIS. Editors and interpreters were F.Mihina and E.Višňovský, who wrote comprehensive preface and introduction.

Central Europe can be understood much better.[3] So I cannot help feeling that his popularity is connected with some features of Marxist philosophy (e.g. antimetaphysical approach, naturalism, Darwinist evolutionism, historicism, virtue of activism) because Marxist philosophy was trying willy-nilly to become both a universal interpretation of the world as well as a foundation for all scientific disciplines. Adopting Rorty in our context has been underpinned by attributes of Marxist philosophy as such: its naturalism, mixed with historical relativism, embodied by a knowledge in socio-cultural context, stressing upon interests in production of knowledge, a notion of science as a guide to action and the orientaton toward the rejection of traditional moral authority in favour of a praxis. These features of Marxism played their role in the assimilation of Rorty´s ideas like behaviourism regarding nature of knowledge, anti-fundationalism, anti-representationalism, anti-essencialism. On the other hand, Rorty´s view on history of philosophy differs radically from the Marxist one and from the continental tradition, while Rorty rejects any theory at all, and Marxist philosophy possesses also a theory of history. After the collapse of communism and its ideology, a free empty space was ready for establishing Rorty´s view according to which philosophy has only one voice in conversation of mankind and as he claims: „… which ever happens, however, there is no danger of philosophy coming to an end..... The only point on which I would insist is that philosopher's moral concern should be with continuing the conversation of the West, rather than its insisting upon a place for tradition of modern philosophy within that conversation" (*Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, p. 394).[4]

In what follows I will focus only on two issues: on his criticism of representation and an idea of post-philosophical culture in order to examine the viability of Rorty´s ideas facing today's philosophy. It is a matter of fact that Rorty´s philosophical neopragmatist position is closely related to his political attitude and political outlook. However, it is questionable whether he really has developed feasible and effective conceptual tools for solution to problems which he is actually interested in.

For roughly the first three–quarter of the 20th century problems posed by representationalist theories of knowledge amounted to problems of linguistics representation; during the last quarter they shifted back to the problems of mental representations. Otherwise the image of knowledge as a mirror of nature was persisting. (See Ch. S. Peirce metaphor on knowledge like mirror.) According to Rorty, knowledge cannot be mediated by any metaphysic entity and there is no connection between Cartesian consciousness and the theory of mental phenomena that have only a quality to appear before the consciousness. With regard to this we have to note that Rorty holds a view of eliminative theory of mind and later on he adapted connectionism á la D. Dennett. If we abandon metaphor of mind as a mirror, we leave aside also mind and body dualism including mind and language distinction. Therefore, an objection against Rorty as anti-realist is not correct as he rejects mind and body problem as such. This problem is completely meaningless. Rorty claims that opinion on mind as a mirror and posted mental phenomena have resulted from interchange of questions about the origin of knowledge, how we obtain knowledge, with the question on justification of knowledge.

This rejection of the representationalist model of mind and language becomes fundamental in Rorty´s writings and reflects his identification with the tradition of pragmatism. Going back to his *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature* Rorty´s reliance on John Dewey did not became apparent, but since the publication *Consequences of Pragmatism* 1982, Dewey´s pragmatism is acknowledged

[3] Despite Rorty´s negative attitude to Marxist philosophy Dewey recognized the close relationship between pragmatism and Marxism. See B.Turner. *Democracy in One Country? Reflections on Pattriotism, Politics and Pragmatism*. In: European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 7, No 3, August 2004, p. 287.

[4] The metaphor on conversation by Rorty has been borowed from M. Oakeshott´s *The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind*.

by Rorty himself as a source for his antifoundationalism. Non foundational and non representational aspects of his pragmatism are related also to Davidson´s critique of conceptual scheme. Rorty´s attack against representationalism depends on Davidson´s rejection of facts and conceptual schemes. „By undermining the scheme content distinction, Davidson made it all but impossible to formulate many traditional philosophical problems." It is a virtue of Davidson´s work, says Rorty that it shows us „how to give up truth makers and representations" (R. Rorty, "Twenty-Five Years After", in *The Linguistic Turn,* 2nd edition, ed. R. Rorty. London: Hackett, 1992, pp. 371-374).

However, as S. Neale shows in his book *Facing Facts,* Rorty pushes Davidson scheme content distinction to its limit and while putting it into the framework of tradition from Heidegger, Dewey, Quine, and Sellars to Wittgenstein who reject reciprocal relations of making true and representing, that are central to the so-called representationalism. "If one gives up thinking that there are representations, then one will have little interest in the relation between mind and world, or language, or world. So one will lack interest in the old disputes between either realists and idealists or the contemporary quarrels within analytic philosophy about realism and anti-realism. For the latter quarrels presuppose that bits of the world make sentences true, and that these sentences in turn represent those bits. Without these presuppositions, we would not be interested in trying to distinguish between those true sentences which correspond to „facts of matter", and those which do not (the distinction around which the realists- vs. anti-realist controversies revolve)" (*Twenty five Years After in Lingusitic Turn*, 2nd edition, London, Hackett, 1992, p. 372).

The idea that there are two cleanly distinguishable components in knowledge, the factual element given to consciousness and the constructive elements contributed by mind or latter by language, Sellars attacks the myth of the given and Quine´s scepticism about the language fact distinctionism constitutes decisive rejection of this indispensable idea. It is in the light of Wittgenstein´s approach to language through the notion of use rather than that of picturing, the idea that language is in correspondence with reality has come to seem increasingly dubious. Rorty´s conclusion from criticism of representationalism seems more radical. Once we accept that we have to give up representations, we realize that the standard problems of philosophy can be eliminated and traditional problems disappeare with disappearance of representations of reality. If the word representation is out, philosopher must find another business to deal with. „If there are no representations, a good deal of work that passes for serious research in philosophy, in cognitive psychology, in linguistics, and even in philosophical logic is going to be worthless" (S. Neale, *Facing Facts*, Oxford 2001, p. 7). Neale´s diagnosis is to my mind appropriate when he states: "Rorty is surely right that most philosophical problems will not be dissolved by a criticism of language. But this is where he blunders. It is quite wrong to conclude from this that a careful (and perhaps formal) examination of sectors of our language will not be philosophically fruitful, for it is by such examination that a great deal of nonsense is exposed" (S. Neale, *Facing Facts*, Oxford 2001, p. 7). Work which has been done respectively on logical and semantic issues concerning the nature of compositionality, extensionality, inference principles, and the semantic of definite descriptions and class abstracts and so on are not corresponding with Rorty´s view on philosophy of language that did not provide us with any useful thought worth of discussion according to him.

Of course Rorty´s statement, that there are links between language and the rest of the world, but these links are causal, not epistemological is a plausible hypothesis, and also his view that we, our body and language, are shaped by our environment can be on the one hand adopted. On the other hand what is rather an inpalusible route is his approach to truth that is neither a criterion for correcting our beliefs nor an explanatory

property explaining why we have the beliefs we have or regarding some beliefs justified and other beliefs unjustified. What we are justified in believing taking for true comes to forging what for a time is the widest and most coherent pattern of beliefs we can muster. But there are no basic beliefs which all the rest of our knowledge and justified beliefs are based on. Neither philosophy nor science can deliver such beliefs. So far so good and with regard to this there is a parallel between Rorty and J. F. Lyotard who also claims (e.g. in *Postmodern Condition)* that there are no final "grand narratives." This parallel made possible to designate Rorty as a postmodern philospher hovewer he did not developed his neopragmatist position directly from postmodern thought, but from Dewey, and James, and along with that at the same time he is heavily influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger in many aspects. However we should be aware that Rorty rejects the whole legacy of Kantian tradition and heritage of the Enlightenment with its emhpasis on reason, subjectivity and rationalism. Pragmatist like Rorty is probably right to argue that there is no "ahistorical metavocabulary in terms of which to formulate algoritmus for theory choice" (Rorty *Philosphical Papers*, Vol.1: Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 67-69), but when he suggests that we have to abandon theory altogether he is plainly wrong.

One could argue, in the spirit of Rorty, that the idea of philosophy as a basis of culture must be abandoned. This radical repudiation of philosophy based on Kantian ideal (as his epistemology is a core of philosophy) means also an escape from so-called traditional binary opposites like true-false, objective-subjective, original-derivative, unified-diverse, and so on. Under the influence of Heidegger and Wittgenstein Rorty insists that we have come to believe that a general search for any sorts of foundations - epistemological, ontological - is misguided. His anti-representationalism, by which he means an account „which does not view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality" (*Objectivity, Relativism and Truth.* **C**ambridge, 1991, p. 1), playes an important role in the whole of his writtings. With the abandonment of foundationalism and along with Kantian understanding of the key task of epistemology we abandon a classical self-image of philosopher as someone who stands in some privileged position and can tell us, what counts as genuine knowledge.

He makes a distinction between ironist and metaphysician. Under the influence of Kuhn´s distinction between normal and abnormal discourse Rorty claims that philosophy has no particular object and he has only one voice in the conversation of mankind. Philosophy has no special mission. If philosophy plays any role, it is only to keep this conversation alive, to produce new vocabularies and experiences, to shape oneself. (The metaphor has been borowed from M. Oakeshott's *The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind.*) Rorty formulated a notion of the so-called *edifying philosophy*, which should be identified as being of abnormal discourses. We turn away from epistemology and move to hermeneutics combined with pragmatic account of plurality of practices, vocabularies and experiences. A vocabulary after being used is substituted by another one. We must, so to speak with Wittgenstein, throw away the ladder after we have climbed up it (see *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.53*-7). In Rorty´s further works, philosophy is seen as a literary genre. "Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form of mater, but by tradition – a family romance involving, e.g. Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad Brother Derrida" (*Consequences of Pragmatism,* 1982, p. 92).

And what about the self-image of philosopher we have now? His identification of himself as such, rather than as, perhaps, a historian, or a mathematician, or a poet - depends almost entirely upon how he sees the history of philosophy. It depends upon which figures he imitates, and which episodes and movements he disregards (*Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 41).* On the one hand regarding criticism of philosophy his work under the title *Truth and Progress* from 1988 did not bring any new ideas, but on the other hand his stress on that we have

to give up deceptive self-concept that philosophy can know things that no one can know so well, brings together pragmatism and hermeneutic. There is no possible transcendental perspective, there are only some particular social practices, moreover, and we never can escape fallibilism and historicism.

To focus on Rorty´s account of philosophy we may call him as Hans Kellner states, the philosopher of redescription that has a lot of antagonism and irony towards the attempt to rediscribe philosophical text. Rorty noted this and wrote: "Ironism, as I have defined it, results from awareness of the power of redescription. But most people do not want to be redecribed. They want to be taken on their own terms – taken seriously just as they are and just they talk. The ironist tells them that language they speak is up for grabs by her and her kind. There is something potentially very cruel about that claim. For the best way to cause people long-lasting pain is to humiliate them by making the things that seemed most important to them look futile, obsolete, and powerless" (R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 89). It is a different story, whether this method of rediscription and Rorty´s approach to history of philosophy is right.

If we compare Rorty´s approach and account of philosophy with today's situation, it is very hard to approve of his diagnosis. Facing facts it is becoming clear that Rorty´s predictions did not fulfil. The analytic philosophy which is understood as the style of argumentation, writing and thinking is alive and well despite all his efforts to show it to be worthless. Moreover, among thinkers who meet criteria of Rorty´s conversationalist philosophy there are on one hand systematic authors like Robert Brandom and – on the other hand – aesthetic author á la Stanley Cavell, as has been mentioned by Czech philosopher T. Marvan. Also epistemology as a discipline is alive and well.

Rorty´s ideas and work can be assessed in terms of positive and negative aspects. Negative aspect expresses a radical change and questionable assertion about philosophy as a discipline, which has no mission regarding shaping culture. A positive aspect highlights the new post-metaphysical vision of culture in which poetry will play a key role. From this point of view philosophy can be seen, at most, as a conversation which has no task to reach any truth, or to persuade somebody into doing something; conversely the conversation should be only creating new vocabulary, a stream of speech acts and shaping discourse. And the most important is the statement that every vocabulary is incommensurable with another and there is no final vocabulary with which one can arbitrate normative and epistemological claims. However, this vision is a very nebulous agenda.

After deconstruction of philosophy Rorty has turned back and starts to deal with other problems related with social issues including democracy, private and public distinctions, politics, friendship, equality of opportunity, individual liberty and so on. Philosophy has no special knowledge and dogma that is the role of a „queen of the sciences„ has been abandoned. For Rorty language without representation is a poetic tool that creates worlds, and language can provide us with the description of this world, which is thoroughly contingent and historical in nature. Thus for Rorty "the method is to rediscribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it... This sort of philosophy does not work piece-by-piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis, rather it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like „try thinking of it this way" or, more specifically, „try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the following new and possible interesting questions". It does not pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old things, which we did when we spoke in the old way... Conforming to my own precepts, I am not going to offer arguments against vocabulary I want to replace, instead, I am going to try to make the vocabulary I favour look

more attractive by showing how it may be used to describe a variety of topics“ (R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 9).

Theory is replaced by irony, for Rorty denies that the theory can definitely argue, evaluate or even deconstruct since there is no fulcrum from which to push one claim as better, correct, or right than other. We should be aware of ineliminable contingency of self and discourse. According to Rorty literature is a far more powerful tool for interpreting world and offering the descriptions needed for self-creation and social progress. Literature seemed to take the place of theory. Thus in Rorty´s view philosophy can provide no shared or viable foundation for political concepts as justice; it should be replaced with poetic descriptions and historical narratives. Rorty wants to revive liberal values without the need to defend them in terms of philosophical grounds. For him: „what is needed is a sort of intellectual analogue of civic virtue, tolerance, irony, and willingness to let spheres of culture flourish without worrying too much about their „common ground“, their unification, the „intrinsic ideals“ they suggest, or what picture of man they presuppose“ (*Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 168). We live in contingent world of competing vocabularies and narratives and none of them could serve as legitimising force or a tool for achievment of consent.

Rorty has paid attention to societal and political issues like solidarity, democracy, happiness, justice, romantic polyetism, freedom, etc. in last decades of his life. His considerations about the problems mentioned, generally speaking, are mostly rather vague and indefinite metaphors, which, if at all, are related only to his neo-pragmatic slogan *„take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself“.*

All those ideas are based on similar premises concerning anti-representational understanding of knowledge, anti-fundationalism, anti-essentialism. *R*orty´s critical attitude towards traditional philosophy and epistemology is related very closely to his account of social issues and democratic political philosophy, and democracy has priority to philosophy. But we can raise questions whether his account of political problems like human rights, separation between public and private speheres, solidarity, justice, patriotism, liberalism etc. can give us intelectull equipment to deal with problems in question. However, his anti-fundationalist account of democratic theory is unclear and combines economic liberalism, democracy and capitalism. Democracy should be pragmatically justified as to allow for open dispute among citizens. In this respect Rorty follows Dewey in arguing that an agreement freely reached by members of democratic community takes precedence over God, Natural Law or Reason (*Philosophy and Social Hope*, 1999, p. 237). But when Rorty states: “My native country has world-historical importance only because it cast itself in the role of vanguard of global egalitarian utopia” (*Philosophy and Social Hope, 234*), this assertion ought to be scrutinized facing American policy to expand democracy by means of force. And when Rorty states that America cannot become a policeman of global politics, regarding international realpolitik of the USA, because the role is incompatible with democratic legacy of pragmatism, Rorty lacks effective tools to deal with this big problem. And this also makes his patriotism a bit strange for it contradicts with Rorty´s antifoundationalism and irony, for there is no self-irony in his account of patriotism for America, only belief, certainty and conviction.[5] Rorty´s own language and vocabulary of national citizenship cannot set up cosmopolitan virtue, for it is impossible to cope with political and social troubles and issues by a return to our historical origin. He speaks very uncritically about “our country, America”. There is no discussion in Rorty how one might connect critical democratic conversation, patriotism and ethnocentric philosophy with Realpolitik.

[5] B. Turner shows in article mentioned above that Rorty´s pragmatic patriotism means final vocabulary that is in accordance with the contradictory expansion and export of American democracy.

At first sight it functions as a disguised but significant final vocabulary of justification.

So for Rorty philosophy has no public or political role, these areas are ruled by political a moral traditions. So, how can we claim that liberalism is good or show convincingly which practices are to be favoured to others without some kind of theory? And what about Rorty´s choice of liberalism why has not been choosen theory of liberalism by J. S. Mill? Rorty´s view on this point differs also from Dewey, who had a simple view on democracy which has been treated by him like "the best means so far found for realising ends that lie in the wide domain of human relationship and and the development of human personality" (*Democracy and Educational Administration, in*: The Later Works 1925-1953, 17 Vls. p. 217). Although we can agree with Rorty´s claims that language and subjectivity are historical and contingent in nature, that our relation to world is mediated many times over, I cannot help the feeling that without any kind of theory we are not able to defend even the liberal democracy which Rorty himself affirms. His suspicion against any theory goes too far. Without any kind of theory, we are not able to explain prons and cons of democracy.

Moreover, Rorty´s political platform depends on his antirepresantionalism, and there is a direct link between his attack on epistemology and his account of democracy; his thinking is a mixture of different incompatible opinions of Dewey and Nietzsche. This attempt to combine postmodernism, Nietzsche and Dewey as a foundation for open, critical democratic political philosophy has failed. The reason is very simple, Nietzche tried to defend heroic individualism and authenticity of self as virtue against modern society and democracy has been seen from his part as the triumph of the herd over the soul of the heroic individual. Fort this reason it is impossible to reconcile Nietzsche´s view with defence of modern democracy. Also respectively Dewey, there is one different point between him and Rorty. Dewey did not accept division between private and public sphere and argued that unless democracy acquired a social and moral charcter, it would be undermined by the private world. In short, Rorty´s burgois liberal postmodernism cannot adequately provide the resources for a coherent political philosophy. In his interview for journal, *Kritika a Kontext (Critigue and Context)* he gave the following answer to the question about any new trend that could constitute a political basis for the coming century. „Just ordinary liberal democracy is all the ideology anybody needs. Yet, liberal democracy works in times of economic prosperity and does not and, I think we are entering a time of economic insecurity, I don´t have much faith that we can keep liberal democracy going. But that's not for lack of ideas, that's for lack of money" (*Kritika and Kontext*, No 34, 2007, p. 23).

Rorty as philosopher seems to combine a Nietzschean heroic individualism with the liberal democratic concern for justice, a composite of rather incompatible forces. Although Gramsci´s philosophy does not meet the criteria of Rorty´s conversationalist edifying philosophy, Rorty himself makes an allusion to the tradition of *organic intellectual* in Gramsci´s thought. So such a contingency and historical narrative including a portion of irony become visible in Rorty himself as an unintended consequence of his way of philosophising, adding to its charm. Although, I disagree with Rorty on many issues, there is no doubt that it is mostly due to his writings that neopragmatism has raised the interest of various theorists like feminists, political scientists, artists etc. I think Rorty´s thought despite the above mentioned weaknesses means an interesting and inspiriring attempt to bridge a gap between American and continental tradition of doing philosophy. Probably I am not wrong to say, that his fame as great thinker is not the flavour of month.

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CH. S. PEIRCE

– „CREDO UT INTELLIGAM[1]!" OR SUPPOSED MAXIMS OF ABDUCTION.

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> *„Consciousness is like a bottomless lake in which ideas are suspended at different depths. Indeed, these ideas themselves constitute the very medium of consciousness itself. Percepts alone are uncovered by the medium... the deeper ideas are, the more work will be required to bring them to the surface".*

Charles Sanders Peirce (CP 7.553)

Human knowledge is a product of challenging temporal process accompanying man in his pilgrimage – and not just for one millennium. It is full of paradoxes – besides other particularly those, which we connect with its purport, with its being, its functions, its sources, and its influence on man itself. It is by no means a matter of course – not anthropologically, nor epistemically, or axiologically. Knowledge in itself as an object of inquiry is not a matter of course – at least in the optics of one of the most influential thinkers at the turning point of 19th and 20th Century in United States of America – Ch. S. Peirce (1839 – 1914). His panorama includes complex dialectics of belief, doubt, critic, and truth. *Credo ut intelligam – I believe so that I may understand* – changes in his optics into intense and profound motive stimulating man to grasp the ambivalent fact concerning himself and his knowledge; the fact that *humanum errare est* – that man is fallible – and that at the same time, realizing his constraints, man wants to reduce this tendency to err to minimum in order to arrive at indubitable truths[2].

Peirce articulates his attitude towards belief and doubt at the beginning of his philosophical activity (1877) in a well known article *The Fixation of Belief.*[3] Pragmatism is – not only in Peirce´s conception – a tool by means of which we are able to illustrate permanent alternation of belief and doubt as states accompanying human knowledge. However, it is not just a pure repetition; beliefs and doubts do not change. What changes is its object.

As an instrument of a process of acquiring knowledge and as a crucial aspect of mature inferential reasoning, abduction is a bridge between different levels of episteme matrix. In this manner we can interpret Peirce´s claim that: „If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction" (([2], V, 196, 197). It is exactly abduction which outlines the sources of our hypotheses as products of our creative logic.

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[1] „I believe so that I may understand" (lat.)

[2] "Why should there even be a reason for belief, if we cannot be certain?" – asks in a similar context Wittgenstein ([10], 93, af. 373) in his philosophical testament. Kant, on the other hand, proposes: " it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely *on faith*, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof" ([9], 53-54). If philosophy is not supposed to change to philodoxy, to became a game, if certainty recedes and the space of mind is filled in with opinion, it has to choose other, stronger grounds and rely on other resources. However, we hardly can avoid the feeling that belief and doubt are close relatives; one does not terminate the other, they merely change their places.

[3] "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else. On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe.... Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, though very different ones. Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed" ([2], CP 5.373 – 5.374).

Abduction as a selection of hypotheses

In his quest for the substitution of Mill´s *inductive guiding principle* as *guiding principle* of whole scientific inquiry, Peirce arguments as follows: we know that it is induction which approves and testifies our hypotheses, but how these hypotheses even emerged in mind at all? In order to show how it is possible for human mind to postulate hypotheses, which – even if they often show to be false – are before confirmation or confutation considerably close to reality, Peirce refers to some demonstrations from the history of science and postulates the issue of the selection of hypotheses ([2], 5.590; ON SELECTING HYPOTHESES). With him, the reader stands in speechless amazement in front of fact, which has been confirmed throughout the whole history of science: "how few were the guesses that men of surpassing genius had to make before they rightly guessed the laws of nature. . . ." ([2], 5.604). Thus, the question goes like this: "How is it that man ever came by any correct theories about nature?" ([2], CP 5.591).

The issue concerns inferential character of every single aspect of human knowledge and its exposition is in the competence of logic. Intellectual inferences, how Peirce sometimes calls them, are deduction, induction, and abduction. However, only two of them – induction and abduction – have synthetic character and it is only abduction alone, which "must cover all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered" ([2], CP 5.590). Logic thus analyses abduction as a specific type of inference.[4] However, it is not much one can say about abduction. Simply, it represents the process of formation of explanation hypothesis. What is crucial is that it is the only type of inference out of the three types of inferences, which introduces every new idea; it does not have any other purport except that it provides suggestions. This is also the primary reason why we find it interesting and topmost important.

According to Peirce, it was Aristotle who first mentioned the way of reasoning, which he calls *abduction*.[5] In Latin translation the so-called *reduction* – writes Aristotle – is a kind of reasoning, or rather a hypothetical syllogism, which generates new knowledge. The kind of reasoning which Aristotle calls *reduction*, in which a mass of facts is being analyzed in order to propose the theory of their explanation, while in this process – despite many defects in argumentation – new ideas (terms) emerge, Peirce calls abduction (or hypothesis, hypothetical inference, retroduction) ([2], A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905). Hypothesis introduces new ideas and new connections, but its common characteristic trait is also a lack of justified argumentation: "*As a general rule, hypothesis is a weak kind of argument. It often inclines our judgment so slightly toward its conclusion that we cannot say that we believe the latter to be true; we only surmise that it may be so*" ([2], CP 2.625). This may be the reason why Peirce considers the three forms of inferences as complementary and interdependent. However, *synthetic inferences* – *induction* and *abduction* (hypothesis) – are of primary interest.

> "*By induction, we conclude that facts, similar to observed facts, are true in cases not examined. By hypothesis, we conclude the existence of a fact quite different from anything observed, from which, according to known laws, something observed would necessarily result*" ([2], CP 2.636).

While induction is a reasoning from particulars to the general law, hypothesis is reasoning from effect to cause. "The former classifies, the latter explains" (ibid).

[4] More exactly, it is the competence of methodeutics (speculative rhetoric), as one part of three parts of the science of semiotics, which is itself a part (or body itself) of logic. *Methodeutics* is crucial actor in exposition of validity and applicability of conceptions and scientific theories. Peirce projected his *Methodeutics* in order to propose certain field of Logic, whose function would be to control the exposition of hypotheses as well as conditions under which methods are true and appropriate for formation of systems of propositions.

[5] If not for *Apellicon´s* translation and systematization of Aristotle (considered as inapt in certain aspects), this term would be presented in 25th chapter of second book of Aristotle's´ *Prior Analytics*. *(([2], A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905)*

Hypothesis introduces such a phenomenon, or a fact, which is under given circumstances, or even under all circumstances, of such a kind, that it is un-observable in direct perception ([2], CP 2.636 – 640). "Hypothesis supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly" ([2], CP 2. 640). To generalize, hypothesis in its singularity is something as a mediator between certainty and uncertainty; between certainty about the character of the "real", which is usually provided by induction, on one hand, and uncertainty about the nature of facts and phenomena which cannot – by nature – be directly perceived or observed, on the other hand. In *A Letter to Calderoni* Peirce refers to this important function of abduction as synthetic inference: "Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force" (([2], A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905).).

Formal exposition of hypothesis is as follows:

C

A —> C

————

A

Peirce offers simple exposition of this diagram of abductive, hypothetical inference:

> "*The surprising fact, C, is observed;*
> *But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,*
> *Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true*"
> ([2], 5.189).

If A is true, C is no longer a surprising fact, because there exists an explanation, which banks on such a state of affairs. This „reverse gear", which proceeds from observation to hypothesis, and than back to observation is according to Peirce the only way how to acquire knew knowledge. In other words, we have to produce, articulate and insert hypotheses into the field of experience, which is permanently stimulating us to new possible explanations and thus offering us still wider range of clarification of possible and actual facts and phenomena. It is clear that what Peirce proposes is that abduction is the elementary aspect of every process of reasoning used by scientists and researchers throughout the whole history of science without any limits. They just did not properly and consciously articulated the principle. *Atocha Aliseda* (pozri ([5], 37-38) offers three important aspects, which he traces in the process of reasoning, or in other words, in the process of searching for satisfying explanation of phenomena which we observe. Aliseda is convinced that if we are to consider certain hypothesis as promising, satisfying, or interesting, it should be: a) explanatory productive; b) testable; c) economic.

Contemporary discourse in the field of linguistics, semiotics, and philosophy of language and science offers still wider group of authors favoring Peirce´s postulation and articulation of abduction. Peirce projects abduction as hypothetical inference, and as such, it fulfills formal criteria of rational conscious inferences. At the same time abduction is closest to the unconscious, or rather *acritical and indubitable inferences*, and many times it is connected with them at some level of argumentation.[6] According to medieval scholars – as Peirce proposes – "all knowledge rests either on authority or reason; but that whatever is deduced by reason depends ultimately on a premise derived from authority" ([2], CP 5.359). Peirce did not and actually could not accept such an attitude. We could perhaps compare abduction to F. Bacon´s *inner illumination,* which we use – according to

[6] As *Eco*, *Bonfanti* and *Grazia* ([14], 97) show, Peirce reduced whole cognitive process down to the concept of *hypothetical inference*, "in which sensations appear as the interpretations of stimuli; the perceptions as interpretation of sensations; perceptual judgments as the interpretation of perceptions; particular and general propositions as interpretations of perceptual judgment; and scientific theories as interpretations of series of propositions" ([14], 97). *Perceptual judgments,* in Peirce´s terminology, are *acritical inferences* and they differ from *abductive inferences* in one crucial aspect: they are fully beyond the reach of logical criticism. However, this aspect does not exclude them from the process of scientific reasoning.

Bacon – when we meet with surprising facts of experience.

When we – together with Peirce – consider the progress of scientific methodology by means of comparing influence of eminent representatives of science, we discover in it certain *guiding principles of inferences* and inquiries, by means of which belief is permanently inspired and revaluated. Simply, there always are certain habits of mind, which govern inference. Without it, we would be like a boat on an open sea without somebody on the board, who would be skilled in navigation. But the crew must under all circumstances get the boat to the harbor; or rather – if we push this analogy to the field of discourse about knowledge – „the quest for certainty" must get to the outcomes which shall satisfy our demands and bring reliability for which we so eagerly strive.[7]

"But what ... is the peculiar genius of the scientific method? Peirce´s answer is at first sight surprisingly simple: conformity to the laws of inference. But behind the apparently naïve simplicity ... lies a revolutionary innovation on Peirce´s part. For by "the laws of inference" he does not mean, as does the traditional Aristotelian logic, simply those standards by which the demonstrative character of certain arguments can be judged: nor does he simply add to this conception, in the manner of many nineteenth-century logicians, the considerations of those standards by which inductive arguments can be assessed. Among the laws of inference Peirce places one which relates to the *admissibility of hypotheses* – this law, we shall find, turns out to be equivalent to his Pragmatism – and the effects of the extension of the traditional conception of inference are considerable. But even if this innovation be acceptable, the assertion that the scientific method is to be distinguished from other than scientific habits of thought simply by its conformity to logical laws, seems at first blush very odd. Logical principles are, roughly speaking, principles of appraisal and criticism, principles for judging whether certain arguments really establish the conclusions which they claim to establish. As such, logic seems to play an entirely critical, uncreative role. How then can strict or conscientious conformity to logical principles ... account for the positive virtue, the power of discovery which we ordinary attribute to the methods of science" ([8], 89-90)? In this sense and in this context Peirce talks about abduction as about augmentative inferential process deprived of cognitive sterility in relation to the increase of knowledge, and he – without renouncing them – ascribes certain cognitive sterility to standardized inductive and deductive forms of inferences. So there are three forms of reasoning, which are deduction, induction, and abduction ([2], V, 161). He talks much about the first two in his methodological and logical writings, yet not much about the third – about abduction. However, there is no doubt that it was the most important. Induction was ever considered as a kind of inference when we on the basis of certain (finite) amount of cases realize certain generalizations,

7 The border-line between certain knowledge and belief is rather treachery, than thin. It can confound our reasoning when it comes to the grounding of our approaches. As Dewey shows in his *The Quest for Certainty*: "the quest for certainty has always been an effort to transcend belief. Now since, as we have already noted, all matters of practical action involve an element of uncertainty, we can ascend from belief to knowledge only by isolating the latter from practical doing and making... Greek thinkers saw dearly – and logically – that experience cannot furnish us, as respects cognition of existence, with anything more than contingent probability... Thus not merely the arts of practice, industrial and social, were stamped matters of belief rather than of knowledge, but also all those sciences which are matters of inductive inference from observation" ([12], 21). With all due respect to Greek thinkers, it seems that the question whether sciences based on inductive reasoning yield knowledge was answered by history itself. However, there are still some surprises prepared in the course of scientific advances, which can prove our current opinions to be false. Thus, we can never be completely certain about everything we consider to be knowledge, for good. This assumption designates abduction for *leading principle* in any progressive scientific inquiry. This *leading principle* is connected with the principle of continuity, which articulates fallibilistic perspective of our knowledge, as Dewey proposes in his 1938 *Logic. The Theory of Inquiry,* congruently with Peirce. Dewey makes use of this idea to show in the end that "the question of relation of method to material is a *long run* issue. For in what has been called the experiential continuum of inquiry, methods are self-rectifying so that the conclusions they yield are *cumulatively* determined" ([13], 470).

that means, we refer certain inferential process outcomes to all other identical cases[8].

There is a certain difficulty in contemporary assessment concerning Peirce´s definition and consideration of his abduction, which consists in the fact that in his age induction was considered to be the elementary process of science. Peirce raised objections; in his opinion induction serves for testing theories, but not for the act of their creation. It cannot fulfill the function of emergent agent of new opinions. Deductive inference is formally more elegant, it creates more exact and strict relations, but in order to become un-analytic it would have to enter the drifting waters of experience. Probably for this reason Peirce´s attention focused on abductive form of logical inferences. The phenomena of scientific creativity explained via process of abduction lays out notable results of science. In this context Peirce is convinced that: "A man must be downright crazy to deny that science has made many true discoveries." ([2], V, 172). We don´t doubt the discoveries, but we accredit them in a large extend to inventions connected with abductive creativity.

> "*In deduction, or necessary reasoning, we set out from a hypothetical state of things which we define in certain abstracted respects. Among the characters to which we pay no attention in this mode of argument is whether or not the hypothesis of our premises conforms more or less to the state of things in the outward world... Our inference is valid if and only if there really is such a relation between the state of things supposed in the premises and the state of things stated in the conclusion. Whether this really be so or not is a question of reality, and has nothing at all to do with how we may be inclined to think*" ([2], V, 161).

Deductive processes remain only brain exercises, if we will not enter with them into the world much more complicated and complex than is the world of the deductive capacity of man. For this reason Peirce goes back to Aristotle and his notion of *apagogue* found in *Prior Analytics*. Inference capable to initiate new theories as basis for additional process of testing is called by Peirce *hypothetical inference*, or *abduction*:

> " *...our first premises, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism. The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of* ***insight,*** *although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together ... If we were to subject this subconscious process to logical analysis, we should find that it terminated in what that analysis would represent as an abductive inference, resting on the result of a similar process which a similar logical analysis would represent to be terminated by a similar abductive inference, and so on* ***ad infinitum"*** ***(***([2], V, 181\3***).***

This knowledge is of such a kind that it is not at first connected with words or with rational recognition; it is rather a result of unconscious texture of experience and it acquires indeterminate form of belief that things are such-and-such. On the face of it, if we consider countless amount of actual valid information, everything looks easy and simple. "But every single item of scientific theory which stands established today has been due to Abduction... Think of what trillions of trillions of hypotheses might be made of which one only is true..." ([2], V, 172). The sense of human knowledge is not the description of the world which is conceived as a matter-of-fact, but it can rather be found in the process of connecting outer, matter-of-fact impersonal world, with

[8] This idea was widely advocated by *J. S. Mill*. In his *A System of Logic* he proposes: "Induction, then, is that operation of the mind, by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respect" ([14], 297). Peirce was strictly against Mill´s assumptions that induction is the primary tool for the process of acquiring knowledge and that knowledge is possible only due to the uniformity of nature. He writes: "Even John Stuart Mill holds that the uniformity of nature makes the one state of things follow from the other. He overlooks the circumstance that if so it ought to follow necessarily, while in truth no definite probability can be assigned to it without absurd consequences. He also overlooks the fact that inductive reasoning does not invariably infer a uniformity; it may infer a diversity" ([2], CP 1.92). For Peirce´s critique of Mills inductivism see also: CP 1.18; CP 2.633; CP 2.766; CP 2.775; CP 5.149; CP 5.345; CP 6.60; CP 6.100; CP 6.394; CP 6.410 – CP 6.413.

inner, anthropic, human, personal, subjective. In abduction, inner and outer merge, they permeate into each other and only in countless approximations they compose complex mosaic of our knowledge. On principle hypothetical character of abductive processes oblige us to permanent confirmation of their validity, which – if they are to be related to reality – has to be empirically saturated. Our privilege – not to be doomed for everlasting ignorance – is due to our ability to be abductively critical to our own ideas, to our own techniques. We can look around us with ever present wonder that things can be different, after all. Their appearance is bound with circumstances and conditions, including ourselves.

In fallibilistic perspective, our knowledge is only one of many possible interpretations of the world. Every system of information built according to the rules of logical reasoning rests on specific (indirect) interpretation of experience and it can – as a ray of inspiration – throw light into the dark places of reality. Abduction plays crucial role here – it represents antennae by means of which we cognitively sense the terrain of reality in our interest; but we have to touch it many times if we want to find out how it really is, even if this process is never finished. Peirce´s philosophy of science is in this respect hodogetic. He himself considered it as a guide – as a draught of the approach by means of which it is possible to reach (un)certain goals of human knowledge. Abduction is a special kind of intuitive reasoning, which is not dependent on *a priori* principles (as deduction), nor is it dependent on experimental observations (as induction). In Peirce´s comprehension, abduction is functional and very important, in certain respect the most important supplement of the two standardized processes of reasoning, from which it differs by its creative ability to produce new hypothetical ideas, throwing them into the sieve of verification process. "Peirce´s use of abduction .. was not entirely original... however, he was the first to employ it in scientific era and his specific account of it was somewhat original... Peirce translated apagogue as abduction. Thus, we have the historical source of Peirce´s notion of abduction" ([7], 14-15). For Peirce, abduction is a tool of scientific creativity, but the evolution of this notion has its roots in Aristotelian exposition of the way of argumentation, by means of which „we are nearer to knowledge" ([3], II, 25). This exposition can be found in the second book of *Prior Analytics* in the notion of *apagogue*.[9] We conceive *apagogue* (lat. reduction or abduction) as a syllogistic process by means of which only approximate veracity and probable outcome is inferred, what results from uncertainty of selected premises. It is clear that what Peirce was after was exactly this *uncertain* kind of inference. However, uncertainty is not conceived negatively, because we cannot be certain of permanency of our results. There are many degrees, levels of abduction; their acceptance is considered by the fact that reasoning is purely inductive or deductive only exceptionally. According to Peirce all "interpretative acts are essentially abductive ... we see that abduction must devolve into perception itself" ([7], 16). As Peirce puts it: " abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them..." ([2], V, par. 181\3).[10]

[9] When Peirce decided to make use of Aristotelian *Prior Analytics* and the notion of *apagogue*, he was not prepared to adopt Aristotelian interpretation. According to traditional understanding, abduction is common syllogism containing certain degree of uncertainty, which is not rare not only in scientific thought, but in thought in general, as well. Peirce´s abduction is a reaction to the status of science, which has to lead its inquiry exploring many facts in order to subdue these facts to certain theory and thus explaining them. At the same time it is a reaction to the status of science, which has to explore facts, whose lack of phenomenal manifestation makes their hypothetical presence just a mental experiment. By means of this, in certain mental emergence, in hypothetical inference, the Greek thinkers proposed atomistic theory of matter, which waited for its confirmation for over two millennia. Besides, we don´t ascend the theory only by means of induction; it is hypothetical inference which brings us nearer to the solution, and opens new cognitive perspective.

[10] Abduction is an inevitable part of emergence of perceptual judgments; it is part of something, what is not a mere amount of experiential facts. Peirce proposes approximately the same idea as B. Russell, when he shows that "imagination always enforces on logic" ([4], 114), and that in scientific reasoning itself, whatever its methodological ground is, non-scientific opinions take

In other words, in order to follow Peirce in his articulation of abduction as the only kind of inference resulting in new ideas, we have to ask, what does scientist do when he is scientifically creative. According to Peirce it is actual creation and presentation of a new idea.[11]

Abduction, even if it is similar to inductive reasoning, is – from the point of view of scientific creativity – more daring and more jeopardous step as induction. If Peirce was not convinced that it is inevitable to distinguish between them, he would not have to revive Aristotelian *apagogue*. In induction, one kind of facts refer to other kind of equal or similar facts, while abductive hypotheses generated from facts of one kind refer to facts of completely another kind. "Abduction really is original and ampliative (extending) in certain important sense... it accents difference instead of similarity" ([4], 22). In psychological sense abduction is based rather on the sense element of thought, it touches facts of a different kind, while induction is based on the habitual element, on strict restriction of thought on the sphere of equivalent kind of facts. Abduction is not just a logical form,[12] but first of all a lively process at the end of which something, which was not present at the beginning, emerges. Confusion between abduction and induction – also in respect to the exposition of Peirce´s thought – is not proper.

Scientific belief, however paradoxically it may sound, is a part of abductive inference, which participates on a belief common for scientists (or people with religious belief) that nature is characterized by organization (A. N. Whitehead) and that "God does not play dice" (A. Einstein)...

part in „inspiration of pioneers of 16th and 17th century" ([12], 128). For example Kepler´s devout imagination was motivated by "Zoroastrian adoration of Sun" ([4], 128) and it led to creation of hypothesis, with which Kepler entered into the history of cosmology.

[11] "This was one reason Peirce revered such scientific advances as Kepler´s introduction of elliptical orbits, Newton´s description of gravity, and the various forms of evolutionary theory. Each of this essentially twisted the standard view on reality in a radical way" ([7], 18).

[12] Good example of abductive procedure is, according to Peirce, Newton´s discovery of gravitation. "The notion of gravitation, the notion, which cannot be discredited, is a hypothesis of abductive inference" ([4], 25). Peirce, considering the fundament of inference by means of which Newton proposed the notion of gravitation, was convinced that this new notion, "the notion of gravitation, is not involved in premises in the sense it is already known (in intellectu) - gravitation was not known before its first hypothetical use. But gravitation is involved in the premises in the sense that there are logical relations between the premises and the conclusion... gravitation is implicit in the nature of universe, but it is not known until it is discovered" ([4], 25). In different words, it cannot be found, but it has to be discovered. Newton did it by means of abductive, not inductive, or deductive method. Even Galilei, as Peirce shows, would not be successful with few imperfect meterings when he discovered for physics fundamental relations of celestial bodies, had he not spontaneously shifted from induction to abductive inference.

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BOOK REVIEW: RICHARD BERNSTEIN'S DEWEY IN SPANISH

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Filosofía y democracia: John Dewey (Spanish translation of *John Dewey* and related essays) by Richard J. Bernstein; Translator: Alicia García Ruiz; Introduction: Ramón del Castillo. Barcelona: Herder Editorial, 2010. 304 pp. €21.15 softcover, 978-84-254-2661-2.

To publish a translation of Richard Bernstein's work on John Dewey, most of which was originally published as a book in 1966, may seem strange given the passage of nearly fifty years. But we are living in strange times. Many scholars have come to acknowledge the "resurgence," "revival," or "renaissance" of pragmatism in the 1990s after it was "eclipsed" by analytic philosophy beginning in the 1940s.[1] And given that Dewey was the only person *prominently* developing the pragmatic tradition before its "eclipse," the recent surge of interest in Dewey's philosophy seems only natural.[2] However, as Nancy Fraser perceptively warns us: "The most important lesson for those proposing to revive pragmatism today is this: There is not one, but several different pragmatisms. We had better know which of them we want to revive."[3] In fact, a parallel point could be made concerning Dewey: not one but several Deweys circulate, even among Dewey scholars themselves.[4] As evidenced in part by the inaugural volume of *Contemporary Pragmatism*, the most widely known pragmatism across the globe today is probably the brand of neo-pragmatism popularized by Richard Rorty, who attributed many of his own central philosophical doctrines to Dewey. This is not the place to consider the deep reservations expressed by prominent scholars of the classical American pragmatists concerning Rorty's interpretations of Dewey and pragmatism more generally,[5] but it is the place to insist that Bernstein's alternative visions of both Dewey and pragmatism are worth publicizing.

Spanish is the second most natively spoken language in the world, and insofar as Rorty, Rorty's Dewey, and Rorty's pragmatism are iconic among many Spanish-speaking scholars, the translation of Bernstein, Bernstein's Dewey, and Bernstein's pragmatism into Spanish is crucial to the continuing vitality of a tradition so committed to pluralism. Indeed, Bernstein's own philosophy is exemplary in this regard. Characterizing the best of the pragmatic tradition as "an *engaged fallibilistic pluralism*" in his Presidential Address to the APA in 1988, Bernstein has contributed to the contemporary florescence of pragmatism precisely by putting it into dialogue with other philosophical

[1] The classic essay on pragmatism's "resurgence" is Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism," *Social Research* 59 (1992). Reference to pragmatism's "revival" occurs, for example, in Morris Dickstein, *The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). For a discussion of pragmatism's "renaissance" see John J. McDermott, "Epilogue: The Renascence of Classical American Philosophy," in *The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy*, ed. Armen T. Marsoobian and John Ryder (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004). The word "eclipse" is widely used to characterize pragmatism's marginalization, which has also been provocatively linked to the McCarthy era in John McCumber, *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the Mccarthy Era* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 90.

[2] Simply enumerating, to say nothing of reviewing, even the last fifteen years of worthwhile scholarship on Dewey is a daunting task. In striking contrast, Bernstein began writing his book on Dewey as a dissertation in the 1950s when "interest in Dewey and pragmatism seemed to be at an all-time low among academic philosophers." Richard J. Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), ix.

[3] Nancy Fraser, "Another Pragmatism: Alain Locke, Critical 'Race'theory, and the Politics of Culture," in *The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture*, ed. Morris Dickstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 173.

[4] These different Deweys often seem to arise based upon a variety of thematic interpretive centers. We might say that there is an ethical Dewey, an aesthetic Dewey, a pedagogical Dewey, a scientific Dewey, a metaphysical Dewey, a religious Dewey, a technological Dewey, etc.

[5] The production of literature on Rorty's misuse of Dewey has become a cottage industry. For a list of articles spanning from 1980 to present, see Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein, *The Rorty Reader* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 2 n. 7.

traditions.[6] Rejecting the simple Anglo-American/Continental split as "unilluminating and unfruitful," Bernstein's scholarship bridges philosophical traditions in an attempt "to deal with the multiplicity of perspectives and interpretations in a decentered world."[7] While never abandoning the pragmatic tradition, Bernstein has consistently sought to understand other traditions on their own terms, which sometimes "requires what Alasdair MacIntyre characterizes as learning a second first language where we come to recognize the ways in which rival traditions are and are not translatable."[8]

This quote from Bernstein brings us to the tremendous service Ramón del Castillo has performed in providing such a learned and painstakingly documented historical introduction to this edited volume, which includes two additional essays on Dewey from 1986 and 2010, thereby gathering all of Bernstein's writings on Dewey into a single Spanish edition for the first time. Throughout each of his three introductory sections, del Castillo demonstrates that he has succeeded brilliantly in learning the pragmatic tradition as a second first language. Even his choice of title—*Derivas pragmatistas*—conveys the carefulness evident throughout his attempt to provide a *pragmatic* look at the origins of Bernstein's pragmatism. In other words, del Castillo is concerned with origins precisely because he is concerned with the various drifts and future directions of the pragmatic tradition. It is an intellectual history, but never a *merely* intellectual history, for he recognizes what is practically at stake given the ways in which "the conflict of narratives" (Bernstein's phrase) defines philosophy itself, especially in the United States.[9]

We thus return to the importance of asking not just which pragmatisms, but also which Deweys we want to revive—two questions that raise the stakes of intellectual history.

Del Castillo begins his narrative in the 1930s, when John Dewey was still considered a model intellectual in the U.S., and tells a laboriously footnoted story of how Dewey's philosophy came to be seen as passé, in ways that were often contradictory (e.g., analytically inclined philosophers Dewey denounced for being a speculative metaphysician in the grand tradition of Hegel while a number of critical theorists rejected him as a crass positivist). In contrast, del Castillo paints an inspiring portrait of Dewey as a multi-faceted philosopher who wrote "about psychology and culture, about history and society, a theorist of education and politics, but also a journalist and an activist, an itinerant observer and engaged polemicist—all while the social sciences and philosophy were veering towards a much more professionalized and scientific model."[10] Today, after the crisis of analytic philosophy, and in the midst of the crisis of the humanities, a return to this Dewey—who Bernstein champions as a great teacher of "the perennial task of seeking a comprehensive vision and understanding of man and his place in the universe"—is anything but passé.[11]

The second section of del Castillo's introduction leaves little doubt that Bernstein's *John Dewey* (1966)—the book that constitutes the bulk of the present volume—was instrumental in keeping this Dewey (and the pragmatic tradition itself) alive. Del Castillo details how Bernstein studied Dewey at Yale under John E. Smith, from whom Bernstein appropriated a methodology that treats the interpretation of the history of philosophy as *internal* to the practice of philosophy itself, so that a dialogical engagement with multiple philosophical

[6] Richard J. Bernstein, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 63, no. 3 (1989): 17.
[7] Richard J. Bernstein, "Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia," *The Review of Metaphysics* 42, no. 2 (1988): 271.
[8] Bernstein, "Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds," 15.
[9] Richard J. Bernstein, *Filosofía y democracia: John Dewey*, ed. Ramón del Castillo, trans. Alicia García Ruiz (Barcelona: Herder Editorial, 2010), 9.
[10] Ibid., 11; translation mine.
[11] I have quoted the original English phrase from Richard J. Bernstein, *John Dewey* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 184-85; [p. 217 in the Spanish volume under review].

traditions becomes a critical dimension of developing one's own philosophical voice.[12] Hence, it is no surprise that Bernstein attempts "to present a sympathetic, comprehensive statement of Dewey's intellectual vision" in relation to both Dewey's own intellectual development and the works of the other classical pragmatists. In later essays, Bernstein also relates Dewey's philosophy to other thinkers including (but not limited to) Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Gadamer, Habermas, MacIntyre, Taylor, Arendt, Levinas, Derrida, and Rorty.[13] The picture of Bernstein (and Bernstein's Dewey) that emerges is that of a pragmatist with a talent for recognizing the potential for philosophical cross-fertilization, precisely as a way of *practicing* the Deweyan ideal of democracy. Even as the philosophical context and interlocutors have shifted, Bernstein continues to show how "Dewey could inspire something different, given that he had understood democracy not simply as a process of deliberation, but above all else as a way of life, as community."[14] Del Castillo therefore presents Bernstein's 1986 essay, "John Dewey on Democracy: The Task Before Us"—printed as Chapter 13 in the present volume—as the hinge of Bernstein's corpus, a follow up to his *John Dewey* designed to show that Dewey's pragmatism was still very much alive and relevant to present philosophical disputes and everyday problems.

Indeed, as del Castillo shows in the final section of his introduction, Bernstein continues to advocate for the value of the pragmatist *spirit* or *ethos* as a method of conducting oneself in a pluralistic philosophic universe. While Bernstein's interlocutors became more postmodern in the 1990s, and even as Rorty treated him as an unliberated pragmatist suffering from nostalgia, Bernstein sought to demonstrate the incongruences of Rorty's ethnocentric ironism while arguing that much still might be gained from Dewey's reflections on *experience*.[15] Most recently, Bernstein's will to reconstruct has led him back to the history of pragmatism given how it has become a pretext for revisiting (and revising) U.S. history. *The Pragmatic Turn* (2010) unites pragmatism old and new in a penetrating chronicle, as Bernstein expertly performs his role as a mediator while simultaneously adding tension to the relations between the distinct versions of contemporary pragmatism, which often express themselves through differing versions of Dewey. All of which brings us back to the question of *which* versions of the pragmatic tradition we want to revive, a question that Bernstein addresses in "John Dewey's Radical Democracy," which constitutes the final chapter of the present volume. Bernstein's return to Dewey in this work is not surprising, given that Bernstein concluded his *John Dewey* with a discussion of Dewey's claim that "the task of democracy is forever that of the creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute."[16] For over forty years, Bernstein has continued to maintain: "Nothing that has occurred since Dewey wrote this vitiates this ideal. It is still our task to work toward this ideal. Recent events, both national and international, make this task more vital."[17] Bernstein's career, no less than Dewey's, has been marked by a "life-long preoccupation" with the theme of

[12] John E. Smith is another scholar of the pragmatic tradition whose work deserves more attention. Unfortunately, scholars working primarily from the analytic tradition are often unaware of just how deep the living tradition of scholarship on pragmatism runs, since their knowledge of secondary literature on pragmatism is often limited to scholars like Richard Rorty or Hilary Putnam. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Douglas Anderson, "Old Pragmatisms, New Histories," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47, no. 4 (2009): 491.

[13] Bernstein, *John Dewey*, vii; [p. 37 in the Spanish volume under review].

[14] Bernstein, *Filosofía y democracia: John Dewey*, 24; translation mine.

[15] In fact, Bernstein argues that "[Dewey's] theory of experience and the ways in which experience is related to nature" constitutes "the heart of Dewey's philosophic vision." Bernstein, *John Dewey*, vii; [p. 38 in the Spanish volume under review].

[16] Ibid., qtd. on 184.

[17] Ibid., 184; [p. 217 in the Spanish volume under review].

democracy understood not just as a problem for philosophers, but as a task for humanity.[18]

When Bernstein published his first book on Dewey, it had only been fifteen years since Dewey's death, but as the twentieth century passed, Bernstein became increasingly convinced that the philosophical reports of pragmatism's demise were greatly exaggerated, since philosophers have continued to "'return' to what was a point of departure for the pragmatic thinkers."[19] This is perhaps Bernstein's most provocative claim with respect to the pragmatic tradition: "that Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead were really ahead of their time—that they were initiating a sea change in philosophy […] that many twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers—some of whom had little or no knowledge of the classical pragmatic thinkers—were dealing with similar themes and coming to similar conclusions."[20] Likewise, Bernstein claims that pragmatism "began as a distinctive American philosophical movement, but it has had a global reach," so that today "there is much more vigorous, extensive, and illuminating global discussion of the multifaceted aspects of pragmatism than at any time since its origins."[21] What remains to be seen—and this is undoubtedly the task before *us*—is *which* pragmatisms will continue to emerge. The contemporary vitality of the pragmatic tradition seems utterly contingent upon its ability to generate a philosophical discussion that is *genuinely* cosmopolitan, and this is precisely what is so encouraging about the publication of Alicia García Ruiz's excellent Spanish translation of Bernstein's work on Dewey, complete with an exceptionally elucidating introduction by the Spanish Americanist Ramón del Castillo. A variety of readers across Spain and Latin America will undoubtedly find this book worth reading both as an introduction to Dewey and as an introduction to Bernstein.[22] We can only hope that these readers will go on to challenge and contribute to Dewey's legacy "as the thinker for whom democracy is the central theme in virtually all his works."[23]

[18] Richard J. Bernstein, *Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 20; [p. 221 in the Spanish volume under review].
[19] Ibid., 17.
[20] Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn*, ix.
[21] Ibid., x, 31.

[22] Bernstein recently wrote that "the themes I first explored in my first book on John Dewey (1966) have pervaded all of my writing since that time." Sheila Greeve Davaney and Warren G. Frisina, *The Pragmatic Century: Conversations with Richard J. Bernstein* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 187.
[23] Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn*, 71; [p. 238 in the Spanish volume under review].

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