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INTRODUCTION: PRAGMATISM AND FEMINISM – A NATURAL ALLIANCE

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In general, feminism stands for nothing else than belief in the equality of women and men. Men who think that patriarchal social order is founded biologically and is a permanent creation fear feminism or are at least indignant at it. However, usually everything they know about feminism has come into their lives thirdhand. They mostly believe that feminism does essentially mean ugly women who hate men or want to become stronger, smarter or richer than men. Nevertheless you can be both humanist and feminist at the same time. What is more, you can be both pragmatist and feminist since both are humanistic and pragmatism shares at least three characteristics with feminism. Firstly, both pragmatists and feminists prefer social changes and strive to establish a more just society since they mostly do not believe in a metaphysical order of the world and society. Representatives of both „factions" are convinced that we can change oppressive social practices and structures, because these are historically and socially determined. Secondly, they both prefer experience since human life is first of all practice (according to pragmatists, even theories belong to practice in a broad sense), and decisive things happen, begin or are connected to our experiential life. Finally, meliorism as one of the main pragmatist principles means that we have to improve human life as much as possible both on the individual and on the social level and from this it follows (though not in a necessary way) that most pragmatists prefer democracy to conservative social structures. Meliorism of this kind shows similar features to, for instance, the ethics of care.

The present issue of Pragmatism Today shows only a small piece of a huge cake, and wants to urge more intensive research work regarding the relationship between feminism and pragmatism. Being so tightly bound together, it is not difficult to find new areas of shared or close ideas. In his article, Maurice Hamington tries to show the connections between Royce's ethical approach and the ethics of care which was originally conceived by feminism. He suggests that „Royce's understanding of loyalty has much in common with a robust notion of care and that dialogue between the notions of care and loyalty has the potential to yield a more robust political theory of care". However, prior to attempting a synthesis of loyalty and care he begins „by describing the trajectory of care being employed here, followed by an overview of Royce's concept of 'loyalty to loyalty' with an eye towards its relational implications". Hamington writes that some philosophers and ethicists view care ethics „as an alternative ethical theory, or a variance on virtue theory," although he is persuaded that ethics of care means „a paradigm shift in moral thinking representing something different (or more) than a normative theory of moral adjudication," and he believes that „a loyalty to care can be considered a metaethical position that links particularism to a liminal sense of normativity that can be the basis for a more robust understanding of political care. Loyalty to care suggests a commitment to a moral ideal of care even when I am confronted by unfamiliar others."

Marta Vaamonde Gamo's paper offers us a fantastic historical description about the strong relationship between Dewey's pragmatism and the contemporary feminist efforts of the age, suffragism. Unfortunately, this connection had all but vanished after Dewey's death, but due to the contributions of Charlene Haddock Seigfried and her fellow American scholars, Erin McKenna, Shannon Sullivan, Judith M. Green, Barbara Thayer-Bacon and others, the relationship between Deweyan pragmatism and feminism is recovering. A new form of pragmatist feminism has been in the making over the last two decades, especially in the USA, causing mutual enrichment. „Feminism completes pragmatic analysis with a gender perspective, while pragmatism offers feminism a working method which sheds light on and dissolves some of the dichotomies present in

contemporary feminist debate." Within this historical framework Vaamonde Gamo creates a Deweyan interpretation of communication. She shows firstly, that „Dewey does not understand dialogue as the result of a relationship of individuals able to act autonomously, which was of what post-modern and communitarian currents accused the liberal and critical proposals. For Dewey, individuals develop this ability over the course of their communicative relationships." Secondly, she justifies that „despite the importance Dewey places on language, he does not turn to textualism. The reference of language is experience." At the end of her article Vaamonde Gamo draws the conclusion, saying that „according to Dewey, communication serves to give order to and transform relationships that are constituents of personalities and communities." This kind of communication which „must cover, in Dewey's opinion, the full range of both public and private relationships," thus becomes one of the important means of building a democracy.

Our third article, written by Markéta Dudová, investigates the philosophical meaning of „vomiting". The starting point of her essay is the feminist Kristeva's „theory of abjection and her understanding of vomiting as a dark revolt „'of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate' from an outside or inside". Dudová looks at some important philosophical figures from the point of view of vomiting, first interpreting Hegel's philosophy and then Romanticism from this aspect. Nevertheless, she offers the most thorough analysis of vomiting when she compares Nietzsche's and Kristeva's interpretations, claiming that for „both Kristeva and Nietzsche, vomiting is a discourse of both life and death," and „the best word to describe their discourse is therefore fragility." As Dudová says, „vomiting draws attention to the fragility of being and life," and this is why it may be of importance as a philosophical precedent of Richard Shusterman's neopragmatist somaesthetics, as well.

I. PRAGMATISM AND FEMINISM

LOYALTY TO CARE:

ROYCE AND A POLITICAL APPROACH

TO FEMINIST CARE ETHICS

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> "Loyalty is a perfect synthesis of certain natural desires, of some range of social conformity, and of your own deliberate choice."
>
> —Josiah Royce[1]

In 2003, Charlene Haddock Seigfried wrote a state of feminist philosophy chapter for the American Philosophical Association publication, *Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century*, and the picture of gender equity was not pretty. Although feminist philosophy had achieved the status of a strong subfield of philosophy, its ideas continued to be marginalized. In particular, feminist philosophy and mainstream philosophy appeared to be operating on distinct tracks: "Insights of feminist philosophy are too often kept in their place, that place being of interest only to women or only to feminist women, and are not taken as applicable to men or to philosophy proper."[2] Seigfried goes on to address American pragmatist philosophy which although is rooted in an inclusive approach to theory, inconsistently engages the works of feminist philosophers. Since Seigfried's clarion call, some strides toward greater inclusion of feminist thought have been made but there remains a long way to go. In American philosophy, the term "feminist pragmatism" continues to gain traction, albeit slowly. Perhaps one of the more curious failures of philosophical integration thus far is between feminist care ethics and American pragmatism.

Care theory[3] shares with American pragmatist philosophy a number of intellectual commitments such as an emphasis on experience and context, concerns about inclusion, an integration of means and ends, and valorization of efficacious action as well as eschewing absolute principles. Despite these points of contact, few publications have explored the potential benefits of intellectual collaboration between these two streams of thought. One of the few early exceptions was a 1993 article by M. Regina Leffers that appeared in *Hypatia*: "Pragmatists John Dewey and Jane Addams Inform the Ethics of Care."[4] Keep in mind that care ethics was first identified in the 1980s, so this connection took about a decade. Leffers views Dewey and Addams as helping to provide a political dimension, or what she referred to as "a universalizing caring response," to care theory that in its nascent form had focused on individual dyadic relationships. Now over twenty years old, Leffers' analysis did not lead to much by way of further pragmatist investigation.

As Leffers suggested, it can be argued that classical American philosophers such as Jane Addams, William James, and John Dewey offer philosophical analyses that are not only in concert with care but more importantly develop intellectual trajectories that can contribute to a more robust understanding of care. For example, Jane Addams claims that a democratic society is animated by more than policies and structures but rather requires a citizenry that is actively engaged with one another for the purpose of learning about and ultimately caring for fellow citizens.[5] William James offers a theory of will that claims individuals can influence reality by taking an imaginative leap of faith. Such attention to motivation

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[1] Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), 62.

[2] Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Has Passion A Place in Philosophy?" in *Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century* (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), 43.

[3] Although the branch of feminist moral theory associated with the work of Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings and others is commonly referred to as "care ethics," I prefer the term "care theory" to capture a wider theoretical trajectory that integrates ontology and epistemology.

[4] M. Regina Leffers, "Pragmatists Jane Addams and John Dewey Inform the Ethic of Care." *Hypatia* 8:2(Spring 1993), 64-77.

[5] Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (New York: MacMillan, 1902), 6-7.

can be extremely useful in considerations of caring for unfamiliar others, particularly as such care is limited by one's own perception of agency and ability.[6] John Dewey's theory of habit as open-ended structures of experience can be applied to care as a means of understanding how care is the result of repeated performance.[7] Other pragmatists such as George Herbert Mead and Ella Lyman Cabot might also be candidates for fruitful discussions about care. A figure perhaps less likely to receive attention for possible contribution to care theory is Josiah Royce (1855-1916).

Known as an idealist, Royce was one of the most influential of the philosophers during the origin of pragmatism in the United States. He wrote on a wide range of topics including social issues, logic, mathematics, philosophy of religion, and, of most significance to this project, ethics. In 1908, Royce wrote a *The Philosophy of Loyalty* where he offers a means for people to live a moral life that recognizes that individual morality cannot be achieved separate from the ethical strivings of others in society. The term "loyalty" becomes the linchpin of moral alignment for Royce.

In this article, I suggest that Royce's understanding of loyalty has much in common with a robust notion of care and that dialogue between the notions of care and loyalty has the potential to yield a more robust political theory of care. Prior to attempting a synthesis of loyalty and care, I begin by describing the trajectory of care being employed here, followed by an overview of Royce's concept of "loyalty to loyalty" with an eye towards its relational implications.

An Expansive Theory of Care: Embodied and Political

Given the diverse and fertile explorations of care being undertaken today, it is useful to clarify what character of care theory is being employed here. Born out of feminist analysis of women's experience by philosophers and social scientists, theorizing about care is now engaged in by individuals from many disciplines, some who identify as feminist and some who do not. Although all care theorists view care as a relational approach to ethics that places the emphasis on contextualized individuals rather than universal normative interpretations of acts, there is wide variance on the moral status of care theory vis-à-vis traditional moral theories. Some view care as an alternative ethical theory, or a variance on virtue theory, while others define care as a paradigm shift in moral thinking representing something different (or more) than a normative theory of moral adjudication. The assumption for this paper is a theory of care that falls into the latter camp through what has been referred to as "embodied care." Many care theorists recognize the ontological shift required for the interconnected and interdependent assumption of identity required for care.[8] A few theorists have acknowledged that care also entails an epistemological transformation that alters the connection between the knower and the known.[9] I have suggested that care is an expansive postmodern theory of being that has implications for who we are, what we know, and what we value. As such, care is a function of our embodiment, not as a purely natural function but an extension of our physical capacities and animated by iterations of actions that constitute our moral selves. Accordingly, every act of care is an act of will that negotiates with social forces that endeavor to place both demands and limitations on our caring for others.[10]

[6] Maurice Hamington, "The Will to Care." *Hypatia* 25:3 (Summer 2010), 675 – 695.
[7] Maurice Hamington, "Care Ethics, John Dewey's 'Dramatic Rehearsal' and Moral Education," *Philosophy of Education Yearbook 2010.* Spring 2011.
[8] For example, Fiona Robinson, *Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 39.
[9] For example, Vrinda Dalmiya, "Why Should A Knower Care?" *Hypatia* 17:1 (2002): 34-52.
[10] Our ethical actions negotiate between perceived social

Reflective repetitions of these actions constitute our mental and physical habits or performances of care that over time instantiate our moral selves. Thus, our moral identities become known through our actions on behalf of others. Authentic caring is a moral ideal that begins with attentive knowledge of the one cared-for through temporal and proximal relations (what Nel Noddings refers to as "engrossment"[11]) and is ultimately manifested in caring actions.

Such embodied care engages in a different kind of "work" than traditional ethical theories. Rather than answering the question, "What should one do?" thus applying abstract and universal rubrics, care is a particularist theory that engages imagination in a caring disposition to specific circumstances. However, care is not purely subjective as authentic acts of care result in the flourishing and growth of the one cared for. As such, the efficacy of care can be assessed, if not with the precision of "right" and "wrong" judgments, through the well-being and potential for thriving of the one cared for, given available evidence and reflection. Accordingly, care theory offers a radical departure in thinking about normativity that does not fit well within existing Western concepts. Care offers a tenuous trajectory of normativity rather than one abstracted from the context of the individuals involved through rules or calculations of actions. Traditional normative abstraction is supported in the name of objectivity and fairness. Care entails a more organic approach to normativity. Fiona Robinson recognizes this when she describes the naturalized epistemology that underpins care as "*not fully normative* in the strong sense, it still retains normativity" (2011: 27). In a stronger critique, Margaret Urban Walker asks, "I have come to wonder, or rather to worry about, why it is so important to know whether 'we' are right and 'they' are wrong, *tout* court (1998: 13). Rather than eschew normativity altogether, care theory offers a context-driven emergent trajectory of moral standards. The moral response (caring) is found within the relationships and the individuals involved. In this manner, care transcends the objectivity/subjectivity dualism. Care is not subjective in that any response cannot simply be labeled as caring. It is also not objective in that a single best caring response cannot be predetermined given the complexity of context. Rather, care involves the time and attention to be responsive to the other, the care receiver, prior to any course of action.

Because care is enacted through the body in the world and in relationships, it is inherently political by challenging and influencing personal and social power. The feminist challenge to the dichotomy between personal and political spheres is played out in caring actions that wield power to listen to and help others as well as our selves. One of the positive changes in philosophy since Seigfried's critique of feminist philosophy's marginalization is the growth of political theorists who have embraced and employed care to analyze institutions, policy, and economics. However, as is the nature of paradigm shifts, many political theorists are falling back on familiar structures of ethical theory to understand the political nature of care. For example, some theorists discuss the "right" to receive care or the "responsibility" to give care, or even how to adjudicate current political practices according to the values of care.[12] Such explorations are admirable because they

norms of deficient and superogatory behavior. For example, if while walking down the street one is asked for directions, a response of "ask someone else" or ignoring the person would generally be considered substandard moral behavior. However, going so far as flagging down a taxi and paying for the stranger to get to their destination, or perhaps even engaging them in a lengthy conversation only to discover that they really have a different need than the destination they had intended could provide, resulting in giving them directions to a different destination, is considered superlative moral behavior beyond the norm. Individuals can discipline themselves or others when the actions are outside the usual range.

[11] Nel Noddings, *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 14.

[12] Joan Tronto, *Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice* (New York University Press, 2013), 153-155.

infuse the language of care into social and political conversations previously devoid of such relational concerns. However, applying entitlements and duties to care fails to fully appreciate the radical potential of care theory. When care is a right or a responsibility to be assigned or distributed, it loses its character as an act of individual will and engagement. When one is internally compelled to care rather than externally commanded to care, the opportunity for robust action, connection, and transformation is severely limited. It is in this context that we turn to Royce, and his concept of loyalty, to see if there is a political understanding of care that can balance internal and external motivation—private and political interest—in a manner that does not abdicate the radical potential of care to reconceive the moral domain as expansive. In other words, can Royce's work on loyalty contribute to a more robust understanding of care's political character without returning to the modernist categorical frameworks of traditional liberal political theory?

Loyalty to Loyalty

> "It [Josiah Royce's late ethics] does not fit traditional forms because it is *primarily* neither utilitarian nor deontological, nor divine command, nor a virtue ethics. Yet it contains key features of all these kinds of ethics. So, it is *not* one of a kind. It is *unique*, sui generis."
>
> —Frank M. Oppenheim[13]

Loyalty has long been regarded as a moral virtue of devotion to a person, group, or idea yet held in some suspicion because it violates the standard of impartiality required for objectivity and justice within liberal theories. Royce elevates and elaborates loyalty to a place of primacy among moral virtues. For Royce, genuine loyalty is an absolute good, however it is both means (loyalty begets more loyalty) and ends (a moral ideal). This section addresses how Roycean loyalty is simultaneously normative, relational or social, political, and an art of self development. The challenge in describing Roycean loyalty is that it is all these elements enmeshed in one another thus transcending easy demarcation.

Royce begins with a traditional definition of loyalty and then adds nuance as witnessed in the quote that follows. Note that Royce emphasizes loyalty to a cause as well as consistency of devotion and action:

The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. A man is loyal when, first, he as some *cause* to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he *willingly* and *thoroughly* devotes himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he expresses his devotion in some *sustained and practical way*, by acting steadily in the service of his cause.[14]

The immediate critique that stems from valuing such devotion is what of the nature of the object of devotion? There are plenty of evil causes to align oneself with. Royce's response is found in the notion of loyalty to loyalty. For Royce, genuine loyalty also entails loyalty to loyalty or a commitment to not hindering the loyal projects of others.[15] If one impedes the loyalty of others, then they are justified in rethinking and shifting their loyalties. Thus loyalty is an ethical ideal for Royce and loyalty to loyalty is a maximizing principle: our loyalties should increase overall loyalty in the world. Loyalty to loyalty then becomes the normative element of Roycean ethics. According to Royce, when confronted with a moral dilemma, individuals should choose the path that facilitates the greatest loyalty among those affected.

Loyalty initially appears ill suited to a feminist theory of care because it addresses a relationship to a cause rather than a person. However, Royce proceeds to suggest a

[13] Frank M. Oppenheim, "Royce's Practice of Genuine Ethics." *The Pluralist* 2:2 (Summer 2007): 1.

[14] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 9.
[15] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 57.

strong social dimension to loyalty.[16] Bette Manter contends that you cannot separate Roycean ethics from his theory of individuation. However, individuation is not the same as traditional atomistic individualism for Royce. Manter indicates that the notion of individuals as "unencumbered autonomous self-reliant agents who pull themselves up by their boot-straps" is a myth and "utterly antithetical to everything Royce believed to be true and good about human being."[17] Royce defines individuals in relational terms: "Individuals are describable enough, if only,--as I said before, --*if only* you assume other previous individuals to which to relate them."[18] When Royce turns to fleshing out loyalty, that same relational ontology permeates his characterization:

The cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something *wholly* impersonal. It concerns other men. Loyalty is social. . . . The cause to which loyalty devotes itself has always this union of the personal and the seemingly superindividual about it. It binds many individuals into one service. Loyal lovers, for instance, are loyal not merely to one another as separate individuals, but to their love, to their union, which is something more than either of them, or even than both of them viewed as distinct individuals.[19]

Not only is loyalty a social endeavor, it serves to build community. Royce describes moral insight as having as one of its aims the destruction of "all which separates us into a heap of different selves."[20] Shannon Sullivan refers to Roycean loyalty as a method for knitting together the individual with the community.[21]

Perhaps surprisingly, for Royce loyalty is at once both a social concept and a means for individual identity formation. Royce indicates that loyalty helps individuals define who they are by clarifying their commitments. For Royce, the pragmatist idealist, moral agency is derived from finding purpose.[22] He conceives of loyalty as not merely blind commitment but an act of will that builds upon what an individual learns from society. He uses the term "enlightened loyalty" to describe the personal reflection and choice that goes into relationships. The relationships require sustenance and are not static in their commitment to the cause. Jackie Kegley sums up Royce's concept of loyalty as "highly personal, involving choice, affection, and a sense of self."[23] It is this last point that Kegley makes, loyalty as a sense of self, which opens up loyalty to be so much more than a normative theory of ethics. Thus the binding together of individuals to support a cause is not merely a political or ethical act but one that helps to establish a relational self.

Royce's 1908/1909 lectures on loyalty at the University of Pittsburgh included a lengthy discussion of the "art of loyalty." For Royce, loyalty was an art available to the masses. Rather than an elite moral form, loyalty is the thoughtful support for a collective cause larger than oneself that anyone can participate in.[24] However, Royce

[16] Ironically, in *Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships* (New York: Oxford, 1993), George P. Fletcher criticizes Royce's formulation of loyalty as overly steeped in the result of an individual will that fails to capture the significance of the loyal person's shared history with others (153).
[17] Bette J. Manter, "The Incompleteness of Loyalty" in *Josiah Royce for the Twenty-First Century: Historical, Ethical, and Religious Interpretations*. Kelly A. Parker and Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012): 119-132.
[18] Josiah Royce, *The Conception of God: A Philosophical Discussion Concerning the Nature of the Divine Idea As A Demonstrable Reality* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1902), 257.
[19] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 11.
[20] Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1895), 193.
[21] Shannon Sullivan, "Transforming Whiteness with Roycean Loyalty: A Pragmatist Feminist Account" in *Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism*. Eds., Maurice Hamington and Celia Bardwell-Jones (New York: Routledge, 2012), 19-41, 27.
[22] John Clendenning, *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce, Revised and Updated Edition* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), 300.
[23] Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, *Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities: A Roycean Public Philosophy* (Nashville: University of Vanderbilt, 1997), 86.
[24] Mat Foust, "'What Can I Do For the Cause Today

saw an element of skill development in the art of loyalty. He believed that individuals could "train" themselves to resolve conflicts among causes. The art of loyalty is much like a critical thinking skill to reflectively consider one's moral motivations and commitments. As Mathew Foust describes, "The art of loyalty is that of discovering what one's own rational will is and how to be faithful to that will in the face of the unpredictable nature of life."[25]

Roycean Loyalty and Feminist Appropriation

Appropriation is a crucial issue for contemporary feminist philosophy and bears some discussion here prior to addressing a synthesis of care and Roycean loyalty. Feminist scholars have engaged in at least three paths of analysis. 1) Critiquing the sexism and misogyny in the canons of Western philosophy. 2) Recovering the work of forgotten women writers and scholars. 3) Appropriating the ideas and analysis of non-feminist intellectuals. It is the latter path that is pertinent to this project. One of the significant questions in feminist appropriation of male philosophers is whether their expressed sexism nullifies their insights for enriching feminist philosophy.[26] Marx, Freud, and Foucault are a few of the figures who articulated various forms of sexist or exclusionary thought in their lives and yet feminists have found their work sufficiently serviceable to apply or appropriate. Royce is clearly not a feminist theorist. As Kara Barnette describes, "Royce himself never developed an account of gender, never explained how his theories might differ in relationship to women, and in his major works, never explicitly advocated for women's suffrage."[27] Yet, Royce offers insight into ethics, community, and interpretation that feminist philosophers have found useful.

Three recent feminist appropriations of Royce can be found in the works of Shannon Sullivan, Celia Bardwell-Jones, and Kara Barnette. Sullivan acknowledges that at times Royce appears to endorse racist and imperialist thinking however she finds that Royce's concept of loyalty might provide a positive method for combating racism on the part of those who identify as white. Rather than distancing themselves from their race or being racked with guilt, Sullivan views loyalty as a method for transforming white identity in a constructive manner. Roycean loyalty supports the building of loyalty of others. According to Sullivan, "Developing a critical loyalty to themselves and to other white people, white people's racial habits might be less toxic to people of color" and they may learn to love themselves.[28] For Sullivan, loyalty to loyalty has sufficient critical character as to allow for self analysis without devolving into self deprecation or self justification. Bardwell-Jones' feminist appropriation of Royce also engages issues of identity but is more concerned with Roycean concepts of interpretation and community rather than loyalty. According to Bardwell-Jones, traditional propositional formulations of knowledge acquisition as depicted in S knows P seem inadequate to account for interpersonal, intercultural knowledge. In his theories of interpretation and community, Royce transforms the dyadic knowledge relationship into a triadic one through the role of the interpreter.[29] The interpreter must "know" both parties to the translation to create knowledge that transcends difference. Bardwell-Jones views this approach as useful

Which I Never Did Before?' Situating Josiah Royce's Pittsburgh Lectures on Loyalty." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 47:1 (2011):87-108, 96.

[25] Foust, "'What Can I Do For the Cause Today Which I Never Did Before?'" 99.

[26] Over two decades ago, Nancy Tuana noted that the central concern for feminists who read mainstream philosophy is when male philosophers' gender assumptions, "affect their central categories of their system—their conceptions of rationality, their construals of the nature of morality, their visions of the public realm." Nancy Tuana, *Woman and The History of Philosophy* (New York: Paragon, 1992), 116.

[27] Kara Barnette, *Necessary Error: Josiah Royce, Communal Inquiry, And Feminist Epistemology.* Dissertation. (University of Oregon, 2012), 141.

[28] Sullivan, "Transforming Whiteness with Roycean Loyalty," 36.

[29] Griffin Trotter, *On Royce* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 78-81.

for thinking about cultural border crossings: "The mediation essential in the process of interpretation reveals that knowledge is not a solipsistic pursuit. The importance of the social emergent in Royce's thought requires the interactions and encounters with others. This implication becomes an attractive feature for feminist epistemology."[30] Kara Barnette is particularly enthusiastic about the potential for feminist appropriation of Royce. Lamenting the dearth of such explorations, she states: "This oversight misses the extraordinary contributions Royce's work could make to feminist philosophy."[31] Like Bardwell-Jones, Barnette is also concerned with applying Roycean concepts to feminist epistemology and community. In separate works, she addresses epistemic privilege, the role of error, and the role of traitors. Barnette contends that Royce provides a middle way between communitarianism and individualism that allows for fallibility and transgressors who are loyal to the greater good of society. Ultimately, Barnette argues that in applying a Roycean framework, the struggle of feminists who continue to work in patriarchal organizations but subvert those communities for the benefit of all people in building a more inclusive society is a form of loyalty to loyalty.[32]

Each of the applications of Royce discussed above not only support the notion that Royce's work is ripe for feminist appropriation, they point to why care theory might particularly benefit. In each case, there is a relational dimension to Royce's contribution that bridges personal and social arenas in a manner that is surprising for a philosopher known for his idealism and metaphysics. The trans-negotiation of epistemology, ethics, and ontology in the ameliorative service of society are explicit or implicit in the analysis of Sullivan, Bardwell-Jones, and Barnette, which is also consistent with the expansive understanding of care theory that underlies this article.

To reiterate what is probably obvious at this point, an appropriation of Roycean loyalty for care theory is not to suggest that Royce is a feminist or a care theorist. Such appropriation is not a form of revisionist history or moral exoneration but an endeavor consistent with the scholarly enterprise: meaningfully building on the insights of those who have gone before.

Loyalty and Care

> "Every political theory contains an implicit or explicit account of caring"
>
> —Joan Tronto[33]

Two potentially fruitful directions of exploration for integrating Royce's notion of loyalty and care theory are in regard to the interrelated notions of the responsibility to care and the role of causal loyalty in framing a political theory of care. In each case, Roycean loyalty offers a means to address an aspect of care that has not been clearly resolved in the care literature. This article concludes with a discussion of the nature of a duty to care and a fresh approach to a politics of care from a Roycean framework.

For care theorists, the idea of a moral duty to care has been the subject of some disagreement. Specifically arguing against a Kantian approach, Nel Noddings resists reducing caring to a principle, duty, or right: "care theorists advise turning away from arguments that concentrate on the wordings of principles and abstract

[30] Celia Bardwell-Jones, "Border Communities and Royce: The Problem of Translation and Reinterpreting Feminist Empiricism" in *Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism*. Eds., Maurice Hamington and Celia Bardwell-Jones (New York: Routledge, 2012), 57-70, 67.

[31] Kara Barnette, "Communities, Traitors, and the Feminist Cause: Looking Toward Josiah Royce for Feminist Scholarship." *The Pluralist* 2:2(Summer 2007), 81-90, 81.

[32] Barnette, "Communities, Traitors, and the Feminist Cause." 89.

[33] Tronto, *Caring Democracy,* 28.

interpretations."[34] Noddings distinguishes between natural caring, the human inclination to care for family and friends, and ethical caring, the decision to care for less familiar others. For Noddings, rather than making a more moral society by creating a duty or requirement to care, we should expand the natural inclination to care: "many of the most important acts and attitudes are governed by inclination, not duty."[35] Fiona Robinson also finds that a Kantian account of moral obligation is unsatisfactory when it comes to motivation for behavior. Robinson contends, "the ability to care with commitment about another can emerge only through sustained connections among persons and groups of persons."[36] However, not all theorists agree. Some believe that Kant and the notion of an obligation to care have been sold short. John Paley suggests that a Kantian approach to morality can accommodate care and asks, "How can a writer who would urge us to accept the ethics of care do so without suggesting that we *ought* to care, and that we ought to cultivate the appropriate sentiments if we have no natural tendency in that direction?"[37] Some theorists suggest that a duty to care is needed for practical reasons. Sarah Clark Miller also cites the need for a Kantian approach because of the historical disparity in caring labor provided along gender and class lines. According to Miller, a duty to care can help foster more equitable distribution of care burdens.[38] Some theorists, like Daniel Engster, employ the notion of a rational obligation to care rather than a Kantian duty to a categorical imperative. For Engster, it is the fact of human interdependency that creates the moral responsibility for us to be responsive to the caring needs of others.[39] In summary, the extent to which care can be morally required has not been resolved among care theorists.

Royce's philosophy of loyalty creates a non-Kantian ethic of responsibility that may address some of the concerns of care theorists around the limitations of duties. Royce was not antithetical to the notion of duties[40] in fact he described loyalty as "the whole duty of man."[41] However, he formulated a conception of loyal duty that rests upon internal motivation and connection while establishing the idea of a commitment to something greater than oneself. Royce creates a theory of obligation that is neither objective in the traditional sense, nor abstract. For Royce, there can be no categorical imperative imposed from an external or abstract position. The duty to loyalty comes from within and flows from the moral commitments one makes. As Royce describes, "The loyal man's cause is his cause by virtue of the assent of his own will. His devotion is his own. He chooses it, or, at all events, approves it."[42] Royce acknowledges the role of psychology and specifically motivation in the force of a chosen duty. As mentioned above, the loyal commitment is critical yet simultaneously it is thoroughgoing:

Whenever a cause, beyond your private self, greater than you are, -- a cause social in its nature and thus at once personal and, from the purely human point of view, superpersonal,--whenever, I say, such a cause so arouses your interest that it appears to you worthy to be served with all your might, with all your soul, with all your strength, then this cause awakens in you the spirit of loyalty.[43]

[34] Nel Noddings, *The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 238.
[35] Noddings, *The Maternal Factor*, 36.
[36] Robinson, *Globalizing Care,* 157.
[37] John Paley, "Virtues of Autonomy: The Kantian Ethics of Care" *Nursing Philosophy* 3 (2002): 133-143, 140.
[38] Sarah Clark Miller, "A Kantian Ethic of Care?" in *Feminist Interventions in Ethics and Politics*. Eds. Barbara S. Andrew, Jean Keller and Lisa H. Schwartzman (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 111-127.
[39] Daniel Engster, *The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 36-54.
[40] Mathew A. Foust, *Loyalty to Loyalty Josiah Royce and the Genuine Moral Life* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 184n60.
[41] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 140.
[42] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 10.
[43] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 25.

Although to characterize loyalty as both a duty and voluntary appears contradictory, Mathew Foust finds the two reconcilable. Foust uses the example of a "patriot" to make the case. To be a patriot implies a complete commitment that cannot be externally imposed. One must choose to be a patriot.[44] Furthermore, the obligation created by loyalty is manifested in action. Unlike the Kantian valorization of a good will, Royce finds action paramount for the loyal actor. In introducing the lectures that make up *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, Royce admonishes that they are intended to foster moral action.[45] He goes so far as to claim, "Every form of dutiful action is a case of loyalty to loyalty."[46]

This internal sense of duty represents a significant divergence from a Kantian approach that may provide the means to address both Noddings' skepticism about duties and Engster's need for a rational obligation to care. Recalling that Royce integrated idealism with pragmatism, care, like loyalty is an ethical ideal. An ideal is not the same as an obligation. The duty to care is self imposed and grows with my commitment to care through relationships with others. Returning to the expansive notion of performative care mentioned earlier, meaningful proximal relations with others creates the opportunity for greater understanding of others. This knowledge has the potential to be disruptive rather than merely propositional in that it has the possibility of raising my level of concern to the point of taking caring action. The commitment grows and eventually there can be a felt duty to care. The choice to care is mine but it is experienced as a willing obligation. In addition, the duty to care is responsive to individuals in their context and so cannot be predetermined. The specifics of the duty are not prescribed imperatives such as not lying but emerge from the caring relationship. As such, even though Noddings claims that care does not come from "grim duty but from a recognized need to produce and cherish a special response,"[47] she likely would approve of this Roycean form of duty.

Another way that Roycean loyalty might contribute to a political theory of care is through the notion of a commitment to a cause. Care theorists have been primarily concerned with care for human beings and sometimes non-human animals.[48] Royce offers a means to think about caring that does not abandon interpersonal care, as we have seen through his explicit construction of loyalty as social, but rather ties direct care to larger causes. Such an approach fits particularly well with an expansive notion of care that endeavors to integrate identity and epistemology with morality. Royce frames causes that elicit loyalty as fundamentally social: "you cannot be loyal to merely an impersonal abstraction."[49] In this sense, loyalty is never about an ideological commitment to a cause but always entails consideration of the relationships formed and the well-being of others. There is a reflective quality to Roycean loyalty that connects the proximal relations with a greater cause on behalf of humanity. Here Royce interjects not only motivation for action but imaginative connections political consequences. For example, in describing using a Roycean framework to build a more global community with common interest and purpose in a cosmopolitan world, Joseph Orosco claims, "From a Roycean perspective, people today can indeed act *as if* they are world citizens, but they do so only when they are *actually* working alongside, responding to, building trust with, and become trustworthy with concrete others in their more local communities."[50] Note how Orosco

[44] Mathew A. Foust, "Loyalty in the Teachings of Confucius and Josiah Royce." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 39:2(June 2012), 192-206, 195-196.
[45] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 6.
[46] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty,* 67.
[47] Noddings, *Starting at Home*, 168.
[48] For example, Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan, *Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals* (New York: Continuum, 1996).
[49] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 25.
[50] Jose-Antonio Orosco, "Cosmopolitan Loyalty and the Great Global Community: Royce's Globalization." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 17:3(2003), 204-215, 209.

infuses relational considerations while simultaneously describing an imaginative connection between local and global work. Although a bit of an over generalization, recent work on care ethics has roughly taken two tracks. One track emphasizes developing the theoretical work around interpersonal care ethics in the spirit of Noddings. The other track has focused on social policy and political care in the spirit of Tronto. Royce's loyalty to a cause when mapped onto care suggests a method to hold both the relational and social tracks together.

What of a loyalty to care? Ultimately, loyalty to care can be considered a metaethical position that links particularism to a liminal sense of normativity that can be the basis for a more robust understanding of political care. Loyalty to care suggests a commitment to a moral ideal of care even when I am confronted by unfamiliar others. Thus Royce's insight can contribute an active dimension to care not often addressed in the literature. Care tends to be framed as a response to expressed need but loyalty to care suggests a more constant obligation to care that may even be preempting and proactive. In all situations we *should* have a commitment to care—an openness to the other that entails listening with the possibility of action. Employing a Roycean framework, the "should" in the last sentence is the result of an internally developed duty based on experience and reflection not an externally imposed standard.

Why should I care for an unfamiliar person? Perhaps I should care not only because they express a need but also because I have a loyalty to care for which I have made a personal commitment. I can commit to care on a personal level in my interactions with other people, but I can also leverage those experiences to imagine and support caring that takes place on a community, regional, or national level. Caring is an ethical ideal that helps define who I am as a moral person through my performances of care but is also a cause much larger than myself. Accordingly, as a society we can attend to the value of care and make it a cause for which we collectively commit to and participate in.

THE INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATION

FROM DEWEY'S EMPIRICAL NATURALISM.

CONSEQUENCES FOR FEMINISM.

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> *"Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful. That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder..."*[1]

One of the hallmarks of John Dewey's pragmatism is his interest in social and democratic reform[2], which closely linked his thinking to feminism.

John Dewey addressed all issues affecting the feminist movement at the turn of the century: the right to vote for women and the need to recognize their civil rights[3], coeducation as a means of achieving social equality[4]; equality in jobs and salaries[5]; the democratic reconstruction of marital relations[6]; and birth control[7]. He also believed that gender equality was the gauge by which democratic society's degree of development could be checked. He thought that if gender equality did not become a guiding principle for both private and public human relations, the contradictions arising from their practical limitations would be blamed on the democratic ideal itself[8].

Despite Dewey's close personal and intellectual relations with the first generation of the feminist movement, pragmatism and feminism subsequently separated[9]. Feminism leaned towards other philosophical currents such as marxism, psychoanalysis and existentialism, while pragmatism lost ground in favor of logical positivism and analytic philosophy. This distancing made Charlene Haddock Seigfried exclaim in the nineties: Where Are All the Pragmatic Feminists?[10]

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[1]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-1996), 1, 132.

[2] Cf. Richard Westbrook, "The Making of a Democratic Philosopher", in *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey*, ed. Molly Cochran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17-18.

[3] A summary of Dewey's position on women's right to vote can be seen in: John Dewey, "A Symposium on Woman's Suffrage", in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1911-1996), vol. 6, 153-154.

[4] John Dewey, "Education and the Health of Women", in *Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1885-1996), vol. 1, 64-68; John Dewey, "Health and Sex in Higher Education", in *Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1886-1996), vol. 1, 69-80; John Dewey, "Letter to A. K. Parker on Coeducation", in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1902-1996), vol. 2, 108-116; John Dewey, "Memorandum to President Harper on Coeducation", in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1902-1996), vol. 2, 105-107; John Dewey, "Is Co-education Injurious to Girls?", in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1911-1996), vol. 6, 155-164.

[5] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 527.

[6] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 526; Cf. John Dewey, "What I Believe", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930-1996), vol. 5, 276.

[7] John Dewey, J. "The Senate Birth Control Bill", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932-1996), vol. 6, 388-389; John Dewey, "In Defense of Mary Ware Dennett's *The Sex Side of Life*", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930-1996), vol. 17, 127; John Dewey, "Education and Birth Control", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932-1996), vol. 6, 388-389.

[8] Cf. Charlene H. Seigfried, *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey* (Pennsylvania: State University Press, University Park, PA, 2001), 59.

[9] Cf. Seigfried, *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, 1.

[10] Charlene H. Seigfried, "Where Are All the Pragmatic Feminists?", *Hypatia* 6 (1991): 1.

Thanks largely to the contributions of this author, over the past two decades a pragmatist feminism has been developing, especially in the USA, allowing the mutual enrichment of feminism and pragmatism. Pragmatism offers feminism a research method, as Nancy Fraser[11] or Seigfried[12] pointed out. Feminism offers pragmatism an analysis of the unconscious matters of conduct and the power relationships which perpetuate sexist stereotypes[13].

In line with this pragmatist feminism, I will try to show the possibilities what the naturalistic and empirical Deweyan concept of communication offers to the contemporary feminist debate. Dewey proposes a view on communication that overcomes the dilemma between an empty proceduralism and a traditionalism grounded on a substantive vision of the community or of values. The Deweyan alternative is particularly interesting for feminism because, on the one hand, it avoids a proceduralist consideration of discourse and rationality that leaves important aspects of the relations between women and men outside the scope of justice; and on the other hand, the empirical view of communication prevents a substantive vision of certain values from limitating the critical and reflective potential of women and men to guide their relationships.

The first part of the paper presents the links between Dewey's pragmatism and feminism. The second part analyses the Deweyan interpretation of communication, concluding with some of the possibilities that it offers to feminism.

Links between John Dewey and feminism

Dewey's interest for democracy led him to defend women's equality as one of its basic aspects and engage with the suffrage movement, in which his wife, Alice Chipman, and one of his best friends, Jane Addams, took part actively. When the *International* organized a symposium on women's suffrage, Dewey said that a society cannot be called democratic if women, a large percentage of its population, do not have the same political rights as men. On August 8, 1912, he taught a summer course on women's suffrage to Columbia University students[14]. A few months later, he gave a conference on women's suffrage in *The Current Events Club of Englewood*. He also participated in marches organized by the suffragist movement[15]. Dewey served on the first consulting committee at Hull House, an institution founded by Jane Addams in 1889[16]. He recognised that his faith in democracy as a way of life achieved by education was strengthened by his contact with Addams[17].

The strong connection between Dewey and Addams confirms the mutually enriching relationship between feminism and pragmatism in its origins. Women at Hull House, who actively took part in the social reform of Chicago through their social and intellectual activities, found in Dewey's thinking the theoretical support which they did not find in the narrow formalism of university academia[18]. Moreover, the pragmatism that Dewey's

[11] Cf. Nancy Fraser, "Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn", in *Feminist Contentions*, ed. Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser (New York: Routledge, 2011), 166.
[12] Cf. Maurice Hamington and Celia Bardwell-Jones, *Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2-3.
[13] Cf. Charlene H. Seigfried, "John Dewey's Pragmatist Feminism", in *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, ed. Seigfried, 55.
[14] Cf. George Dykhuizem, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974), 150.
[15] There are more details on Dewey's participation in the suffrage movement in: Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, 149-150.
[16] Cf. Jane Addams, "A Toast of John Dewey", in *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, ed. Seigfried, 25.
[17] Cf. Molly Cochran, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 28.
[18] Cf. Charlene H. Seigfried, "John Dewey's Pragmatist Feminism", in *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, ed. Seigfried, 50.

professed, his consideration that theory also has a practical sense, led him to formulate his democratic ideal in view of the practices developed at Hull House[19], the Institution that inspired the famous Laboratory School which he founded later.

Dewey supported a model of participatory democracy and a practical, social and emancipatory view of philosophy that brought him close to feminist ideas from the origins of his thought. In keeping with his radical democratic ideal, he believed that the emancipation of women would be achieved when the relationships of subordination with men became collaborative. Gender equality had a radical sense for Dewey, as he interpreted it as a vital principle that should guide all relationships between women and men, both publicly and privately, therefore affecting all aspects of their personality, both intellectual and emotional. He understood that the replacement of dominant relationships by equal relationships required an institutional change, but that this change was meaningless if it was notcoming from a change in attitudes and personal dispositions[20].

Accordingly, an educational reform designed to promote a democratic life habits between men and women was essential[21]. Dewey devoted several articles specifically to this topic "Letter to A. K. Parker on Coeducation" (1902), "Memorandum to President Harper on Coeducation" (1902); Is Co-education Injurious to Girls?" (1911). He believed that coeducation enhanced the working and social participation of women, i.e., it prevented their education being used solely to turn them into wives, mothers or teachers. But coeducation also meant that children would work together on common projects, which was the way to not only promote attitudes of mutual sympathy and respect but also the critical thinking, communication of ideas and intellectual honesty which characterise scientific research[22]. Coeducation was the cornerstone needed to raise the social intelligence on which democracy depended.

But in addition to educational reform, the replacement of the relationships of subordination by relationships of collaboration between women and men required the transformation of all social institutions, especially marriage. Dewey states in *What I Believe?* (1930) that ideas about family and marriage were an exclusively male construction[23]. Consequently, the family needed to be reformed too to achieve real equality. He dedicated part of his work *Ethics* (1908) to this issue. Like feminism, he stated that the general and functional dualism of the public and private sectors set limits on personal development, on the functional effectiveness of institutions andon cooperation between women and men whose attitudes and interests conflicted[24]. Although he welcomed the incorporation of women into the workplace, as it provided them with financial independence, helping to correct their subordination to men, he regretted that this inclusion was not done on an equal basis. Job training for women was worse than that for men, so they could only aspire to very limited and low-paid jobs. In addition to this, the traditional idea thatfamily care was the responsibility of women remained, so they had to combine family care with their

[19] Cf. Richard Bernstein, *Filosofía y democracia: John Dewey* (Barcelona: Herder, 2010), 77.
[20] Cf. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939-1996), vol. 14, 228.
[21] Cf. Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 94-95.
[22] Cf. John Dewey, "Letter to A. K. Parker on Coeducation", John Dewey, "Letter to A. K. Parker on Coeducation", in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1902-1996), vol. 2, 111.
[23] Cf. John Dewey, "What I Believe", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930-1996), vol. 5, 276.
[24] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 523-524.

job, which, Dewey stresses, was hardly rewarding[25]. Dewey applied the same type of change to the family institution as to other social institutions. He did not propose breaking up the family but democratically reforming it[26]. The main way to achieve this, Dewey thought, was through education.

Dewey's analysis of the family is particularly relevant because it allows to check the scope and limits of his feminist proposal and, therefore, of his democratic approach. The assessment of the family in *Ethics* and the methods to reform it change in *"War's Social Results"* (1917). Dewey proposes that marriage should remain "as it is" instead of being democratically transformed as suggested in *Ethics* and that women should "abdicate" their public and employment status upon marriage to facilitate soldier's reintegration into civil life. Instead of looking for a way to reintegrate men while supporting the emancipation of women, Dewey maintains the male hegemony in case of conflict of interest.

Dewey had anenormous confidence in intelligence and its complement, education[27]. Although it is true that, as Bernstein emphasised, he did not dismiss the conflicting aspects of American democracy[28], he did believe that the main procedure for attaining democratic progress was extending social intelligence through education. As a result, he did not analysed the influence that unconscious aspects of personality have on the direction of intelligence and behaviour nor their role in the perpetuation of prejudice. He also did not analyse in depth, as Seigfried indicated[29], the social force of prejudice and the factors that contribute to its continuity. He only devoted two articles to this topic, *"Racial Prejudice and Friction"* (1922) and *"Contrary to Human Nature"*. According to Dewey, force of habit leads us to "naturalise"whatactually has a social origin, for example, the subordination of women. In this sense, the feminist analysis of the factors which preserve sexist habits and gender prejudices provides depth and allows us to complete deweyan criticism.

The Deweyan interpretation of communication and its contributions to feminism

After the well-known linguistic turn of philosophy, most of the current political theories recognise dialogue as a process of democratic legitimation. In the field of contemporary feminism, the importance of communication and shared interest are also highlighted in order to move towards a democracy in which women participate with their own voice.

Despite the emphasis on dialogue as a normative process, its meaning varies among different feminist currents of thought, causing dilemmas which Dewey's empirical naturalism allows to illumniate.

Feminist discourses relating to dialogue as a normative process are profuse. I will use two of them: the politics of difference proposed by I. Young and cosmopolitanism advocated by S. Benhabib. Both derive from discourse ethics: they conceive dialogue as a process of legitimation and support the recognition of the equal dignity of participants and the free expression of their interests as its constitutive principles[30]. However, they differ in their interpretation of dialogue. This disparity

[25] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 528.
[26] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 536/529.
[27] Cf. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939-1996), vol. 14, 227.
[28] Cf. Cochran, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Dewey*, 297, 298.
[29] Cf. Seigfried, *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, 57.
[30] Cf. Iris M. Young, *Intersecting Voices, Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 49.

expresses and summarises some of the dilemmas of contemporary political theory.

Young's post-structuralist proposal[31] highlights the importance of social and cultural contexts that shape the personality of the individuals involved in policy dialogue and which underlie the dialogue itself. As a result, respect for the dignity of the members in the debate involves respecting their cultural conditions which must be recognised and expressed. Consistent with this approach, Young proposes a politics of difference aimed to the recognition and expression of traditionally oppressed groups[32].

Benhabib believes that democracy is characterised by individuals having the opportunity to thoughtfully determine the rules that guide their coexistence, instead of relying on uncritically assumed values or discriminatory practices. The equal dignity and freedom of the debate depends on all individuals having equal opportunities to participate and reasonably defend their approaches, in order to reach agreements. For this exact reason, Benhabib, unlike Habermas[33], does not limit the topics that should be discussed to shared intestests: the specific interests of certain groups or individuals can be discussed, and individuals involved in the debate are not previously autonomous or even have a clear awareness of themselves and others, as traditional contractualismdefends, but they developtheir autonomy and reflective capacity during the course of the debate[34]. Young criticises Benhabib's theory of justice for not analysing the social conditions needed for individuals to be able to express their own interests[35]. As a result, according to Young, it justifies the social domination of those individuals who control the discursive strategies of the debate. From Young's point of view, discrimination and assimilationism are the scenarios that arise from Benhabib's democratic proposal.

Benhabib believes that the recognition of different groups proposed by Young can be discriminatory for certain individuals, for example, for women[36]. In fact, the attempt to reconcile general rights with traditional rights in certain multi-ethnic areas and for certain issues which are considered private, such as family, has meant that the aspects of life that most directly involved women were ruled by patriarchal regulations[37]. Ultimately, the excessive importance of cultural groups as determinants for individuals, according to Benhabib, is a threat to the democratic and emancipatory feminist ideal that attempts to replace uncritically assumed customs by the reflection of individuals as determinant of the guidelines that guide their coexistence[38].

Benhabib and Young shared their defence of participatory democracy whose guidelines are adopted through an orderly debate for equality and freedom. However, while Young regards the groups as units of political representation, Benhabib considers the individuals. Young refers to equality and freedom of traditionally oppressed groups, without taking into account, according to Benhabib, the fact that cultural

[31] Cf. Young's influences include M. Merleu-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, J. Lacan, M. Foucault, J. Derrida, J. Kristeva, G. Deleuce, L. Irigaray, P. Bourdieu, T. Adorno, J. F. Lyotard and E. Levinas. Cf. Iris M. Young, *On Female Body Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 8. Cf. Iris M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 7. Cf. Young, *Intersecting Voices*, 50.

[32] Cf. Iris M. Young, "Imparcialidad y lo cívico público", in *Feminist Theory and Critical Theory*, ed.Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Valencia: Alfons el Magnànim, 1990), 116.

[33] Cf. Seyla Benhabib, *El ser y el otro en la ética contemporánea* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2006), 129.

[34]Cf. Benhabib, *El ser y el otro en la ética contemporánea*, 66.

[35] Cf. Young, *Intersecting Voices*, 48.

[36] Cf. Seyla Benhabib, "In Memoriam Iris Young 1949-2006", *Constellations*, vol. 13, nº 4, December 2006: 442.

[37]Cf. Benhabib includes some specific examples in: Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture* (Buenos Aires: Katz, 2006), 156-163.

[38] Cf. Benhabib, *El ser y el otro en la ética contemporánea*, 29.

differences can be oppressive for individuals. Benhabib refers to equality and freedom of individuals, without taking into account, according to Young, the social conditions on which individuality depends, which can be oppressive. The result is that Benhabib believes that dialogue is a process for moving towards cosmopolitan rights, while Young believes that it is a method for increasing recognition of cultural and social differences and particularities.

Dewey also proposed participatory democracy based on dialogue. However, it is based neither on the individual nor on the social group, but on the transactions between the individual and the group, which constitute his experience.Accordingly, Dewey uses an empirical method in his analysis which, as I will try to point out, radicalise the democratic ideal and allows to dissolve the boundaries between other alternative democratic proposals currently under discussion.

Dewey regarded democracy as a participatory way of life[39], so references to communication as support for democracy are found in most of his political writings; but it is in *Experience and Nature* where he applies his empirical method to analyse the ontological and anthropological roots of language and communication, on which he bases his idea that dialogue is a political and moral process[40].

Dewey opposed the traditional, rationalist views on language, according to which it is an expression of an antecedent thought. In this regard, he stated:

> "The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership[41]".

In the traditional view of language, the ontological primacy was on the substances, which corresponded to ideas, and which, finally, are expressed in words. Dewey's starting point is concrete experience, as a relationship between individuals in a particular context, instead of the substance. In such a vital position, individuals must cooperate, coordinating their actions in order to survive. In order to cooperate, certain gestures and phenomena began to be used as symbols and signs of other phenomena and actions. Therefore, language expressions appear when certain gestures or phenomena begin to acquire a new use, a symbolic use[42].

Communication, whose function and meaning is participation, is instrumental and final, according to Dewey[43]. It is a procedure which, through its symbolic representation, makes all past events available, saving us from the tyranny of the present and giving us the ability to imaginatively rearrange the experience. But it is also final because it selects the aspects of the phenomena and the order of things which arereagarded as valuable in a particular community, on which depends the development of our personality, our way of perceiving, feeling and acting.

[39] Cf. John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy", in *Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1888-1996), vol.1, 240.
[40] Cf. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-1996), vol.1, 4.
[41] Cf. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-1996), vol.1, 141.
[42] Cf. Sidney Hook, *John Dewey. Semblanza intelectual,* (Barcelona: Paidós, 2000), 58.
[43] Cf. Cf. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-1996), vol.1, 159.

Since democracy is an ideal participatory way of life, communicative relationships are their primary means of development[44]. As such, Dewey's democracy takes on a radical sense because the communicative relationships which characterise it are constituents of individuality and community. Unlike other policy proposals, the deweyan starting point lies not with individuals or groups but with human transactions[45], that culminate when they are communicatively ordered[46].

The radical nature of dialogue and communication means that, according to Dewey, it must affect all dimensions of personality and all areas of relationships, both public and private[47]. In Dewey's case, dialogue cannot be reduced to a process of public deliberation. In this case,there is always a remanent deprived of justice: whether the *ethos* in which the debate is settled, which escapes Benhabib's criticism; or the functioning of the groups, which Young admits without critical evaluation[48]. According to Dewey, the aim is to raise interests in which everyone can participate and to which everyone can contribute, each with their specific ideas[49] .The procedure and way for giving reasons comes from the communication process, to which it gives an order. The most important thing is that the proccess keeps on. This is achieved by promoting interest in collaborating[50].

Dewey and feminism share their interest in progressing towards a participatory democracy in which women collaborate with their own voices. However, the communication on which Dewey's democracy is based has a radical sense which gives a broader scope to his proposal compared to other contemporary feminist alternatives. According to Dewey, communication serves to cooperatively give order to human experience. Through communication, both individuality and community develop. As a result, and unlike other alternatives, Dewey does not assume the ability of individuals to act autonomously, which depends on specific social and objective conditions; or groups, whose functioning depends on the rules and conduct of individuals. Dewey does, however, attach great importance to the performative character of language as communicative relationships allow a progressive and democratic transformation of personalities and communities. It therefore applies to all social relations, both public and private, and all aspects of the person: intellectual, emotional and volitive.

[44] Cf. John Dewey, *The Public and its Problems*, in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927-1996), vol. 2, 350.
[45] Cf. John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy", in *Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1888-1996), vol.1, 231.
[46] Cf. John Dewey, *Ethics*, in *Middle Works of John Dewey1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1908-1996), vol. 5, 349.
[47] Cf. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939-1996), vol. 14, 228.
[48] Cf. Barbara Thayer-Bacon, "Education's Role in Democracy: The Power of Pluralism", in *Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism*, ed. Hamington and Bardwell-Jones, 149/151.
[49] Cf. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939-1996), vol. 14, 230.
[50] Cf. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us", in *Later Works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939-1996), vol.14, 229.

Conclusions

Over the last two decades, a form of pragmatist feminism has been developing, especially in the USA, which is seeking mutual enrichment of both feminism and pragmatism. Feminism completes pragmatic analysis with a gender perspective, while pragmatism offers feminism a working method which sheds light on and dissolves some of the dichotomies present in contemporary feminist debate.

In this vein, it is not surprising that Dewey has been one of the pragmatists on whom the attention of feminists has been focused. Dewey maintained a personal and philosophical relationship with feminism from the beginning of his professional career. His wife, Alice Chipman, and his friend, Jane Addams, both were part of the suffragist movement. Both collaborated in his works, his wife was the director of his Laboratory School and, when Dewey was a visiting professor in China, he teached a course on suffragism and women's rights. Dewey participated in the first Board of Hull House, of which Addams was the director, and even said that Addams decisively influenced his idea of democracy as a way of life transmitted by education. While Dewey's pragmatism was enriched by the contributions of feminism during his time, his emphasis on practices as a reference to theories gave a theoretical relevance to the practices carried out by women in social institutions such as Hull House. Feminists found support in Dewey's philosophy and a theoretical justification for their practices.

After Dewey's death, American philosophy leaned toward positivism and analytic philosophy, and continental feminism went its own way. In short, the link between Dewey and feminism broke.

Thanks to the work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Erin McKenna, Shannon Sullivan, Judith M. Green, Barbara Thayer-Bacon and others, the relationship between deweyan pragmatism and feminism is recovering. Dewey's pragmatism offers feminism a method for reconstructing on an empirical basis and avoiding reifications, controversial concepts in contemporary feminist debate such as subjectivity, objectivity, rationality, equality and difference. In turn, the feminist perspective gives depth to the deweyan perspective, which had paid little interest to the social powers and unconscious factors that influence behaviour and reinforce prejudice.

In the context of this Deweyan pragmatist feminism, this article presents an analysis of dialogue as a democratic process from the point of view of the Deweyan empirical method. The naturalistic and empirical interpretation of communication radicalises Dewey's proposed democracy, avoiding the criticisms relating to other democratic proposals present in the current feminist debate:

Firstly, Dewey does not understand dialogue as the result of a relationship of individuals able to act autonomously, which was of what post-modern and communitarian currents accused the liberal and critical proposals. For Dewey, individuals develop this ability over the course of their communicative relationships. However, he does not reify the social group or traditional values as determinants of behaviour either, which is of what critical and liberal feminism accuses the post-modern and communitarian alternatives. Dewey starts from human relationships, which are ordered linguistically. Language directs our experience and, therefore, both the constitution of individuality and the composition of the community depend on it.

Secondly, despite the importance Dewey places on language, he does not turn to textualism. The reference of language is experience. Relationships are aimed at cooperation and the language is used to coordinate behaviour as a joint action. It has, therefore, a practical

dimension and purpose: it can transform the experience, shaping interests and desires, and give sense to natural phenomena. Dewey's justification for language is not transcendental, but natural and functional, so dialogue is not formally reduced. In a communicative situation, semantic, syntactic, body and affective factors are intertwined and cannot be separated. As a result, in order to establish communicative relationships and dialogues, it is not necessary to disregard desires; on the contrary, the desire to cooperate and the feeling of a need to participate should be encouraged. Post-modern currents reproachthe critical feminism for an univocal and rationalist view of the debate; Dewey does not say this. However, Dewey, unlike some post-modern currents, does not ignore the role that general rules have on behaviour or on the debate. Without the desire and the need to cooperate, relationships would not be established, but without intelligent organisation of the desires to cooperate and general criteria with which to evaluate the various proposals to be debated, the public space would fragment, which is of what the critical feminist currents, such as Seyla Benhabib's, accuse post-modern currents.

Thirdly, according to Dewey, communication serves to give order to and transform relationships that are constituents of personalities and communities. Therefore, and unlike alternative feminist democratic proposals, both critical and post-modern, dialogue cannot be reduced to a process of public deliberation. If this is the case, and depending on the subjects of political representation, there is always a remanent deprived of justice. This may be the social factors on which the autonomy of the participants in the debate depend, if the political subjects are individuals; or the internal functioning of social groups, if they are the groups. Dialogue must cover, in Dewey's opinion, the full range of both public and private relationships, and all provisions of the person: emotional, intellectual and volitive.

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THROWING UP AS A PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPT

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According to specialists in medicine, vomiting is an almost universal experience for human beings. But what does throwing up mean?

Throwing up can mean almost anything. Throwing up, as a non-specific symptom, is a *signifier* that can stand for many different *signifieds* - medical emergencies, ranging from an acute alcoholism, food poisoning or gastritis to scarlet fever, malaria, mumps, appendicitis or cancer. Vomiting might be experienced even when one' general health is good, as a consequence of severe exertion, pregnancy or great emotional or sensory disturbances. In addition, vomiting might be self-induced, as in various bulimic behaviours, as an escape response or in food or medication poisonings as a recommended first aid treatment. Vomiting thus might prove to be a warning sign, a relief, a form of self-harm, or a life saver.

If vomiting is an experience universal to all human beings, what does it mean when an idealist philosopher is thrown up? Is it even possible to say? What is possible to say within medical discourse might not be allowed in the humanities. So when I say that a Romantic poet throws up, am I still within the realm of the thinkable, or am I verily moving "beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable?"[1] With vomiting we are for sure leaving the border of the symbolic and approaching the "place where meaning collapses."[2]

To juxtapose idealist philosophy and vomiting is not, however, meaningless. Throwing up can cast light on our concepts of subjectivity, meaning and being. Travelling into the physical will not rule out the metaphysical.

The starting point of this paper will be Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection and her understanding of vomiting as a dark revolt "of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate" from an outside or inside.[3] In vomiting, apprehensively, desire is turned aside - "sickened, it rejects"[4] and the rejection protects. Vomiting "does not *signify* death."[5] No, "these body fluids [. . .] are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. Such wastes drop so that I might live."[6]

Kristeva shows that throwing up is not just an important physiological function of the organism, but also a powerful philosophic concept, encapsulating a conflict with one's own being and with the outside world, a concept that grapples with traditional philosophic concerns such as being, subjectivity, or the relation between the self and the other. She sees vomiting as revolt, rejection, protection. In her conception, vomiting separates her from those who pose a threat to her existence. Vomiting is self-defence against what was to nourish her well. Kristeva speaks of vomiting as of a "mute protest", which "to be sure, is inscribed in a symbolic system, but in which, without either wanting or being able to become integrated in order to answer to it, it reacts, it abreacts."[7]

Kristeva, however, is not the only source one can use when writing about vomiting. Although Romantic idealist philosophy has been criticised for overlooking, as Nietzsche puts it, "'little' things, which mean the basic concerns of life itself,"[8] the philosophy of the Romantic thinkers, nonetheless, teems with metaphors of consuming and digesting, metaphors which, in fact,

[1] Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1.
[2] Ibid., 2
[3] Ibid., 1
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 3
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 256.

frame their philosophic texts; and the recurrence of such metaphors of and their gradual shift from the figural to the literal, was noted as early as the nineteenth century by their less known contemporaries.[9]

Georg Hegel, might indeed be dubbed a philosopher of digestion. Hegel thinks of crowning philosophy by assimilating all previous systems, and to achieve this, his dialectical process has to digest everything. But his digestion leaves no traces: within his dialectical process, everything is eaten, absorbed, digested, and assimilated without a remainder.[10] His dialectics, which refuses loss, is a "total incorporation" of the external world into itself;[11]and the Absolute Idea, the climax of the dialectical process, is something resembling "constipation,"[12] because excretion is a failure of the system of assimilation, creating an imbalance in the conversion of the other into the self; hence is a surplus "resistant to dialectical totalization."[13]

Hegel is essentially scared of otherness and the foreign, and his dialectical system incorporates and converses foreign matter into "a self-like unity"[14] by negating "the specific unity of the other."[15] Hegel distinguishes inorganic body from the human body: whereas, in chemical interactions, each inorganic substance "loses its quality."[16] In the process of digestion, on the other hand, the human body always preserves itself by assimilating and negating the consuming object.[17]Thus Hegel's digestion exemplifies "the perfect crime," in which the other and the foreign are annihilated, invisibly, without any evidence left behind.[18] Though for "Hegel this process constitutes life as such, enabling the living creature to ward off the inorganic", his contemporaries and his followers, however, asked what kind of life it "could be if it truly left nothing behind."[19]

Beneath Hegel's logic of digestion, there lies an "assimilative violence" that negates the specificity of the other;[20] it might be also understood as a violence of "position"; with the subject establishing its own position by negating another.[21] Hegel's digestion essentially is voracious and violent, bent on the destruction of the other, a destruction that will enable the subject to replicate itself, to posit itself as the subject, thus to live and flourish: "This system of living movement is the system opposed to the external organism; it is the *power* of digestion – the power of overcoming the outer organism."[22] But for Hegel's contemporaries and followers, his "voracious system" smacked, instead of life that it sought to sustain, of violence and lifelessness, with death being the most appropriate and the closest analogue to Hegel's logic of digestion.[23]

Ludwig Feuerbach - who, under the influence of Marx, brings the speculative dialectic from its transcendent spheres down to earth - also uses the physiological process of digestion to define the relationship between the self and the other.[24] His pun "you are what you eat" (Der Mensch ist, was erisst), coming from his 1850 review of JakobMoleschott's*Theory of Nutrition. For the*

[9] David L. Clark, "Hegel, Eating: Schelling and the Carnivorous Virility of Philosophy," in *Cultures of Taste / Theories of Appetite*, ed. Timothy Morton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 124.
[10] Ibid., 117-8.
[11] Ibid., 119.
[12] Tilottama Rajan, "(In)digestible Material: Illness and Dialectic in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Nature*," in *Cultures of Taste / Theories of Appetite*, ed. TimothyMorton (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2004), 221.
[13] Ibid., 222.
[14] Ibid., 221.
[15]Ibid., 219.
[16]Ibid., 218.
[17]Ibid.
[18] David L. Clark, "Hegel, Eating," 130.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 135.
[21] Tilottama Rajan, "(In)digestible Material," 219.
[22] G.W.F. Hegel,*ThePhilosophyofNature*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 120.
[23] David L. Clark, "Hegel, Eating," 120-1.
[24] Jay Geller,"'It's Alimentary': Feuerbach and the Dietetics of Antisemitism," in *Cultures of the Abdomen: Diet, Digestion, and Fat in the Modern World*, ed. Christopher E. Forth and Ana Carden-Coyne (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 127.

People, has sunk into the everyday usage. The pun, nonetheless, exemplifies a radical shift from Hegel's view to that of the subject being transformed by the digested food. For Feuerbach, who draws here upon old Greek, as well as Christian, theories that people and animals are defined by what they eat, being is "one with eating, to be means to eat."[25] Feuerbach's theory thus stands in sharp opposition to that of Hegel's: the other is not assimilated, but, on the contrary, the self is defined, transformed, and constituted by the other. Feuerbach's (re)location of otherness within the self shakes with the self-confidence and sovereignty of the self, making it extremely vulnerable to the external world and its influences.

To finish off idealist philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche modifies Kant's famous inaugural claim: When "Kant says: 'Two things remain forever worthy of reverence,' that is, the starry heaven and the moral law, today we should sooner say: 'Digestion is more venerable.'"[26] It might be due to his life-long desire for physical health that the theme of digestion pervades "Nietzsche's writings, and like many of Nietzsche's important terms, it metamorphoses, accrues different implications, and serves various functions."[27] Nietzsche's conception of digestion is closer to that of Feuerbach's, because Nietzsche, like him, believes that being and subjectivity emerges from "the food choices we make or are able to make;"[28] to eat badly simply means to live badly. His conception, on the other hand, is in complete opposition to that of the total digestion of Hegel's, because, *also sprach Zarathustra*, to "chew and digest everything, […] – that is a genuine swine-nature!" But this essentially is a Germanic problem: "The German spirit is an indigestion: it does not finish with anything."[29]

Nietzsche sees the digesting body as "permeable, unstable, invaded and inhabited by other (parasitic) bodies," thus being constantly transformed by and according to the other.[30] To keep his spontaneity, instincts and himself alive, Nietzsche therefore proposes to "*react as rarely as possible*,"[31] to close himself off, to make "his body impermeable, […] refusing osmosis or *Stoffwechsel*, the German word for metabolism which means, literally, change of stuff, a transformation of materials."[32]

Nietzsche shares with Kristeva a belief in the rebirth of the self through sickness. Although he longs for health, Nietzsche, finally, learns to appreciate sickness. In *Ecce Homo*, he describes the circumstances of the origin of one of his texts:

> The perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of the spirit, reflected in this work, is compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological weakness, but even with an excess of pain. In the midst of the torments that go with uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm, I possessed a dialectician's clarity *par excellence* and thought through with very cold blood matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not *cold* enough.[33]

Nietzsche respects sickness, because life must be experienced from weakness as well as strength. It is his ability, he believes, to move smoothly from sickness to health that makes him master in reversing perspectives: "the first reason why a 'revaluation of values' is perhaps possible for me alone."[34] And he begins that revaluation by affirming to us that all the concepts like "God,"

[25] Ibid., 140.
[26] Nietzsche qtd. in Silke-Maria Weineck, "Digesting the Nineteenth Century and the Stomach of Modernity." *Romanticism* 12.1 (2006): 36.
[27] Ibid., 35.
[28] Ibid., 39.
[29] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 238.
[30] Silke-Maria Weineck, "Digesting the Nineteenth Century," 36.
[31] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 253.
[32] Silke-Maria Weineck, "Digesting the Nineteenth Century," 35.
[33] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 222-3.
[34] Ibid., 223.

"soul," "truth," or "beyond" -that is, the concepts of "that damned 'idealism'"[35] - are "mere imaginings – more strictly speaking, *lies*", whereas nutrition is inconceivably more important, because it means the basic concern "of life itself."[36]

Till he himself realized its importance, Nietzsche "always ate *badly*: morally speaking, 'impersonally,' 'selflessly,' 'altruistically' – for the benefit of cooks and other fellow Christians."[37] The consequence of this inadequate diet was an upset stomach: Oh, "German cuisine quite generally – what doesn't it have on its conscience!"[38] He describes his German diet as "a completely senseless abuse of extraordinary resources. […] Any refined self-concern, any protection by some commanding instinct was lacking; I simply posited myself as equal to nobody; it was […] an oblivion of all distance between myself and others."[39] Insufficient nutrition made him incapable of self-reflection; he was unable to listen to his instincts, or to see the reason for his unhappy situation. He did not see that he was close to the end because of the idealism he indigested, and only his sickness brought him to reason.[40]

Nietzsche appreciates sickness, because sickness for him is not the problem: to swallow "'Christian love' as well as anti-Semitism, the will to power (to the 'Reich') as well as the gospel of humility, *without any digestive complaints*,"[41] that is the problem. Not to vomit, but, on the contrary, to swallow indiscriminately what is on offer, to digest everything without reflection, the inability to reject, the inability to say No - that is a "swine-nature!" Not in vomiting but in staying healthy in a harmful environment, in eating as if nothing was happening - in that Nietzsche sees the problem.

"One has to know the size of one's stomach," says Nietzsche, "the biggest stomach, however, is not necessarily the best one."[42] And as Weineck reminds, one "must also know when to throw up what is already inside: Romanticism, Wagner, both anti-Semitism and Christian love, for example, all those overtly sweet stuffs that, if digested, will make you lazy and interfere with your instinct.[43]

Throwing up for Nietzsche is a life-saver, an instinct of self-defence: it commands us "to say No when Yes would be 'selfless'"; it is "warding off, not letting things come close."[44] Throwing up serves as "a barrier to push back everything that would assail [us] from this […] cowardly world."[45] Throwing up is a protection and remedy against that which is harmful.

In his conception of vomiting, Nietzsche stresses the same aspects as Kristeva does: protection, rejection, selection. The vomiting person, instinctively, "collects from everything he sees, hears, lives through": he is "a principle of selection, he discards much."[46] Because he digests nothing, but throws up before the food is digested, the vomiting person is not transformed by the other but manages to keep his integrity and subjectivity: "He is always in his company, whether he associates with books, human beings, or landscapes."[47] He has a sense for what is good for him, and is sensitive enough to notice when his existence in the world is threatened.

Like Kristeva, Nietzsche also stresses the most important aspect about vomiting: its ambiguity. For Kristeva, the abject is "above all ambiguity;"[48] but whereas excretion is a more or less regular, daily activity, an abject that "I

[35] Ibid., 241.
[36] Ibid., 256.
[37] Ibid., 237.
[38] Ibid., 238.
[39] Ibid., 241-2.
[40] Ibid., 242.
[41] Nietzsche qtd. in Silke-Maria Weineck, "Digesting the Nineteenth Century," 38, italics mine.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 252.
[45] Ibid., 253.
[46] Ibid., 224.
[47] Ibid., 224.-5.
[48] Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 9.

permanently thrust aside in order to live,"[49] vomiting is not a regular physiological function of the everyday; its occurrence is, therefore, always significant, always special. Vomiting might signal a banal disorder, but also a serious illness. It might be induced as first aid in the case of an organism poisoning to expel the harmful from the organism, but one is for sure, vomiting "does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it," on the contrary, vomiting "acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger."[50] With vomit, rather than with the other body fluids, one is the more approaching "the border of my condition as a living being."[51]

For both Kristeva and Nietzsche, vomiting is a discourse of both life and death. As Kristeva asserts, it is a discourse where death interferes with what is supposed to save one from death. It "kills in the name of life, […] it lives at the behest of death."[52] And Nietzsche adds that through the constant need to throw up in order to ward off the harmful, "one can become weak enough to be unable to defend oneself any longer.[53] Therefore, the best word to describe their discourse is therefore fragility. Vomiting draws attention to the fragility of being and life. Both of them, however, are aware of the beneficial aspects of vomiting, because as Nietzsche famously puts it, "what does not kill him makes him stronger."[54] They both see a certain stimulus in vomiting: for Kristeva, vomiting constantly questions the "solidity of being" and impels the subject to start afresh, and Nietzsche speaks from his own experience that:

> [B]eing sick can even become an energetic *stimulus* for life, for living more. This, in fact, is how that long period of sickness appears to me *now:* as it were, I discovered life anew, including myself; I tasted all good and even little things, as others cannot easily taste them – I turned my will to health, to *life*, into a philosophy.[55]

Nausea gave Nietzsche the power and impulse to live and create, and his *Gaya Scienza* is the result of the most unexpected thing, "*convalescence*."[56] From such severe sickness as he has experienced:

> one returns **newborn,** having shed one's skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childlike and yet a hundred times subtler than one has ever been before.[57]

But at the beginning of this new life of more intense joy and subtler sensitivity, there was nausea, a nausea "that had gradually developed out of an incautious and pampering spiritual diet, called romanticism."[58]It is the throwing up of Romanticism therefore that makes him live more, anew and more fully.

Nietzsche sees Romantic philosophy as impassionate, false and affected. He criticizes the style of Romantic philosophers for having pretentious phraseology, for being insincere and fake. There is something in Romanticism Nietzsche cannot digest. But how to get rid of the Romantic diet, this "careless mental diet and pampering"[59]which is being ingested in Western culture for more than two centuries? How to reconstruct one's own identity under the layer of the Romantic ideology?

For Nietzsche, vomiting is the answer. In his conception, throwing up is not just a physiological function. Vomiting is also the body's reaction to the bitter diet of Romanticism, to idealist philosophy, its pretentiousness and insincerity. It is the body's self-defending strategy to reject opinions, feelings and desires that are foreign to the body while presented as being its own.

[49] Ibid., 3.
[50] Ibid., 9.
[51] Ibid., 3.
[52] Ibid., 15.
[53] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 252.
[54] Ibid., 224.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Friedrich Nietzsche,*The Gay Science*, 32.
[57] Ibid., 36.
[58] Ibid., 33.
[59] Ibid.

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II. BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW

CORNELIS DE WAAL: *PEIRCE – A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013)

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With *Peirce – A Guide for the Perplexed*, Cornelis de Waal has taken on the formidable task of crafting a primer to the thought of C. S. Peirce. Although several valuable introductions to different aspects Peirce's philosophy have been published since his death 100 years ago, this book answers a genuine need for a succinct general overview – suitable for new comers to the world of Peirce – without sacrificing scholarly rigour along the way.

Of course, given the nature of this guide, it is by necessity selective, often just glossing over some of Peirce's central contributions and mostly omitting detailed discussions. Nonetheless, de Waal's slim volume can be recommended to the experienced Peirce scholar as well as to the beginning student. Although the book is focused on the fundaments of Peirce thought, it also sketches some challenging and not altogether uncontroversial interpretations along the way. The author's sources are not restricted to readily available volumes of Peirce's writings such as the *Collected Papers*, the *Essential Peirce*, and the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*; he also refers to and quotes from many unpublished manuscripts and letters. It is evident that de Waal knows his Peirce, no doubt a product of his long affiliation with the Peirce Edition Project of Indianapolis.

In the beginning of the book, de Waal identifies three possible paths available for introducing a philosopher such as Peirce. Firstly, there is the chronological method of following Peirce's development year by year. In effect, something of this nature is being generated by the thorough introductions to the *Writings* volumes. However, in de Waal's assessment, a developmental strategy would not be suitable here because of its complexity. The second option would be to focus on "greatest hits"– that is, introducing Peirce by concentrating on his paramount (or at least most popular) insights and discoveries. According to de Waal, the risk of such an approach is that it can conceal the systematic character of Peirce's thought. There is also an increased danger of distortion, as the interpretation of what is valuable and what is not is inevitably informed by current perspectives; arguably, Peirce has all too often been relegated to the secondary status of an "interesting" precursor to some later philosopher or movement in the history of philosophy. So, de Waal chooses the third path – a systematic presentation grounded in Peirce's classification of the mathematical and philosophical sciences. This provides the basic framework for this guide, which mostly moves methodically from more abstract toward more concrete forms of inquiry. Still, however straightforward such a solution may seem, it is not without its complications – some of which can be seen in de Waal's reconstruction.

After a short account of Peirce's life, the book is divided into eight chapters: "Mathematics and philosophy", "Phenomenology and the categories", "The normative science of logic", "Semeiotics, or the doctrine of signs", "Philosophy of science", "Pragmatism", "Truth and reality", and "Mind, God, and Cosmos". For those familiar with Peirce's classification of the higher sciences, it is evident that de Waal here follows a given path from the echelons of pure mathematics to metaphysics and cosmology, the final philosophical stages above the physical and psychical sciences. However, it is also clear that de Waal – in spite of his systematic ambitions – puts more emphasis on the theory of signs, pragmatism, the "philosophy of science", and Peirce's conception of truth and reality than a stricter interpretation of Peirce's classification would warrant. For one thing, Peirce's mature arrangements tend to omit explicit references to "semeiotics", typically just referring to "logic". Of course, it is plausible to interpret this as "logic in the broad sense", but it is by no means self-evident how an extended semiotic

conception of logic fits into the hierarchical scheme – which may also explain Peirce's curious reluctance to employ the term in classificatory contexts.

Be that as it may, something of a selective "greatest hits" approach can be detected in parts of de Waal's methodical, top-down reconstruction. This may render his account vulnerable to some of the same criticisms concerning selection that have sooften been levelled at the *Collected Papers*; although by mostly focusing on Peirce's later positions, de Waal does not commit the mistake of trying to cram all of Peirce into an ahistorical system. The classificatory, step-by-step approach seems to work best at the most abstract levels, especially in the explication in the relationship between mathematics and philosophy, in which de Waal's book excels. However, perhaps not surprisingly, the story becomes a lot more complicated when it moves into questions concerning the phenomenological categories and logic, the areas where Peirce did most of his philosophical work for about fifty years. Some things – such as Peirce's mature theory of perception and his logic of vagueness – are largely bypassed. While de Waal's narrative never loses its systematic thread, it is also clear that the full range of Peirce's philosophical interests is not always easily fitted into the classificatory scheme.

This brings us to one of the more controversial aspects of a Peircean arrangement of the sciences. Accepting Peirce's later explanation for his method of classification, de Waal emphasises that it is intended to be a "natural" account of the occupations of scientists, not a formal organisation according to the objects of knowledge or scientific methods. That is, the primary justification for identifying anything as *a* science (in Peirce's broad acceptation) should not be an *a priori* principle, but rather the actual practices of living scientists; a classification such as this should not include any imaginary disciplines, conjured up for the benefit of the system. This is certainly an attractive picture; the only problem is that Peirce does not really practice what he preaches. Even for a sympathetic interpreter, it would be difficult to locate the requisite research communities for Peircean esthetics or phenomenology. One man does not a science make; and whatever the situation may be today, it hardly seems credible to claim that there was a social group of "phaneroscopists" during Peirce's time. Hence, it seems more accurate to say that Peirce's classificatory project identifies possible sciences, informed by the categoreal analysis developed in mathematics and phaneroscopy and Comtean principles of hierarchy. A Peircean can still argue that such disciplines could conceivably occupy a "scientist" for a lifetime, but that hardly qualifies as a classification of actual practices; and in truth, most philosophers following in Peirce's footsteps tend to do work in several of the Peircean sub-disciplines, without even intending to restrict their efforts exclusively to one specialised line of inquiry. The fact that Peirce may have been prophetic in certain respects – the development of semiotics springs to mind – does not alter the fact that there is this basic tension in his purported rationale for classification. This is something that de Waal, perhaps intentionally, ignores; but as the systematic organisation of his guide is rooted in this aspect of the Peircean project, it would arguably have been judicious to take a closer – and maybe more critical – look at Peirce's principles of classification.

Starting at the top of Peirce's classification also entails that the problem of why we inquire in the first place is postponed until the branch of logic Peirce called "rhetoric" or "methodeutic"; in de Waal's book, the sixth chapter on Peirce's "philosophy of science" covers most of this ground. However, while it is true that Peirce was sceptical of "natural history" accounts of logic, it is also a fact that he paid a lot of attention to questions of the roots, the motivations, and the nature of scientific inquiry. Not only is it often difficult to find a satisfactory slot for some of Peirce's better known writings in the

classificatory scheme ("The Fixation of Belief", for example); it would also have been possible to introduce Peirce's thought from this point of view – that is, by focusing on his key interest in the practice and logic of social inquiry. If we were to set out from this direction, it would be natural to begin or frame the story with an account of what one might describe as regulative principles of inquiry, such as fallibilism, the critical common-sensist view of doubt and belief, the principle of continuity – even Peirce's oft-ignored anthropomorphism (which de Waal, to his great credit, does discuss). I would even argue that this approach constitutes a fourth - "rhetorical" or "methodeutic" - path to the world of Peirce, one suggestively captured in his claim that in philosophy, we "must not begin by talking of pure ideas, - vagabond thoughts that tramp the public roads without any human habitation" (CP 8.112).

By this I do not mean to insinuate that de Waal would have yielded to the temptation of over-systematisation and excessive abstractness – certainly a very real danger when dealing with a philosopher such as Peirce. Quite the contrary: one of the true delights of de Waal's writing is the way he provides appositely down-to-earth explanations of some of the most abstruse conceptions in Peirce's thought without succumbing to debilitating "sops to Cerberus". Adopting a methodeutic starting point would have led to a different book, with some difficulties of its own – but with the possible advantage of providing a better understanding of the motivations behind Peirce's concerns and the prospective scope of his findings. As de Waal points out, Peirce tended to view logical advances as products of actual problem solving. It also might help us make sense of the seemingly incongruous fact that Peirce on the one hand portrays the relationship between the sciences as strictly hierarchical, so that "lower" sciences cannot provide principles to "higher" disciplines, while he on the other hand seems to elevate a metaphysical insight such as the continuity-thesis of "synechism" to a leading principle of logic. De Waal's solution to this particular dilemma is to place synechism in rhetoric. This seems plausible, but it also raises some interesting questions about the possible primacy of rhetoric/methodeutic in scientific inquiry, which de Waal does not address. At any rate, I would argue that a more substantial, reciprocal give-and-take is going onbetween different levels of philosophical inquiry (and between philosophy and some of the special sciences, and perhaps even between philosophy and mathematics) than Peirce's compartmentalisation, strictly interpreted, appears to permit.

Yet, this does not diminish the value of de Waal's book as an overview of the would-be systematic product of Peirce's multifarious – if not always perfectly methodical – labours. The path that de Waal has chosen is certainly perfectly legitimate, as it is anchored in a structure actually conceived by Peirce. In an introductory volume, it would be very difficult – perhaps almost impossible – to combine it with elegantly with the kind of alternative approach I suggested above. But to get a fuller picture of Peirce's systematic approach, both perspectives may be needed.

I will conclude this review with some minor critical observations. Mostly, de Waal has chosen his Peircean terms wisely, neverwading too far into the quagmires of Peirce's terminological experiments. However, in what appears to be an attempt to find a compromise in one of the ongoing quarrels in the field, he has opted for "semeiotics" rather than "semiotic" or "semeiotic", the two alternatives Peirce mostly uses as names for the theory or doctrine of signs. Although de Waal's choice is understandable and by no means erroneous, this is unlikely to satisfy either of the two warring factions – that is, Peirceans that (following Max Fisch) swear by "semeiotic" as a proper designation and the later semioticians who (following Thomas Sebeok) argue for the superiority of "semiotics". More puzzling, perhaps, is

de Waal's claim that the application of Peirce's "tone-token-type" distinction *to* the sign *produces* the "qualisign-sinsign-legisign" division. In all instances that I am aware of, these were alternative names Peirce gave to basically the same concepts. Here, the analytic afterlife of the type-token distinction may be at play. Likewise, the claim that the "dynamical object has an indexical component" (p. 86) feels a bit confused, as indexicality is more correctly described as something that characterises a relation between sign and object.

One could also question de Waal's claim that Peirce's "On a New List of Categories" (1867) contains Peirce's first presentation of his theory of signs. Although this seminal article certainly introduced some key semiotic concepts in print for the first time, it hardly amounted to a full account of "semeiotics"; and as a matter of fact, Peirce had already introduced the idea of semiotic as "the general science of representations" in lectures and manuscripts a couple of years prior to the "New List".

Some of these comments may be feel rather pedantic; but it is really a homage to de Waal's accomplishment that it is to such details that one must go to find points to criticise. Overall, de Waal's *Peirce* delivers an admirably balanced account of a frequently perplexing but always rewarding thinker; it is an enjoyable read, the flow of the narrative marred only by a couple of infelicities that should have been corrected in proofreading. Given the numerous challenges involved in interpreting Peirce's writings and assessing his legacy, de Waal really has done a remarkably good job in producing the best brief guide to Peirce on the market today. This volume will no doubt be used as a basic textbook in many courses on Peirce's philosophy in coming years; and seasoned travellers in the world of Peirce will also find it to be a guide well worth consulting.

BOOK REVIEW

JOHN RYDER: *THE THINGS IN HEAVEN AND EARTH. AN ESSAY IN PRAGMATIC NATURALISM*
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013)

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How many versions of pragmatism there are? This question has been haunting non-pragmatists since the times of Lovejoy. But today this is an issue for us pragmatists as well. Some time ago I myself have distinguished basically two recent versions of "new" pragmatisms: 1. Rortyan postanalytic (postlinguistic) neopragmatism, and 2. Neoclassical pragmatism with its three versions: Neo-Peirceian, Neo-Jamesian, Neo-Deweyan.[1] Meanwhile, two other "classifications" of "new pragmatism" have appeared: one put forward by Ch. Misak drawing on Peirce, and thus Neo-Peirceian, while another one promoted by A. Malachowski developing the Rortyan version in a quite radical way. To make things more complicated, there are authors who see the relation between the "old" and the "new" pragmatisms as more complex and who do not even think of Rorty as a pragmatist, S. Haack being the most important among them. And, moreover, there are authors who suggest another variety of recent pragmatism by promoting "pragmatic naturalism". One of these is based on the conception developed by Justus Buchler (1914-1991)[2], who is not well known either in the US or outside it, and his mentor at Columbia University in NYC, John Herman Randall Jr. (1899 – 1980), labeled as so called "Columbia naturalism" or "New York naturalism".[3] In 1972, Buchler was one of the founders of the "Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy", of which many of his former students are active agents up to the present.[4]

This conception of naturalism has been revived recently by several authors who regard themselves pragmatists, though they draw on James and Dewey rather than on Buchler and Randall, or even on another school of ideas established in Buffalo by Marvin Farber (1901-1980) and his follower Paul Kurtz (1925-2012).[5] The other pragmatists who sympathize with or even endorse this or that version of naturalism (or pragmatic naturalism, for that matter) include a whole host of authors from S. M. Eames to Mark Johnson to S. Pihlström, etc. There is also a concept of "liberal naturalism" proposed by M. de Caro and David Macarthur which includes among its proponents also Putnam and Rorty, along with such analytic philosophers as T. Scanlon, P. F. Strawson, J. Hornsby, and B. Stroud, which I take to be controversial.[6]

John Ryder was a student of Buchler at Stony Brook and has been active in "pragmatist circles" for decades, focusing mostly on the issues of social and political philosophy and interpretations of American philosophy abroad, primarily in Soviet Russia. His interest in developing a pragmatist version of naturalism is a long-term affair dating back at least to the excellent anthology of resources he edited in 1994.[7] Now he has offered a more substantial contribution aligning him with the authors who advocate a more traditional approach in the philosophy of contemporary pragmatism that is preserving philosophical disciplines

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[1] See Višňovský, E (2000). O súčasnom neopragmatizme." *Filozofia,*55, 10, 777-787.

[2] His main works include: *Charles Peirce's Empiricism* (1939)*, Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment* (1951), *Nature and Judgment* (1955), *The Concept of Method* (1961), *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* (1966), *The Main of Light: On the Concept of Poetry* (1974).

[3] See Anton, J. P., ed. (1967). *Naturalism and Historical Understanding. Essays on the Philosophy of John Herman Randall, Jr.* New York: State University of New York Press.

[4] Some of Buchler's students published the joint volume which may be regarded as his late *Festschrift*; see Marsoobian, A., K. Wallace, R. S. Corrington, eds. (1991). *Nature's Perspectives. Prospects for Ordinal Metaphysics*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

[5] See Shook, J. R., and P. Kurtz, eds. (2009). *The Future of Naturalism*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

[6] See De Caro, M., and D. Macarthur, eds. (2004). *Naturalism in Question*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

[7] See Ryder, J., ed. (1994). *American Philosophical Naturalism in the Twentieth Century*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

like metaphysics or ontology and epistemology, unlike Rorty and his followers, as necessary endeavors if philosophy is to remain philosophy. Thus their pragmatism is still modern, or late modern, rather than postmodern. The reason for such an approach is simply that pragmatists today should not pose the same old traditional philosophical questions that comprise those disciplines, rather on the contrary, they 'would do better to ask different sorts of questions' (p. 2). However, no matter what kind of issues we are trying to solve, "we invariably have some more general conceptions of how things are" (p. 3).

In his latest book, John Ryder offers what I would like to call his "mature" philosophy and a very well-balanced conception of all philosophical issues with which he decides to engage. Even though many of the chapters in this book have been published elsewhere before, often in somewhat different versions, the author has rewritten them and cleverly combined them into a piece of work that amounts to a coherent whole in order to cover what he considers to be some of the most important "things in heaven and earth". What kinds of things are these, according to Ryder?

First of all, and this is what he starts with, it is philosophy itself. He is discontent with what philosophy in its history has achieved and how it is approaching both the world and humanity. The upshot is "a distorted understanding of ourselves, our world, and the many problems, personal and social, that we face" (p. 2). Simply put, Ryder calls for a new philosophy, or at least for a "renewed" one (and here he is in line with all those pragmatists who advocate the "new" as opposed to the "old", including Rorty) that would become a pragmatist alternative to both traditional analytic and continental schools, and yet be a sort of rapprochement of three major approaches, as advocated recently e. g. by Bernstein, Margolis, Hickman. The choice for adopting a single philosophic perspective for Ryder is clear: it is a non-reductive pragmatic naturalism drawing on the Columbia Naturalist tradition whose central point is a theory of relationality (pp. 6-8). This is a pluralistic philosophical *Weltanschauung* (since "nature is complex") which, among other things, openly declares that "philosophy is not mathematics", and should not even be modeled on mathematics as its paradigm (p. 8, 43, 50-51, 291).[8] The aim of Ryder's effort is to "describe a pragmatic pluralism" and to show its "value and wisdom" (p. 11).

I take it that the motivation for such a conception of philosophy is clearly a "pragmatic" as well as a "pragmatist" one in the sense of the non-reductive humanism which is inherent to "pragmatic naturalism". Philosophy as one of the human enterprises should not play God from high above in the Heavens in order to rule those miserable creatures down here on the Earth, since philosophy is just one of the tools they have developed to enrich their transitory life and existence on the Earth, even while looking to the Heavens for such reasons as moral hope, aesthetic inspiration or political authority. But philosophers should not escape the Earth for the sake of the Heavens, nor the Platonist Cave for the sake of the Realm of Ideas. Philosophy is vital here on the Earth so that the human world does not turn into a Hell, even if it cannot be made a Heaven. This may be considered a humanistic mission of any kind of philosophy to which Ryder's pragmatic naturalism subscribes, with all its pervasiveness.

One of the strands of Ryder's thought is the "reconciliation" he attempts in many ways. For him, there are no good reasons to draw a strict and sharp line between modernism and postmodernism, classical pragmatism and new pragmatism, constructivism and objectivism, all the more between pragmatism and naturalism and between naturalism and humanism. Neither are there good reasons to take the standpoint of

[8] No doubt, Peirceans and Peirce himself would have been appalled by such a radical claim.

one against another.[9] This conception is based on the understanding (which is mostly Deweyan) that there is a relational continuity between nature and experience (or nature and culture for that matter). Simply put, nature is not only given and objective with respect to our experience, it is also creative (by itself) and constructed (by us). And *vice versa*, experience is not only constructed and subjective, it is also determined (by its conditions) and objective (by natural relations). Naturalism in its pragmatic vein is no pure absolutism or objectivism, and pragmatism in its naturalistic vein is no pure relativism or subjectivism.

The key values of pragmatic naturalism lie in both its traits and virtues. Its basic trait is to conceive of everything as existing within nature and without the need to postulate or search for anything "supernatural" (p. 37). This "does *not* mean – first, that nature is equivalent to the material world, and second, that scientific inquiry is the only method that can produce knowledge of nature" (p. 38). Pragmatic naturalism is not reductive in terms of materialism or scientism. The pragmatic naturalistic category of nature, its broadest and most basic, includes the conception of the whole sum of human experiences and human artifacts that can exist only within nature, even if nature itself cannot be understood as "a whole" since its relational character implies that it is always open (pp. 42, 60, 89). Pragmatic naturalism "is a relational philosophy; it is a philosophy for which nature is a category sufficient for all things…" (p. 43). Among its main virtues is its avoidance of traditional philosophical dualisms of which I would select as the most basic the dualism between (human) subjectivity and (natural) objectivity. In particular the concept of "objectivity" has become suspicious among pragmatists, along with its critique of Cartesian subjectivity. Pragmatism conveys the sense that this is a philosophy in line with a Nietzschean vein of "human-all-too-human" perspectivalism, or as purely anthropocentric, due primarily to the Jamesian/Rortyan interpretations of human experience and knowledge; in other words, that pragmatism appears to be a "philosophy of human subjectivity". This impression apparently has to be corrected and Ryder is doing so (pp. 46-49). Rather than abandoning both concepts of subjectivity and objectivity, or emphasizing one at the expense of the other, they should be reconstructed in a pragmatic naturalist, relational way: neither is to be eliminated since neither is absolute. Experience is not only humanly subjective, but it includes natural objectivity as well, nor nature is only naturally objective, but it includes human subjectivity as well. The "dialectics", i.e. the complex relations (transactions) between experience and nature, include the dialectics between subjectivity and objectivity.

The key idea that Ryder suggests, develops and defends is the idea of relationality. This is combined with the central target that Ryder identifies for pragmatic naturalism to supercede – the Newtonian atomistic, and thus anti-relational, vision of the world which has held us captive to the present.[10] Taking all "things in the heaven and earth", no matter whether given or created, live or inanimate, nonhuman or human, including human beings, as 'discrete individuals independent of all the others' (p. 33), as self-independent, autonomous or even isolated atoms "like balls on a billiard table" (p. 53), has seemed very 'natural' to the human mind. A mainstream intellectual tradition has been established that regards substances as ontologically primary and relations as

[9] One exception to this is Rorty's neopragmatism which, according to Ryder (pp. 17-24), is no pragmatism at all due to his complete neglect of naturalism and the concept of experience. This may, however, be debatable at least for two reasons: 1. Rorty's early references to Darwinism, 2. Rorty's late conception of panrelationalism.

[10] Ryder dubs it also a "Baroque atomism" (10, 33-35 etc.) which fits well into his conception except that Baroque as a cultural epoch is more complex; see Deleuze, G. (1988/1993). *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Trans. by T. Conley. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

secondary, if they are acknowledged at all. There must be something existing first (Peirce's Firstness) in order to interact with another thing (Peirce's Secondness), as the traditional ontological understanding would have us think at least from the times of Plato and Aristotle. However, there is no such thing that could have existed without any relations to some other thing because with any given thing, relations (Peirce's Thirdness) exist inherently as well.[11] There is no such thing that might be constituted without relations to some other thing. Thus relations are ontologically constitutive and pragmatic naturalism provides "a relational, ordinal ontology" (p. 54).

Such is the upshot of Part 1 of the book, laying down the key concepts and attitudes in its summary. The next five chapters of Part 2 provide the elaboration of these foundations as applied to ontology (chapters 3 to 5), faith and God (chapter 6), and art and knowledge (chapter 7). With respect to ontology Ryder follows his mentor Buchler (and Buchler's mentor Randall) as he revives their "relationalism" in the understanding of both the world and human being. Nature as a whole, a person or a society, or any kind of particular entity, is just relational through and through, despite the fact that the standard or traditional ontology is non-relational.[12] However, Ryder does not present the alternative view that "*whatever there is*" is "to be constituted relationally" (p. 88) as the "only one and necessary truth". Rather, he articulates it as a reasonable "attempt" and a "more modest claim" (pp. 89-92). Thus as a pragmatist and naturalist he does not claim that all being is necessarily relational; he just claims that to understand it as relational is "at least possible" (p. 93), and that whether this understanding "works" better or is more "useful" than the traditional one, can be decided only on a "pragmatic test" (p. 43).

Such an understanding may be applied not only to the world as "given" and "found" but also to the world as "made" and "created" (or constructed). The ontology of "objective reality" is "naturally" supplied by the ontology of "human artifacts", including the whole

"nonmaterial world" of human concepts, theories, visions, images, ideas, ideals, values, meanings, beliefs, knowledge, judgments, truths, etc. comprising together what is called "intellectual culture" (or "spiritual culture"). According to pragmatic naturalism there is no "mystery" here – all of these are created by various kinds of human cultural practices, which are also relational, ordinal, contextual, historical, etc. Cultural practices are creative. However, their cultural products do not represent a different kind of ontology, neither are they practiced arbitrarily (p. 116). Rather they fit into the general ontology of natural complexes which are being thus transformed, but by no means created *ex nihilo*. There is no tension between the ontology of (objective) nature and the ontology of (creative) human culture provided we understand the constitutive relations within and between them.

If humans are not creators *ex nihilo*, then they are not Gods, despite playing gods in many of their cultural practices. Pragmatist naturalist ontology also shows that the idea of God itself is one of the human cultural creations which have not been (and could not be) created *ex nihilo*. There are real and natural earthly grounds for such a creation. Religious belief and faith in God has a rich cultural meaning within a naturalist view, offering a host of important values such as humility, piety, trust, hope, sense of justice, etc. (pp. 129, 136-139). These are the values that provide the relational "common ground" between pragmatic naturalism and a religious life of faith (p. 140).

The sciences and the arts (in addition to religions) are

[11] Even though Ryder does not invoke the Peircean vocabulary, this fits well in his conception of pragmatic naturalism. Note that Ryder's teacher Buchler was a Peircean scholar.

[12] The key concept, with which this ontology stands and falls, is Buchler's concept of "natural complexes". See his *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* (1966).

another important human creations created by and in human cultural practices. Based on the philosophical concept of human creativity, which pragmatic naturalism fully endorses, there cannot be a sharp divide between these two in terms of the old dualism that "science is cognitive" and "art is non-cognitive". In order to make a breakthrough to a novel conception of science and art, a much richer concept of knowledge is needed than that provided by the traditional propositional concepts of "knowledge that" or "knowledge how". In place of these rather narrow concepts, pragmatists have elaborated the concepts of "knowledge through" (J. Buchler) or "interpretive knowledge" (R. Shusterman), meaning the "knowledge of" in the sense of an "understanding of" or an "insight into" something. The latter accommodate very well to the arts, showing their natural cognitive dimension. Even more, Ryder invokes Buchler's original theory of judgment as the basis for relational integration of science and art into one coherent pragmatist naturalist theory (pp. 164-170).

Part 3 (chapters 8 to 11) is fully devoted to fields in which during past decades Ryder has become a respectable scholar – the social and political arena. Here he consistently applies the pragmatic naturalist philosophical *Weltanschauung* to develop the conceptions of democracy and international relations. These sections supply the most refreshing and innovative thoughts in the book concerning some crucial contemporary issues of our social experience, while Dewey rather than Buchler is the main source here.

Ryder does not wish to conceal at all that the current situation concerning democracy is "far more complicated" than often assumed (p. 180). He introduces and explains a host of examples from diverse parts of the world that show not only how difficult and hard the processes of democratization can be (which was already a truism for Dewey), but also how directly democracy has been challenged and even altered in both manifestly and covertly undemocratic ways. Democracy as a very fragile and delicate idea has been stolen, diverted and distorted countless times, even in the name of democracy itself. There are also many real fundamental dangers to democracy in the country that considers itself a "cradle" of democracy – the USA, on which Ryder reflects in a very critical way. He boldly and bravely demands "a profound revision" of American "conception of national sovereignty" and national interests of the USA (p. 206). Democracy is "nominally and substantially" as well as globally "in need of rehabilitation before it can serve as a forceful ideal again" (p. 201).

Nonetheless, Ryder firmly advances a "modest claim" that "democracy is a desirable way of life" (p. 180-181), in comparison to non-democratic ways, allowing a majority of people (if not all) "to live full, rich, and developed lives culturally, socially and economically" (p. 181). This means that democracy still is, could be and should be the ideal of a social and individual life that is worth striving for; a valuable ideal despite being less than perfect (p. 223, 226). He develops the pragmatic naturalist concept of "thick democracy" all the way down based on Dewey's conception of "creative democracy", distinguishing it very effectively from the concept of "thin" or just "formal" democracy as a way of government (mostly traditional liberal-constitutive). The latter should give way to the former wherever possible.

Ryder takes it that to ground the kernel of democracy in such a floppy concept as "human nature" does not make serve it well. The better pragmatic naturalist attitude can be based on the concept of "common interests" both across and beyond any specific human community. The "pursuit of common (shared) interests" is the "most significant component" (p. 188) of Ryder's understanding of democracy, and it seems to work well in his analyses. In line with it is his outline of an ideal of "a democratic individual" as "knowledgeable, thoughtful, critical, experimental, and ethically sensitive" (p. 189) to those common interests in the first place. This is also a

relational conception of democracy built on taking practical care of the shared ties that bind people together no matter how different their individual interests and ways of life could be. Where there is no common interest or a search for common interest, there can hardly be any thick democracy. This does not exclude plurality and dissent within the framework of democracy (even though Ryder is well aware, along with others such as R. Talisse, that this is "a serious problem"), but there is at least a hope for a solution. This solution may presumably consist mostly in the participation (hence "participatory democracy") of as many participants as possible in the creation and practical support of the common interests. Another hope for a thick democracy may be in a possibility that such participation, cooperation and communication in the process of developing shared interests may "prevail by example" (p. 222).

Ryder further develops the Deweyan idea of "education for democracy". It is a necessary condition that the democratic individual has to be educated in terms of his/her relation to community and an awareness not only of the crucial importance of common interests but also of the practical need to be willing and able to participate in the formation of these interests. But such an education requires a very different approach, one that is in direct opposition to the one built on "making people competitive in the marketplace" as its main goal, or teaching "young people not to be reflective, experimental, hypothetical, and open-minded, but rather to accept as absolute certain principles and truths and to apply them rigidly" (p. 221).

One of the most dangerous deformations of democracy to be identified today is its reduction to a "thin" democracy in a way of election procedures and traditional liberal-democratic ways of government. This really is just a "mask", or even worse a caricature, of democracy (especially when combined with corruption) as evaluated from the standpoint of Deweyan pragmatic naturalist conception. Things are even worse by an identification of democracy simply with market mechanisms or "marketization", i. e. "the application of market principles and values to nearly all aspects of the society" (p. 227).[13] There is, presumably, no need to invoke Marx (as Ryder is doing) in order to understand that there also might be a version of a "capitalist totalitarianism" when organizing all social institutions "in accord with market values" (p. 227). Market society is just one component of a democratic society, but when the former is totalized beyond the limits of its justified economic sphere, the latter begins to suffer substantially: because "democracy is characterized by ongoing pursuit of common interests, a democratic society requires that its citizens interact with one another in a spirit of mutual cooperation and collaborative pursuit of common ends" (p. 228).

Therefore it is fully understandable that in the area of education such a strategy is even more damaging. The "goal of a democratic education cannot be primarily about besting others in a competitive market" and there is "no room in a democracy for education construed to conform to market values or for market principles" (p. 228), in particular when it comes to higher education and the academic life at contemporary university in general. The university is an institution designed to play the key and irreplaceable, un-eliminable role in the formation of democratic society and its education. Ryder presents in a couple of pages (pp. 229-239) a very succinct and instructive analysis of the current situation of the university as seen from the standpoint of democracy. He depicts a realistic contextual, relational scene which is sufficiently complex due to its inclusion of a mixture of values and practices functioning in conflict rather than in harmony. Those individuals, in particular university administrators, who simply do not understand, or forget, or ignore that the university is an

[13] Such a reduction of democracy has been implemented and entrenched in the post-communist countries, e. g. in Slovakia and others in Central Europe.

academic institution, which means that it stands and falls with its academic values and on how they are being nurtured and developed, and who attempt to manage or even replace these values with other social or economic values, commit a fatal mistake (p. 232). In such cases the university is being "commodified", "marketized", "economized" and even "ideologized" and "politicized" in terms of contemporary "academic capitalism".[14] Similarly, the vocabulary according to which "students are customers and the university is the provider of services for them" is deeply mistaken and harmful. This vocabulary should be replaced by the vocabulary of opportunities and responsibilities for growth on both sides, that of the students as well as that of the universities, in mutual interaction (p. 234). And those who rule the academic world, administrators and university managers, should strive to find the balance that has been hitherto almost tragically and regretfully lost – the balance between all the values and practices that comprise the life of the university – academic, social, political and economic values and practices (p. 238-239), but with one crucial caveat: academic values are to be taken as the goals, whereas all other as the means, when it comes to the issue of the quality of university education. Ryder writes clearly in this regard, though I would stress the latter point even more radically based on my own academic experience from the past decades in Central Europe.

The international situation and policy is the final area to which Ryder applies his pragmatic naturalist philosophical approach, and this in the most radical way. He calls for a substantial revision and reconstruction of the international order starting with a fundamental rethinking of concepts on which this order has traditionally been constructed. The relational paradigm is, of course, the clue here as well. The concepts that need to be revised for such a pragmatic naturalist relational reconstruction include the concepts of borders, national sovereignty, national interests, foreign policy, international cooperation, internationalization, pacifism, militarism, etc., and the revision is necessary in order to bring them into accord with the declared democratic principles. What this all amounts to is a pragmatic naturalist conception of cosmopolitanism and humanism in which both are naturally the implications, or rather the inherent traits, of a thick democracy on the global level.

There is not much that is claimed in the book with which I would like to dissent. Perhaps one point of criticism would concern the author's exclusively positive references to European Union (pp. 199, 208, 264, 284-256, 301) as a paradigm case of a pragmatic naturalist democracy and a new kind of international relations. Even though there is quite a lot of truth in what he refers to, the overall process is much more complex. Apart from the generally infamous Brussels' bureaucracy, which applies also to the Bologna process of the unification of the European higher education area, several other factors such as tendencies to centralization, and the fact that a market ideology massively dominates political parties whether right- or left-wing, etc., show that the results of the "Europeanization" of Europe are far from ideal. The character of democracy within the Eurozone is still "thin" rather than "thick". One of the reasons in the intellectual sphere is surely the fact that the European democratic tradition is prevailingly liberal-democratic, while any types of participatory or "direct" democracy, not to say the pragmatic democracy, is very weak, indeed almost negligible. The task of a Deweyan creative and intelligent democracy is still the task before the European pragmatists.

John Ryder has written a useful and intellectually

[14] For the conception of academic capitalism see: Slaughter, S., and L. L. Leslie (1999). *Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University; Slaughter, S., and G. Rhoades (2009). *Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, State, and the Higher Education.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University.

valuable book, presenting his philosophical views from ontological to political to aesthetic to ethical in a single coherent volume that deserves to be read by the contemporary generations of pragmatists of various brands. They can learn from this reading to become wiser and to adopt a more balanced pragmatist *Weltanschauung.*

BOOK REVIEW

ERIN MCKENNA: *PETS, PEOPLE, AND PRAGMATISM*
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013)

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Imagine the following photograph: a boy and a dog are running in your direction across a meadow. The background is blurry, but you can tell that the space opening behind them is wide and filled with greenery. They are very close. You can clearly see the dog's whiskers and the boy's pale face, tense from the effort, but smiling. They seem to be having fun. Both look at a piece of wood that the boy is holding in his left hand, and which his companion is trying to catch. The dog's ears flap, the boy's ginger curls wave freely, and so does his baggy, checkered shirt, as well as the leash he is holding the dog on. You can almost hear the thumping of their feet against the soil and their quickened breathing. You feel like moving aside to let them pass. If you were really standing there, a few steps away, they wouldn't even notice you. So absorbed in their game. A boy and a dog.

Now, whatever your own reaction to such a picture might be, forget about it for a moment and imagine the following one:

What we have here is a perfect example of the ideology of domination of nature masquerading as a harmonious relationship between a pet and its owner. In fact, the very signifier "owner," with which those who claim to love their "animal companions" describe themselves so gladly, clearly indicates the nature of the relationship that is instantiated here: pets are mere commodities used for their owners' pleasure. Of course, the dog in the picture may seem to be enjoying him- or herself, too, but you can surely experience moments of joy even if you are a slave, which, however, does not change your overall oppressed condition. And that dog is a slave indeed. Forget the free-like-the wind imagery of the photo and remember that the dog is on a leash. And what about the things that are omitted in this all-too bucolic picture? Such as that the dog probably came from a puppy mill, one of those disturbing places where puppies are kept in horrendous conditions, suffering separation anxiety and all sorts of infections, parasites, and injuries. Or that when the boy finally gets bored with his animal "friend," the latter will be abandoned just as millions of other dogs are every year. That it may end up killed in a shelter, or sold to a lab where it will be submitted to cruel tests, or left alone in a forest, tied to a tree by its leg. A sorry end for a sorry creature who is, like every other "domesticated" animal, "a monster of the order invented by Frankenstein … engineered to conform to our wishes."[1] Pet-keeping is inherently oppressive and must stop, but such propagandist pictures as this one only make it more firmly entrenched in our societies.

The reason for the above exercise in imagination is that the picture just described happens to be on the cover of Erin McKenna's *Pets, People, and Pragmatism*, and that one of the principal aims of the book is to prove that those who deem pet-keeping inherently wrong are themselves wrong. That this is an aim of the book, however, does not mean that McKenna is unaware of the horrors of puppy mills and various other abuses that pets face, or that, being aware of such problems, she would like to "explain [them] away."[2] She does see the abuses. She condemns them too. But at the same time she argues that they can be eliminated without necessarily prohibiting the institution of pet-keeping per se,[3] and that the institution should in fact be preserved because it offers various advantages to humans and non-humans alike. In a word, she is trying to "develop a middle ground" on the issue (17).

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[1] Paul Shephard, *The Others: How Animals Made Us Human* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996), p. 151

[2] Erin McKenna, *Pets, People, and Pragmatism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 17. Further references will be given parenthetically in the text.

[3] Note that for her purposes in the book, "'pet' applies to those animal beings with whom human beings have especially intimate relationships that are not particularly focused on use value, but are heavily focused on companionship" (11).

Such an approach puts McKenna among other pragmatists who have pursued the third way strategy in politics and ethics, which is also known as meliorism or reformism.[4] Her predecessors on this path are many, but as a recent example one might name Richard Rorty, a thinker who fiercely criticized the atrocities of capitalism and urged for a return to "class politics,"[5] while at the same time arguing that a total revolution was not the answer, and that one should rather tinker with the system itself to steer it in a more hopeful direction. The results are well-known. Rorty's arguments convinced neither the neoliberals nor radical leftists, and he was attacked by both. It remains to be seen whether McKenna will meet analogous reactions from the radical critics of pet-keeping and the defenders of the status quo. In the meantime, let us take a look at the contours of the "middle ground" she occupies.

Although she admits her indebtedness to ecofeminism, McKenna makes it clear from the very beginning of the book, that she draws mainly on the theoretical resources of American pragmatism. This philosophical tradition is of course rich and varied, so it might be helpful to explain here that what she adopts from pragmatism are its, as she calls them, "five basic dimensions" (104), that is fallibism, experimentalism, pluralism, naturalism, and developmentalism. According to McKenna, when applied to the question of our relationships with other animal beings, these translate into the following approach:

> we need to understand the evolutionary (naturalism) history of the various animal beings and we need to examine the ways we have influenced and transformed each other. We need to be open to seeing the world from the perspectives of all the animal beings (pluralism) with whom we live if we want to develop mutually satisfactory relationships. We need to recognize that these relationships are always in process (developmentalism) as is the nature of both the human and other animal beings. We need to experiment (experimentalism) with new and different ways to sustain and to improve the relationships, and we need to be willing to admit when we make mistakes (fallibilism) in understanding ourselves, other animal beings, and our relationships with each other (104; cf. 36-42).

It is from this five-dimensional perspective that McKenna wants to achieve the main aims of her book, that is (a) to undermine what she sees as "extreme positions" on the institution of pet-keeping, including those that postulate to eliminate it altogether, and which she associates in particular with PETA, Tom Regan, and Gary L. Francione; and (b) to show how pragmatism could be used to have the institution improved (or "ameliorated," if you are as fond of Deweyese as McKenna is).

As regards (a), McKenna argues that the extreme views in question are often underlain by "human exceptionalism," that is a belief in there being a fundamental ontological difference between humans and the rest of the animal world – something which becomes rather ironic in the case of otherwise diametrically opposed views (2; cf. 24, 39). For instance, there are those, she says, who relying on "a sense of nature that puts humans outside of nature," believe that "all human relationships with other animal beings must end – because they violate the interests of the other animal beings and they fail to respect any intrinsic value of the other animals beings" (17). Then there are those who believe, relying on the same understanding of nature, that humans can use other animals "in any way they see fit" (2) – because only our species can have any interests whatsoever. For McKenna, both views are untenable, because so is their common exceptionalist tenet. According to her developmentalist and naturalist perspective, our species not only had emerged from the

[4] See, for instance, Richard Shusterman's *Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 62, for remarks on pragmatism as a "middle road."
[5] That is, "a politics that centres on the struggle to prevent the rich from ripping off the rest of the country" and aims at "the goal that matters most: the classless society." Rorty, *Achieving Our Contry: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 260-261.

so-called natural environment, but as soon as this happened, it began to "engage in transactive" (that is "mutually transformative") relationships with that environment and its other inhabitants, which continue until this day (117, cf. 42). It would be quite appropriate to say, then, that human and non-human animals "co-constitute each other" (8). Given that, drawing a strict ontological boundary between the two groups is absurd, and so is – a fortiori – deriving any ethical conclusions from it.

But frequent attachment to human exceptionalism is not the only problem McKenna sees in extreme positions adopted in the debate on the keeping of pets. According to her, many such positions are characterized by insufficient attention to the complexities of the question; the complexities of domestication's history and of the current condition of pets, as well as the complexity of consequences that radical responses to pet abuse may bring. Take those animal advocates who would like the practice of pet-keeping to end entirely. Some of them see domestication narrowly as an intervention "in nature," "a feat of engineering that is deliberate and planned," and based on "domination" (27). But that picture, argues McKenna, is problematized by the available historical evidence which encourages us to see domestication "as a naturally arising symbiotic relationship, rather than an extraordinary discovery"[6]; to see it as something "unintentional and not conscious,"[7] something which, given "the habits of other animal beings", may "seem almost inevitable" (29). Note that McKenna does not want to deny that domestication has involved domination, control, and engineering, but rather to stress that this cannot be the whole story about it.

Similarly, McKenna's point goes, the abuse which millions of pets suffer every day is not the whole story about the current state of human-pet relationships, even if "many" animal advocates behave as this was actually the case. Consider animal shows and horse racing. "If some exhibitors engage in cruel practices in the pursuit of competitive titles with other animal beings, many jump to the position that showing and competition with animals is always wrong" (7). But, as McKenna assures us, not all exhibitors do such things, just as not all people involved in horse racing are guilty of using of "banned training practices such as spiking …, tendon firing or injecting irritants into horses legs [sic] …, deadening tails …., breaking tails …, the artificial weighting of their feet …, and the use of banned drugs" (51). From McKenna's perspective, to condemn animal shows or horse racing only on the basis of such abuses, would be wrong, plain and simple. And banning those forms of human-animal relationships on such grounds would be even worse because it would "actually show a lack of respect" for the animals involved. What McKenna means by this is that, when "done well" shows and races "fit the nature and developmental histories of specific" animals and "provide an important outlet for expressing their physical abilities and mental capacities" (83). To her mind, taking away this outlet altogether because shows and races sometimes involve abuse, would be an example of "over-correction in response to problematic situations" (84).

It should be noted here, that McKenna has major doubts about "all or nothing kinds of changes" in general, arguing that "they often do as much harm as good" – a harm which is sometimes entirely unexpected by those who are the keenest to introduce such changes. One of the examples she gives concerns pit bulls, who, because of their frequent use in dog fights, have been entirely banned by "many cities" in the US. However good the

[6] Richard Bulliet, *Hunters, Herders, and Hamburgers: The Past and Future of Human-Animal Relationships* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 90; quoted after McKenna (29).
[7] As regards dogs, for instance, "they and humans may have been in a relationship … that have started from fourteen thousand to fifteen thousand years ago – long before humans could have completely controlled the relationship" (134).

intentions behind the ban might have been, its outcome is that these are "mostly the dogs themselves who suffer." They are "often being euthanized," and if that is not the case, they are "kept hidden and so are more easily subject to abuse" (170).

Let's not forget, however, that the task McKenna set for herself in the book is not only to criticize positions adopted by others, but also to propose a concrete, positive alternative herself. What animates her proposal, to which we hereby turn, is the conviction that in order to develop "more respectful" forms of pet-keeping we first need to "get acquainted" with "the activities we want to evaluate and possibly change," including all beings involved in them (147). It therefore should come as no surprise that McKenna focuses on pets she herself is most acquainted with – that is, dogs, cats, and horses. She devotes one separate chapter to each of these species, and all the three chapters have an analogous structure, consisting of parts addressing "Abuse and neglect," "Use In Research and Biomedical Contexts," "Use In Entertainment," "Use in Competition," and finally, and not unfittingly, "Death." McKenna relies here not only on what she knows from her first-hand experience, but also on empirical material gathered by ethologists, anthropologists, historians, journalists, animal trainers, and others, putting forward so many proposals that it would be impossible to summarize them all in a review like this one. However, the following two should serve well as an illustration of her approach.

For instance, in Chapter 1, McKenna addresses the question of "natural horsemanship" that is "the philosophy of working with horses by appealing to their instincts and herd mentality" (56). While not denying that the particular "training methods" advocated by natural horsemen such as Pat Parelli work just fine in the case of some "horse beings," she observes that they are hardly applicable to all horses in all circumstances. Unfortunately, "many people" treat those techniques as if they were "absolute," universal solutions, something which "can lead to problems and put both the human being and the horse being in a dangerous position" (56-57). Now, McKenna suggests that what might prevent such errors is adopting a pragmatist perspective indeed, which is because "[b]eing pluralistic Pragmatism recognizes that there is no one-size fits all solution or approach" (58, cf. 145). This is of course but one of the "dimensions" of pragmatism that McKenna would like to put to work in the service of improving human-pet relationship. Our next, and final, example shows all five dimensions applied to one particular problem (i.e. the use of horses in entertainment), demonstrating, too, McKenna's frequent strategy of supporting her arguments with an autobiographical narrative:

> Using the Pragmatist perspective one realizes that, given the *natural* and *developmental* history of domesticated horses, there are horse beings who want to perform, who want to run, who want to pull, who want to jump, who want to cut cattle, who want to run barrels, who want to model, who want to demonstrate the power and precision of dressage. Experiments, and the willingness to learn (*fallibilism*), have taught humans a great deal over the five thousand to six thousand year relationship with horses. As long as one has appropriately matched the activity with the physical and psychological abilities of the horse and is able to work with the particular personality and interests of the individual horse (respect the *plurality* of horses), there is nothing inherently wrong these activities from the Pragmatist point of view.
>
> For example, Donald is the horse with whom I had the longest relationship. We met when he was one and he has recently died at age thirty-two. Needless to say, we knew each other pretty well. When Donald was young we showed in the Morgan shows in English pleasure and pleasure driving. He always made it clear he preferred driving to riding. He pranced around once he saw the harness and he couldn't wait to get going once he was hooked to the cart – even in his thirties. At the age of twenty-seven, he went to a local Morgan show as company of Hank, the younger horse in my life. I put him in a driving class just for the fun of it. I wasn't sure he could sustain the trot as long as the judges might ask. By then the ligaments in his hind legs were stretched out due to age and he didn't have much strength in his hindquarters. So, I figured we'd just do what he wanted – this was just for fun. True to form he barely stood to be hooked.

> He was quiet in the warm up ring, but was willing to go. But then we entered the show arena. He started really to come alive and move out. When people started clapping he moved out more. Then a horse passed him. He hit a trot I hadn't seen since his early teens! The crowd went crazy and Donald just turned it on. He got second place and left the arena in full stride. Then he started to walk. The walk back to the barn was a slow one, but he was alert and very animated. Once there, he started to whinny – not something he regularly does. It seemed he was telling Hank what he had done. He did the same when he returned our home barn the next day (76-77).

As I have already said, it is impossible to summarize here all of McKenna's proposals on how to improve our relationships with dogs, horses, and cats. It also not possible for me to refer to all the major points she makes in the book, nor to assess the validity of the points that I referred to above, not to mention putting them in the context of the relevant literature. I do hope, however, that the task of assessing, discussing, and contextualizing her book will be undertaken by the community of pragmatist scholars, which, importantly, has thus far shown little interest in animal studies and its main debates. Surprisingly little, I might add, given pragmatism's roots in Darwin. With *Pets, People, and Pragmatism* and her other publications,[8] McKenna has been trying to increase that interest, and for this she should definitely be thanked.[9]

[8] Including the collection *Animal Pragmatism: Rethinking Human-Nohuman Relations*, which she co-edited with Andrew Light (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004).

[9] I am grateful to David Wall, who read an earlier draft of this review and offered useful comments.

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