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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL *Henrik Rydenfelt* 5

I. SITUATING PRAGMATISM TODAY (PRAGMATISM AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY)

INTRODUCTORY *Emil Višňovský* 7

THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF PRAGMATIST THOUGHT *Sami Pihlström* 10

TELLING TALES OUT OF SCHOOL:
PRAGMATIC REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHICAL STORYTELLING *Vincent Colapietro* 17

SOME SOURCES OF HILARY PUTNAM'S PLURALISM *Russell B. Goodman* 34

WILLIAM JAMES AND JOSIAH ROYCE IN POLISH PHILOSOPHY:
AN UNEASY RECEPTION *Krzysztof (Chris) Piotr Skowroński* 43

JOSIAH ROYCE: CLASSICAL AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER; PRAGMATIST, PHENOMENOLOGIST,
PROCESS THINKER AND ADVOCATE FOR COMMUNITY *Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley* 49

CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCE
Kenneth W. Stikkers 56

JOHN DEWEY'S LEGACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY *Larry A. Hickman* 63

II. PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS. ART, EXPERIENCE, AND PRACTICES OF ART

INTRODUCTORY *Lyubov Bugaeva* 72

HOW TO DO DIFFERENT THINGS WITH WORDS:
WHY DEWEY'S AESTHETICS IS PECULIAR *Roberta Dreon* 74

WHAT IS PRAGMATIC MEDIA PHILOSOPHY? *Mikhail Stepanov* 85

THE EMOTIONAL BODY AND VISUAL EXPERIENCE *Lyubov Bugaeva* 94

ART AND SOUL:
JAMES AND SCHELER ON PRAGMATIC AESTHETICS *Rebecca L. Farinas* 99

GADAMER'S AND SHUSTERMAN'S AESTHETICS *Alexander Kremer* 110

CENTRAL PARK IN THE DARK:
THE AESTHETIC INTERSECTION OF CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE *John Ryder* 115

IN PRAISE OF QUOTIDIAN AESTHETICS *Larry A. Hickman* 122

EDITORIAL

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The present issue of Pragmatism Today collects together papers presented at the First European Pragmatism Conference in Rome, Italy, 19-21 September 2012 (http://www.nordprag.org/epc1.html). The conference was co-organized by the Nordic Pragmatism Network, with funding from NordForsk, and the Italian Associazione Pragma. For the first time, it brought together the various European groups and individuals whose work has concentrated or built on the tradition of philosophical pragmatism. The conference as well as this publication speak to the vitality of pragmatism in contemporary philosophy and its growing importance in Europe.

The articles in this issue are based on presentations in conference panels organized by Lyubov Bugaeva (St. Petersburg State University) and Emil Visnovsky (Comenius University & Slovak Academy of Sciences) - who have also acted as guest editors for this issue - and the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. Rebecca L. Farinas's and Alexander Kremer's articles were subsequently selected for inclusion.

In accordance with the themes of the original conference panels, there are two main topics to the present articles. The first is the place of pragmatism aside various other traditions of philosophy - those of European origin - and pragmatism's reception in terms of the issues in contemporary European thought. The second is pragmatist aesthetics, by and large approached by way of the pragmatist concept of experience.

We would like to thank Lyubov Bugaeva and Emil Visnovsky for their work as guest editors. Alexander Kremer has been in charge of the technical production. In addition, we would like to express our gratitude to the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy for their generous offer which has enabled the production of printed copies of this issue.

I. SITUATING PRAGMATISM TODAY (PRAGMATISM AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY)

INTRODUCTORY:

SITUATING PRAGMATISM TODAY

(PRAGMATISM AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY)

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We have gathered here at this conference to discuss pragmatism (the philosophy of pragmatism). Pragmatism is *our philosophy*, that is philosophy we have found or "discovered", for our purposes; philosophy we acknowledge and consider it right in many ways, though by no means an absolute philosophy (and we think there is no such thing as absolute philosophy which could be right once and for good); philosophy we try to sustain and develop further today in our post-post-modern contexts.

Pragmatism is philosophy we have not created, but which we have inherited from our trans-Atlantic ancestors. Let me say (with Joe Margolis who has recently summarized it nicely in his *Pragmatism's Advantage*[1]) that pragmatism, though American by its origin, "is no longer merely or even distinctly American". Pragmatism in the past decades has become international or even global, finding its proponents almost in every corner of the world. It might be interesting to explore why pragmatism has become attractive today in the countries where the dominant philosophical traditions have been utterly different, let alone to say directly anti-pragmatist, but this is not the place for such an exploration.

However, permit me just to remark, that Western philosophy in its history has been and to some significant dimension still is *Eurocentric* (and European philosophy is conservative), which means that to introduce (let alone to embed) any kind of non-European philosophy into its *milieu*, might sometimes seem as a Sisyphean work. Why? Because we Europeans have our Plato and Aristotle, our Descartes and Kant, Hegel and Marx and all those others, so why should we need somebody else? Why should we learn from others and change our philosophical habits, our paradigms or our styles of philosophizing? Moreover: do Kantians need Hegelians, or *vice versa*, in order to develop their philosophies? Or do Cartesians need Nietzscheans and *vice versa*? Who needs whom in philosophy and what for? Of course, Kantians need Hegelians both need each other in order to criticize each other and thus to demonstrate their own philosophical truth they consider if not an absolute one, then at least the best one of all. Thus what kind of motivation might European philosophers, specifically those educated in dominant continental or analytic traditions, have to look elsewhere for a different kind of philosophical truths or thoughts? What kind of motivation to read pragmatists might have contemporary, say, phenomenologists other than Ryle or Carnap had when appealed to avoid Heidegger, or Searle has when calling for not to read Derrida? Many times it seems that philosophy lives and works as if in some self-enclosed circles, which sometimes might interpenetrate, but primarily defend themselves and argue for their core ideas as if self-sufficient and self-absorbed doctrines. This, to some extent, is understandable, that is to the extent in which they avoid dogmatism, but pragmatism is essentially a *different* philosophy.

Pragmatism, at least as I see it, is an *open* and *transformative* philosophy because it is capable (and even willing) to learn from others. It also does not pretend to be the final philosophical wisdom which would desire to dominate or absorb others. Pragmatism is *pluralistic* and *dialogical* philosophy, as it contends philosophy should be. Pragmatism invites us to unblocked and general "conversation of mankind" (to use Rorty's famous phrase). These are some well-known philosophical virtues of pragmatism (and pragmatists).

[1] See Margolis, J. 2010. *Pragmatism's Advantage.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, xi

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Now, let us move closer to the topic of this panel "Pragmatism in the context of modern philosophy". When I suggested the topic of this panel to the organizers, what I had in mind was mostly the place of pragmatism in the history of modern Western philosophy. This topic includes the questions such as: Is pragmatism a unique (a "new") philosophy, and if, in what sense? What has pragmatism brought to Western modern philosophy that is new (and different); what is not (or would not be) there, were it not for pragmatism? In what sense it is in alliance with or in opposition to traditional modern philosophy? What are the main philosophical ideas/theories pragmatism has contributed to modern philosophy? What is the relation of pragmatism to the key modern thinkers/schools like Cartesianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, Marxism, Freudism, etc.? Is pragmatism itself a type of modern philosophy or rather a postmodern (post-postmodern, trans-modern, anti-modern) philosophy?

But, what does it mean to be "modern" (or post-post-modern) within the context of philosophy? I must confess that when suggesting the topic of this panel, the previously lost and unfinished volume of John Dewey *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy*,[2] which now is available, was unknown to me. When presenting the papers at The 7th CEPF Conference, Turda, Romania, June 3-9, 2012 titled "Modernity and Pragmatism", I said to my colleagues that: "Clearly nobody would object to the suggestion that 'pragmatism is modern philosophy' and one of its constituent parts (and not simply from a temporal perspective); although *the concept of modern philosophy* itself is still predominantly *Eurocentric* (indeed, so is the very concept of philosophy that we have become used to employ until recently)". And I went on to indicate the continuity of pragmatism with "modern philosophy" and its dominant traditions and figures, following recent works of Robert Brandom[3] and Sami Pihlström[4] (who join those who define pragmatism as a synthesis of German idealism and Darwinism), having included in this broad modern tradition both original Cartesianism as well as pragmatist anti-Cartesianism, etc. In fact, the uppermost interpretation of modern philosophy predominant in Europe so far has been that its founding-father was Descartes and its decisive schools have been those already mentioned above (Cartesianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, etc.). But Dewey gives us much broader and deeper interpretation of the history of modern philosophy: according to him, we have never been modern in philosophy up to the rise of pragmatism; because those traditional philosophies traditionally called "modern" have continued in the traditional dualisms (subjective/objective, etc.) established by Ancient and prolonged by Medieval philosophers. Thus, according to Dewey, to be modern is to get rid of those artificial philosophical dualisms, or, in other words, to become a pragmatist (or rather the pragmatist), or something like that in philosophy.

Either way, concerning the place of pragmatism in the history of philosophy, it has been undoubtedly secured, even though there still are interpretations which attempt to avoid or ignore or just diminish it. Sometimes it is only we pragmatists who consider it one of the three current dominant traditions along with continental and analytic, but the proponents of the latter two do not thing the same way.[5]

[2] See Dewey, J. 2012. *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy.* Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois University Press.

[3] See Brandom, R. 2011. *Perspectives on Pragmatism.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

[4] See Pihlström, S., ed. 2011. *The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism.* London and New York: Continuum.

[5] See, the works of the well-known and important Oxford philosophical historian Anthony Kenny (1931-) does not recognise pragmatism in his *A Brief History of Western Philosophy* (1998); neither does Roger Scruton (1944-) in his *A Short History of Modern Philosophy* (1981). While Kenny does at least partially correct this in the fourth volume of his *A New History of Western Philosophy* entitled *Philosophy in the Modern World* (2007) when

To sum up (as, for instance, the authors of the volume *100 Years of Pragmatism*, edited by John Stuhr, 2010, are doing),[6] pragmatism has not changed (reversed) the course of Western modern philosophy so far; it has not accomplished a philosophical revolution in the way it perhaps should and could have done. Pragmatism has been largely contested and also ignored (largely too), and more often misunderstood. But the potential of pragmatism to be developed and to become the philosophy relevant to human life and problems of men and women, is a greatly promising one.[7]

writing about Peirce and James (although not, however, about Dewey), Scruton continues to ignore pragmatism in the second edition of his history book (2002).

[6] See Stuhr, J. 2010. *100 Years of Pragmatism.* Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press.

[7] The text is a part of the research conducted within the grant VEGA SR No 2/0053/12.

THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF PRAGMATIST THOUGHT

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Introduction

This paper revisits the issue of *the unity vs. diversity of pragmatism*. As is well known, this topic was explored almost immediately after pragmatism had been introduced by William James and other classical figures as a new philosophical method and orientation – Arthur Lovejoy's critical analysis "thirteen pragmatisms" is a famous early contribution – and the discussion was intensified again in the 1980s when several scholars of classical pragmatism accused leading neopragmatists of misinterpreting or misrepresenting the pragmatist tradition. For example, it has been argued – in my view compellingly – that Richard Rorty's radically antirepresentationalist conception of pragmatism is based on problematic understanding of what pragmatism originally was or is. However, I will suggest in this paper that it can be argued, applying the pragmatic method itself, that the question concerning unity vs. diversity must itself be examined pragmatically, i.e., in terms of the potential difference it makes in our pragmatist philosophizing.

For antiessentialist pragmatists, there can hardly be any timeless, ahistorical, universal essence of pragmatism (that is, no single fundamental criterion that pragmatist thought must fulfill, distinguishing pragmatism from other philosophical methods or frameworks), but on the other hand pragmatism cannot be defined so widely that "anything goes" within it. The need to find a balance between these implausible extremes – a search for a pragmatically workable "middle ground" in this metaphilosophical issue – will be illuminated by drawing attention to the relation between pragmatism and some other modern philosophical orientations, including Wittgensteinian philosophy in particular. Arguably, there is, then, both unity and diversity in pragmatism; pragmatism is (to employ a Wittgensteinian expression) a family resemblance notion, and pragmatist philosophizing is at its most fruitful, or most pragmatic, when it enters into a constructive dialogue with other methods and strategies of philosophical inquiry.

Four views on the integrity of the pragmatist tradition

Arguably (as I have suggested on a number of earlier occasions, including my introduction to a recent reference work that I edited[1]), one can adopt at least four different, though perhaps overlapping, attitudes to what has been labeled "the pragmatist tradition".

First, some scholars have claimed that only Charles S. Peirce's own philosophical method, first formulated in the 1870s but in 1905 famously re-baptized as "pragmaticism", is a piece of solid philosophy and that all subsequent formulations of pragmatism were, and continue to be, distortions or misunderstandings of Peirce's original views. This, however, is an extremely one-sided and dogmatic view. In serious pragmatism scholarship today, no one can plausibly deny the fact that William James and John Dewey, as well as Josiah Royce, George Herbert Mead, and C.I. Lewis, among others, also produced original philosophical systems, even though they were all indebted to Peirce in many ways and at least some of them probably did to some extent misunderstand or misapply some of Peirce's ideas. Their developments of the *pragmatic method* are a case in point: when James extended Peirce's original principle of making our scientific concepts clear into ethics and religion, he perhaps slightly mischaracterized Peirce's ideas but at the same time quite deliberately changed the meaning of the pragmatic maxim, thereby extending the original scope of pragmatism in order to make the method more relevant in inquiries into ethics and religion, in particular.

Secondly, several philosophers have insisted on the

[1] See Pihlström, S., ed. 2011. *The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism.* London and New York: Continuum.

primacy of Peirce's version of pragmatism while admitting that there are interesting and important non-Peircean developments to be found within the tradition. In contrast to the first group of scholars, for whom there is only one true pragmatism, these philosophers – including, e.g., H.O. Mounce and Nicholas Rescher – maintain that there are essentially "two pragmatisms": Peirce's original *realist* views have gradually been transformed, via James's, Dewey's and others' contributions to the pragmatist tradition, to something completely different, namely, Rorty's *antirealist* and *relativist* neopragmatism (which Rorty himself refused to characterize as "relativist", though) . The "two pragmatisms" picture thereby assumes a strict dichotomy between Peircean pragmatism, on the one hand, and all later, inferior pragmatist systems, on the other.

Thirdly, one may insist on the *continuity* of certain pragmatist themes in all the classics of the movement, especially Peirce, James, and Dewey but also including Royce, F.C.S. Schiller, Mead, and Lewis. These themes include, e.g., philosophical notions such as experience, purposiveness, human interest, continuity, creativity, growth, habit (of action), (non-reductive) naturalism, all of them receiving specifically pragmatist interpretations and elaborations. For example, the concept of experience, as developed by pragmatists, is dynamic and active, hence quite different from, say, the classical British empiricists' static and passive notion of experience. Those adopting this third approach (e.g., Susan Haack, Sandra Rosenthal, and many others) usually insist, however, that neopragmatists like Rorty have seriously distorted original pragmatism. This group finds considerably more unity in the pragmatist tradition than the first two, but still prefers to continue to learn from the classics of the movement instead of developing neopragmatism.

Finally, there is a fourth attitude, adopted (I think) by myself and fortunately many others as well today. The one maintaining this attitude is prepared to admit that even Rorty's neopragmatism is part of the extremely heterogeneous tradition we may call pragmatism. There are both unity and enormous differences among the pragmatists – within this one and the same dynamically developing tradition whose amorphousness is a sign of its philosophical strength and vitality rather than of distortion or corruption. It is, however, compatible with this attitude, emphasizing both the unity and the differences -in-unity of the pragmatist tradition, to attack, say, Rorty's (mis)readings of the classical pragmatists. Internal critique of pragmatism is, crucially, part of pragmatism itself. Moreover, this fourth position acknowledges that pragmatism – as well as, possibly, any other truly living philosophical tradition – is to a great extent constituted by the open question regarding who is to be classified as a thinker belonging to this tradition, and on which criteria. It is, furthermore, well compatible with this flexible attitude to the tradition to encourage "new pragmatisms" (to refer to the title of Cheryl Misak's 2007 collection[2]), contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and other fields that need not have any explicit connection with the historical tradition of pragmatism but that nevertheless develop somewhat similar views and arguments.

When defining pragmatism and distinguishing it from other philosophies one must always carefully consider the *pragmatic purpose* such definitions and distinctions are taken to serve. Are we seeking the final truth about what pragmatism essentially is (or was) in order to be able to tell "true" pragmatists apart from those who distort the tradition? And if so, do we believe that the "true" pragmatism thus distinguished from its actual and possible distortions will help us in solving some particular philosophical (or historical and interpretive) problems? In many cases, there may be good pragmatic reasons for resisting such attempts to establish a pragmatist

[2] Misak, Ch., ed. 2007. *New Pragmatists.* Oxford: Clarendon.

orthodoxy. It may be advisable to leave the exact status of pragmatism open, to look and see what kinds of different philosophies and philosophers (as well as non-philosophers) are discussed under the rubric "pragmatism", and to try to develop context-sensitive philosophical reasons for considering or for refusing to consider some particular line of thought a form of pragmatism. The nature of pragmatism will then be continuously open to debate, and there is no pressing pragmatic need to finally conclude such a debate any time soon.

Pragmatism and other contemporary philosophical approaches

I concluded the *Continuum Companion to Pragmatism*, mentioned in the previous section, with a chapter on the "new directions" of pragmatism today. In that chapter, I included a brief comparison of pragmatism with some other major current philosophical orientations. Let me here recapitulate the main points of that discussion.

First, pragmatism clearly shares with *analytic philosophy* the emphasis on argumentative rigor and conceptual clarity (though relatively few pragmatists are willing to phrase their arguments in formal language). What pragmatism does not share with (at least some parts of) analytic philosophy is the occasional narrow-mindedness of the latter. Contemporary analytic debates in epistemology, metaphysics, or the philosophy of mind are often relatively narrowly focused in the sense that philosophical voices from outside the analytic tradition itself – from, say, pragmatism or phenomenology or Wittgenstein studies – are not taken seriously at all. Pragmatism scholarship, in my view, is at its best when it truly communicates with other traditions, including of course analytic philosophy; against philosophical specialization of various stripes it can demonstrate the fruitfulness of listening to "other voices". As there are no good reasons for analytic philosophers to ignore relevant pragmatist contributions – even though, for instance, Peirce's scholastic realism is, unbelievably, hardly ever discussed in the context of analytic metaphysics, although it offers crucial insights into generality and modality that could transform the entire analytic debate – nor are there any better reasons for pragmatists to be militant anti-analytic philosophers.

Secondly, pragmatism shares with *phenomenology* the attempt to draw attention to (subjective or intersubjective, as well as dynamic and embodied) experience. However, it does not accept some phenomenologists' foundationalist approaches that seek to offer an a priori foundation for the sciences, for instance – nor the related dream of what may be called philosophical presuppositionlessness, the attempt to begin one's inquiries from an absolutely certain standpoint with all "natural" presuppositions, including even the belief in the reality of a natural world, "bracketed". In the interest of opening a genuine dialogue with Husserlian, Heideggerian, and Merleau-Pontyan phenomenologists, the pragmatist may refer to Peirce's own peculiar phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as well as to James's and Dewey's concerns with "pure" or "primary" experience, but the point I am trying to make here is broader. Pragmatism and phenomenology can join forces in reconsidering our philosophical methodologies at a fundamental level. It could even be investigated whether the so-called pragmatic method (the pragmatic maxim) and the phenomenological method (or the phenomenological reduction) could be interpreted not as mutually exclusive or contrasting methodologically choices but as mutually supporting ones, both of which could be employed in philosophical attempts to understand our experience as it emerges within habits of action.

Thirdly, our being-in-the-world – to use Heideggerian terminology – can be seen as a basic problem in pragmatism. This problem, obviously, is something that pragmatism shares with *existentialism* and *hermeneutics*. Together with these in many ways rather different

philosophical orientations, pragmatism emphasizes our self-understanding, as well as our need to take seriously our finitude and mortality as defining our existential situation as well as the resulting turn toward the future, to the ways in which the experienced world opens to us in our inevitably finite horizon. In Sartrean jargon, "man is a project", never completed, and this is something that most pragmatists would be happy to subscribe to – without, however, subscribing to the thesis that human existence is absurd. It is precisely by understanding ourselves as incomplete projects that we may revolt against absurdity.

Fourthly, pragmatism – or at least some currents within Deweyan pragmatism aiming at a viable account of democracy, in particular – are at least as actively political and as seriously investigating the possibility of socio-cultural transformation in contemporary societies as *critical theory* (or the Frankfurt School), despite the latter's key representatives', especially Max Horkheimer's, uncompromising critique of pragmatism as an approach allegedly naively based on instrumental reason. What pragmatism does not share with critical theory is the latter's deep cultural pessimism. Pragmatism looks toward the future and, for example, to the development of modern technology melioristically and hence more open-mindedly, refusing to allow technological determinism and pessimism to overshadow the positive promises inherent in the development of new methods of thinking and acting in the world.

Fifthly, and finally, pragmatism is (as repeatedly argued in some of my previous works[3]), reinterpretable as a form of (Kantian-like though clearly not orthodoxly Kantian) *transcendental philosophy*. In particular, pragmatism emphasizes the kind of *reflexivity* – the self-reflection of human reason and intelligence, as rooted in our practices – that has been a cornerstone of transcendental philosophy since Kant. However, as noted in connection with phenomenology, pragmatism is not at all happy with transcendental philosophers' aim to provide an aprioristic first foundation for philosophy and science. There is, and can be, no "first philosophy"; here the pragmatist attitude is deeply fallibilist. Everything, including the transcendental conditions we may identify as necessary for the possibility of certain given human actualities (e.g., experience or meaning), is revisable and reinterpretable in the course of our ongoing experience and inquiry.

Most of the philosophical traditions or schools here only very briefly compared to pragmatism are unfortunately somewhat narrow-minded and shortsighted when it comes to seeking and maintaining communicative relations outside one's own approach. The same is, admittedly, true about pragmatism. All too often pragmatists just debate among themselves over what pragmatism actually is or who should (or should not) be called a pragmatist. Such debates do play an important role in keeping pragmatism an open tradition, but they may also to some extent hinder the development of dialogues between pragmatism and other orientations. The pragmatic attitude itself would strongly favor encouraging such dialogue.

Insofar as pragmatism – or the pragmatic method – amounts to a philosophical attempt to understand human being-in-the-world reflexively from within the practices in which that being-in-the- world is manifested, it is not primarily, let alone exclusively, a philosophical *theory* about anything more specific than that, although it is highly relevant in a number of theoretical discussions in various areas of philosophy. Pragmatism may not be immediately applicable to philosophical or scientific problems, but then again pragmatists are, or should be, suspicious of the very idea of *applying* philosophical theory to some practical problem. Good philosophy is

[3] See Pihlström, S. 2003. *Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View.* Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books; and Pihlström, S. 2009. *Pragmatist Metaphysics.* London: Continuum.

always already "applied" simply by being humanly relevant. On the other hand, pragmatism is certainly not independent of the surrounding scientific disciplines. Our philosophical attempts to understand ourselves and the world we live in often emerge from the developments of the empirical sciences. In addition to the dialogues between rival philosophical schools, pragmatism should promote *interdisciplinary* dialogues in inquiry, especially across the supposed gulf between the human and the natural sciences.

Taking all of this into account, I cannot think of a better categorization for pragmatism than the one according to which pragmatism is a form of *philosophical anthropology*. Like pragmatism itself, this field of philosophical inquiry virtually extends through philosophy as a whole. Metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and many other issues often classified as belonging to different sub-fields of philosophy are all crucial, and entangled, in philosophical anthropology. The pragmatist is a philosophical anthropologist in the sense of considering all these and other philosophical topics in terms of human practices and habits – of human culture not to be distinguished from nature. Thus, pragmatism may in fact be promising in contemporary philosophy also because it may be able to make philosophical anthropology flourish ag ain as a philosophical program. This is at least one of the potential new directions that pragmatists may look forward to.

Pragmatism and Wittgensteinianism

Let me conclude this paper by a brief discussion of pragmatism and Wittgensteinian philosophy – even though, historically, there is little to be added to the already existing scholarship on the relation between Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy and the pragmatist tradition. Russell Goodman's monograph, *Wittgenstein and William James*[4], tells us most that is worth telling about this issue, at least insofar as we are concerned with Wittgenstein's relation to James. There are, however, a number of (both historical and systematic) issues in contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship that could be fruitfully re-examined from a pragmatist perspective.

For example, in recent Wittgenstein studies, several noted scholars (including James Conant, Cora Diamond, and Rupert Read) have suggested that Wittgenstein's philosophy is completely different from any traditional attempts to philosophize in terms of theses and arguments. Those are to be rejected as little more than remnants of "dogmatic" ways of doing philosophy. Instead of engaging with theses and arguments, philosophy should be therapeutical and deconstructive, helping us get rid of assumptions that lead us to philosophical pseudo-problems in the first place. The so-called "New Wittgensteinians", taking very seriously Wittgenstein's famous encouragement to "drop the ladder" toward the end of the *Tractatus* and his later proposal in the *Philosophical Investigations* to lead philosophical thought to "peace", advance this therapeutic-deconstructive program.

From a pragmatist point of view, we can again perceive a misleadingly dichotomous opposition between implausible extremes at work here. To defend a modestly traditional conception of philosophy as a systematic, argumentative practice employing theses and arguments supporting those theses is not to be a dogmatic believer in any particular philosophical system. As a brief illustration of this, I suggest that, despite his criticism of traditional ways of doing philosophy, Wittgenstein can be seen as employing pragmatic versions of Kantian-styled *transcendental arguments* (e.g., the private language argument) in favor of certain

[4] See Goodman, R. 2002. *Wittgenstein and William James*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

philosophical conceptions (e.g., the view that our language is necessarily public). The private language argument can be regarded as transcendental precisely because the fact that language is public is, as a result of this argument, claimed to be a necessary condition for the very possibility of linguistic meaning. A private language would not be a language at all; as Wittgenstein notes, rules cannot be followed privately. Similarly, it could be argued on the basis of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* that, necessarily, there must be agreement about certain apparently empirical matters ("hinges", e.g., our basic conviction about the earth having existed for a long time and not just for, say, five minutes) in order for meaningful use of language to be possible at all. I am not making any claims about the success of these or any other Wittgensteinian arguments, but it seems to me clear that Wittgenstein can be plausibly read as employing a "pragmatized" transcendental method of examining the necessary practice-embedded conditions for the possibility of something (e.g., meaningful language) whose actuality we take as given.

Analogously, the pragmatists can also be reinterpreted as philosophers presenting and evaluating such transcendental arguments (or, more broadly, transcendental considerations and inquiries), even though neopragmatists like Rorty have tried to depict not only Wittgenstein but also James and Dewey in a deconstructive manner, as some kind of precursors of both Wittgensteinian therapy and Derridean deconstruction (and postmodernism generally). For a pragmatist, there is no reason at all to resort to any unpragmatic dichotomy between transcendental philosophical theory and philosophy as a therapeutically relevant practical activity. Rather, philosophical theorizing itself is, inevitably, a practice-embedded human activity.

A healthy pragmatism should, then, instead of relying on an essentialist dichotomy between post - philosophical therapy and systematic argumentation, insist on the compatibility and deep complementarity of deconstruction and reconstruction. The deconstruction of philosophical problems and ideas should always be followed by a reconstruction. This is in effect what Dewey argued in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920); as Hilary Putnam later put it in *Renewing Philosophy*, "deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility".[5] The crude dichotomy between therapeutic and systematic philosophy is completely unpragmatic, as it assumes an essentialistic conception of *the* proper way of doing philosophy, without letting the richness of different philosophical aims, methods, and conceptions flourish. It thinks before looking, to use a Wittgensteinian phrase; or, to adopt a Peircean expression, it blocks the road of inquiry. Our philosophical inquiries often need both deconstruction and reconstruction; therefore, to one-sidedly restrict proper philosophizing to only one of these impedes philosophical understanding.

There are many other debates in Wittgenstein scholarship to which a pragmatist perspective would offer insightful (but often neglected) perspectives. For instance, three key issues of Wittgenstein studies provide particularly useful insights into the ways in which Wittgenstein, or the contemporary "Wittgensteinian" philosopher, could be regarded as a pragmatist: the distinction – invoked in recent discussions of *On Certainty*, in particular – between *the propositional and the non-propositional*; the related tension between anti-Cartesian *fallibilism* and what has been called (by Stanley Cavell) *the "truth in skepticism"* in Wittgenstein; as well as the relation between *metaphysics and the criticism of metaphysics* in Wittgenstein's philosophy, and Wittgensteinian philosophy more generally. I believe it can be plausibly argued that dichotomous readings of Wittgenstein in terms of these three philosophical (or metaphilosophical) oppositions lead to unpragmatist and

[5] Putnam, H. 1992. *Renewing Philosophy*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 133.

even un-Wittgensteinian positions, just as the dichotomy between theoretical (constructive) and therapeutic (deconstructive) does. Space does not allow me to develop these thoughts here, though.

Conclusion

To be a pragmatist, or (analogously) to be a Wittgensteinian thinker, today is to be continuously reflexively – transcendentally, as we may say – concerned with one's own philosophical perspectives and approaches, not only with their intellectual but more broadly with their ethical integrity. It is to turn one's self-critical gaze toward one's own practices of philosophizing, one's own being-in-the-world, one's own habits of action, intellectual as well as more concretely practical. In James's terms, it is to take full responsibility of one's individual "philosophical temperament" and to self-critically develop it further, through one's contextualizing inquiries, hopefully learning to listen to the richness of the human "voices" speaking to us from within the indefinite plurality of language-games that our fellow human beings play with each other and with us. Among these language-games are the contributions of earlier and contemporary thinkers to the pragmatist tradition. To let that tradition flourish, we must not artificially restrict it. However, I have tried to suggest here that this permissive and flexible attitude to the integrity of pragmatism need not, and must not, give up critical and normative (meta)philosophical reflection on proper ways of philosophizing.

TELLING TALES OUT OF SCHOOL:

PRAGMATIC REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHICAL STORYTELLING

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1.

It is perhaps pertinent to begin by pointing out the obvious. By *modern philosophy*, we unreflectively mean modern *European* philosophy and, moreover, by *pragmatism* we mean a philosophical movement originating in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. The modern period of European philosophy stretches from Francis Bacon (1561) and René Descartes (1596-1650) to some indeterminate or (at least) contested point, perhaps in the nineteenth century (or even before) *or* in the future. Whether the project launched by Bacon and Descartes is an ongoing (cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity: An Unfinished Project") or rather an exhausted affair is, to some extent, still an open question. This makes a difference for our topic, since situating pragmatism in the context of modernity might mean *either* seeing it as primarily carrying forward the impetus of modern European philosophers *or breaking decisively* with the dominant ethos of European thought during the modern epoch. Just as Bacon and Descartes carried forward far from of the scholastic tradition than either realized, Peirce and James might also have carried forward more of the modern ethos than either appreciated. Even so, Bacon and Descartes instituted a break with medieval thought (at least, we have tended to accredit their self-understanding in this regard), just as Peirce and James (along with a host of others) inaugurated a truly novel approach to philosophical inquiry.[1] However dramatic the rupture in both cases, there is of course *continuity* with the past. So, one question is whether we devote ourselves to tracing the threads of continuity or we try to ascertain wherein the American pragmatists definitively broke with the dominant traditions of European philosophy. Of course, we can, in principle, do both. But, in practice, we tend to be *either* historical *synechists*, interpreters of the histories in which we are caught up who are devoted to tracing the threads of continuity, or rupture theorists. I imagine that there might be cultural and even nationalistic biases operative here, with Europeans disposed to see American pragmatism as continuous with European thought and Americans inclined to think the pragmatic movement marks a decisive break. Hence, situating pragmatism in the context of modern philosophy is itself a philosophical, not merely historiographical, task; for it requires us to interpret our own histories in terms of their philosophical vitality and, in turn, this requires us to assess that philosophical vitality in terms of their putative power to advance philosophical inquiry. Put more simply, historical importance is bound up with contemporary concerns.

Far from being innocent or uncontroversial, *American pragmatism* and *modern thought* are (to use W. B. Gallie's expression) essentially contested concepts. In addition, the relationship between the two is an essentially contested matter.[2] This means that there is

[1] It is worthwhile to note, if only in passing, that Descartes tends to eclipse Bacon, so he is often identified as *the* father of modern philosophy. It is also worthwhile to recall Richard J. Bernstein's comment on the Cartesian origin of modern philosophy. In *Praxis and Action* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), he wittily observes: "Descartes is frequently recalled the father of modern philosophy. If we are to judge by philosophy in the last hundred years, this title can best be understood in the Freudian sense. It is a common characteristic of many contemporary philosophers that the have sought to overthrow or dethrone the father" (5).

[2] See Gallie, W. B. 1964. "Essentially Contested Concepts", in *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding.* (London: Chatto and Windus). Gallie wrote an early and still instructive book on C. S. Peirce. The reception of Peirce in Great Britain owes much to Gallie's efforts to interpret Peirce to an audience prejudiced against according the originator of pragmatism his due. If I recall correctly, Christopher Hookway, one of Peirce's leading contemporary expositors, came to that elusive genius through Gallie. A philosophical tradition is, at bottom, an ongoing series of

no possibility of decisively answering the question of the relationship between American pragmatism and modern (European) thought. I and indeed Gallie would be misunderstood, however, if that were taken to mean that it is useless to debate the question. We *can*, by debating this question, come to a fuller, richer, deeper understanding of the relationship between the pragmatic movement and modern thought. And we can do so by attending painstakingly to the details of history (cf. Gallie, *ibid*.). Even though there is, in such cases, no incontestable truth, there can be fruitful debates.

Let me return to the obvious. We tend to use the expression *American philosophy* in a manner analogous to *modern philosophy* and to use this expression especially so in reference to the pragmatic movement. Indeed, pragmatism is often characterized as a distinctively American tradition. Sometimes this is done for the purpose of disparaging pragmatism, sometimes for the purpose of exalting pragmatism. The unmarked signifier needs to be marked as such. So, it is worthwhile to note that American philosophy means *North* American philosophy (cf. Scott Pratt). Finally, any attempt to situate pragmatism in the *context of modern philosophy*, understood exclusively in terms of modern European philosophy, is likely to begin – and, not infrequently, to end – with a consideration of pragmatism in reference to *German* thinkers who are imagined to be especially relevant to the task of understanding Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, and other figures in this tradition. More than any other figure, this tends to privilege the importance of Kant and his progeny (however remotely scattered and effectively disguised) vis-à-vis our understanding of pragmatism. This tendency is, at once, certainly understandable, partly justifiable, but ultimately unfortunate. For we miss the depth and significance of pragmatism if we interpret this orientation as primarily a transformation of Kant's project.[3] As important as the continuity between Peirce and Kant is (and, in my judgment, it *is* important, truly important), the philosophical revolution inaugurated by Charles Peirce marks a radical rupture with European modern. Or so the story goes, at least as I am inclined to unfold it.

On this occasion, however, I am more interested in reflecting upon our habits of storytelling than in unfolding any specific story.[4] Even so, I might be accused of smuggling one or more stories onboard the ship U.S.S. Meta-Story. The charge would not be entirely unjust. But, in truth, I am not smuggling any story onboard; I am brazenly carrying onto the ship goods I have not purchased. Simply to render, for example, plausible my story or account of Kant's relationship to pragmatism, I would have to go into far more detail than I can, given what else I want to say. Like the cook on the U.S.S. Meta-Story, I have other fish to fry.

personal encounters in which genuine mediation occurs. Moreover, a sign is anything that puts another thing in touch with yet another thing (cf. Peirce). In the life of any tradition, persons often function as signs ("sign is," as Peirce astutely observes in a letter to Victoria Lady Welby, dated. October 12 1904,"something by knowing which we know something more"; also, "the essential function of a sign is to render inefficient relations efficient"). Finally, Gallie is an important philosopher in his own right. In addition to "Essentially Contested Concepts," it is especially pertinent to recall that he is the author of "The Idea of Practice" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, volume 68, 1967-68, 63-83. While in *Peirce* and other writings, Gallie proves himself to be an insightful expositor of Peirce, in "The Idea of Practice" he puts Peirce to work in helping him deepen our understanding of practice. Regarding the importance of the concept of tradition for understanding the history of philosophy, see Randall, Jr., J. H. 1963. *How Philosophy Uses Its Past.* New York: Columbia University Press; also Smith, J. E. 1992. *America's Philosophical Vision.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. "The history of a tradition … is," as Smith notes, "an indispensable resource for philosophical understanding" (*ibid.*, 86).

[3] See, however, Christensen, C. B. 1994. "Peirce's Transformation of Kant," *The Review of Metaphysics*, volume 48, issue 1, 91-120.

[4] Though my focus is on meta-narrative, I will indulge here and there in storytelling. My story about storytelling invites me to pick up narrative fragments (e.g., James's meeting in Rome of Papini and other Italian thinkers) at opportune moments.

This brings me to my main point. What James says *in* his *Pragmatism* is something I on this occasion would like to say *about* the movement so closely linked to his name. "The world is," he insists, "full of partial stories that [for the most part] run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds".[5] This text is to be found in the chapter devoted to "The One and the Many," not at all an insignificant fact. Our cultural worlds are, indeed, largely constituted by partial stories, intersecting in complex ways. In their intersections, these narratives in some respects can mutually support one another, but even more often they dramatically clash. The complexity of the relationships between (or among) these stories has no limit. In dramatically clashing, for example, stories can be mutually supportive: they need the rival narrative for their own narrative coherence or, at least, dramatic power. My interest is not so much in charting a path through a labyrinth of complexity as it is making us more conscious of our habits of storytelling, our modes of narration. The largely unreflective modes of narrative understanding so integral to our various forms of identity – our philosophical no less than our national identity, our cultural no less than our cosmopolitan identity – [these *unreflective* modes of narration] need to be seen for what they are: a more or less integrated cluster of *unconscious* habits of human storytelling. The plurality of perspectives from which events are narrated is even more worthy of acknowledgment than the plurality of narratives themselves. Just as there are *many* ways of construing the problem of the one and the many, there are various ways of narrating the story of pragmatism, precisely in the context of modern European philosophy.

The American angle of vision (cf. John J. McDermott) is one from which the various stories told involve a philosophical declaration of independence. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,[6] judged Ralph Waldo Emerson's "The American Scholar" to be our *intellectual* declaration of independence. Of course, he meant our independence from Europe. With Queen Gertrude in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, however, many (especially Europeans) might be disposed to interject, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."[7] The more loudly Americans declare their intellectual independence, the less likely their declaration sounds convincing. Indeed, the very need to issue such a declaration at this point renders its truth suspect. But this cannot be the end of the story. Geographically and politically, the United States is independent. But culturally and intellectually matters are far less straightforward. Our debt to Europe is so deep and vast that it cannot be calculated. We speak a variety of languages, most of them having their origin here. And this linguistic inheritance is only a single instance of a multitudinous bequest from our European forbearers.[8] In order to gain a perspective on our relationship to Europe (here and throughout this paper I am speaking *as an American*),[9] it is instructive to call upon observation made by someone who is neither from a European nation nor the United States. In The Mexican writer Octavio Paz[10] suggests[11]: "The question that

[5] James, W. 1907. *Pragmatism*. New York: Longmans, 71.

[6] It is relevant to recall that Holmes was a "member of the Metaphysical Club. See Fisch, M. H. 1986. "Pragmatism Before and After 1898". In: *Peirce, Semiotic, and Pragmatism.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986; also Menand, L. 1992. *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

[7] Please recall that she says this in response to her son Hamlet's question regarding a play he has arranged to stage for his mother and her new husband ("Madam, how like you this play?"). While this is a question about the play within the play (that is, one story enfolded in another), my invocation of Gertrude's interjection is intended to call into question my story *about* a story.

[8] Of course, "we" also have indigenous, Asian, Arab, and other forbearers, but one cannot say everything in the same breath.

[9] In addressing the question of how to look at pragmatism in the context of modern European philosophy, I find it necessary to step back and consider broader cultural issues. There are a number of reasons for this, not least of all

[10] Kraus, E. 2011. *Redeemers: Ideas and Power in Latin*

occupies [Edmundo] O'Gorman[12] is how to define the historical entity we call America.[13] It is not a geographical region, and it is not a past; perhaps it is not even a present. It is an idea, an invention of the European spirit. America is a utopia, a moment in which the European spirit becomes universal by freeing itself of its historical particulars and of conceiving itself as a universal idea. … O'Gorman is correct when he sees our continent as an actualization of the European spirit, but what happens when to America as an autonomous historical entity when it confronts the realities of Europe?[14] He shortly thereafter adds[15]: "until recently America was Europe's monologue, one of the historical forms in which its thought was embodied. Lately, however, this monologue has become a dialogue, one that is not purely intellectual but is also social and political" (*ibid*.). There is much that is one-sided in this account, not least of all that America was, at one point, Europe's monologue. Would it not be more accurate to say that America is, among countless other things, Europe divided against itself and divided against itself in such a way that what is in no small measure other than itself (other than European) can insinuate itself in the flux of history?

Hegel is certainly perceptive when he notes that: "But the man who flees is not yet free: in fleeing he is still conditioned by that from which he flees".[16] America's flight from Europe is, no doubt, in no small part Europe's flight from itself, indeed, the flight of some humans (European and otherwise) from other humans. Especially for those descended from individuals who have been brought here as captives, it is, moreover, a place *from* which many feel compelled to flee (see, e.g., James Baldwin; also Richard Wright). America is a deeply and possibly irreparably self-divided place and culture, in part because Europe is such a place. An American cannot but declare intellectual independence but in that very act cannot but appear to be more like a rebellious adolescent than a mature person who has truly attained intellectual autonomy. But even the suspect stories of rebellious adolescents can hold their own fascinating. Beyond this, they can provide insights, if only into the psyche of that adolescent. For these and other reasons, then, I will retell one such story.

America. New York: HarperCollins, translated by Hank Heifetz and Natasha Wimmer, Chapter 5 ("Octavio Paz: The Poet and the Revolution"). Paz's 1990 Nobel Lecture, *In Search of the Present* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), is relevant to the topic of my paper. "The search for the present," Paz writes, "is not the pursuit of an earthly paradise or of a timeless eternity; it is the search for reality" (*ibid.*, 16). "What is modernity? It is, first of all, an ambiguous term: there are as many types of modernity as there are types of society. Each society has its own. The word's meaning is as uncertain and arbitrary as the name of the period that precedes it, the Middle Ages. If we are modern when compared to medieval times, are we perhaps the Middle Ages of a future modernity? Is a name that changes with time a real name? Modernity is a word in search of its meaning. Is it an idea, a mirage or a moment of history? Are we the children of modernity or are we its creators? Nobody knows for sure. Nor does it matter much: we follow it, we pursue it. For me at that time modernity was fused the present or, rather, produced it: the present was modernity's final and supreme flower" (*ibid.*, 17-18). When Paz refers to "that time," he means when he wanted so urgently to belong to his time and his century, confessing: "Later, this desire became an obsession: I wanted to be a modern poet. My search for modernity had begun" (*ibid.*, 17).

[11] Paz, O. 1985. *The Labyrinth of Solitude.* New York: Grove Press, translated by Lysander Kemp, 170.

[12] As his name suggests, Edmundo O'Gorman was an Irish-Mexican.

[13] There is obviously slippage here, from America in the sense of the United States to America in a more inclusive and proper sense. But what Paz says about "America" in this context applies *mutatis mutandis*, to the United States.

[14] Paz goes on to assert that: "This question seems to be Leopoldo Zea's essential concern. As a historian of Spanish-American thought, and as an independent critic even when discussing everyday politics, Zea declares that until recently America was Europe's monologue..." (*ibid.,* 170).

[15] It is not obvious whether Paz is here speaking in his own voice or simply offering an account of Zea's position. My sense is that he is, perhaps qualifiedly, endorsing Zea's position.

[16] Hegel, G. W. F. 1830/1975. *Logic. Being Part 1 of the Encylopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by William Wallace. New York: Oxford University Press, 138.

While the United States in the eighteenth secured its political independence from Great Britain, in the nineteenth it won its intellectual independence from its European inheritance inclusively understood. One of the wayward children of the European Enlightenment had supposed learned for itself, as a culture, the lesson of the Enlightenment, as taught by Immanuel Kant. With Emerson, an upstart nation had in effect responded to the Enlightenment challenge and actually dared to think for itself. Quite simply, it exhibited the *courage* to speak and write, to assert and argue, in its own name – that is, in the name of its own experience. The terms in which the disclosures of this experience were to be articulated [those terms] were henceforth to be drawn primarily from that experience itself. That is, they were *not* culturally inherited terms (at least not principally such terms), but rather experientially derived ones. Accordingly, the philosophical task cannot but be at the same time a poetic task (cf. William James, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results"; also Richard Poirier, *Poetry and Pragmatism*), for this task encompasses of the crafting of a language not yet in our possession. This must be not only a language true to our experience but also one drawn deeply from that experience itself. Simply to be in the position to undertake this task presupposes, of course, an inheritance (cf. Stanley Cavell). But the *creative* appropriation of a cultural inheritance cannot but be, at least in this context, a dramatic transfiguration of that cultural endowment. Moreover, nothing less than creative appropriation is requisite for the historically situated undertaking of coming to terms with one's own experience. If I try to come to terms with my own experience by means of terms drawn exclusively or primarily from others, I have almost certainly betrayed my experience. Finally, the motives animating my endeavor need, time and again, to be explicitly acknowledged and conscientiously examined (cf. Peirce). In particular, we need to be attentive to how our desires to secure power, privilege, and prestige tend to usurp the effective sway of more admirable motives. It may be the case (as James so eloquently suggested) that "[t]he ceaseless whisper of the more permanent ideals, the steady tug of truth and justice, give them but time, must warp the world in their direction" ("The Social Value of the College-Bred"), but it all more often *is* the case that the deafening shouts of the more brutal forces in human history define the world in the image of their own brutality. In reference to pragmatism, however, respectability rather than brutality is likely to be a source of corruption. Indeed, the bid for respectability – in all too many instances, for the left over crumbs of disciplinary acknowledgment – tends to corrupt pragmatism today. From a Jamesian perspective at least, being an insider renders pragmatism suspect. One of the characters in *The Glass Menagerie*, the play by Tennessee Williams, suggests that when the unicorn loses its horn it becomes an ordinary horse. It is worthwhile to tarry here a moment. Allow me to recall the most salient details of this contemporary drama.

We are of course in a double bind. To fail to secure a place for ourselves, by renouncing the feast itself, is to condemn pragmatism to be on the outside looking in (without anything to eat and to be eaten by resentment). To fight tooth and nail to win such a place, however, will almost certainly mean that we adapt our manners to those already at the table, rather than gathering at our own house, with its own culinary and social practices. This is a double bind and how we can most wisely respond to this bind is a delicate matter of ongoing renegotiations. What I most want to urge is that the disciplinary success of pragmatism carries the largely unseen danger of betrayal. That is, our bids for respectability have to some extent been successful (witness this conference, yet in turn our successes carry the danger of our own undoing, as pragmatists. There is even, at least, a hint of betrayal in the subtitle of James's own *Pragmatism – A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking*. Given the vagaries of the word, we might say rather that it is an unfortunate name for new ways of thinking. In any event, the quality of our thought is

revealed first and foremost in the quality of our questions, so much so that thinking is itself as much a process of interrogation, including self-interrogation, as anything else. Pragmatism is not so much a novel resource for addressing traditional questions (a new way of answering old questions) as it is a surprisingly untapped reserve for posing truly novel questions. The quality of our questions is to no slight degree a function of their novelty. More than any other contemporary thinker, Michel Foucault embodies the pragmatic sensibility, for he possessed an uncanny ability to ask the unasked questions (those questions we so embarrassingly failed to feel the urge to ask until he with an eloquence comparable to James's own and a doggedness equal to Dewey's helped us to discern their salience). Doing the done thing, in a traditional manner, is hardly evidence of having absorbed the defining lesson of the pragmatic movement. It is indeed rather clear evidence of the unchecked inertia of unreflective habits. Doing something new, in a manner which avoids returning us too quickly and completely to traditional modes of inquiry or inherited forms of narration, would seem far better evidence for having *practically* taken the pragmatic turn.

Cheap bids for independence are as dangerous as debasing bids for respectability. So, let us turn back to the Emersonian theme of intellectual independence and consider this danger in reference to this thinker. Ironically, the opening paragraph of Kant's "What Is Enlightenment?" was in effect rewritten by Emerson, time and again, but nowhere more memorably than in "Self-Reliance": "There is a time in every man's education [i.e., in every person's intellectual development] when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that *imitation is suicide*; that he must take himself for better or worse as his portion; and though the whole universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given him to till".[17] In the arresting figure of this Concord sage, the United States won intellectual maturity by asserting its intellectual independence. Or so the story goes.

The bias of modernity against the classical period (the ancient no less than the medieval epoch) is built into the title of this session. European philosophy might have been expansively conceived to include at least the medieval period. In my judgment, Peirce, precisely as a pragmatist, is *far* more of an Aristotelian than a Kantian, far more a Scotist than even a Hegelian. Max H. Fisch, whose work on Vico is arguably as important as his contributions to our understanding of Peirce and, more generally, pragmatism, would have endorsed at least the first of these claims (the claim that Peirce I more Aristotelian than Kantian).

To be even more polemical, the bias of Europe against American philosophy, both as *American* philosophy and American *philosophy* (cf. Hitler; also Heidegger), might be detected in the title of this session There is certainly no necessity to do so; indeed, given the individuals involved in the organization of this session, there is almost every reason to resist such an ungenerous interpretation. Quite apart from conscious intentions, however, there are unwitting effects. The ironies of history are bound up with the effects of our actions mocking our intentions. So, I want to consider one possible effect of the present arrangement (*despite* the admirable intentions of admirable individuals). I am all too mindful that in doing so I run the risk of offending my hosts, both proximate ones (those most directly involved in the organization of "Pragmatism in the Context of Modern Philosophy") and virtually all of the Europeans involved in this gathering. Yet, I am equally wary of a pitfall here – the philosophical re-colonization of American philosophy.

[17] Emerson, R. W. 1982. *Selected Essays*, edited by Larzer Ziff. New York: Penguin Books, 176; emphasis added.

The *logical* point needs certainly to be stressed. It is logically impossible to appreciate the novelty or uniqueness of pragmatism except in reference to both the historical context from which it sprang and the contested field in which it has forged a distinctive identity vis-à-vis rival positions. But the *political* point should not be overlooked, especially among friends (Is not part of the definition of friendship that we can dispense with too exacting norms of politeness and too finely calibrated an attunement to possibilities of being offensive?).

It is imperative to return, time and again, to a critical consideration of the pragmatic movement in reference to the historical contexts indispensable for understanding, also appreciating, the uniqueness of this movement. First and foremost, this means the immediate context of American culture in its broader sweep, but inseparably the still broader context of European culture, including of course modern European philosophy. It is, however, permissible (at least, I hope it is permissible!) to interrogate the limitations and dangers of situating the pragmatic movement in the context of European thought, especially when *in practice* this means elevating Kant to the status of patriarch. This status is implicit in the very title of Murray G. Murphey's still influential essay (even if it is unknown to younger thinkers, their thinking has been shaped by those who have been directly influenced by this account of pragmatism). That title is "Kant's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists".[18] Regarding this essay, I want above all else to make two points. *First*, one can glimpse he distance between the historiographical bias of the time when he wrote this essay and that of our own time. The essay opens by helping to make this patent[19]: "One of the difficulties which besets the historian of American philosophy is the apparent discontinuity [Why merely *apparent*?] of the subject, and nowhere is this continuity more evident than with respect to pragmatism" (*ibid.*, 3).[20] Murphey takes as his task dispelling this apparent discontinuity by showing in detail the previously overlooked continuity between American thought (at least, the philosophical writings of the Cambridge pragmatists) and European philosophy. As important as it is to discern such continuity, many of us today have been taught by Michel Foucault[21] and other contemporary theorists to be suspicious of historical accounts in which an unbroken chain of intellectual development is the dominant note. Second, it is important to recall the substance of Murphey's story. A distillation of this is contained in this passage: "… the pragmatists drew heavily upon the heritage of Scotch realism and idealism which had served the purpose before Darwin. But, while a Berkeley-type idealism had sufficed for Johnson and [Jonathan] Edwards, it was Kant who as the dominant influence upon the pragmatists. Indeed, Cambridge pragmatism was, and is, more indebted to Kant than to any other single philosopher. Other pragmatists, such as Dewey, came this position not through but through Hegel, and so represent a

[18] Murphey, M. G. 1968. "Kant's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists". *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, volume 4, number 1, 3-33.

[19] Of course the distance is not discernible or discoverable except in reference to contemporary historiography. But the very formulation of Murphey's concern cannot but be somewhat jarring to contemporary ears and that experience itself is indicative of the distance between the bias present at that time (1968) and that operative in our own. I am using bias here in mostly a neutral sense.

[20] John William Miller suggests: "The besetting fallacy of history is anachronism, the descript of the past in terms of an abstract present. History writing that is not a imaginative reconstruction of a past *on its own terms*, indeed the very discovery of such terms, leaves the past a mystery or else reduces it to the ahistoricity of scientific nature, to psychological atomism or theological incomprehension" (*The Philosophy of History.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1981, 186-87; emphasis added). Miller is especially instructive for illuminating the complex interplay between continuity and rupture in both historical events themselves and responsible narrations of those events.

[21] See especially Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, edited by Donald F. Bouchard and translated by Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977.

somewhat different phase of the movement than the one discussed here. But the work of the Cambridge pragmatists has an internal coherence of its own which justifies isolating it for special consideration" (*ibid.*, 8-9).

If these thinkers are Kant's children, then that obviously accords him the status of father. My own sense, however, is that it practically accords him the status of nothing less than a *patriarch*, since he is, by the good graces of these *dutiful* (!) interpreters, allowed to dictate the terms in which the position(s) of the pragmatists are explained and evaluated. In his Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the APA ("Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism"), given just over a decade after the publication of Murphey's essay, Richard Rorty told a dramatically different story, one wherein Peirce alone figured as the child of Kant: "His contribution to pragmatism was merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated James. Peirce himself remained the most Kantian of thinkers – the most convinced that philosophy gave an all-embracing ahistorical context in which every other species of discourse could be assigned its proper place and rank. It was just this Kantian assumption that there was such a context, and that epistemology or semantics [or the theory of signs] could discover it, against which James and Dewey reacted".[22] If Peirce truly remained such a Kantian, then he ought to be both discounted as a pragmatist and (more generally) disparaged as a philosopher. But he was different and other than this. While Rorty is right about the criterion, he is wrong about its applicability to Peirce. One needs to save Peirce as much from his Kantian friends as his Rortyian enemies.

2.

No philosophical movement – better, no *intellectual* movement – has done more to bring the modern epoch to a decisive close than American pragmatism, though the qualifier *American* was shortly after 1898 already misleading (see especially Fisch). In fact, I am disposed to say that, in this respect, pragmatism *surpasses* all other movements. This is not intended as American Salesmanship though it must sound as such in many of your ears! Just as jazz is more alive in Europe and Asia than in the US, arguably pragmatism is more alive here than in my own country. Whatever the contemporary sites of its irrepressible vitality, nothing at the time of its origin was quite comparable to the impetus traceable to Peirce's founding essays and James's later reaffirmation of these brilliant insights ("Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" [1898]; see Fisch, "Pragmatism Before and After 1898"). When William James wrote to his brother Henry that the pragmatic movement was something comparable to the Protestant Reformation,[23] we should not take this as hyperbole. The efforts at philosophical reconstruction launched by Peirce, James, and Dewey were as far-reaching and deep-cutting as those demands for religious reform made by Luther, Calvin, and Wesley. Just as the latter carried reverberations far beyond institutional religion, so the former exerted influence far beyond academic philosophy. Indeed, the pragmatic movement is a cultural phenomenon of a complex character, the significance of which we are still struggling to ascertain, the depths of which we have not yet sounded. It was almost from the outset an international movement, at least a European one.

[22] Rorty, R. 1982. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 161.

[23] "I shouldn't be surprised," wrote William to Henry, "if ten years hence it should not be rated as 'epoch-making,' for the definitive triumph of that general way of thinking I can entertain no doubt whatever – I believe it to be something quite like the protestant reformation" (Perry, R. B. 1935. *The Thought and Character of William James*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, volume II, 453). As Perry stresses, James took the success of pragmatism, like humanism, to be due to "its historic timeliness": it was, in James's own words, "like one of those secular changes that come upon public opinion overnight as it were, borne upon tides 'too deep for sound or foam'" (The Meaning of Truth).

The Scottish psychology Alexander Bain was acknowledged by Peirce as "the grandfather of pragmatism" (The Essential Peirce, volume 2, 399).[24] Early in the history of the *Transactions* (hence, early in that of the Charles S. Peirce Society itself), Murray Murphey published a characteristically essay entitled "Kant's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists" (1968). But it is also fundamentally misleading. For the Cambridge pragmatists are more accurately seen as *Darwin's children*. They conceived themselves as much in reference to scientists as philosophers (indeed, they – especially Peirce – tended to conceive themselves as scientists engaged in the task of drawing out the cultural implications of their own scientific practices). While this is most evident in the case of Dewey, it is no less true in that of either Peirce or James. The philosophical revolution known as American pragmatist owes as much to the Darwinian account of biological evolution as it owes to any strictly philosophical antecedent.

In any event, no intellectual movement at that critical moment in Western history (I am referring to the second half of the nineteenth century) took the Darwinian revolution with greater *seriousness* than the early pragmatists.[25] Part of the significance of pragmatism is precisely its response to Darwin, the *seriousness* with which it took the publication of *Origin of Species* (1859). The word is actually James's own: in notes for one of his courses, we encounter this directive to himself, "Take evolution *au grand serieux*".[26] When he was writing the *Principles of Psychology* (1890), he revealed (once again) to his brother Henry, "I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts". No facts were, especially for minds, however plastic, shaped in no small measure before 1859 (as were the minds of Peirce and James), irreducible and stubborn than those brought to the attention of the philosophers by Darwin.

In "Design and Chance" (1883-1884), Peirce reveals that "Darwin's view is nearer mine" than that of Epicurus. He immediately adds: "Indeed, my opinion is only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, and brought into the realm of Ontology".[27] Andrew Reynolds goes so far as to suggest that "Peirce wished to *Darwinize* physics – to biologize it, to challenge the dogma of ther fixity of [even] atomic and molecular 'species'" or structures (*Peirce's Scientific Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Chance, Law, and Evolution*, 95).[28] In a sharp rebuke of Herbert Spencer's indefatigable efforts to conjoin mechanistic determinism and evolutionary theory, Peirce insists: "Now philosophy requires thorough-going

[24] As a member of the Metaphysical Club, the lawyer Nicholas St. John Green "often urged the important of applying Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a man is prepared to act.' From this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him [Bain] as the grandfather of pragmatism" (Cf. *Essential Peirce*. Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, volume 2, 399).

[25] Though Murray in "Kant's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists" (1968) highlights the importance of Darwin for an understanding of pragmatism, he tends to interpret this movement in a narrowly philosophical way. Hence, Kant rather than Darwin is seen by Murray as the pivotal figure in the historical origination of Cambridge pragmatism. Just as Fisch in "Pragmatism Before and After 1898" told the story of this movement in reference to James's lecture at the University of California at Berkeley ("Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results"), I am inclined to tell the story of philosophy itself in reference to 1859, the year in which Darwin belatedly brought his theories forth.

[26] Cf. Perry, R. B. 1935. *The Thought and Character of William James*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935, volume II, 444.

[27] *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, volume 4, 552. In his review of volumes I-VI of *The Collected Papers*, published originally in *The New Republic* (3 February 1937), John Dewey noted: "Peirce lived when the idea of evolution was uppermost in the mind of his generation. He applied it everywhere. But to him it meant, whether in the universe of nature, of science or of society, continual growth in trhe direction of interrelations, of what he called continuity." *The Later Works of John Dewey.* Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991, volume 11, 482-83. Dewey's suggestion about the relationship between Peirce's evolutionism and synechism is perceptive and illuminating.

[28] There are, however, various texts in which Peirce expresses his deep reservations about the Darwinian account. In MS 318, he even calls Darwin's theory "incredible."

evolutionism or none".[29] While Peirce was to some extent a half-hearted Darwinian (again see Wiener), he was unquestionably a thoroughgoing evolutionist.

In one of his notebooks, Darwin wrote:"To study Metaphysics, as they [sic.] have always been studied[,] appears to me like puzzling at astronomy without mechanics. – Experience shows the problem of mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself. – the mind is function of [the] body. – we must bring some *stable* foundation to argue from".[30] This stable foundation is nothing other than an evolutionary approach to the human animal. The most advantageous course is not to attack the citadel of the mind itself, but to study the *somatic* agency of human beings intricately caught up in the ongoing processes of their ambience and, indeed, their own lives.

There is arguably a disciplinary blindness exhibited by professional philosophers to the radical novelty of an intellectual revolution such as that inaugurated by the American pragmatists. Without intending to disparage such philosophers, their tendency to narrate the history of their disciplinary exclusively in terms of philosophers both distorts that history and impoverishes their practice.

What is especially ironic, there has been a marked tendency to interpret pragmatism in terms drawn extensively (sometimes exclusively) from the very traditions the pragmatists were committed to superseding – one might say *deconstructing* (cf. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*).[31] This is nowhere more evident than in reference to Kant. Despite its vogue, especially among Europeans, *transcendental pragmatism* is an oxymoronic expression. In his succinct critique of a magisterial formulation of this impossible position, Klaus Oehler shows just why and where Jürgen Habermas is mistaken in portraying Charles Peirce as a transcendental pragmatist.[32] The implications of this critique extend far beyond Habermas; they reach to this manner of interpreting pragmatism, not just Peirce.

So, once again, I want to insist that the pragmatist approach is not a variant of Kant's transcendental approach, simply with *a prioi* conditions being replaced by natural and historical ones. In this instance, this is an exceedingly limited and imperceptively limiting mode of interpretation. The pragmatists (save Lewis at certain points in his intellectual development) simply were not Kantians; they were – pragmatists. The insistence upon interpreting them as children of Kant, as though this is an *especially* effective way of illuminating their philosophical projects, dooms us to significantly misinterpret Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, and many others in this tradition.

The extent to which embodiment, sociality, history, tradition, agency, normativity, and a host of other considerations need to be *acknowledged*[33] exposes the

[29] "The Architecture of Theories" in *The Essential Peirce*, volume 1, 289; also *CP* 6.14.
[30] Notebook N 5, October 3, 1838; see Gruber, H. E. 1980. *Darwin on Man*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 217.
[31] In an interview with Julia Kristeva, first published in 1968, Derrida suggested: "Like the concept of the sign … it [that of structure] can simultaneously confirm and shake logocentric [pragmatists, please hear here rationalistic] and ethnocentric assuredness. It is not a question of junking these concepts, nor do we have the means to do so. Doubtless it is more necessary, from within semiology [or from within structuralism], to transform concepts, to displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work and thereby produce new configurations; I do not believe in decisive ruptures. … Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone" (*Positions*, translated by Alan Bass. London: The Athlone Press, 24).
[32] Cf. Oehler, "Reply to Habermas," and Habermas, "Peirce and Communication" in Ketner, K. L. ed. 1995. *Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquirers.* New York: Fordham University Press.
[33] "Knowledge is," Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests, "in the end based on acknowledgment" (*On Certainty*, # 378).

bankruptcy (or insolvency) of modernity, including the monumental achievement of Immanuel Kant in synthesizing the defining features of the modern epoch. To recall Bruno Latour's observation, there is a sense – perhaps a multiplicity of senses – in which we have never been modern. But, of greater moment, there have been forces afoot guaranteeing that we are no longer modern. In certain respects, modernity is (as Habermas claims) an unfinished project, an ongoing task. But, in other respects, it is a lost cause. There are moments when I am tempted to think that modernity is thoroughly spent and even its unrealized possibilities are destined (as repetition compulsions) to assume novel forms, forms increasing the distance between the aspirations and ideals of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Kant, on the one hand, and *our* aspirations and ideals, on the other. However that might be, American pragmatism marks the sharpest break with European modernity.

3.

It seems so ungracious – even rude – to insist upon this point in this context. So, in the interest of geniality, allow me to turn from my polemic regarding philosophical historiography concerning American pragmatism, in order to turn to one of the most delightful stories in the history of pragmatism. On this occasion, in this city, it seems especially appropriate to recall a series of events important for a historically nuanced understanding of the pragmatic movement. When James attended, in 1905 in this city, the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, at which time he met Giovanni Papini and other admirers of pragmatism,[34] he was at the height of his career. He had given in 1898 the address at Berkeley; he had …. He would soon give, first at the Lowell Institute in 1906 and then at Columbia University in 1907, his lectures on pragmatism. In 1909, he would meet Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, and at Clark University in Worcester, MA. While here at that time he wrote home to his wife.

To repeat a sentence from his letter to his wife Alice: "It has given me a certain new idea of the way in which truth ought to find its way into the world".[35] How do ideas make their way into the way? Is it altogether different today than it was in 1905?

James arrived at the conference here in 1905 solely for the purpose of attending it, but upon arrival he pressed into service.[36] For the next several days, James worked on his presentation, writing it in the language in which he would present it – French! It was entitled *"La Notion de Conscience"* and published later that same year as the lead article in *Archives de Psychologie*. James sent Peirce a copy of this article and Peirce responded by confessing: "When you write in English .. I can seldom satisfy myself that I know what you are driving at … But

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Cf. Stanley Cavell, "Knowing and Acknowledging" in *Must we Mean What We Say?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

[34] "I lunched at the da Vitis .. and," he wrote to his wife Alice on April 30, 1905, "I have been been having this afternoon a very good and rather intimate talk with the little band of 'pragmatists,' Papini, Vailatic, Calderoni, Amendola, etc., most of whom inhabit Florence, publish the monthly journal; 'Leonardo' at their own expense, and carry on a very serious philosophic movement, apparently really inspired by [F. S. C.] Schiller and me …" (*The Letters of William James*, volume II. Boston: The Athlantic Monthly Press, 1920, 226.) Though he went to the conference simply to attend it, he went to Europe for a variety of reasons, apparently most of all to visit the birthplace of philosophy, not having ever been to Athens before.

[35] Perry, R. B. 1938. *The Thought and Character of William James*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, volume II, 570.

[36] "This morning [April 25] I went to the meeting-place of the Congress to inscribe myself definitely, and when I gave my name, the lady who was taking them almost fainted, saying that all Italy loved me. Or words to that effect, and called in poor Professor de Sanctis, the Vice President or Secretary or whatever, who treated me in the same manner, and finally got me to consent to make an address at one of the general meetings, of which there are four, in place of Sully, Flournoy, Richet, Lipps, and Brentano, who were announced but are not to come. I fancy they have been pretty unscrupulous with their program here, printing conditional futures as categorical ones" (*The Letters of William James*, volume II. Boston: The Athlantic Monthly Press, 1920, 225).

now that you are tied down to the rules of French rhetoric, you are perfectly perspicuous; and I wish … that you would consider yourself so tied down habitually".[37] James responded to this suggestion with one of his own: "Your encouragement to me to become a French classic both gratifies and amuses. *I* will if *you* will – we shall both be clearer, no doubt. Try putting your firsts, seconds, and thirds into the Gallic tongue and see if you don't make more converts!"[38]

As this delightful exchange reveals, philosophical friendship can be a thorny affair, even when it is tempered with gentle chiding. The concrete realization of philosophical community – for a number of reasons, I am more inclined to say, philosophical *friendship* – cannot but take the form of a personal exchange. It need not be a face-to-face conversation; it might – and in our time it most likely will – take the form of an electronic conversation. Philosophical truth inserts itself into the historical world in and through intimate relationships between (or among) human beings.

Personal relationships are however always forged in the context of overlapping cultural matrices. Such a context is much like the stories partly constitutive of it, often thwarting the very energies and innovations it generates. Concerning the topic of this session, cultural and institutional inertia all too often works effectively *against* the creative and effective appropriation of the reorienting insights of a philosophical movement, especially one so radically novel and as the pragmatic orientation. What Dewey noted in "Philosophy and Civilization" (1927) needs to be recalled on this occasion: "If American civilization does not eventuate in an imaginative reformulation of itself [and such a reformulation is philosophy in its pragmatic sense[39]], if it merely re-arranges the figures already named and placed, in playing an inherited European game, that fact is itself the measure of the culture which we have achieved".[40]

One of the most singular cultural achievements in human history is the European philosophical tradition, including the intellectual revolution wrought by early modern thinkers. For those exiled from modernity as much by the forces of modernity itself as anything else, however, the "inherited European game" is properly seen as a somewhat optional one. No one should be chastised for devotion to mastering its intricacies, just as no one (especially an American) should be condemned for being no longer preoccupied with re-arranging "figures already named and placed."

4.

I am not unmindful of my own Oedipal impulses in the present context, also of conveying the inevitable impression of being engaged in an embarrassing act of adolescent rebellion. There is, no doubt, truth on both scores. Make no mistake about it: I *am* trying to kill the father, *as father* (i.e., Kant as father). My motive is however not altogether malevolent. I am engaged in this attempt at patricide in order to make it possible to love the old man, to take him *on his own terms* and,

[37] Perry, R. B. 1935. *The Thought and Character of William James*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, volume II, 433.
[38] *Ibid*., 435.
[39] "In philosophy," Dewey claims, "we are dealing with something comparable to the meaning of Atenian civilization or of a drama or a lyric. Significant history is lived in the imagination of man, and philosophy is a further excursion of the imagination into its own prior achievements" (*The Later Works of John Dewey.* Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991, volume 3, 5). "Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the larger patterns of continuity which are woven in effecting the enduring junctions of a stubborn past and insistent future" (*ibid.*, 6). "Philosophy … is a conversion of such culture as exists into consciousness, into an imagination whioch is logically coherent and is not incompatible with what is factually known" (*ibid*., 9).
[40] *Ibid.* He immediately adds: "A deliberate striving for an American Philosophy as such would be only another evidence of the same emptiness and impotency" (*ibid.*).

moreover, to help him and his more dutiful children to see me as something more than an extension of him. That is, I want my siblings even in their devotion to see me as irreducibly different from anything that has gone before. If he were a musical patriarch and we were initiated into music by playing in his orchestra, who would be the more faithful children after he died – those who play the old man's music in the old man's way or those who transfigure their inheritance? Does not philosophy as much as music suffer from those who themselves suffer from nostalgia? Milan Kundera reminds us that: "The Greek word for 'return' is *nostos*. *Algos* means 'suffering.' So nostalgia is the suffering caused by an unappeased yearning to return". He adds: "In that etymological light nostalgia seems to be something like the pain of ignorance, of not knowing. You are far away, and I don't know what has become of you. My country is far away, and I don't know what is happening there".[41] Even more pertinent to our purpose, Stanley Cavell notes that nostalgia "is an inability to open the past to the future, as if the stranger who will replace you will never find what you have found".[42]

I would now like to make a *constructive* suggestive, though itself one with a polemical implication. If we do turn to, say, Kant or Hegel, in our effort to understand the pragmatists, would we not be better off at this point in the reception and interpretation of pragmatism to consider what has rarely, if ever, been considered – for example, Kant as the author of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* or Hegel's own treatment of anthropology? It is crucial to see that modern European philosophy is far from an insular affair, in particular, far from the insular affair which contemporary philosophers with their typical preoccupations make of "modern philosophy." The conception of philosophy in place was inclusive of fields of inquiry other than philosophy. As exemplified by Kant and Hegel, the philosopher *as philosopher* was required to keep abreast of developments in disciplines other than philosophy. This is everywhere manifest in Hegel's writings, but also everywhere discoverable in Kant's corpus. Philosophy is a site wherein a plurality of disciplines and discourses intersect. If we are to consider pragmatism in the context of modern European philosophy, and if we are to do so in the manner of such paradigmatic figures within European thought as Kant and Hegel, then we need both, in reference to their time and ours, look beyond philosophy.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein insightfully observed: "A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example".[43] But we might, prompted by this observation, suggest another cause of such disease – a different form of one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of reading. At present, nothing might prove to be more nourishing than the texts of such philosophically literate anthropologists as Tim Ingold and E. Valentine Daniel or similarly literate sociologists as Hans Joas and Margaret Archer.[44]

Hegel was a champion of *Vernunft* who, because of this

[41] Kundera, M. "The Great Return" in *The New Yorker*, May 10, 2002, 96.

[42] Cavell, S. 2005. *Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 218. This point is made in the context of an essay (in part) about H. D. Thoreau ("Thoreau Thinks of Ponds, Heidegger of Rivers"). The quotation in the body of my paper continues: "Such a negative heritage would be a poor thing to *leave to Walden*'s readers, whom its writer identifies, among many ways, precisely as strangers" (*ibid*.). By implication, the positive heritage is the animating faith (or is it hope? Or is it love? Or is it all three) that the strangers who will come after us will be able to find what we have found.

[43] Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 1953, # 593.

[44] In particular, Daniel, E. V. 1996. *Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and Ingold, T. 2007. *Lines: A Brief History.* London: Routledge.

commitment as well as events in his life, made a point of exploring the phenomenon of madness (see Hegel's Theory of Madness). Despite his sharp distinction between the strictures of transcendental logic and the disclosures of empirical inquiry, Kant was keen to know what experimentalists were discovering about the heavens, the earth, the elements, plants, and animals. Philosophical thinking nourished exclusively by the excessively restricted diet of philosophical texts was evident no more in the case of Kant, Schiller, and Hegel than in that of Peirce, James, and Dewey. To situate the pragmatists in the context of modern European philosophy, then, might mean seeing them as continuing a philosophical tradition we have failed to honor adequately – seeing them as painstakingly attentive to the actual developments in experimental fields from cosmology to medicine, from cartography to anthropology. Hegel might have been, as Peirce was occasionally – and disparagingly – disposed to say, "a seminary-trained philosopher," but very quickly he evinced the orientation of "a laboratory-trained philosopher," at least, a thinker who valued the hard-won discoveries of observation-based investigations.

We can tell the story of pragmatism in terms of Cambridge old and new, of (say) Peirce and James, on the one hand, and Putnam and Goodman, on the other. Much might be learned from such a narration. Or we can tell the story of Peirce's pragmatism in terms of a transformation of Kant's project or Hegel's. Much too can be learned from such a construal. Or we can take the *logic of inquiry* as our theme and, then, see how various stands of specific inquiries into the general nature of responsible inquiry have been woven together into an utterly fascinating tapestry. With respect to such an undertaking, we might focus on a typically neglected figure – for example, Heinrich Hetrz (1857-1894) – and see how this trained physicist's account of the physical sciences compares with that of Peirce, another trained physicist, also see how his influence upon Wittgenstein shaped that immensely influential philosopher's understanding of science compares to the influence of like-minded German theorists on another truly influential thinker, William James.[45] It would be hard for me to imagine a more exciting or fruitful inquiry, thought this might simply be an indication of the poverty of my imagination!

I have no doubt that I am here engaged in a process of *acting out* and *working through* a complex inheritance.[46] The personal dimensions of philosophical reflection *philosophically* merit attention. Culture is philosophy writ large, while our psyches themselves are (among other things) one of the loci in which the contradictions and conflicts of our cultures play out. But, then, philosophy itself is such a site.

How do we understand our philosophical traditions vis-à-vis one another, especially when we are variously situated? At bottom, the task of understanding these traditions is inseparable from that of simply understanding one another as human beings. Allow me, at this juncture, to cede space to the voice of James Baldwin. He after all came to Europe to think, not least of all to think about America, because the atmosphere in the country in which he was born was asphyxiating. While Thoreau retreated to the woods to front life, Baldwin and a significant number of others from the United States journeyed here to undertake the same mission. While James might write home … In "Fifth Avenue, Uptown" (1960), Baldwin wrote: "Negroes want to be treated like men: a perfectly straightforward statement, containing only seven words. People who have mastered Kant, Hegel, Shakespeare, Marx, Freud, and the Bible [however] find this statement utterly impenetrable. The idea seems to threaten profound, barely conscious assumptions. A kind of panic paralyzes

[45] See Janik, A. 2001. *Wittgenstein's Vienna Revisited*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, especially Chapter 7.

[46] Cf. Adorno, T. 1998. "The Meaning of Working Through the Past" in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*. New York: Columbia University Press.

their features, as though they found themselves trapped on the edge of a steep place."[47]

In the essay from which I have already quoted, Baldwin suggests – more precisely, *insists*: "A Ghetto can be improved in one way only: out of existence."[48] Some ghettos originate as such; other ones come into being by a process of devolution, a vibrant, open space degenerating into an impoverished, insular one. However a ghetto originates, there is only one way to improve it. A vast, varied country can become a ghetto. A vibrant, multifaceted discipline such as philosophy can also devolve in this direction. Lest I be seen more as a partisan than a philosopher, it is crucial to add: even a movement such as pragmatism can prove to be a ghetto.

Situating pragmatism in the context of modern European philosophy is an indispensable way of working *against* the possibility of pragmatism devolving into a ghetto. But, alas, it also can all too easily become a way of unwittingly contributing to the realization of this possibility. Pragmatism purports to be a philosophy of the streets and (were there very many in the United States) the café, not principally one of the study or classroom. James is quite explicit and, indeed, emphatic about this: "The world of concrete personal experience to which the street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplex. The world to which your philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble".[49] Philosophers more often than not have constructed "a classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge," making of philosophy itself "a refuge, a way of escape… "But I ask you in all seriousness," James continues, "to look abroad on this colossal universe of concrete facts, on their awful bewilderments, their surprises and cruelties, on the wildness which they show …"[50]

The world of concrete experience is that of human streets in their labyrinthine patterns but also that of at least seemingly empty spaces in both their promising solace and isolating cruelty. As the anthropologist Ingold suggests, to learn is to improve a movement along a way of life.[51]

Philosophy is not charged with the task of erecting an edifice to defy the vicissitudes of time (cf. Peirce). The Eternal City is, in truth, a transitory affair (cf. Freud, "On Transience"). Philosophy, at least as envisioned by the pragmatists, is rather preoccupied with the task *making our way* through the entangling circumstances of the historical present – *this* time seen as a site of confluence and conflict, ruin and reparation. Lionel Trilling,[52] however, offers a somewhat different characterization: "A culture is not a flow, nor even a confluence; the form of its existence is struggle, or at least a debate; it is nothing if not a dialectic. And in any culture there are likely to be certain artists who contain a large part of the dialectic within themselves, their meaning and power lying in their contradictions; they contain within themselves … the very essence of the culture [or the historical present of their riven culture], and the sign of this is that they do not submit to serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency. It is a significant circumstance of American culture, and one which is susceptible of explanation, that an unusually large proportion of notable writers of the nineteenth century were such repositories of the dialectic of their times; they contained both the yes and the no of their culture…"[53]

[47] Baldwin, J. 1985. *The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction 1948-1985*. New York: St Martin's Press, 211-12.
[48] *Ibid.*, 210.
[49] James, W. 1907. *Pragmatism.* New York: Longmans, 17-18.
[50] *Ibid.*, 18.
[51] This is the title of a lecture Ingold apparently has given a number of times. One can listen to it on YouTube.
[52] See Cornel West's inclusion of Trilling in his story about pragmatism, "Lionel Trilling: The Pragmatist as Arnoldian Literary Critic". In: *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism.* Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 164-81.
[53] See Trilling, L. *The Liberal Imagination: Essays on*

About especially any such a time, wherein "yes" and "no" are both constitutive of the present, there can be only partial stories. Many of these simply "run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times." But as this meeting makes evident – indeed, makes possible – these stories often to "mutually interlace and interfere at points." They are frustrated *and* facilitated by these intersections. There is, however, no perspective from which all of these stories might be unified without being distorted or disfigured. To repeat, there is an irreducible plurality of perspectives no less than a countless number of stories themselves. It is as important, if not *more* important, to acknowledge the plurality of perspectives as the innumerability of stories.

The story of pragmatism told in reference to the context of modern European philosophy is, in truth, a vastly extended family of stories bearing witness to irreducibly different lineages of query. History does indeed make bastards of us all; or, more accurately, a detailed knowledge of even the most *respectable* lineages reveals that putative fathers can be familial fictions.

Stories have legs. They travel. They even travel on ships (while crossing the Atlantic Ocean, Peirce wrote a draft of one of the most important documents in the history of pragmatism). Especially in the case of pragmatism, this is as it should be, for pragmatism is after all an ambulatory mode of philosophical thinking (cf. James, "A Word More About Truth" in *The Meaning of Truth*). In a sense, it is an new name for a primordial activity – walking about, though doing so discursively rather than physically. It is a form of discourse – a way of talking – more akin to the movements of the body on a crowded street or overgrown path, a morning saunter or evening promenade, than to any other human activity. "Cognition, *whenever we take it concretely*, means 'ambulation,' through intermediaries, from a *terminus a quo* to, or towards, a *terminus ad quem*".[54] The termini from which we set out are no more absolutely fixed than the ones toward which we move or at which we arrive. We can pick up the story from Kant – or, further back, from Locke or even Scotus, from Aristotle or even Socrates (cf. Peirce). We can, as Jorge Luis Borges so enchantingly demonstrates, re-arrange the books on the shelves of our libraries in such a way that alternative histories so themselves to be arguably more important than the actual course of historical events. The point from which we pick up the story is not utterly arbitrary, but it is arbitrary in the etymological sense of this word: We decide to begin here, to endow this figure with the status of father. The origins of, and statuses within, our stories are putative and, there, provisional: they may prove themselves to be indispensable for the realization of our purposes, but even more likely they will show themselves to be inadequate in some respects, at least as judged by "the typically perfect mind, the mind the sum of whose demands s greatest, the mind whose criticisms and demands are fatal in the long run".[55]

As you have no doubt noted, I have not so much told a story as engaged in a meta-narrative reflection, both gesturing toward a variety of possible stories and making a case for narrative pluralism. In doing so, I may justly be accused of *acting out*, of not doing what I was assigned to do. How better to be a pragmatist than to take an assignment as an opportunity to do something different from what is expected from, or asked, of oneself? Antecedently fixed purposes are, time and again, transformed – even transfigured – in the course of being pursued. Historically emergent purposes, opening previously undervalued perspectives, stake a claim on our attention and imagination. And this is critical for any *pragmatic* narrative of the pragmatic movement, at least as I am most disposed to tell this story.

Literature and Society. New York: The New York Rewiw of Books, 1950, 3.

[54] James, W. 1909/1997. *The Meaning of Truth.* Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 247.
[55] James, W. 1907. *Pragmatism*. New York: Longmans, 23.

What are we *doing* when we tell the story of pragmatism in this way rather than that? What are the effects of stories in which the central concern is to trace the threads of continuity from a European past to a more recent yet still somewhat remote time in the history of the United States? What are the effects of focusing narrowly upon the work of professors at Harvard? Our stories do indeed begin and end at odd times. Why not pick up the story before Peirce – or before Kant? Why not begin with Socrates and Aristotle?[56] Why end the story with Dewey or Mead – or Lewis? Why end the story of pragmatism before the present? Why even tell the story? What moves us to construct these narratives in just these ways?[57]

The irritation of doubt, hence the irritable disruption of the effective operation of especially our definitive habits,[58] requires (Peirce suggests) an external source, an experiential obstacle. As the questions posed just moments ago suggest, my role here today has been, more than anything else, to serve as the source of doubt, to be an *irritant*. It is more important for our more or less unconscious habits of philosophical storytelling need to be arrested than for these habits to be allowed to operate without resistance. The account of inquiry offered by pragmatists is one in which unanticipated disruptions and cognitive arrest play a central role. Why should not a story about pragmatism itself dramatize and (in dramatizing) *enact*, not simply discuss, just these themes in this account? Are not the tales told out of school not only the more fascinating but also the more instructive ones?[59]

[56] See, e.g., *The Essential Peirce*, volume 2, 399. The portion of MS 318 included in this chapter from volume 2 of *The Essential Peirce* (Chapter 28) begins by noting: "The philosophical journals, the world over, are just now brimming over, as you know, with pragmatism and antipragmatism."

[57] Cf. James, "The Sentiment of Rationality". James begins this essay by asking two deceptively simple questions: "What is the task which philosophers set for themselves; and why do they philosophize at all?" The same questions need to be raised regarding what tasks we set for ourselves when construct stories about pragmatism and what motives animate and direct our efforts to unfold such stories.

[58] In *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), John Dewey asserts: "Character is the interpenetration of habits" (*The Middle Works of John Dewey*, volume 14, 29). Our habits interpenetrate in such a way and degree as (in effect) to define us.

[59] Of course, this might seem simply additional evidence that my stance is that of a rebellious adolescent, that here I am simply *acting out*.

SOME SOURCES OF HILARY PUTNAM'S PLURALISM

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> "Reason has so many forms that we do not know which to resort to: experience has no fewer."
>
> Michel de Montaigne, "On Experience"

I am interested in the lives of certain ideas, in their adventures as Whitehead put it. One of these ideas is pragmatism, which lives in a tradition of largely but not entirely American thought, in which Hilary Putnam has a stellar place. Another is pluralism, an allied tradition of thought, or what can be seen as an alternative version of the same tradition. My thesis here is that Putnam has a place in this tradition as well.

Philosophical pluralism was first canonized in a book published in 1920 by a young Frenchman, Jean Wahl, who went on to become a professor at the Sorbonne, the teacher of Jean-Paul Sartre, and the author in the nineteen thirties of influential books on Hegel and Kierkegaard. Wahl's book on pluralism, entitled *Les philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique*, was published in an English version by Routledge in 1925 as *Pluralist Philosophies of England and America*.[1]

In Wahl's lineup of pluralist thinkers, William James occupies the central place, not least for his book *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909). Wahl discusses James's philosophy as a whole from a pluralist perspective, focusing on his "cult of the particular," "polytheism," "temporalism," and "criticism of the idea of totality." He also includes many other writers in his pluralist panorama: Gustav Fechner, Hermann Lötze, Wilhelm Wundt, Charles Renouvier, John Stuart Mill (to whom James dedicated *Pragmatism*), John Dewey, Horace Kallen, George Santayana, Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller—even George Holmes Howison of Berkeley, said to be a "pluralist idealist" of the "Californian School," and Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, said to be aligned with pluralism because of their views about temporality.

What then does Wahl mean by pluralism? He offers no one definition but rather a plurality of them, a plurality of pluralisms, and he acknowledges that Arthur Lovejoy might easily follow up his already classic paper "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" with a similar paper on the many pluralisms. Wahl beats him to it, however, by distinguishing among noetic or epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetic, moral, religious, and logical pluralisms. Following James, for example, he states that noetic pluralism, is the view that "the facts and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in. There is no point of view absolutely public and universal".[2] Speaking more generally, he writes that "pluralism is a philosophy which insists by preference on diversity of principles…it asserts both the diverse character and the temporal character of things".[3] A few pages later Wahl writes that "pluralism is the affirmation of the irreducibility of certain ideas and certain things," and also that it is a form of realism: "pluralism is … a profound realism that asserts the irreducibility of phenomena.... the irreducibility of one domain of the world to another" (Wahl, 279). Wahl notices the confluence between pragmatism and pluralism, but he denies their identity: "Speaking generally, pluralism is a metaphysic of pragmatism; though pragmatists cannot hold the monopoly of this metaphysic. It is usually associated with a realistic tendency which is particularly strong in the United States".[4]

The convergence of pragmatism, pluralism and a strong "realistic tendency" are again to be found in the United States, in the work of our contemporary Hilary Putnam. Let me briefly consider some ways in which Wahl's words are true of Putnam. Regarding irreducibility, and leaving aside his work in the philosophy of mind,

[1] Wahl, J. 1920/1925. *Pluralist Philosophies of England and America*, trans. Fred Rothwell, London, Routledge.

[2] *Ibid.*, 155.
[3] *Ibid.*, 275.
[4] *Ibid.*, 273.

consider Putnam's conclusion from a section entitled "Conceptual Pluralism" in *Ethics Without Ontology*. Putnam is considering the longstanding problem of how what he calls the "fields and particles scheme" of physics and the everyday scheme of "tables and chairs" relate to one another. He writes: "That we can use both of these schemes without being required to reduce one or both of them to some single fundamental and universal ontology is the doctrine of pluralism…"[5]

Making the same point elsewhere, Putnam does not speak of the everyday as a "scheme," and instead follows Husserl and Wittgenstein in defending the authority and legitimacy of what he calls "the lebenswelt." Complaining that philosophy makes us "unfit to dwell in the common",[6] Putnam urges us to "accept" "the *Lebenswelt*, the world as we actually experience it".[7] The verb "accept" is crucial here, because Putnam does not think that the existence of the world can be proven, and he does not think that the everyday world is the subject of a theory that is in competition with science. It is at this point that his thought converges with that of his Harvard colleague Stanley Cavell, who wrote in "The Avoidance of Love" that "what skepticism suggests is that since we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be a function of knowing. The world is to be accepted; as the presentness of other minds is not to be known, but acknowledged."[8] This is not meant to be a refutation of or even an avoidance of skepticism, but rather the recognition of a difference. It is a difference that is obscured, Putnam holds, in the search for "the One Method by which all our beliefs can be appraised".[9]

Pluralism shows up in Putnam's work not only in the contrast between science and the everyday—a species of what several recent writers have called "vertical pluralism," the pluralism of different domains or discourses—but in his discussions of truth, even truth within science. This latter is "horizontal pluralism," the claim, as Maria Baghramian puts it, "that there can be more than correct account of how things are in any given domain".[10] In his pragmatist period Putnam defends a conception of truth that owes something to Charles Sanders Peirce, who wrote that the "opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth".[11] Putnam states that "a true statement is one that could be justified were epistemic conditions ideal".[12] Unlike Peirce, however, Putnam asserts that there need not be only one such scheme. Why, he asks, "should there not sometimes be equally coherent but incompatible conceptual schemes which fit our experiential beliefs equally well? If truth is not (unique) correspondence then the possibility of a certain pluralism is opened up".[13]

These incompatible schemes fit the experiential beliefs of a community of inquirers, as wave and particle schemes appeal to the community of physicists. Putnam goes further however in asserting what amounts to another form of pluralism in *Realism with a Human Face* when he denies that truth can conceivably be attained by a single community. It is not that the community will in the long run find several schemes that fit their experiential beliefs, but that no single community can know all the truth. "People have attributed to me the idea that we can sensibly imagine conditions which are *simultaneously ideal* for the ascertainment of any truth whatsoever, or simultaneously ideal for answering any

[5] Putnam, H. 2004. *Ethics Without Ontology.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 48-9.
[6] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 118.
[7] *Ibid.*, 116.
[8] Cavell, S. 1976. *Must We Mean What We Say?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 324.
[9] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 118.
[10] Baghramian, M. 2004. *Relativism.* London: Routledge, 304.
[11] *The Essential Peirce*, vol. 1, ed., Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, 139.
[12] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, vii.
[13] Putnam, H. 1981. *Reason, Truth, and History.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 73.

question whatsoever. I have never thought such a thing….There are some statements which we can only verify by failing to verify other statements".[14] This statement chimes with James's claim, quoted by Wahl, that there is "no absolutely public and universal point of view."

There is yet another site in Putnam's writing where a kind of pluralism emerges. This is in "James's Theory of Perception," in *Realism with a Human Face*, one of the most sympathetic and imaginative discussions of James's so-called "radical empiricism" to be found in the literature. For a Darwinian like James, Putnam argues, no two individuals are identical, so that although "there is a 'central tendency,' this tendency is simply an average; Darwin would say that it is a mere abstraction." For Darwin, Putnam concludes, "the reality is the variation," not the type.[15] James's criticism of the power of concepts to capture reality is a reminder, Putnam argues, "that even though the rationalistic type of thinking has its place—it is sometimes pragmatically effective—once it becomes one's only way of thinking, one is bound to lose the world for a beautiful model."[16] The world one loses is the world of concrete particulars, of "variations." This is a pluralism not of schemes or truths, but of particulars, and it is aptly rendered by James's explicitly pluralistic slogan quoted above, namely: "Something always escapes."

I have now touched on Putnam's defense of common sense against scientific reductionism, and of the possibility of incompatible schemes at the limit of inquiry, and his idea that no community could be in the position to justify every true statement. I want now to consider even more briefly three other characteristics mentioned by Wahl as characteristic of pluralism: their focus on temporality, their realism, and their pragmatism.

Temporality appears not in Putnam's metaphysics but in his epistemology. The term "history" in Putnam's title, *Reason, Truth, and History*, for example, refers to the view of knowledge that he learns not only from James and John Dewey, but from Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and even Ludwig Wittgenstein. Putnam reads Foucault's historical studies, for example, not as those of a relativist who is concerned to argue that "past practices were more rational than they look to be," but as those of a fallibilist, for whom all practices, including our own, are less rational than they appear to be. Putnam concedes that rationality cannot be "defined by a 'canon' or set of principles," and that our conceptions of the cognitive virtues evolve, but he at the same time asserts the authority of regulative ideas, such as that of "of a just, attentive, balanced intellect".[17] In *Ethics Without Ontology* Putnam finds a continuing basis for agreement with Foucault's idea that our concepts have histories: "Although 'analytic' philosophers still often write as if concepts were a-historic entities (which is exactly how they were conceived by the fathers of analytic philosophy, Moore and Russell), there is no reason for their latter-day successors to deny that concepts have a history, and that conceptual analysis and historical analysis can fruitfully enrich each other…"[18]

I shall be even briefer with regard to Putnam's realism and pragmatism. Putnam is of course a pragmatist, bearing out Wahl's generalization that pragmatists tend to be pluralists. In regard to realism, Putnam's pragmatist period is marked by a vigorous attempt to defend a form of realism. Following Kant and James, he attempts both to credit the human contribution to the world we know—enunciated in the slogan he draws from

[14] *Ibid.*, viii.
[15] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 235.
[16] *Ibid*., 236.
[17] Putnam, H. 1981. *Reason, Truth, and History.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 163.
[18] Putnam, H. 2004. *Ethics Without Ontology.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 113.

James, that "the trail of the human serpent is over everything"—, and at the same time to assert the reality and objectivity of that world. Putnam called one such attempt "internal realism," and later chose "pragmatic realism" when the "internal" in "internal realism" seemed to suggest a lack of contact with the world or an excessive subjectivity. In any case, it is only "metaphysical realism"—the fantasy of a "God's eye view of the world"—that Putnam rejects, not the realism of common sense or of science. In his title as in his book *The Many Faces of Realism* Putnam asserts both plurality and realism.

Finally, Wahl states that pragmatists tend to be pluralists, and so it is in the case of Putnam, who accounts for the connection in the statement cited above. If "the world" is the world as we conceptualize and encounter it, a world bearing the marks of the human serpent, then, as Putnam says, a certain possibility of plural schemes is opened up.

In the rest of this essay I want to consider three figures in the background of Putnam's pluralism. Two of them, like Putnam himself, are self-identified pragmatists who taught at Harvard: William James and Nelson Goodman. The third is Ludwig Wittgenstein, neither a pragmatist nor a Harvard professor, whose importance for Putnam and in general for what we know as "neopragmatism" is immense, and whose relation both to pragmatism and to pluralism is interestingly complicated.

The term *pluralism*, the *Oxford English Dictionary* tells us, originally had an ecclesiastical use, indicating the practice of holding more than one office at a time. It first makes its way into philosophy only in the late nineteenth century. James employs the term in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), and in *A Pluralistic Universe*, where he defines pluralism as "the doctrine that [the universe] is many" He goes on to state: "Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralist view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness. The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom".[19]

The dominating unity of James's day was the Hegelian and Neo Hegelian Absolute Spirit propounded by his contemporaries Thomas Hill Green and F. H. Bradley, but James also wishes to counter an emerging scientific reductionism. His position is both metaphysical and epistemological: there is no one overarching entity, and no all-inclusive explanation of the world.

James develops the idea of multiple systems of truth, multiple useful ways of making our way through the world, *Pragmatism* (1907), in the chapter entitled "Pragmatism and Common Sense." Our common "ways of thinking" "concepts" or "categories" have a history, James maintains, and our notions of "One Time," "One Space," "Bodies," "Minds," "Thing," "Kinds," "causal influences" and "Subjects and attributes" are useful tools "by which we handle facts by thinking them".[20] These ways of thinking, he suggests, are discoveries of "prehistoric geniuses whose names the night of antiquity has covered up" and which then "*spread*" over long periods of time "until all language rested on them and we are now incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms".[21] "There are many conceptual systems," James holds, including the categories of common sense, the theories of science, the criticism of philosophy—all of them means of "rationalizing" the "everlasting weather of our perceptions".[22] James presses the question, so

[19] James, W. 1987. *Writings 1902-1910.* New York: Library of America, 776.
[20] *Ibid.*, 561.
[21] *Ibid.*, 566.
[22] *Ibid.*, 562.

important for Putnam, of which of these schemes is the true one, and he answers that although each is useful for one sphere of life or another, there "is no *ringing* conclusion possible when we compare these types of thinking, with a view to telling which is the more absolutely true.... Common sense is better for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether either be *truer* absolutely, Heaven only knows".[23]

If Putnam wants to admit into his republic the language and practices of ordinary life, including those of morality, James wants to admit not only science and common sense, but religion in at least some of its aspects. James was a scientist: he attended the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard, not Harvard College, and spent his junior year abroad floating down the Amazon with Louis Agassiz. His graduate degree was in medicine and his first appointments were teaching anatomy and physiology at Harvard, though he soon moved to psychology and then philosophy. He begins *The Varieties of Religious Experience* with a chapter on religion and neurology, but it is in the conclusion to that work that he makes some of his most provocative statements about the sciences. "The scientist" he states "is, during his scientific hours at least, so materialistic that one may well say that on the whole the influence of science goes against the notion that religion should be recognized at all".[24] James nevertheless speaks up for religion not as a set of doctrines or practices, but as an example of certain modes of experiencing and conceptualizing the world. "It is the terror and beauty of phenomena, the "promise" of the dawn and of the rainbow, the "voice" of the thunder, the "gentleness" of the summer rain, the "sublimity" of the stars, and not the physical laws which these things follow, by which the religious mind still continues to be most impressed..."[25] James is impressed too, and he sees the source of religion's authority in the personal point of view. "Science," (with a capital "S") is "impersonal"[26] by its very nature, and therefore, James argues, it is not equipped to register the world in these ways. The sciences offer us ways of knowing the world, but there are other ways which science cannot duplicate or reduce to its terms. The universe is: "a more many-sided affair than any sect, even the scientific sect, allows for….the world can be handled according to many systems of ideas, and is so handled by different men, and will each time give some characteristic kind of profit, for which he cares, to the handler, while at the same time some other kind of profit has to be omitted or postponed".[27]

James defends these personal and humanized ways of thinking against the charge that they are just survivals that must be eliminated in the course of a general "deanthropomorphization of the imagination." James's call not only to retain and develop but to recognize the authority of an anthropomorphized imagination is echoed ninety years later in Putnam's assertions of the objective validity of the human point of view. "There *are*," Putnam tells us in *The Many Faces of Realism*, "tables and chairs and ice cubes. There are also electrons and space-time regions and prime numbers and people who are a menace to world peace and moments of beauty and transcendence and many other things".[28] These tables and chairs are James's subject in "Pragmatism and Common Sense," and these moments of beauty and transcendence are his subjects in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

Putnam acknowledges the importance of Nelson Goodman for his own pragmatism in many places in his writing. In "After Empiricism," for example, he links him with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Austin, and Wittgenstein in countering Hume's project of dividing reality into "the

[23] *Ibid.*, 569.
[24] James, W. 1902/1994. *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* New York: Random House, 533.
[25] *Ibid*., 541.
[26] *Ibid*., 543.
[27] *Ibid*., 137-8.
[28] Putnam, H. 1987. *The Many Faces of Realism.* Chicago: Open Court, 16.

Furniture of the Universe" on the one hand and "our projections" on the other.[29] In his earlier review of *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), Putnam states that "the heart of Goodman's book … is its defense of pluralism." For example, he takes Goodman as saying that while both physicalism and phenomenalism are good "research programs," if they become "dogmatic monisms … there is everything wrong with both of them".[30]

Putnam entitles a section of his review "one world or many?" and this is the question I now want to consider, with the help of an earlier paper by Goodman that Putnam does not mention, entitled "The Way the World Is" (1960). In this paper, published, appropriately enough, in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Goodman takes up the question of the way the world is by first considering how it is given to us, a question to which he argues there is no clear answer. He next turns to the question of how the world is best seen, and he argues that the answers are many: "For the ways of seeing and picturing are many and various; some are strong, effective, useful, intriguing, or sensitive; others are weak, foolish, dull, banal, or blurred. But even if all the latter are excluded, still none of the rest can lay any good claim to be the way of seeing or picturing the world the way it is".[31] Goodman's central claim, embedded in the following passage, is that there is no *one* way the world is, but that the world is *many* ways: "If I were asked what is *the* food for men, I should have to answer 'none'. For there are many foods. And if I am asked what is the way the world is, I must likewise answer, 'none'. For the world is many ways. … For me, there is no way that is the way the world is; and so of course no description can capture it. But there are many ways the world is, and every true description captures one of them.[32]

Whereas in *Ways of Worldmaking,* Goodman speaks of "multiple actual worlds",[33] here he speaks of the many ways the world is. Putnam calls the multiple actual worlds position "naughty"[34] presumably because it clashes with our commonsense view that there is just the world. That is why I like the language of "The Way the World Is." However, Goodman argues that it makes little difference how we speak about the matter, that whether there are many worlds or one world with many versions depends on how we take things: "As intimated by William James's equivocal title *A Pluralistic Universe*, the issue between monism and pluralism tends to evaporate under analysis. If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. The one world may be taken as many, or the many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking".[35] I would want to say, then, that I find it most profitable and least confusing to take the one world as many rather than to speak of many worlds. I think also that the idea of contrasting aspects is worth considering, for its implication that multiplicity is a feature not just of our schemes, theories, or versions, but of the world itself. How much distance, I wonder, is there between Putnam's "many faces of realism" and Goodman's "multiplicity of contrasting aspects"?

Before leaving "The Way the World Is," I want to consider Goodman's statement that: "If I were asked what is *the* food for men, I should have to answer 'none'. For there are many foods." Goodman is a pluralist about foods. He gives no examples, but it is easy to think not just of different bowls of cornflakes and multiple hamburgers, but of different systems, cultures of foods: Sichuan, Tunisian, Italian, Mexican, paella, fejoado, poi, bagels, collard greens, nettle stew and Cashel blue. It is

[29] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 52.
[30] Putnam, H. 1983. *Realism and Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 155.
[31] Goodman, N. 1972. "The Way the World Is". In: *Problems and Projects*. New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 29.
[32] *Ibid*., 31.
[33] Goodman, N. 1978. *Ways of Worldmaking*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 6.
[34] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 42.
[35] Goodman, N. 1972. "The Way the World Is". In: *Problems and Projects*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 2.

so hard *not* to agree with Goodman that there is no one food for human beings that I am reminded of Wittgenstein's statement in the *Investigations* that if one were to try to advance theses in philosophy it would be impossible, because a philosophical thesis is one to which everyone would agree.[36] The pluralist seems sometimes not so much to be advancing a thesis as attempting to remind us of something— "for a certain purpose," as Wittgenstein says.[37] What are Goodman's purposes in reminding us about the plurality of foods and asserting the plurality of worlds?

Goodman raises just this question in *Ways of Worldmaking* when he writes: "in what non-trivial sense are there … many worlds? Just this, I think: that many different world-versions are of independent interest and importance, without any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base. The pluralist, far from being anti-scientific, accepts the sciences at full value. His typical adversary is the monopolistic materialist or physicalist who maintains that one system, physics, is preeminent and all-inclusive, such that every other version must eventually be reduced to it or rejected as false or meaningless. … But the evidence for such reducibility is negligible….(How do you go about reducing Constable's or James Joyce's world-view to physics?) … A reduction from one system to another can make a genuine contribution to understanding the interrelationships among world-versions; but reduction in any reasonably strict sense is rare, almost always partial, and seldom if ever unique. …. The pluralists' acceptance of versions other than physics implies no relaxation of rigor but a recognition that standards different from yet no less exacting than those applied in science are appropriate for appraising what is conveyed in perceptual or pictorial or literary versions…"[38]

As it is for Putnam, reductive physicalism is Goodman's main enemy, but in contrast to both Putnam and James, Goodman makes art a central concern. It is Constable's or Joyce's "world-view" from which we are said to learn, just as we learn from those of Aristotle or Einstein. Constable, Picasso, Fra Angelico, and the unnamed wall painters of ancient Egypt all show us aspects of the world, according to Goodman. In *Languages of Art* Goodman argues that both art and language can refer to or depict the world, and he draws attention to art's capacities for exemplification and expression. In *Ways of Worldmaking* he argues that expression and exemplification add to the ways in which we understand the world—add to the worlds we make, as he prefers to put it: "Worlds are made not only by what is said literally but also by what is said metaphorically, and not only by what is said either literally or metaphorically but also by what is exemplified and expressed—by what is shown as well as by what is said".[39] In his review of *Ways of Worldmaking*, Putnam pushes Goodman toward an even wider pluralism that would acknowledge the moral underpinnings of his project: "Goodman recognizes that we wish to build worlds because doing so enriches us in many ways. And this, it seems to me, requires him to recognize that the notions of truth and rightness subserve a vision of the good".[40] Putnam's critique not only looks forward to his concern with what he calls "the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy," but, as he is well aware, back to William James's view in *Pragmatism* that truth is "one species of good".[41]

Wittgenstein is an important influence on Putnam, but he is neither a pragmatist nor a self-identified pluralist. Nevertheless, his later philosophy is deeply concerned with plurality, multiplicity, and variety, and this is one reason, I have argued, for the deep affinity he felt for

[36] Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 128.
[37] *Ibid*., 127.
[38] Goodman, N. 1978. *Ways of Worldmaking*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 4-5.
[39] *Ibid.*, 15.
[40] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 168-9.
[41] James, W. 1902/1994. *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* New York: Random House, 520.

William James, despite his hostility to pragmatism. Wittgenstein does not, however, assert a multiplicity of world versions or worlds, but rather a "multiplicity" of language-games and concepts. He states that there are "*countless*" different kinds of use of words and sentences, and that "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.) "This multiplicity, he also states, has a temporal structure: it "is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten".[42] Wittgenstein considered as an epigraph for the *Investigations* a quotation from *King Lear*—"I'll teach you differences." His book teaches the differences among such concepts as intending, deciding, hoping, thinking, conversing, reading, and confessing, and among the language games we play in describing things, giving orders or measurements, making up a story, telling jokes, playing chess, and translating from one language into another.

Wittgenstein also teaches the difference between the methods of science and the methods of philosophy. As Jim Conant points out in "Putnam's Wittgensteinianism," a section of his introduction to *Realism with a Human Face*, Wittgenstein warns in *The Blue Book* against our "craving for generality" and its source in "our preoccupation with the method of science…., the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest number of primitive natural laws. ….Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."[43] This is a Wittgensteinian source for Putnam's "vertical pluralism."

Although Wittgenstein emphasizes the multiplicity of language games, he does not assert the multiplicity of human forms of life. He tests the limits of our human form of life—for example, in his discussions of hypothetical tribes who measure the quantity of a stack of wood by how much ground it covers, and he observes that "one human being can be a complete enigma to another".[44] Yet his emphasis is on what is common, on the human form of life that we share, not on ways in which we are different. He contrasts the human form of life not with other actual or possible human forms, but with those of dogs—who are said not to be capable of believing that their masters will be at the door tomorrow—and lions—whom we could not understand, even if they could speak.

There is this difference also. The pragmatist pluralists James, Goodman, and Putnam are all epistemologists, whereas Wittgenstein is centrally concerned not with knowledge or metaphysics, but with language and philosophical psychology. In *On Certainty*, the one work of Wittgenstein's where knowledge comes to center stage, he does not assert a plurality of schemes, theories, or ways of worldmaking, but writes of a "world-picture [that is] the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting".[45] This world-picture, which includes "the existence of the earth" for many years in the past", is not only my picture, but "our" picture: "it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the *scaffolding* of

[42] Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 23.

[43] Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*- Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, xlix.
[44] Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan, 223.
[45] Wittgenstein, L. 1969. *On Certainty*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 161.

our thoughts."[46]

The world-picture evolves, perhaps at a rate as slow as that of common sense as James understands it in *Pragmatism*, but Wittgenstein does not conceive of the world-picture as "knowledge." That is part of his quarrel with Moore and implicitly with James. "Why," Wittgenstein asks, "should the language-game rest on some kind of knowledge? Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists? Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?[47] The answer to all these questions is presumably "no," and Wittgenstein's point is that knowledge is not the foundation for our language-game. For James—at least in his pragmatist guise—and I think for Goodman, our relation to the world is fundamentally one of knowing it. With his Wittgensteinian focus on the *lebenswelt*, and his exploration of what he calls our "moral images," Putnam has a wider view of that relation.

To conclude: I have been considering some sites of pluralism that resonate with Putnam's work in the writings of William James, Nelson Goodman, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. If Jean Wahl were updating *Pluralist Philosophies of England and America* today he would clearly have to add some more chapters. "Pluralism," like "pragmatism," "romanticism," and "religion" is a family resemblance term,[48] but running through many of its uses is the idea that there are multiple ways of understanding a given subject, range of phenomena, or just the world, with no one way adequate for a full account of it all.

It seems to me that philosophers are in a particularly good position to appreciate pluralism so construed, for two reasons. First, because we are the custodians and producers of ethical theories, and although most of us have our favorites, we also know that each of the standard models—deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics—has both strong and weak points, and that none is completely adequate to our moral intuitions and experience. So it is with philosophy itself, and this is my second reason for thinking that philosophers already have an intimate pluralistic understanding. If someone asked me what is *the* philosophy to study I would say along with my namesake Nelson Goodman: "none"; for to study philosophy is to study not just one person or theory, but a range of them. Whitehead said that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato, and Aquinas thought of Aristotle as "the philosopher," but we do not teach our students that there is just one philosopher or philosophy. James gives us a reason for our approach and a reason for believing that it will never be otherwise in his emphasis on the *humanity* and *personality* of philosophical writing. He states in *Pragmatism* that the history of philosophy is a study in individual points of view and individual temperaments, and that "the finest fruit of our … philosophic education" is our understanding of the "essential personal flavor" of these strange and profound views of the world.[49] In *A Pluralistic Universe* he writes that a philosophy is "the expression of a man's intimate character," and that a philosopher's "vision is the great fact about him."

As I think about Putnam, I keep coming back to a sort of energetic happiness expressed in all his writing, from early papers like "It Ain't Necessarily So" through *Reason, Truth, and History* and beyond. It a joy in his own powers and insights, melded with a penetrating intellectual and moral seriousness. Putnam reminds us not only of the many faces of realism but of the many human faces of philosophy—among which his is one of our time's most probing, imaginative, and sane.

[46] *Ibid.*, 209-11.
[47] *Ibid.*, 477-9.
[48] Cf. James, W. 1902/1994. *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* New York: Random House, 31.
[49] Cf. James, W. 1987. *Writings 1902-1910.* New York: Library of America, 502.

WILLIAM JAMES AND JOSIAH ROYCE IN POLISH PHILOSOPHY: AN UNEASY RECEPTION

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Polish philosophy did not make use of the great opportunity it had at the beginning of the 20th century to absorb William James, Josiah Royce, and American Philosophy in general. The Polish-American contacts in philosophy that did take place at the time, although involving big names on both sides – and I am going to limit my presentation to the biggest, that is the most eminent and most influential Polish philosophical names as regards the present topic –, did not produce any intensive exchange of ideas or initiate any common large scale undertakings, and it is hardly possible to notice any influence of James and Royce as well as of American Pragmatism in general upon Polish thought. And it is not, at all, that the major texts were unknown to the Polish readers; in the case of James it was just the opposite, and his works were translated into Polish very soon after their original publication in America.

Thus, "Is Life Worth Living?" was translated in 1901 and "The Will to Believe" in 1901 both by W. Kosiakiewicz; "Habit" in 1901 by R. Radziwiłłowicz; *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* in 1902 by I. Moszczeńska (the sixth edition was published in 1930); in 1911 there were translations of *A Pluralistic Universe* by W. Witwicki, *Pragmatism* by M. Kozłowski (the second edition in 1957), and *The Meaning of Truth* by W. Kosiakiewicz; *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was translated in 1918 by J. Hempel (the second edition in 1958 and the third in 2001). The scattered and indeed, rare attempts to promote Pragmatic ideas, and these having rather loose connection with specifically James' version of Pragmatism – apart from quite numerous papers and short articles of an informative character[1] - that followed these translations, had only very limited success in Poland.[2]

There are different reasons for this lack of absorption of the philosophical calling from America. Firstly, the strong cultivation of the metaphysical tradition taken from Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics along with the classical concept of truth and the objective understanding of values that was predominant in the mainstream of Polish philosophy. Secondly, the traditional Catholic background of Poland and the very strong impact of this background upon Polish thought. Thirdly, the national and messianic rather than communal and practical dimension of social and political thought in Poland. Fourthly, the strong influence of German philosophy, especially Hegel and Kant. Fifthly, Polish thinkers at that time did not speak English as their second language (usually it was German) and did not think of America as a source of a philosophical inspiration unlike Germany, and also France. Sixthly, Poland, until 1918 was politically and economically under partition and the energy of the then intelligentsia was focused upon the preservation of the national culture as well as upon seeking the ways for cultural independence

[1] See: J. Kodisowa, "W. James i pragmatyzm" [Wm. James and Pragmatism], „Prawda" [„Truth"], 1910; R. Radziwiłłowicz, "W. James", "Sfinks" ["Sphinx], 1910; W. Witwicki, "W. James, próba charakterystyki" [„Wm James, an Attempt of Characterization", "Ruch Filozoficzny" ["Philosophical Movement"], 1911; W. Witwicki, „W. James jako psycholog" [„Wm James as a Psychologist"], „Przegląd Filozoficzny" [„Philosophical Review"], 1913; J. Hempel, „Doświadczenia religijne" [„Religious Experience"], „Krytyka" [„Critique"], 1912; S. J. Agatstein, „W. James jako psycholog i filozof religii" [Wm James as a Psychologist and a Philosopher of Religion]", „Kwartalnik Filozoficzny" [„Philosophical Quarterly"], 1938. See footnote 10 of the present work.

[2] Perhaps the most noticeable was, in reference, however, to F.C.S. Schiller's "humanism" rather than to James, Kozłowski's version of Pragmatism which he called: "Polish humanism", and which he shortly promoted in the journal called "Myśli i życie [Thoughts and Life]" (1912-1913); also Stanisław Brzozowski's "Religia i społeczeństwo [Religion and Society]"(1907) should be mentioned, where he referred to James's idea of religious pluralism, and his *Idee* [*Ideas*], 1910, especially the chapter "Pragmatyzm i materialism dziejowy" ["Pragmatism and the Historical Materialism"], where he glorified work, action, as well as practicality, and linked these ideas with Pragmatism, without however, a special reference to James or any other representative of American Pragmatism.

rather than exploring unknown ideas from distant lands, although this happened too. Seventhly, even under partition, Poland still rejoiced a hundreds year old native philosophical tradition, present first of all at the universities in Cracow (founded in 1364), in Vilnius (1579), in Lvov (1661), and Warsaw (1816), and the cultivation of the heritage and the reference to the past masters prevailed, at least in philosophy, over the search for the new solutions. Generally, although not exclusively, the character of Polish philosophy has been pessimistic rather than optimistic, static rather than dynamic, spiritual rather than naturalistic, speculative rather than empirical, and, therefore, the reception of Pragmatism could not take place.

The first opportunity, at the very beginning of professional and classical philosophy in the United States, could have materialized from the close and cordial contact between William James and the eminent Polish philosopher and author of an influential work on Plato published in the English language, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (1897), Wincenty Lutosławski (1863-1954). Their intellectual contacts started when Lutosławski gave lectures at some American universities (1893, and later 1907-1908[3]), and this led to a philosophical friendship between these two scholars. They corresponded to each other, and, moreover, James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, called Lutosławski his friend,[4] and also wrote, in 1899, "Preface" to Lutosławski's *The World of the Souls* (1924), where James appreciated Lutosławski's width of intellectual horizon and the strength of his romantic engagement. However, due to different temperaments and personalities, as well as the incompatible aims they were aiming for, it was not possible for Lutosławski either to promote James or to introduce American philosophy into Poland. As it seems to me, he was sensitive to the differences between them rather than to any common perspectives for the future. Thus, he wrote in his biography that James was "a living symbol of American spirit", "a decent man, extraordinarily intelligent and clever"; on the other hand, however, he did not like James' ignorance of the history of philosophy and, chiefly, James' inability to read Plato and Aristotle in Greek, about which Lutosławski commented this way: "This alone was enough to mark the difference between us". For James, Lutosławski continued, "each opinion aspired to self-assertion" whereas for Lutosławski "there was a golden thread linking the true thinkers of all peoples and epochs, making the unity of this *philosophia perennis*, which results from the work of many thinkers throughout the ages".[5] In addition to this, Lutosławski, Platonist, metaphysician, spiritualist, and classicist that he was, felt the superiority of European tradition in philosophy, and channeled his own energy to activities that aimed at the creation of a Polish national system of messianic philosophy, looking for stimulation in Polish, Greek, and German thought.

Another occasion for making American-Polish, or rather Polish-American philosophical contact fruitful was the emergence of the world famous Polish school of logic and philosophy called the Lvov-Warsaw School, founded by Kazimierz Twardowski at the end of the 19th century. One of its biggest names – apart from Alfred Tarski and Stanisław Leśniewski – Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956), gave a speech about James' *Pragmatism* at a meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov, in 1907. He called James' ideas fresh and animating, however, he claimed that logical strictness is not his strong side, and that the book should be read with criticism. In his opinion, for

[3] His lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston (October 21, 1907) and at University of California (March 9, 1908) constitute his book *The Polish Nation*, published in Paris in 1917.

[4] See James, W. 1908. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York: Moffat, 1908, 281.

[5] See Lutosławski, W. 2004. *Metafizyka* [*Metaphysics*]. (Manuscript completed in 1951). Edited by T. Mroz. Drozdowo: Muzeum Przyrody, 116 (footnote). At another place in the book (235), mentioning James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lutosławski wrote that "one can see it as the first in scientific literature strict proof of the efficiency of prayer".

Pragmatists the convictions are true when they facilitate easy and comfortable actions, and he was not alone in seeing Pragmatism this way.[6] Interestingly and characteristically for Polish scholars, Pragmatism was not only associated with logical and philosophical carelessness, but also with moral relativism and, according to them, it narrowed down to the efficiency of practical activity, something sounding rather dangerous because of the lack of a stable moral direction of this practical activity while aiming at the target. Such an approach was also present in the most popular manual of logic, epistemology and methodology[7] written by one of the leading Polish thinkers of all time, Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886-1981), who also belonged to the Lvov-Warsaw School. By the way, it was Kotarbiński, who successfully promoted "Praxeology", the philosophical and ethical idea of efficient activity, but, strangely enough, he did not refer to Pragmatists as the possible supporters of his concept,[8] although, at least in my opinion, it was possible and would have been a great link between Polish and American philosophy.[9]

As it seems, the most popular promotion of William James was made by another member of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and the most eminent Polish historian of philosophy ever, Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886-1980), who in his three volume *Historia filozofii* [*History of Philosophy*],[10] presented James' life, ideas, and the context of his thought (Charles S. Peirce, F.C.S. Schiller, John Dewey, Italian Pragmatists). Since Tatarkiewicz's book, with over twenty editions, has been, up till now, the most popular manual of the history of philosophy in Poland, a book that is known to each and every student of philosophy in this country, and to very many liberal arts students too, James and American Pragmatism became known, at least in its basics, to many generations of readers. It should be added that Tatarkiewicz was especially skilful in his clear presentations of the ideas; one of the reasons must have been that he was also an aesthetician and historian of aesthetics (he is the author of the *History of Esthetics* [11] in three volumes, later translated into English) and the clarity and order of the presentations are as if natural in his writings. However, due to the character of his presentations, that is, an outline of James' thought to be directed at students rather than scholars, this could not be a source of inspiration as far as profound studies are concerned. It must be stressed, however, that Tatarkiewicz, in his presentation of James, did not criticize him for the things that other representatives of the School did, that is James' weakness in logic and his alleged moral relativism; rather James as an eminent representative of psychology and an original philosopher was presented and the main points of James' work – such as pragmatic method, pragmatic theory of truth, empiricism, pluralism, and philosophy of religion – were plainly and finely outlined.

It should be added that Tatarkiewicz was also responsible for introducing Royce to Poland, who was much less present, if at all, in Polish thought than James. An outline of his philosophy was presented in the above mentioned *History of Philosophy* by Tatarkiewicz, in the parts devoted to Anglo-Saxon Idealism, that is along with

[6] See Łukasiewicz, J. 1998. *Logika i metafizyka* [*Logic and Metaphysics*]. Edited by J.J. Jadacki. Warszawa: WFiS UW, 389.

[7] See Kotarbiński, T. 1931. *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* [*Elements of Theory of Cognition, Formal Logic, and Methodology of Science*]. Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków: Ossolineum, 132-133.

[8] Kotarbiński referred to Alfred Espinas („Les orgines de la technologie", 1890) as being in the first place.

[9] This might have been due to political reasons; Kotarbiński developed his ideas in the 1950s and 1960s, when Poland was behind the Iron Curtain and any sympathy with America's effectiveness was dangerous.

[10] The first edition of *History of Philosophy*'s third volume, where James (and Royce) was described, appeared in 1950, and the latest edition in 2005; the book provides ample bibliographical data; some of them were used in footnote 1 of the present work.

[11] Tatarkiewicz, W. 1999. *History of Aesthetics*, 1970-1974, edited by J. Harrell, C. Barrett, and D. Petsch. 3 vols., Bristol: Thoemmes Press. The Polish original version was published in the years 1960-1967.

R.W. Emerson, Th. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and J. Ward.[12] According to Tatarkiewicz, Royce's *The World and the Individual* is the main work of American Idealism, Royce himself the main representative of idealism in America, and Royce's abstractive, transcendental, and absolutistic thought was presented in Royce's books with fantasy and humor, just as Socrates and Plato did in the past.

By the way, as regards Royce, I should imagine that, for example, his *Philosophy of Loyalty* could have been of some interest, I suspect, if translated into the Polish language at the beginning of the 20th century. It could have been even more stimulating for the then thinkers in Poland fighting for their political rights, cultural identity, spiritual freedom, and philosophical self-expression, and for the professional historians of philosophy this would have most surely been a fertile field for the studies over the relations and dependencies of Royce to Kant and Hegel. Thus, Royce might have had a bigger chance of being promoted than James, and the reason why he was not better known is that such philosophy was looked for in Germany at that time rather than in America, and one should regret that Royce has never been known and discussed in Poland, with the exceptions just indicated in the above.

Coming back to James, another occasion for the promotion of his thought and Pragmatism in general was Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958), Polish philosopher and sociologist, who lectured at the University of Chicago (1915-1919), Columbia (1932, 1939), Urbana (1940-1958), and even became the President of the American Sociological Association (1953-1954). His works, out of which the most influential was written in collaboration with W.I. Thomas, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918-1920) and his idea of "humanistic coefficient" belong to his great contribution to modern thought. Znaniecki, in his early works mentioned James and was sympathetic to the spirit of Pragmatism, especially as regards voluntarism, anti-dogmatism, and anti-fundamentalism in philosophy, along with the conviction about the huge role a social background and a historic context in shaping values and ideas, about the humanistic coloring of all objects perceived, and about the meaning of actual experience "here" and "now". However, he referred more to Wilhelm Dilthey, Henri Bergson, the Neo-Kantians, and Polish tradition rather than to James. Despite the fact, then, that he was interested in Pragmatism, and his own thought shared similar traits, it would be very risky to claim that he was influenced by James.

Perhaps the last big chance, at least theoretically, to initiate the contact between Polish and American thought in the first half of the 20th century was the emergence of a grand scale format Polish philosopher and aesthetician Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), mostly recognized and appreciated for his *The Literary Work of Art*[13] (published originally in the German language, in 1931). Especially his deep interest in the problem of the theory of cognition could have been a very good area of discussion with the epistemological ideas proposed by William James, and, indeed, Ingarden referred to James' idea of pragmatism, in the light of the problem of the objectivity/subjectivity of the perception of the objects external to the mind. However, Ingarden was a phenomenologist (he was one of the most skilful disciples of Edmund Husserl) and strongly criticized the newly emerged concepts of, as he called it, psychologistic and (psycho-) physiologistic character to

[12] As regards the presentation of Royce's thought in Poland, Tatarkiewicz was followed only by Leszek Koczanowicz who, in his book, *Jednostka – działanie – społeczeństwo. Koncepcje jaźni w filozofii amerykańskiego pragmatyzmu* [*Individual – Activity – Society. The Concepts of the Self in American Pragmatism*], 1994, devoted one chapter to Royce's idea of the Self as a process of interpretation.

[13] See Ingarden, R. 1973. *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature. With an Appendix on the Functions of Language in the Theatre,* translated and with an introduction by George G. Grabowicz, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

explain the epistemological issues. Moreover, he mostly referred to the thinkers and ideas of the Continental thought, especially the philosophical traditions in the German and French speaking countries, and viewed James' idea of Pragmatism – referring by the way, to the French translation of *The Meaning of Truth* – as a part of a broader and stronger tendency in the late 19th and early 20th centuries thought, that is one co-shaped by E. Mach, R. Avenarius, H. Bergson, and F.C.S. Schiller. He called this tendency generally: "pragmatic" or "pragmatistic" (without any reference to Peirce whatsoever), seemingly having seen James' main contribution to it by giving the name to the whole tendency,[14] as if he ignored the specificity of the movement initiated by (Peirce and) James in America. Nor was American Pragmatism promoted by one of the most eminent of Ingarden's disciples and followers of his thought, whose professional career developed in the United States, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, the founder and the President of the World Phenomenology Institute as well as the editor of "Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research". Her excellent work, however, has been focused primarily on phenomenology and her numerous books, authored and edited, are accessible mainly in the English language, being, therefore, hardly any source of the promotion of James and Royce in Poland, although, let it be added, they have been a very good source for the promotion of Ingarden's thought in the English speaking countries.

The Communism era in Poland, that began after WWII, was the time when America was seen by the political authorities ideologically and politically as an enemy to the countries within the Soviet camp, and the officially (I mean by the political government) expected approach to American philosophy was to be either informative and sketchy or confrontational and ideologically biased. In such unfavorable conditions, the most significant presentation of James into Polish philosophy was made by the most eminent as well as the most unbiased promoter of American Pragmatism and of American philosophy in general in Poland, Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz. She is the authoress of books (in Polish) on Peirce (1965), on American Pragmatism (1970), on American philosophy (1975), on Peirce's semiotics (1994), and on James (1973, 2001).[15] Her fruitful work started in the late 1960s, and has continued up to the present day, and the excellent translations of the basic texts of James (as well as of Peirce's), included in her book on him, till now, have been a major source of reference for many students and scholars, who have had no access to the original texts of these philosophers.

Some meaning in the process of promotion and presentation of James and Royce in Poland should be ascribed to the authors of books on philosophy that were translated into the Polish language mainly for academic circles, and two names should be mentioned as being in the first rank. B. A. G. Fuller's *History of Philosophy* (1955 third edition), whose second volume, that included James and Royce, was translated in 1967 and published with up to ten thousand copies being printed,[16] and Frederick Coplestone's *A History of Philosophy* (1966), volume 8 that included Royce and James, was translated in 1989 and published with twenty thousand copies being issued.[17]

As we can see, William James was relatively well known to those Polish readers who were interested in American philosophy, and, simultaneously, he was rejected; his thought did not inspire the minds of Polish scholars and if they mentioned him and Pragmatism at all, it was because they wanted to criticize its main theses from the

[14] See Ingarden, R. 1971. *U podstaw teorii poznania* [*At the Ground of the Theory of Cognition*], Warszawa: PWN, 143.

[15] Buczyńska-Garewicz, H. 1973/2001. *James*. Warszawa: PIW.

[16] Fuller, B. A. G. 1967. *Historia filozofii* [*History of Philosophy*], tom II. Translated by Cz. Znamierowski. Warszawa: PWN.

[17] Copleston, F. 1989. *Historia filozofii* [*History of Philosophy*], volume VIII. Translated by B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa: PAX.

point of view of the objectivity in espistemology, ontology, and axiology. Pragmatism, at least James' version of Pragmatism, was not adaptable to the intellectual conditions of the Polish philosophers both in the time of the thrive of Polish philosophy before World War II and during its subsistence in the era of Communism.

Indeed, it is nowadays – after the collapse of Communism and the opening of the borders, both physical and mental, to the external world along with a huge rearrangement of the social and intellectual life – that enthusiasm and wide scale interest in American thought, including Pragmatism have taken place, although I am not sure whether this enthusiasm and interest ultimately refers to Pragmatists or rather to Americans and America, that is, to her vitality, her might, and her attractiveness. Anyway, a host of translators, commentators, and researchers study and promote James as well as Pragmatism, and James' works are translated and/or old translated ones re-edited. Thus, *Pragmatism* has two new translations: 1998[18] and 2004,[19] *The Will to Believe* translated afresh in 1996,[20] *The Meaning of Truth* in 2000,[21] and *Some Problems of Philosophy* in 2004[22]; the translation of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was re-edited in 2001,[23] and the translation of *A Pluralistic Universe* re-edited in 2007.[24]

These translations are accompanied by some studies over James and American Pragmatism in general.[25]

It must be admitted, however, that the growing interest in American philosophy has not, at least as yet, produced any sort of Polish Pragmatism nor any serious centers for the research of James' thought, not to mention Royce's. It is hoped that something like this might happen within the next few years. This hope is not unjustified; for example, it is at the Institute of Philosophy of Opole University, Poland, that the 1st International Conference on Josiah Royce is to be held in June 2008, as a fourth conference of a series of annual conferences under the general title: *American and European Values*[26]; within this series a conference on William James is to be held in 2010.

[18] James, W. 1998-*Pragmatyzm. Nowe imię paru starych stylów myślenia*, translated by M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa: KR.
[19] James, W. 2004. *Pragmatyzm. Nowa nazwa kilku starych metod myślenia. Popularne wykłady z filozofii*, translated by M. Filipczuk, Kraków: Zielona Sowa.
[20] James, W. 1996. *Prawo do wiary*, edited and translated by A. Grobler, Kraków: Znak.
[21] James, W. 2000. *Znaczenie prawdy. Ciąg dalszy Pragmatyzmu*, translated by M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa: KR.
[22] James, W. 2004. *Z wybranych problemów filozofii. Początek wprowadzenia do filozofii*, translated by M. Filipczuk, Kraków: Zielona Sowa.
[23] James, W. 2001. *Doświadczenia religijne*. Translated by J. Hempel, Kraków: Nomos.
[24] James, W. 2007. *Filozofia wszechświata. Wykłady o filozofii współczesnej z Manchester College*. Translated by W. Witwicki, Kraków: Zielona Sowa.

[25] As regards the philosophy of William James, some papers by Piotr Gutowski seem to be worth of mentioning as well as a chapter of Leszek Koczanowicz's book (see footnote 12) devoted to James' concept of the Self.
[26] The first conference, held in 2005, was devoted to the problem of Philosophical Rapprochement in the context of American and European Values; the second, in 2006, was devoted to George Santayana, and the third, held in 2007, to Charles S. Peirce's Normative Thought.

JOSIAH ROYCE: CLASSICAL AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER; PRAGMATIST, PHENOMENOLOGIST, PROCESS THINKER AND ADVOCATE FOR COMMUNITY

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Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce and John Dewey are the usual actors in the drama called "Classical American Philosophy," and their significance as philosophers is rightfully captured by John McDermott: "They represent one of the most creative clusters in the history of philosophy."[1] I believe part of the creativity comes from the rich interchange and relationships between the four.[2] These four philosophers shared significant intellectual as well as personal relationships. Peirce and Royce were deeply interested in the logic and science of their time and both developed doctrines of a triadic form of knowledge known as interpretation. Royce was the first person to sift through Peirce's papers and he published the first post-mortem assessment of the significance of those papers and of Peirce's thought in general.[3] The close relationship between William James is well known to many but I believe is best summarized by James' own words: "Royce and I love each other like Siamese twins".[4]

In this paper I focus on Josiah Royce's thought primarily in the context of pragmatism, though brief references will also be made to his relationship to phenomenology.[5] Some of Royce's unique contributions to American philosophy will also be discussed: his excellent theory of community; his analysis of the relationship of genuine communities and genuine individuals and his understanding of religious experience as a fundamental aspect of human existence and of human development into well-functioning individuals.

The four Classical American philosophers as pragmatists each placed stress on meaning and ideas as plans of action as well as looking to future consequences; they emphasized temporality, process, uncertainty, and a world full of rich possibilities. Each, in different ways, saw experience and the human self as essentially embedded in both a physical and social world. Finally, all argued against various false dichotomies particularly those between mind/body, body/emotion, fact/value, human/nature, individual/community; they stressed continuity in experience and nature.

Logic, Nominalism, and Science

Peirce disagreed with James on the general nature of pragmatism, adopting the term *pragmaticism* to characterize his view in contrast to that of James. On several occasions, however, Peirce expressed the opinion that Royce's views, especially as expressed in *The World and the Individual* (CP 8:119) came closer to his own view in its stress on the long-range *conceivable* consequences of a belief and in working out an idea's consequences in formal logic. (CP 8:119). Peirce saw Royce's notion of the internal meaning of an idea to

[1] Quoted by Frank M. Oppenheim S.J. 2005. *Reverence for Relations of Life.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, preface.

[2] Royce sought continuously to enrich his own experience and ideas and often astonished his students by his openness to criticism and questions. One of those students, Richard C. Cabot writes: "he shocked me into perceiving that a man could really welcome difference of opinion as a precious gift." Richard C. Cabot, "Josiah Royce as a Teacher," *Philosophical Review,* 25, no. 3, 1916, 466-72, 467.

[3] Cf. Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan, "Charles Sanders Peirce," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* 13, 1916, 701-709.

[4] *The Correspondence of William James,* edited I.K. Skrupskelis and E.M. Berkeley, 12 Vols. Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press. 1992- 2004, 10:520.

[5] The relationship of Royce as well as other pragmatists to process thought should be explored. A recent dissertation analyzes Royce's thought via that of Whitehead's (cf. Anderson, M. M. 2011, *Hyperthematics: An Extension of Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Interpretation.* Dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) and Sandra Rosenthal argues that "The passage from temporality as the basis of meaningful experience to process metaphysics as the basis for understanding its ontological character is operative in all pragmatists" (Rosenthal, S. B. "The process of pragmatism: Some Wide-Ranging Implications," *The Pluralist,* Vol. 6, No. 3, fall, 2012, 5-18).

include "all the experiments which would verify it." (CP 8:115) He writes: "I think Royce's conception in *The World and the Individual* . . . . . comes nearer to the genuine upshot of pragmaticism than any other exposition that a pragmatist has given, than any *other* pragmatist has given."[6]

At the core of Royce's epistemology and metaphysics is his definition of an idea as a "plan of action." An enduring theme of all his early articles is "a theory of knowledge and reality which in its essence is activist and social".[7] Royce wholeheartedly rejects, as do the other pragmatists, any copy theory of knowledge, arguing that knowledge is a mode of action; it is an active search for the fulfillment of purpose. He tells us that "thoughts are not dead and finished mind products. . . .Thoughts are living and each thought lives in the most literal sense, but a moment."[8] He also posits the essence of thinking as "originality." In the essay, "How Beliefs are Made," Royce asserts: "Thus, all knowing is, in a very deep sense, acting; it is, in fact, reacting and creation".[9] In this essay Royce focuses, long before James, on the role of "attention" in knowing; he also stresses recognition as another key factor.

Part of the manner in which Peirce distinguished his pragmatism from that of James was in terms of his attack on nominalism and his belief in the importance of "general ideas," especially for scientific progress (CP 5:3). Royce, like Pierce, discusses the necessity of "general ideas" for science and also speaks of them as habits. Royce writes: "Conscious general ideas are simply conscious habits of conduct in the presence of the objects to which these ideas apply."[10] There is clearly a behavior-pragmatic element in Royce's analysis of general ideas as indicated in the following: *"The whole general idea involves what one may well call 'a plan of action,' that is, a way of behavior is fitting to characterize and portray an object of the class in question"*.[11] Royce also sees selective interest as central in general ideas: "there is, in the object of your general idea, that character which guides your interest and your attention to make this response".[12]

These clear emphases on habit, on interest and selection demonstrate Royce's pragmatic tone. In his discussion of general ideas Royce also anticipates phenomenology with a notion of *motor intentionality.* He states that the real test of a general idea is the presence of "that element of motor consciousness, that awareness of the thinking being concerning what he proposes to do with the object and characters that he thinks about".[13]

Both Peirce and Royce wrote extensively on science and advocated for the significance of general ideas in science.[14] Like Peirce, Royce differentiates between

[6] Robin, R., ed. 1967. *Annotated Papers of Charles S. Peirce.* Amherst: MA: University of Massachusetts Press, MS 284.
[7] Royce, J. 1929. *Fugitive Essays,* edited by Jacob Lowenberg. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 11.
[8] *Ibid.*, 75-6.
[9] *Ibid.*, 362.
[10] Royce, J. 1893. "Topics in Psychology of Interest to Teachers, Lecture I, "What is a General Idea?" HARP Folio 63, 26-54.
[11] Royce, J. 1893. Lecture VI: "Apperception, Attention and the Theory of an Orderly Acquisition of General Ideas, HARP Folio 64.
[12] Royce, J. 1893. Lecture II< "General Ideas and the Theory of Habits". HARP Folio 64.
[13] *Ibid*.
[14] Little scholarly attention has been paid to centrality of the philosophical ramifications of modern science-physical, biological, and formal and mathematical figure in Royce's philosophy, so I fully applaud the assessment of Michael Futch when he writes: "Even the most cursory glances at his [Royce's] corpus reveals a systematic and deep engagement with many of the leading developments in nineteenth century science, from the nebular hypothesis, or evolution in both its Darwinian and Spenserian form, to the work of Cantor and Dedekind. It would perhaps not be going too far to suggest that, from his first to last writings, the development of Royce's philosophy is in no small measure driven by an attempt to come to terms with these developments" (Futch, M. "The Dogma of

mechanical processes and non-mechanical processes in Nature and he, like Peirce, holds that "laws of nature" should be interpreted as habits – they are approximate rhythms: "Nature, as actually observed, shows us rhythms that tend *within limits,* to be pretty constant"[15] – it is "certain that physical Nature is full of *approximate rhythms . . . ..* that tend to repeat over and over".[16] These laws of nature are not nomological necessities and unlike mechanical laws, these "Habits and natural rhythms, contrawise, are by their very nature asymmetrical and time-reversible".[17] Further, these laws of nature are subject to the evolutionary process and thus are only temporary—"Take them in a long period, and these rhythms tend to pass and to be lost in revocable decay"; they come into existence and pass away in the course of cosmic history.[18]

As general ideas, the laws of science must be seen as idealizations. Mechanical laws, Royce argues, are abstractions from concrete reality; they have heuristic value, serving as "inference tickets," enabling us to predict what, given antecedent conditions, the subsequent conditions will be. They are tools, "only extremely ideal ways in which science finds it convenient to conceive facts for the purposes of a brief theoretical description of vast ranges of experience. . . .They help us compute, to predict, to describe, and to classify phenomena".[19] Both Peirce and Royce took on the so-called "Doctrine of Necessity," arguing that it is commonly accepted in the absence of any empirical warrant and that it is basically a metaphysical doctrine. Royce, acknowledging his debt to Peirce's keen criticism, writes: "Hence, the so-called axiom of the unvarying character of the laws of nature is no self-evident truth, is not even at once an empirically established and an universal generalization and possesses its present authority because of the emphasis our social interest give to the discovery of uniform laws where we can discover them. That we do discover and verify them over a very wide range of our experience of Nature is an unquestionable fact, and one of which every Philosophy of Nature must take account. But it is much to know that this discovery is not due to any innate idea, or to any first principle of reason, but is an empirical, although by no means an universal generalization, which we have been led by social motives to *emphasize and to extend as far as possible,* and so to conceive as if it were universally characteristic of Objective Nature."[20]

Royce's second argument against mechanical notions of scientific law is a version of the "under-determination of scientific theories" argument posited by Duhem and Quine and recent philosophers of science. Royce writes: "Nobody can doubt that they [scientific theories] are 'ideal constructions' since science may enter its accounts by other methods of bookkeeping…..We know that Nature, as it were *tolerates* our mathematical formulas. We do not know that she would not equally well tolerate many other such formulas instead of these".[21] Here, Royce shows significant insight into the processes of modern science.

Royce also argues that non-mechanical laws, habits, are

Necessity: Royce on Nature and Scientific Law," *The Pluralist*, Vol. 7, No.1, spring, 2012, 54-71.). Dewey, of course, valued science and wanted to harness its power constructively, but I believe that Peirce and Royce were more conscious than Dewey of the limitations of science (see Kegley, J. A. K. **"**Peirce and Royce and the Betrayal of Science: Scientific Fraud and Misconduct," *The Pluralist* 5:2, September, 2010, 1-26).

[15] Royce, J. 1899. *The World and the Individual,* 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, vol. 2, 222.

[16] *Ibid*.

[17] *Ibid*.

[18] *Ibid*., 221-3.

[19] *Ibid*., 214, 224.

[20] *Ibid.*, 195. In a later work, Royce says that one of the salutary effects of the statistical approach to scientific law which he and Peirce advocate will be "to relieve us of a certain unnecessary reverence for the mechanical form of scientific theory- a reverence whose motives are *neither rationally nor empirically well founded"* (Royce, J. 1951. *Collected Logical Essays of Josiah Royce,* edited by Daniel S. Robinson, Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown and Company, 55).

[21] *Ibid.*, 216, 225.

common to both physical and mental phenomena. Indeed, in good pragmatic fashion, Royce argues that this fact serves to "efface the contrast between matter and mind."[22] Royce, like Peirce and Dewey, argued strongly against the false dichotomy between the physical and mental and for continuity in nature. In *The World and the Individual*, Royce offers three hypotheses about nature: (1) "the vast contrast which we have been taught to make between material and conscious processes really depends upon the accidents of the human point of view;" (2) "we have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature;" and (3) "in the case of Nature in general. . . . . we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process, whose relation to Time varies vastly".[23] He goes on: ". . . . we can never know how much of Nature constitutes the life of a finite conscious individual, unless we are in intelligent communication with that individual's inner life".[24]

Mind, Knowledge of Mind and Other Selves

James, Royce, and Dewey were all practicing psychologists and all three served as Presidents of the American Psychological Association. Both James and Royce wrote Introductions to Psychology and Dewey's much discussed article on the "reflex arc" has been pivotal in recent developments of radical embodied cognition and neuropragmatism.[25] James expounded ideas in his work that Royce had earlier explored and continued to develop, e.g. attention, and the stream of consciousness. Although they shared many ideas in common, Royce found James too individualistic and prone to nominalism. Further, James struggled with two central problems that Royce was able to address—(1) how we can know the reality of other minds and (2) explaining how two human minds can know one and the same thing.

Royce believed that one could not develop an adequate theory of self or of mind maintaining the traditional division of types of knowledge, namely, conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge. Expanding on the ideas of Peirce, Royce advocated a third type of knowledge called "interpretation" to understand the ideas, feelings, and intentions of our fellow beings as well as for self-understanding. In his essay on "Mind," Royce cites the example of someone crying "Fire." He says that in this case I am called upon to regard my fellow's cry as a sign or expression of the fact either that he himself sees a fire or that he believes there is a fire. Or that, at the very least, he intends me to understand him as asserting there is a fire. Of course, says Royce, I cannot understand my friend's cry unless I hear it, unless I have at least some perceptual knowledge. Further, I need some conceptual knowledge of fire, of his object. But even more, argues Royce, my knowledge of my fellow's meaning, my 'grasping of his idea,' consists neither in the percept of the sign nor in a concept of its object which the sign arouses, but in my *interpretation* of the sign as an indication of an idea which is distinct from any idea of mine, and which I refer to a mind not my own, or in some wise, distinct from mine. For Royce, we come to know that minds not our own are in the world by interpreting the signs that these minds give us of their presence.[26]

[22] *Ibid.*, 219.
[23] *Ibid.*, 224-6.
[24] *Ibid.*, 232-3.
[25] See Dewey, J. 1986. "The Reflex Arc concept in psychology." In: *The Early Works of John Dewey,* vol. 5, 96-10; James, W. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Royce, J. 1903. *Outlines of Psychology: An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications.* New York: The Macmillan Company, Rockwell, T. 2005. *Neither Brain nor Ghost.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Chemero, A. 2009. *Radical Embodied Cognition.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[26] Royce, J. "Mind." In: Hastings, J., ed. 1916. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 8: 649-57.

Royce emphatically rejects the hypothesis that we can assert the existence of our neighbor's mind upon the argument from analogy. Royce argues that an argument from analogy is not its own verification; rather it is essentially unverifiable in the normally required terms, i.e., in terms of immediate perceptions. My neighbor's states of mind can never become for me objects of immediate acquaintance unless they become my states of mind and not his, precisely in so far as he and I are distinct selves. And we all know in analogical reasoning, differences can be as telling as similarities. What if my own case of mental states may be unique or atypical or abnormal? Indeed, how well do I know my own mental states at all? Royce asserts that despite well-known assertions to the contrary nobody has any adequate intuitive knowledge of acquaintance with himself. Royce also observes that the argument by analogy for knowledge of other minds has very limited application, again because of the significance of dissimilarities. Does it apply equally to children, the mentally ill, even women, if drawn on analogy with a man?

The third type of knowledge, "interpretation," is never verified through immediate data, or through the analysis of conceptions, but rather through conversation. In conversation our neighbor expresses ideas which contrast with our own present ideas, but we view them as intelligible but requiring us to probe their meaning. We give back to our neighbor our interpretation of his meaning, in order to see if this interpretation elicits a new expression which is in substantial agreement with the expression we expected from him. Our method is "conversation."

Royce also argues that self-knowledge is a process of interpretive knowledge. The present self interprets the past self to the future self. I am always engaged in an interpretive act, interpreting the past self to the future self. "In brief," says Royce, "my idea of myself is an interpretation of my past – linked also with an interpretation of my hopes and intentions as to my future."[27] For Royce, the "self" is a series of interpretations – we achieve the unification of separate ideas and experiences through interpretation. The self is a temporal, ongoing process, unified by continual reflection and communication. The self also continually confers meaning on itself. It is engaged in creating a meaningful narrative.

In answering James' second question, "how can two human minds know one and the same thing?" Royce highlights the communal and temporal nature of all consciousness; again, interpretative awareness of others is fundamental. He pointed to the kind of shared knowledge had by two oarsmen rowing the same boat: "Each man views the boat and the oars and the water as objects which he experiences for himself. At the same time, each of the two men believes that both of them are experiencing, while they row together, the same external fact-the same boat, the same oars, the same water."[28]

The oarsmen are engaged in a process of interpretation that is fully triadic—other rower, physical object, and oneself, all are sending and receiving signs—and in their teamwork the oarsmen rely on these processes as if they had achieved their goal of knowing the same realities together. Royce says: "Our social consciousness is, psychologically speaking, the most deeply rooted foundation of our whole view of ourselves and of the world…. ."[29] Royce has, in my judgment, an interactionist view of experience and of knowledge not too different from that of Dewey.

[27] Royce, J. 1899. *The World and the Individual,* 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, vol. 2, 42.
[28] Royce, J. 1913. *The Problem of Christianity,* New York: The Macmillan Company, 317-8.
[29] *Ibid.*, 330.

The Individual and the Community

Both Dewey and Royce discussed the conditions for building community while also critiquing a prevalent and false individualism that they believed threatened community and even the future of democracy.[30] False individualism was tied in with property rights and economic and pecuniary values; an individualism that Dewey and Royce believed led to "lost" and isolated individuals. They argued for conditions that fostered the development of individuals capable of achieving their full potentialities and full and rewarding experiences and lives, and yet also capable and concerned to contribute in creative ways to the common life. Both philosophers advocated for building a "Great Community." Dewey promoted the role of genuine communication in building communities, while Royce developed his doctrine of interpretation as the means for creating genuine communities.

Royce valued and honored the individual in his metaphysics as well as his social and political philosophy. His exposition of the relationship between individualism and community I believe is one of his unique contributions to philosophy. Royce argued that worthwhile individuality and community arose out of their mutual interaction in a creative ongoing, infinite process. He argued for the following claims: (1) Individuals are inescapably rooted in a social context and true individuality is forged out of that context. The individual is *both* self-made and a social product and the genuine individual self is the responsibility of *both* the individual and community; (2) Community is a social product. True community is created by the hard work of free, self-conscious, self-committed, self-creative, moral individuals; (3) the task of the individual is both to fashion a "beautiful" life and to build a "beautiful" community, while the obligation of the community is to foster the development of true individuals; (4) individuals are finite, sinful, fallible and need to extend self to develop morality and overcome error. Royce asserted that humans fall prey to parallel sins: (a) the sin of self-loss, becoming part of the crowd, a "they," instead of an "I;" and (b) the sin of self-sufficiency, of the individual who "goes it alone" and believes that genuine selfhood can be achieved in this manner; (5) Individuals keep communities alive, moral, and sane by keeping them from stagnating into inveterate habit, moving toward exclusivity and intolerance, or degenerating into mob madness. For Royce, *individuals without community are without substance; communities without individuals are blind.*

In *The Problem of Christianity*, Royce addressed the conditions of genuine communities, providing another unique contribution to philosophy These include: (1) the power of an individual to extend his/her life beyond self and one's self-context; (2) the presence of communication among selves in the community as well as attentive listening to the ideas and hopes of others; (3) the willingness of individuals to engage in interpretation of meanings to each other – such interpretation involves respect and regard for each self and idea involved; reciprocity and mutuality and genuine humility; (4) recognition of the cooperative efforts of each member of the community – without this interaction of co-working selves, the community could not accomplish its aim.

In this work Royce also outlines the requirements of genuine religious community, an understanding that John E. Smith argues provides many valuable insights for philosophy of religion and the religious community itself. In his *Source of Religious Insight,* Royce stresses the individual and communal aspects of religion and religious experience, in contrast to James's individualistic stress in

[30] Dewey, J. 1957. *The Public and Its Problems.* New York: Henry Holt & Company; Dewey, J. 1962. *Individualism Old and New.* New York: Capricorn Books; Royce, J. 1913. *The Hope of the Great Community.* New York: The Macmillan Company.

his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Royce's arguments for the necessary interaction of genuine individuality and genuine community are valuable for understanding religious experience and for social and political issues. About the religious Smith provides a compelling assessment: "Finally, in view of the omnipresence of the religious community in the history of religion, it is essential to arrive at a proper understanding of the relation between the individual and the community as it concerns religious faith. The common assumption that religion in its social or community form represents merely 'organized' religion in contrast with a purely individual (and therefore, 'real' or 'genuine') piety, needs to be reexamined. The emphasis on 'conversion' as a purely private and personal affair, plus suspicion of the church as an institution, have had much to do with the failure of Protestantism to find a *viable* form of *religious* community.. . . .The nominalistic outlook that leads to an exaggerated individualism in many region of modern life has also infected religion in America, with the consequent loss of proper regard for the bonds that transcend the lonely individual and bring him into a community of suffering, of joy, and faith. The fact that wherever we look among the monuments and records of religious traditions we are brought face to face with communities of some kind suggest that community can be neither external nor accidental."[31]

In making a difference in contemporary society one cannot ignore this insight and Royce's valuable exposition of various aspects of religious experience and religious community. Royce is clearly as classical American philosopher whose thought is well worth more careful examination.

[31] Smith, J. E. 1995. *Experience and God.* New York: Fordham University, 17-8.

CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCE[1]

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Much research already examines historical and thematic connections between classical American pragmatism and continental philosophy, especially phenomenology. For example, there are numerous studies comparing and contrasting the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with the radical empiricisms of William James and John Dewey.[2] Pragmatism, however, advises philosophers to be mindful of the existential, problematic situations that motivate inquiry, and so it is surprising that relatively little has been said about similarities in the experienced concerns that motivated the inquiries of both phenomenologists and pragmatists. This paper examines what I take to be the central existential concern behind the phenomenological movement, namely, what Husserl famously termed "the crisis of European science,"[3] and it argues that a very similar concern motivated much of classical pragmatism, as seen at least in James and Dewey.

Talk of a "crisis" in Europe's boasted reason, upon which its edifice of science was built, appears significantly first in the writings of Friedrich Schelling. According to him, Western rational science, grounded firmly in the assumption of an absolute separation (*Scheidung*) of Nature from Spirit (*Geist*), is experiencing a "crisis" with respect to human self-understanding and freedom. How can the presumedly utterly irrational impulse of life (*Seele*) give birth to mind and reason? How can spirit then become alienated from soul and take command over irrational life as its lord and master? And, once it does, once life is thoroughly subjected to mind's logic and laws of causal determinacy, what becomes of human freedom? As Schelling writes, "thoughts are doubtless born in the soul; but a thought once born is an independent power which works on it its own way, and which indeed grows so great in the human soul that it masters its own mother and prevails over her."[4] (The casting of "soul" as a female, dominated by a masculine "mind" is enormously significant, as Scheler noted already in the 1920's, but we will not be able to explore the implications of this "crisis" for matters of gender in this essay.) The "crisis" created by this conquest of reason over life, of Spirit (*Geist*) over Nature, "first appeared [in] that conflict of mind and heart" and culminated in "Spinozism," to be condemned not for being fatalistic--Schelling did not think that it was--but for its utter lifelessness, for its absence of any soul. "All men were now warned of the abyss (*Abgrund*); it was clearly laid before all eyes [by Fichte]. The only remedy which still seemed possible was seized; only that bold utterance could bring on the crisis; it alone could frighten Germans away from this ruinous philosophy [of Spinozism] and lead them back to the Heart, to inwardness of feeling and to faith."[5]

Similarly Friedrich Nietzsche spoke of a "crisis" that developed in the modern West, stemming from the separation of Apollonian reason from primal, creative, Dionysian life-energy.[6]

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[1] A Polish translation of it is forthcoming in the journal *Kronos*.

[2] E.g., Wilshire, B. 1968. *William James and Phenomenology: A Study of* The Principles of Psychology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press; Cobb-Stevens, R. 1974. *James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Edie, J. 1987. *William James and Phenomenology.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press; Wild, J. 1959. *The Radical Empiricism of William James.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday; Schutz, A. 1941. "William James' Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1, 1941, 442-52.

[3] Husserl, E. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

[4] Schelling, F. W. J. 1809/1936. *Philosophische Untersuchengen ueber das Wesen der Menschlichen Freitheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende* (1809), in Saemmtliche *Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Vol. VII, 347; *Of Human Freedom*, trans. James Guttmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 19-20.

[5] *Das Wesen der Menschlichen Freitheit*, 348; *Of Human Freedom*, 21.

[6] Nietzsche, F. 1956. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. F. Golfing. Garden City, NY:

The phenomenological movement, too, was in large measure a response to a growing sense of a "crisis" in European rationality and science, as expressed in the very title of Edmund Husserl's last and most impassioned and provocative book, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*. As for Schelling, the "crisis" for Husserl entailed a growing tension between metaphysical principles of Nature and Spirit, of Life and Reason,[7] but it was more profoundly manifest in a growing existential chasm between scientific, theoretical accounts of the world and the experienced, everyday sense of the world, or what Husserl termed the "*Lebenswelt*," wherein humans experience life as meaningful. Husserl identified Galileo's mathematical schematization of nature as a key event in the history of this crisis. The experienced world, in which the sun rises and sets, was displaced by a view in which such life-world experiences are rendered as mere illusions: the sun only appears, to the non-scientific eye, to rise and set. To this example we might add others that developed as Western science advanced: seemingly "free" persons became merely causally determined mechanisms. Love as a decidedly spiritual experience is described scientifically as a mere set of bio-chemical processes. The "real world," according to the new science, is not the one experienced first-hand through the senses but an array of circles, vortices, and forces, described best mathematically--a world of Platonic forms.

The issue behind the displacement of the life-world by such theoretical formalisms, according to Husserl, was not one of truth: it was not a question of whether or not such scientific accounts provide "correct" or accurate depictions of the world as it is in itself. Rather, the question, for Husserl--someone primarily trained as a mathematician--was, "*What is the meaning of this mathematization of nature?*"[8] As he wrote, in perhaps his most pointed description of the crisis of European science, which we quote at length because it provides a key link to American pragmatism: "Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.…In our vital need--so we are told--this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the questions which humanity, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence.…What does science have to say about … us humans as subjects of … freedom? The mere science of bodies has nothing to say; it abstracts from everything subjective.…Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have meaning if the sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment?"[9]

As European science became more and more sophisticated in explaining the mechanisms by which we exist and the universe operates, it became increasingly inept in addressing the question of the meaning of our existence. The issue was not one of the "truthfulness" of science but a question of whether or not human existence, with all its suffering and despair, could find

Doubleday.

[7] Husserl, E. 1965. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man." In: *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer. New York: Harper and Row, 152.

[8] Husserl, E. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 23. Emphasis in the original.

[9] *Ibid.,* 6-7.

such a world-view bearable. Europe, Husserl proclaimed, was spiritually "sick": "Europe … is in critical [spiritual] condition."[10]

Husserl's remedy for the crisis of European science was transcendental phenomenology, whose genetic method traces the growth and development of theoretical scientific abstractions out of their life-world origins, thereby retrieving the life-world meanings of those abstractions from their obscurity and revealing the organic connection between them and scientific theorizings.

Max Scheler described the crisis as a perversion of the relationship between life and the machine: "With the development of modern civilization, … *the machine* has grown to dominate life. 'Objects' have progressively grown in vigor and intelligence, in size and beauty--while humans, who created them, have more and more become cogs in their own machine….The mere means are developed and the goals are forgotten. And that precisely is decadence."[11] Western science had succeeded in keeping alive longer human life that experienced itself as less and less worth living: Western man was in danger of dying--spiritually if not biologically--not from a shortage of food but from spiritual malnutrition, a lack of meaning. "[E]verything living and vital is eliminated from this strange picture [in the modern scientific account]. This world is an accumulation of logicians standing in a huge engine-room--bloodless, emotionless, without love or hate."[12]

Martin Heidegger, in turn, located the crisis of European science in technology, understood not so much as a collection of gadgetry but as a mode of "enframement" ("*Gestell*") that allows Being to disclose itself (*poiesis*) only through static, predetermined categories, not in itself, as *physis*, but only in accordance with prevailing, a priori formalisms, that is, as *techne*.[13] As with Husserl, the crisis of European science was one of meaning: the technological enframement of the world obscured the meaning of Being; Western technology had forgotten the meaning of Being, which Heidegger's whole life-long project aimed to recover.

The body of literature in continental philosophy and literature that speaks of this crisis in Western science is huge--we have not even mentioned Kierkegaard, Berdyaev, Ortega y Gasset, Durkheim, or, more recently, Habermas--but the examples above are sufficient for our purpose of showing a similar concern in the beginnings of American pragmatism.

Classical American philosophy gave its own renditions of this crisis in meaning and its own remedies to it, sometimes in ways strikingly similar to those of its European counterparts. Ralph Waldo Emerson already expressed concern about a growing tendency to experience the world in second-hand ways. In "The American Scholar" he famously opens by asking, "Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?"[14] This decrying of the loss of "an original relation to the universe" bears especially striking resemblance to Heidegger's talk of our forgetfulness of the meaning of Being, the loss of an original relationship to Being, as a result of technological enframement.[15]

[10] Husserl, E. 1965. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man." In: *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer. New York: Harper and Row, 150.
[11] Scheler, M. 1961. *Ressentiment*, trans. W. W. Holdheim, ed. L. Coser. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 172, 174.
[12] *Ibid.*, 164.
[13] Heidegger, M. 1977. "The Question Concerning Technology," trans. W. Lovitt. In: *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 293-95.
[14] Emerson, R. W. 1957. "Nature." In: *Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. S. E. Whicher. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 21.
[15] Stanley Cavell, too, sees striking similarities between Emerson and Heidegger on these matters. "Aversive Thinking: Emersonian Representations in Heidegger and Nietzsche." In: *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism*, The Carus Lectures, 1988. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, 33-63.

The relationship of spirit to nature was no necessarily dichotomous one for Emerson, although the former was commonly experienced as alienated from the latter in the present age, without Emerson having the benefit of that word made famous by Marx ("alienation"). "Particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts," Emerson told us, and "Nature [in general] is the symbol of spirit [in general]."[16] Modern humanity, however, had somehow forgotten how to "see" this ontologically analogical relationship: Nature appeared as mere sensuous surface and had lost its power to signify spiritual realities. The problem for Emerson, as Stanley Cavell well points out, was one of skepticism, but a skepticism that expresses itself not merely in epistemological uncertainty. Rather, the skepticism was existential, a felt distrust of one's relationship to the world, a feeling that one's senses could not be trusted and that the world was hence no longer one's home.

So, too, Henry David Thoreau ventured to Walden Pond to recover an "original relation to the universe" that had somehow become lost. In proclaiming, "The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation,"[17] he chillingly announced this crisis of meaning, and in going to the woods he offered a remedy for it: "I went to the woods because I wanted to live deliberately …. and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; … I wanted … to know [life] by experience."[18] Through such a deliberate act Thoreau aimed to cut through the alienation from life that, he thought, plagued his age, and like Heidegger he, throughout *Walden*, suggested that recent technologies had something to do with this alienation.

It is perhaps William James, though, who, among both Europeans and Americans, best personified and embodied the crisis of European science. Once an aspiring painter, he was educated in the biological sciences of the day, only to discover that those sciences had nothing to say to him about the *meaning* of the life that they explained and classified. Indeed, note the stunning similarities between the following, biting commentary from James's "The Will to Believe" and the lengthy passage from Husserl quoted above: "When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness …. Can we wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science [we again note the gendered language] should feel like spewing [all] subjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which grow up in the schools of the science go dead against its toleration; so that it is only natural that those who have caught the scientific fever should pass over the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the incorruptibly truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness and unacceptableness to the heart in its cup.

> It fortifies my soul to know
> That, though I perish, Truth is so"[19]

And elsewhere: "This systematic denial on science's part of the personality as a condition of events, this rigorous belief that in its own essential and innermost nature our world is a strictly impersonal world, may conceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove to be the very defect that our descendents will be most surprised at in our boasted science, the omission that to their eyes will

[16] Emerson, R. W. 1957. "Nature." In: *Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. S. E. Whicher. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 31.
[17] Thoreau, H. D. 1968. *Walden and Civil Disobedience: The Variorum Editions*, ed. W. Harding. New York: Washington Square Press, 5.
[18] *Ibid.*, 67.
[19] *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. J. J. McDermott. New York: The Modern Library, 1968, 720.

most tend to make it look perspectiveless and short.[20]

Much of James's personal depression stemmed from a sense of hopelessness that, whatever his own organic disposition, was fueled by modern science's account of the world as a causally determined mechanism, which, to James, made a joke of human longings for freedom and meaning. James, as he recounted, felt paralyzed and crushed: as he recorded in his journal: "Hitherto, when I felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into."[21] Why struggle, why bother to assert oneself boldly when, according to modern scientific accounts, all is causally determined: freedom is but chimera and all human quests for meaning are greeted by a cold, indifferent universe, which, frankly, doesn't give a damn? James, like Husserl, pondered, how are we to console ourselves with such a view of the universe and of life?

James, like Husserl, proposed, already in his *Psychology*, a genetic method, whereby abstract scientific concepts are traced back to concrete, everyday experience. More importantly, though, James turned to belief as the remedy for the crisis. Belief for him, however, was not merely a matter of cognitive assent: belief was a commitment to action, a willful determination to *make* some human aspiration real. Humans are no mere observers of coldly indifferent facts: they are active players in the universe, with a say, a vote, in what is to be and not to be. As James argued in "The Will to Believe," "*faith in a fact can help create the fact*."[22] Through willful acts of belief human agents break through the impersonal façade of the universe, as described by the sciences of his day, and humanize the world, make it theirs: through belief, "The universe is no longer a mere *It* to us, but a *Thou*."[23] As James described his own recovery from debilitating depression through willful, active belief: "My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will…. and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by acting…. For the present then remember: care little for [metaphysical] speculation; much for the *form* of my action." Rather than suicide, "now I go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power…. I will posit life (the real, the good) in the self-governing *resistance* of the ego to the world. Life shall [be built in] doing and suffering and creating."[24]

Although not speaking with the same existential urgency as Husserl and James, Dewey was no less attuned to the crisis they described. Dewey, too, criticized how the sciences of his day--natural and social sciences alike--anchored in an array of false metaphysical dichotomies, had grown increasingly detached from everyday, practical experience. This tendency manifest itself first and foremost, perhaps, in philosophy: philosophy had become increasingly concerned with the solving of logical puzzles created by professional philosophers and decreasingly with the actual, concrete problems of life--social as well as personal.[25] One of Dewey's remedies was nothing less than a radical redefinition of the very meaning of philosophical rigor: philosophical rigor is to be defined, not so much in terms of formalized

[20] James, W. 1986. "Address of the President before the Society for Psychical Research" (1896). In: *Essays in Psychical Research.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 136-37.
[21] *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. J. J. McDermott. New York: The Modern Library, 1968, 8.
[22] *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. J. J. McDermott. New York: The Modern Library, 1968, 731. Emphasis in the original.
[23] *Ibid*., 733.
[24] *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. J. J. McDermott. New York: The Modern Library, 1968, 7-8. Emphasis in the original.
[25] I have in mind here Dewey's famous dictate: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, vol. 10: 1916-1917. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980, 46.

procedures whereby one moves from premises to conclusions, increasingly with the aid a symbolic logic indistinguishable from mathematics, but in terms of fidelity to experience. Such rigor was anchored in Dewey's "postulate of immediate empiricism," whereby "things--anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing'--are what they are experienced as,"[26] by contrast to the tendency in modern science that Husserl described, to displace the world as experienced in everyday life with its own abstract, formalized accounts . Following this postulate, philosophical theorizing and that of the other sciences in turn "recover" and "reconstruct" themselves in a double-barreled manner. In the name of philosophical rigor, Dewey insisted, first, that every intellectual inquiry begin with clear articulation of the concrete problem that motivates it: why is this an existential, *human* problem, rather than merely an intellectual puzzle for the professional scholar? Second, once we arrive at our theoretical conclusions, we return to the existential problem that motivated the inquiry, to be certain that our conclusions do not provide merely intellectual satisfaction but contain practical value in solving the problems of life that motivated the inquiry in the first place.

In addition to and more profoundly than this method of recovery and reconstruction, though, Dewey followed Emerson and Thoreau (and also his anarchist friend Emma Goldman[27]) in suggesting that the crisis of modern life, whereby scientific reason feels increasingly detached from matters of the meaning of life, might be overcome through a renewal of what Cavell describes as an aesthetic sense of the ordinary.[28] A further symptom of the crisis of modern technological life was the growing reduction of the aesthetic and of what is termed "art," to objects and performances confined to museums and concert halls, and Dewey was greatly disturbed by "the chasm between ordinary and esthetic experience" that this created, the growing gap between the increased production of such objects, often funded by the wealth of the rising bourgeoisie, and the increasing ugliness in the lives of ordinary workers.[29] The remedy, Dewey suggested, in *Art as Experience*, was a reconception of art in terms of an aesthetics of existence: we must think of aesthetics less in terms of the production of art objects and increasingly in terms of the "art of living," wherein art objects work to enrich human experience; that is, we must rethink art in terms of the cultivation of human growth, the promotion of the human organism's capacity for new experiences, ever-increasingly complex and rich. Through a recovery of an aesthetic sense of the ordinary, the commonplace, the wounds of the crisis might be healed and a feeling for the meaning of everyday life restored. In this regard and as I have shown elsewhere,[30] classical American philosophy responded to the crisis of modern science in this manner well ahead of continental philosophers: only in the late 20th century, with thinkers such as Michel Foucault, does one find on the continent a similar concern with the aesthetics of everyday existence and the "art of living."

Another major aspect of this crisis of Western science, which we can only mention briefly here, is the crisis of community, articulated in Europe by the likes of Ferdinand Toennies,[31] Max Scheler,[32] Werner Sombart,

[26] Dewey, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism". In: *The Middle Works*, vol. 3, 241.
[27] On the possible influences of Goldman upon Dewey, see Lynne M. Adrian, "Emma Goldman and the Spirit of Artful Living: Philosophy and Politics in the Classical American Period." In: *Frontiers in American Philosophy*, ed. R. W. Burch and H. J. Saatkamp, Vol. I. College Station: Texas A & M University, 1992, 191-99.
[28] Dewey's indebtedness to Emerson on this point is apparent in his essay "Emerson—The Philosopher of Democracy". In: *The Middle Works*, vol. 3, 184-92.
[29] Dewey, J. *Art as Experience*. In: *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953*, Vol. 10: 1934. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987, 14-16.
[30] Stikkers, K. 2009. "The 'Art of Living': Aesthetics of Existence in Foucault and American Philosophy," *Radical Philosophy Review* 12, nos. 1-2, 339-53.
[31] Toennies, F. 1957. *Community and Society*, trans. and ed. Ch. P. Loomis. New York: Harper & Row.
[32] Scheler, M. 1961. *Ressentiment*, trans. W. W. Holdheim, ed. L. Coser. New York: Free Press of

and Emile Durkheim and in America by Josiah Royce and Jane Addams, among many others. What these thinkers point to is a growing gap between the norms of traditional community (*Gemeinschaft*), based in a *feeling* of a common life--family, custom, and tradition--and the growing demands of industrial society (*Gesellschaft*), rooted in rational principles of social contract, industrial efficiency, and "scientific management." For example, throughout her writings Addams was attentive to the growing, felt chasm between family life and work, as experienced by those with whom she dealt in the settlement house, the loss of an organic connection between family and work that was enjoyed by traditional agrarian communities.[33]

My aim here, then, has been to call attention to a common motivation behind the rise of classical American pragmatism and developments in European philosophy at the same time, especially phenomenology. On both sides of the Atlantic leading philosophers were responding to a perceived "crisis" of meaning, stemming from a growing chasm between Western science's theoretical accounts of the world and the concrete experiences of everyday life. What does this new age of science and technology mean in terms of the quality of concrete experiences of life? In light of such shared concerns, it should not be surprising, then, that numerous scholars have found striking similarities between American pragmatism and radical empiricism, on the one hand, and European phenomenology and existentialism, on the other: both are descriptions, diagnoses, and remedies of and for this crisis. Given that part of Dewey's remedy for this crisis was to insist, in the name of philosophical rigor, that inquiries begin with careful attention to the existential problems that motivate them, it is surprising that more attention has not been paid to this "crisis" of meaning as a common existential motive behind the inquiries of American pragmatists and continental phenomenologists, although much has been written about similarities in the inquiries themselves.

Not only, though, need we look more carefully at the experienced problem--the crisis--that motivated classical pragmatism and classical phenomenology, but, in accord with the second part of Dewey's call for the recovery and reconstruction of philosophy and science, we might examine the extent to which pragmatic and phenomenological inquiries have adequately addressed the crisis that motivated them at their starts: to what extent is a sense of "crisis" still with us regarding our present-day sciences? To what extent is there still a perceived gap between the abstract inquiries and theorizings of science and everyday life-world experiences? As one who works especially in the philosophy of economics I can attest that a sense of crisis, in the way described above, is profoundly present in contemporary economic science:[34] leading economists note that the pronouncements of their profession are increasingly disconnected from the lives of ordinary people, undermining confidence in that profession and the governments that it advises.[35] Thus my sense is that work begun by classical American pragmatists and classical continental phenomenologists in healing the crisis of meaning in modern Western science is far from over.

Glencoe,165-67.

[33] E.g., Addams, J. 2001. *Democracy and Social Ethics.* Champaign. IL: University of Illinois Press, 94-95.

[34] See my "Phenomenology and Economic Science." In: *Descriptions*, ed. D. Ihde and H. Silverman. Stony Brook: State University of New York Press, 1985, 211-22.

[35] E.g., Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A. and Fitoussi, J.-P. 2010. *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up.* New York: The New Press, xxi.

JOHN DEWEY'S LEGACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY[1]

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Why would anyone today think that John Dewey's ideas are still relevant to the problems of the second decade of the 21st century? For one thing, the six decades since his death in 1952 have seen enormous technical, demographic, climatic, economic, and cultural changes, to name just a few. For another, at the time of death his ideas had already been out of fashion for more than a decade. Nor would they get much in the way of respect during the remainder of the 20th century. Nostalgia aside, do we have any good reasons for continuing to read Dewey with an eye to our current situation?[2]

Tracing Lines of Intellectual Influence

Historians of philosophy and intellectual historians might answer this question by reminding us that there is still much that we do not understand about Dewey's role in the history of philosophy, and more specifically about his contributions to the development of American pragmatism and the philosophy of education. Examination of the ways his ideas relate to those of Peirce, James, Mead, Addams, and others, and especially to the many female teachers and school principals who were his collaborators and, as he said, his inspiration as well – all of this holds the promise of expanding our understanding not only of the past, but of our present and future as well.

Lines of influence between Dewey and William James, for example are at this point far from clear. Since Dewey was not particularly keen on preserving his correspondence, the entire known extant James/Dewey correspondence comprises only 26 letters. We do know for example, that Dewey had already absorbed James's 1890 *Principles of Psychology* within a year of its publication. We also know that the 31 year-old Dewey did not shy from writing to James, pointing out certain peculiarities of that work. In one remarkable letter he writes to James that "'on page 369 (I)4 you virtually fall into the meshes of the 'psychologic fallacy.'"[3] Nevertheless, Dewey was so impressed with James's work that he immediately initiated a two-semester course at the University of Michigan dedicated to the *Principles*. The lines of mutual influence between James and Dewey, I suggest, require further scholarly attention.

As for Dewey's relation to Peirce, if one has an eye for such matters it is possible to find scattered throughout Dewey's work sets of "threes" that bear a remarkable resemblance to Peirce's firsts, seconds, and thirds. Consider, for example, Dewey's discussion in chapter nine of *Experience and Nature* of the failure of purported works of art to be fully fine, in the sense of final, because they have become merely instrumental to some non-aesthetic purpose. First, some fail because they constitute no more than self-expression. Second, others fail because they are little more than reactions to existing programs and projects in the art world. And third, still others fail because they are little more than exhibits of commercial or political commodification. Is it

[1] A portion of this paper, the section on economics, was presented at the 10th East-West Philosophers' Conference, at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii Manoa, May 2011. The full paper will be published in the proceedings volume.

[2] References to John Dewey's published works are to the critical (print) edition, *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953*, edited by J. A. Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1991, and published in three series as *The Early Works*: *1882-1898*, *The Middle Works*: *1898-1924*, and *The Later Works*, *1925-1953*. These designations are followed by volume and page number. "LW.1.14", for example, refers to *The Later Works*, volume 1, page 14. In order to insure uniform citations of the standard edition, the pagination of the print edition has been preserved in *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953: The Electronic Edition*, edited by L. A. Hickman. Charlottesville, Virginia: InteLex Corp., 1996.

[3] 1891.05.06 (00458): John Dewey to William James. *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-2007*. L. A. Hickman, General Editor. *Volume 1: 1871-1918*, fourth edition. *Volume 2: 1919-1939*, third edition. *Volume 3: 1940-1952*, second edition. *Volume 4: 1953-2007*, first edition. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation, 2008.

too much of a stretch to interpret this text as a discussion of three failures of putative art objects as 1) qualitative expression without regard to another, 2) overt reaction to a second, and 3) the intrusion of an irrelevant third element between the artist and his or her materials and his or her public? Is it too much to detect an echo of Peirce's categories in this material? Regarding Mead, much more briefly, it is arguable, and in fact highly probable, that Dewey borrowed from his close friend much of his own treatment of the formation of the self. Jane Addams also enters the picture. Dewey's letters to his wife Alice bear unassailable testimony to his debt to Addams concerning issues of great social import. And the story of Dewey's relation to his teachers is a project that cries out for attention. The phrase "Dewey's teachers" is of course ambiguous: there were teachers who worked for and with him, but there were also those who taught him a great deal. They included Elsie Ripley Clapp, Anita McCormick Blaine, Myrtle McGraw, Frances Bradshaw, and many others.

For those more interested in the specifics of tracking anticipations and influences across philosophical orientations, the question of Dewey's relevance might be addressed by considering the ways that Dewey anticipated some of the insights of his younger contemporaries such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein, both of whom were 30 years his junior. As we know, some of the ideas about technology and tool use that Dewey advanced in 1916 in both *Essays in Experimental Logic* and *Democracy and Education* anticipated Heidegger's treatment of "Vorhandenheit" and "Zuhandenheit," by at least a decade. And his 1893 essay "The Superstition of Necessity" argued, well before Wittgenstein's 1921 *Tractatus*, that existential necessity is merely a "superstition." Wittgenstein would later write a German version of that very claim: "*Der Glaube an den Kausalnexus is der Aberglaube.*"[4] Of course Dewey also anticipated the later Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* as well, when he argued that language is instrumental, when he rejected the idea of a private language, and when he demolished the "picture theory" of language.

I have little doubt that these facts are well known. I emphasize them here because there continues to be considerable confusion regarding what the founding pragmatists actually said and accomplished. Here is Anthony Gottlieb in his July 1, 2012 review of Carlin Romano's book *America the Philosophical*, published on the front page of the *New York Times Book Review*: "According to pragmatism, our theories should be judged by their practical value rather than by their accuracy in representing the world. The ultimate fate of this idea was neatly put by a great American philosophical wit, Sidney Morgenbesser, who said it was all very well in theory, but it didn't work in practice. He meant that pragmatism sounds like a good ruse, but it emerges as either trivial or incoherent when you flesh it out." Continuing, he writes that "[t]here are weaker strains of philosophical pragmatism, which investigate the meaning of our concepts by looking at how we use them. But this idea is mainly the property of Wittgenstein. . . ."[5]

Time does not permit me to list all the things that are wrong with Gottlieb's remark. I will only suggest that until the record of Dewey's contributions to technical philosophy are better known, including the fact that he anticipated by at least two decades Wittgenstein's turn to an instrumental view of language and that the theory was hardly Wittgenstein's "property" – until those historical accuracies are honored in reviews and journals of opinion, there is still much work to be done.

[4] Wittgenstein, L. 1986. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1986, 5.1361.

[5] Andrew Gottleb, review of *America the Philosophical* by Carlin Romano, The New York Times Book Review, July 1, 2012, 1 and 14-15.

Hermeneutic Integrity of the Text

In the last paragraph I began my transition from suggestions about the relevance of histories of philosophical developments and studies of lines of influence to a discussion of the continuing relevance of Dewey's technical philosophy. There is first, and perhaps most importantly, the question of fealty to the text. In other words, to what extent have contemporary philosophers (leaving aside the casual remarks of less technically informed journalists) – to what extent have contemporary philosophers gotten Dewey right? Complicating the matter, we are perhaps all aware that at least one famous philosopher suggested that even if Dewey didn't say what *he* said he said, then he *should* have said what *he* said he said.

Others, viewing Dewey's work through the lens of 20th century Anglo-American analytic philosophy, have found "mistakes" where the relevant text, presented to a candid world, would indicate no such mistakes. Robert Brandom, for example has argued that one of the mistakes of the classical pragmatists (including Dewey, it is supposed) is that they looked only "downstream" to the consequences of belief, thus missing an important feature of contemporary semantic theories, namely that the antecedents of belief encountered "upstream" as the circumstances of appropriate application are correlative to consequences and therefore must be taken into account. But to argue in this manner is to fail to note a crucial distinction Dewey made in his 1938 *Logic*– a distinction certainly familiar to most or all of us in this room – between language adopted for purposes of communication more generally, or what Locke called "civil language," and "language that is determined *solely by prior inquiries* related to the purposes of inquiry, the latter alone being logical in import" (LW.12.284, emphasis added). It is difficult to know how to read Dewey as saying something other than that a judgment that terminates a sequence of inquiry is true, that is, warranted as assertable, as a consequence of *prior* inquiries and as fitting within a previously problematic situation – "*prior*" here meaning nothing short of "upstream." So I submit that there remains work to be done calling the attention of some of the so-called "analytical" pragmatists to the actual details of the texts of classical pragmatism.

The Forward Reach of Dewey's Technical Philosophy: Dynamic Systems Theory

Beyond the important issues of hermeneutic integrity, if we are to talk of contemporary relevance there is also the very large question of the forward reach of Dewey's technical philosophy. In this regard it is safe to say that there are aspects of his work that are only now beginning to be appreciated and that continue to provide the stimulus for cutting-edge research programs. Dewey's 1896 essay on "The Reflex Arc in Psychology" stands out as a prime example of this phenomenon.[6] W. Teed Rockwell, a leader in the field of dynamic systems theory, has said this about as clearly as it can be said. "If Dewey had been your ordinary run-of-the mill prophetic genius, he would have used his classic 1896 article "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" to predict the downfall of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive psychology almost a century later. Instead he leapfrogged over both behaviorism and cognitive psychology, and articulated the basic principles of dynamic systems theory."[7] In brief, Dewey's 1896 essay takes us well beyond Skinner, Watson, Chomsky, and Fodor, to name a few, by refusing to register information as atomic moments that are somehow welded together. He argued instead, in Rockwell's felicitous paraphrase, that "we respond to each perception with a set of behavior patterns, which normally help to fulfill a purpose of some sort. The behavior itself also exists within a range of possibility spaces, and acquiring skill is setting up consistent and useful correlations between

[6] EW.5.96-110.
[7] Rockwell, W. T. 2005. *Neither Brain nor Ghost*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 177.

perceptual space and behavioral space; or to put it more colloquially, learning to do the right thing at the right time. . . ."[8] Here is Dewey himself in *Experience and Nature*:"The thing essential to bear in mind is that living as an empirical affair is not something which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism: it is always an inclusive affair involving connection, interaction of what is within the organic body and what lies outside in space and time, and with higher organisms far outside."[9] Research in what Tibor Solymosi has termed "neuropragmatism" appears to have a rich future, and there is little doubt that Dewey's work, including his "reflex arc" essay, will continue to be relevant to further research in this promising program. The forward reach of Dewey's technical philosophy continues to have great potential in this area of research.

The Forward Reach of Dewey's Technical Philosophy: Conceptual-Propositional Theory

The forward reach of Dewey's technical philosophy is also evident in the related field of research into the corporeal-metaphorical basis of cognition. There is Mark Johnson, for example, whose 2007 book *The Meaning of the Body* demonstrates some of the ways that aesthetics and logic, as they are intertwined in Dewey's work, can have a significant impact on some of the basic assumptions of Anglo-American analytic philosophy of language.[10] Building on Dewey's insights in *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience*, he argues against what he calls the "conceptual-propositional theory of meaning" advanced by philosophers such as Quine, Searle, Davidson, Fodor, and Rorty.[11] As we know, the view they hold in common is that "[S]entences or utterances (and the words we use in making them) alone are what have meaning. Sentences get their meaning by expressing propositions, which are the basic units of meaning and thought." Moreover, "[A]ccording to this objective semantics, neither the syntactic rules, nor the logical relations, nor even the propositions themselves have any intrinsic relation to human bodies."[12]

Johnson, of course, will have none of that. His candidate for replacement of this widely accepted view is empirically obvious and beautifully stated: "if babies are learning the meaning of things and events, and if babies are not yet formulating propositions, then meaning and understanding must involve a great deal more than the ability to create and understand propositions and their corresponding linguistic utterances. . . . Meaning traffics in patterns, images, qualities, feelings, and eventually concepts and propositions."[13] Comparison of this statement with Dewey's remarks in *Experience and Nature* is instructive: "Every thought and meaning has its substratum in some organic act of absorption or elimination of seeking, or turning away from, of destroying or caring for, of signaling or responding. It roots in some definite act of biological behavior; our physical names for mental acts like seeing, grasping, searching, affirming, acquiescing, spurning, comprehending, affection, emotion are not just 'metaphors.'"[14] Given the continuing dominance of what Johnson calls the "conceptual-propositional theory of meaning," and given the considerable implications for philosophy of the alternatives presented by Dewey and Johnson, I would suggest that the forward reach of Dewey's technical philosophy offers an almost inexhaustible resource for reconstruction of the philosophy of language during the coming decades.

Teaching Logic

While we are on the subject of propositions, it seems worth pointing to an area where Dewey's ideas have not yet received adequate consideration, even though they

[8] *Ibid.*, 165-66.
[9] LW.1.215.
[10] Johnson, M. 2007. *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
[11] Ibid., 8.
[12] Ibid.
[13] *Ibid.*, 8-9.
[14] LW.1.221.

have enormous potential to change the ways that courses in introductory logic are taught. His treatment of logical propositions provides an interesting case. Dewey's larger logic, of course, inverts the traditional account. Whereas the traditional account begins with terms, which are combined into propositions, which are further combined to form arguments, Dewey instead begins with judgments, of which propositions are treated as component factors. Taken seriously, this alone would probably present a major headache to most authors of logic textbooks. Dewey, however, goes even further: he argues that propositions are neither true nor false, but rather appropriate or inappropriate, valid or invalid.

As they function in the logic of living inquiry, propositions are just proposals, and proposals are on their faces neither true nor false. In baseball, for example, a pitcher's offering to the batter is neither true nor false: it is merely a proposal until it enters into a judgment – that is, until it is judged to be true or false by the action of either the batter, or the umpire, or both. A batter's hit, based on his or her judgment regarding the appropriateness and validity of the pitch, is in turn a proposal to a fielder. The same may be said of a marriage proposal. The proposal may be sincere, valid, and relevant. But it is the judgment of the recipient of the proposal, and not the proposal itself, that carries the truth value. Thus does Dewey capture the rhythms– the delicate give and take – of living inquiry: propositions are proposals and judgments may be intermediate or final with respect to some end-in-view. It is perhaps also worth noting that in the film industry a proposal is also a pitch – neither true nor false until a judgment is made by a producer. Once again, Dewey's radical insights offer a rich resource for further research and exploration. How, for example, would introductory logic courses change were Dewey's logical works taken seriously? It seems fair to suggest that current studies of the predicate calculus would not be abandoned, for they are indeed useful, but that they would be embedded within a larger context of a theory of inquiry to which they were treated as ancillary.

In the few minutes that remain to me, I want to mention two additional areas in which Dewey's ideas continue to be relevant to 21st century concerns. The first is in the field of economics.

Economics

As we know, the heart of neo-classical economic synthesis is the idea that: people have rational preferences among outcomes; that individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits; and that people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.[15] But already in his 1898 essay "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" Thorstein Veblen had proposed supplanting the older economic models, based as they are on nineteenth century physics (and metaphysics), with newer ones that are rooted in the evolutionary models of the biological sciences.[16] He argued that neoclassical economic theory was in need of reconstruction because of its reliance on pre-Darwinian assumptions and outlooks.[17]

For his part, Dewey rejected a fundamental principle of the old economics, namely the idea that a Cartesian self floats free as an atomic economic entity, independent and with scant regard for institutional context. With respect to ethical considerations, Dewey wrote that "The individual disconnected from his social situation is ethically unreal, and no devices for instilling, through stories about him, lessons of truth-telling, patriotism, industry, etc., succeed in really concealing the moral

[15] See Weintraub, E. R. "Neoclassical Economics," *Concise Encyclopedia of Economics* <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html> Accessed 8 Sept. 2011.

[16] Veblen, T. "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 12, 1898, 373-97.

[17] My colleague Kenneth Stikkers reminds me that neoclassical economists now claim that even if their anthropology may be a bit off, their position nevertheless has strong predictive value.

unreality of the case."[18] Viewed from another angle, Dewey charged this notion of economic individualism with impeding the progress of science and technology. "For the most part," he wrote, "economic individualism interpreted as energy and enterprise devoted to private profit, has been an adjunct, often a parasitical one, to the movement of technical and scientific forces."[19]

Dewey summarized the problem with the neoclassical argument in the following way. "The essential fallacy is that the theory assumes that original and natural wants determine the economic phenomena of production and exchange. In fact, before they become economic wants–effective demands–they are reshaped by the existing distributive-exchange system. The market and business determine wants, not the reverse; the argument moves in a vicious circle." He then pointed out that the argument contains a logical mistake. There is an ambiguous middle term: "want" as psychological and "want" as actual demand are conflated.[20] Dewey's point is that putative fixes, such as the distinction between "absolute" demand and "effectual" demand merely fine tune the problem of hedonism. They do not fix it. Dewey's and Veblen's alternative offered economists an image of an embodied and socially contexted human being who is "a coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity."[21] This alternative to the neoclassical version *homo economicus* would not be isolated and autonomous, but situated and conditioned within the context of formative institutions of many and various types.

In other words, an evolutionary economic theory would take into account the history and present tendencies of the institutions that are instrumental to the formation of individuals and communities. The idea of a more or less static economic entity pushed and pulled by various forces but regularly returning to equilibrium would be replaced by a post-Darwinian model in which changing circumstances create newly informed and reconfigured individuals who are continually required to seek new ways of recalibrating their situation within those changing environments.

Current institutional economists, which include Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman, tend to accept a post-Darwinian model such as the one advanced by Veblen and Dewey. The same might be said of the proponents of the new "behavioral" economics. They do not eschew mathematical analysis, to be sure, but instead argue that our understanding of economic conditions requires that we take fuller account of the cultural contexts within which mathematical and statistical models operate. Institutionalists are thus highly critical of some of the "unquestioned" assumptions of the classical synthesis, such as most versions of "rational choice theory" and what they regard as subjectivist accounts of "utility."

In the competition between neoclassical and institutionalist economic models, the stakes are very high, and they once again underscore Dewey's relevance to our current situation. The current situation in China serves as an example. Institutionalist insistence on cultural context fits nicely, for example with arguments by sociologist Daniel A. Bell and others that the Chinese Communist Party will need to manage the country's economic development in ways that acknowledge and honor her Confucian traditions. To ignore those traditions would inevitably deform analyses of economic activity, effectively leaving them as exercises on a drawing board, isolated from the flux of real world events.

[18] MW.4.210.
[19] LW.5.85.
[20] LW.15.264. Economists in the 19th century distinguished between "absolute demand" and "effectual demand." In fine, the difference is between "I want x" and "I want x so much that I am willing to sacrifice y." Dewey responds that this distinction does not fix the hedonism problem.
[21] Veblen, T. "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 12, 1898, 390.

There are now strong indications that some of the new projects in institutional economics are beginning to get some traction. I call your attention, for example, to several essays produced by the Political Economy Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research, authored or co-authored by Alberto F. Alesina. Alesina writes of the increasing difficulty of fitting the various complexities of contemporary societies into the "traditional model of economic policy in which benevolent social planners maximize the utility of a representative individual." Some economists, he reports, have "started exploring how political forces affected the choice of policies, paying special attention to the distributive conflicts and political institutions, which are absent in representative agent models."[22]

If we add analysis of underlying ethical issues to this, we get something very much like Dewey's analysis of desiderata for projects in economics. And if we add the specifics of institutional influences in traditionally Confucian societies, I suggest, then we get important resources to bring to the continuing discussions about the future of democratic forms of life in those societies.

Education

I have saved the most important part of my discussion of Dewey's continuing relevance for last, but, regrettably, my remarks must be brief. It is by now hardly a secret that there is an educational crisis in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere. Here is a story from the New York Times: "Public Money Finds Back Door to Private Schools." Here is another: "Military Children Stay a Step Ahead of Public School Students." Here is a third: "Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools."

Dewey's insights into education are arguably now more relevant than ever in the field of education. Even though there are exceptions, and I will mention some of those in a moment, educational policies and practices are tending in the opposite direction of the broad-based humanistic educational programs for which Dewey fought so hard. What are these trends?

First, there is an emphasis on standardized tests and teaching to the test that extends from K-12 up now into higher education. This type of system, which has long been a feature of schools in China, Japan, and elsewhere, has produced the infamous "cram schools." The "No Child Left Behind" initiative, that was put into place by the George W. Bush administration and is now being slightly modified by Obama's secretary of education, incorporates some of the worst features of those Asian systems. Dewey, of course, was a strong opponent of the type of rote memorization that is required for high level performance on such tests.

Why is it the case, as the *New York Times* reports, that "Military Children Stay A Step Ahead of Public School Students"? Among possible factors listed in that report, the one that immediately arrests the eye is that military schools are not required to teach to the test. Standardized tests are used, but they are used in the ways that Dewey recommended: in order to assess a student's abilities and weaknesses, and as a test of the effectiveness of the curriculum. The curriculum itself is more diverse and the emphasis is on learning to learn rather than memorizing facts that will soon be forgotten. Other factors include smaller class size and amicable relations between teachers and management. One of the consequences of this approach seems to be that the achievement gap that plagues some public schools does not appear to exist in schools run by the American Department of Defense.

Second, in the United States there is a growing movement toward Charter Schools. Even though such schools tend to be funded with public dollars, there are in most cases inadequate safeguards against

[22] Alesina, A. F. "Program Report," *NBER Reporter* 3 (2007). <http://www.nber.org/programs/pol/pol.html> Accessed 8 September 2011.

discrimination in the selection of students or required sectarian religious instruction. Dewey, by contrast, was a strong proponent of what he regarded as the democratizing tendencies of public education, and he argued that a democratic society must put in place safeguards against discrimination and taxpayer-funded religious instruction.

Third, there is a growing movement in the field of home schooling and virtual schooling. Home schooling tends to be particularly prevalent among religious fundamentalists who want to shield their children from contact with those with whom they disagree. Dewey, by contrast, regarded the public school as a primary agent of socialization, a place where children can be exposed to difference in ways that are of benefit not only to them and their parents, but to the wider society as well. Some schooling at home is virtual schooling provided by for-profit charter schools operated entirely online, at taxpayer expense. According to the report I mentioned, such companies utilize public funds for advertizing and to lobby legislators for additional funding. Morever, when compared to all schools in Pennsylvania, to take just one example, on-line schools were shown to lag significantly in terms of performance.

Fourth, there is also the related matter of "for-profit" universities, which in the United States are draining enormous sums of money away from public institutions of higher learning. Some of these institutions, according to reliable reports, have tended to mislead their students and prospective students not only about prospects of future employment, but the legitimacy of their expected degree as well. Compounding the problem, many students attending questionable for-profit universities receive public support that they then spend on tuition, tuition payments that could have been spent at public or private non-profit universities.

A two-year study by the U. S. Congress, released on August 1, 2012, paints a picture of for-profit higher education that is grim indeed. In the 2009 fiscal year, the colleges examined spent $4.2-billion (22.7 percent of all revenue) on marketing, advertising, recruiting, and admissions staffing. They spent $3.6-billion (19.4 percent of all revenue) on profit. And they spent $3.2-billion (17.2 percent of all revenue) on instruction.[23] As I write, the State of California has apparently begun to address some of these corrupt practices by denying CalGrant funds to the worst offenders. As we know, Dewey argued against corporate corruption and for the proposition that public funds should serve the public, and not narrow corporate interests.

In the few minutes allotted to me I have attempted to address the issue of Dewey's continuing relevance by discussing issues that involve the tracking of influence within the history of philosophy, the hermeneutic integrity of the texts of classical pragmatism, the forward reach of Dewey's technical philosophy as it applies to dynamic systems theory and reform of the teaching of logic, economic theory, and education. I have suggested that Dewey's project remains relevant and that progressive philosophers, historians, economists, and educators can find within it continuing insights that will serve to advance their own research agendas.

[23] Source: The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 30, 2012. <http://chronicle.com/article/A-Damning-Portrait-of/133253/?cid=at&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en>

II. Pragmatist Aesthetics.
Art, Experience, and Practices of Art

INTRODUCTORY:

PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS.

ART, EXPERIENCE, AND PRACTICES OF ART

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Pragmatist aesthetic theory is always in the making; it allows one to become a creator and not simply an observer. The pragmatist approach to the theme is two fold. In one respect philosophical theory sheds light on art practices and the experience of art. At the same time innovative forms of art and contemporary art practices contribute to the development of pragmatist aesthetics. The seven papers presented in this section explore both dimensions of this relation and at the same time act accordingly – they follow either deductive or inductive reasoning and take either aesthetics or art as a starting point. In general, the focal theme is the understanding of art that is pioneered in the works by John Dewey.

Roberta Dreon in her paper argues that Dewey's approach to aesthetics can exert a peculiarly 'refreshing' effect on the traditional analytical debate in the philosophy of art. She considers three strictly related concepts that, as she states, shape Dewey's distinctive point of view: "aesthetic experience", "aesthetic quality", and "consummation". Through her inquiries into these three concepts Dreon demonstrates that Dewey's conception of art makes sense of our common experiences and of our interaction with the environment. The interaction leads to the notion of consummatory experience and enjoyment, and to the understanding of art forms that do not fit traditional categories.

It is well known that pragmatist aesthetic theory does not operate with such categories as beauty and does not single out fine arts as the true ones. The representational theory of mind does not work in pragmatist aesthetics because mind and body are treated not as two separate entities but as an inseparable whole in their continuity. Meaning is embodied meaning, which "emerges as structures of organism-environment interactions or transactions" (Johnson, Mark, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. xii). Falling back on Mark Johnson's theory allows one to explore "the bodily depths of human meaning-making" that takes place in various situations, including the media environment and cinematography, where the visceral connection to the world is a more complicated case of interaction and mediation, and which involves several perceiving and interacting subjects.

Taking this path, Mikhail Stepanov considers the role of pragmatist philosophy of media in the development of the philosophical study of media. From his point of view pragmatism, with its central focus on experience, practice and embodiment, proves to be a precise tool for philosophical scholars of media as both the public and the professional worlds are permeated by the media, and people continuously interact with the world, with others and with themselves through media. The task of a pragmatic philosophy of media, as Stepanov understands it, is to study medial experiences. In Stepanov's view these experiences are acquired in the process of interaction between artifacts and patterns of perception. Once again, the key word here is common everyday experience, which is outside any categorization in terms of beauty or truth.

Cinematography, which is one kind of media, portrays characters in their environments, thus allowing a correlation of the body and consciousness in their continuity, and in the context of their environment. However, the cinematographic versions of interaction with the environment differ from the ones taking place in our world, not simply due to the character of the screen world and of cinematic representation but also to the multi-subject structure of organism-environment interaction. Lyubov Bugaeva in her quest for the making sense of watching movies in terms of experience arrives

at the idea of an 'active perception'. The process of watching movies from this point of view is a way of acting. While the viewer is immersed in the film flow he shapes and is shaped by the screen version of the environment. This ongoing interaction between the virtual and the real world builds the basis of enactive cinema and maybe even of the cinema of the future.

The ideas of lived experience, embodiment and interaction with environment, though taken in a different context and in different philosophical traditions that reveal unexpected similarities (Max Scheler and Williams James), permeate Rebecca Farina's paper. Art is seen as self-contained and at the same time connected with communal living. Similarly, Alex Kremer claims that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Shusterman's neopragmatism are much alike as they share such features as anti-foundationalism, pan-relationism, and anti-essentialism.

The theme of John Ryder's paper is also interaction and everyday life experience, though with a twist. Ryder explores the constitutive relations between city and countryside that he discovers and discloses. Contrary to the established semiotic opposition of civilization (city) and nature (countryside), Ryder claims that none of them prevails over the other and that both equally contribute to the enrichment of aesthetic experience and art production. Larry Hickman highlights the presence of the aesthetics dimension in commonplace things as well as the reciprocal and unbreakable ties between quotidian, lived experiences and fine, spiritual arts. He develops the contribution that quotidian aesthetics makes to our refined aesthetic environment and suggests that the objects of quotidian aesthetics are instrumental for creating art.

Taken as a whole, the seven papers on aesthetics presented in this volume reveal a number of principles of pragmatist aesthetics – experienciality that presupposes rootedness in common, lived experience; attention to the quotidian, which is seen as a source of 'fine' arts; the active and interactive character of art; complementarity, and embodiment. One hopes that the experience of reading them will itself be consummatory.

HOW TO DO DIFFERENT THINGS WITH WORDS:

WHY DEWEY'S AESTHETICS IS PECULIAR

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In this paper I intend to define some underlying features of Dewey's pragmatist aesthetics, distinguishing his own approach to this discipline from that of others. The very title of the paper – John Dewey's aesthetics – creates some embarrassment. For at least two and a half centuries we have been accustomed to think of aesthetics as a specific philosophical discipline, which is mainly characterized by exclusion. Aesthetics has been defined as sensitive cognition in opposition to intellectual knowledge, as subjective or intersubjective judgement, unable to capture any objective knowledge, as philosophy of art in contrast to the philosophy of nature, and as the contemplation of pure forms, detached from any practical interest. Above all, the birth of aesthetics as a specific discipline in Western culture has historically been linked to the affirmation in Europe and then in North America of a unitary system of the arts, i.e. to the emergence of a substantive idea of Art as a singular noun with a capital A, a process intimately related to the radical affirmation of the autonomy of artistic pursuits vis-à-vis other human activities.[1]

Therefore, we should at least try to limit this embarrassment by speaking of inclusive aesthetics in Dewey's case. I use the expression 'inclusive' because on the one hand the chief aim of this aesthetics is to find the aesthetic in experience, by both rooting it in the structural biological dependence of human organisms upon the natural and social environment of which they are part, and by seeking to recover the aesthetic aspects originally underlying our ordinary practices. From this perspective, Dewey's approach is characterized by two interrelated principles: "cultural naturalism" and ethical and political critical implications. On the other hand, Dewey proposes a broad concept of art, since this is understood as every "mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession".[2]

However, it would be too time-consuming to deal with these subjects in the present paper,[3] where I think it will be more fruitful to limit the inquiry by focusing on three expressions. It seems to me that they help define some specific aspects of pragmatism, distinguishing it from other philosophic traditions. These three words are more or less widely used and discussed in recent and contemporary philosophical debate, but Dewey used them to pursue very different goals from those prevailing in other philosophic reflections.

The first expression, which has been made the subject of a wider debate, is that of 'aesthetic experience'. I am going to argue that this expression is primarily used by the American philosopher in order to challenge the compartimentalization of works of art and their separation from our ordinary lives and to affirm the primary aesthetic connotations of our experiences. In Dewey's thought this formula appears to be used in a very different way from in either continental research on aesthetic autonomy or unsuccessful analytical attempts to define art.

The second expression, 'aesthetic qualities', has been broadly discussed in analytical aesthetics, but almost no attempts have been made to compare the term with Dewey's proposals.[4] Dewey's thesis is that we have to assume that qualitative aspects are basically part of our

[1] See P.O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics, Part I", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 12/4 (1951), pp 496-527 and "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics, Part II", 13/1 (1952), pp 17-46.

[2] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, *Volume 1:1925* of *The Later Works, 1925-1953* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1988), p. 269.

[3] I discussed these aspects of Dewey's thought in: *Fuori dalla torre d'avorio. L'estetica inclusiva di John Dewey oggi* (Marietti 1821, Genova-Milano, 2012).

[4] Except for some observations in: H. Putnam, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World* (Columbia U.P., New York, 1999).

common experiences, that they are modes of meaning of our environment and cannot be reduced to subjective phenomena or be restricted within special compartments.

The third expression, 'consummation' or 'consummatory experience', is actually connected to a wider lexical constellation, which includes 'enjoyment', 'satisfaction' and 'fulfilment'. Dewey's pragmatic approach is based on the recognition of our aesthetic needs, as conceived from a quasi-anthropological perspective; in this regard it differs substantially from the exclusively negative approach to art characterizing Adorno's critical theory. If aesthetic aspects have been removed from our ordinary experience, the arts cannot limit themselves to negating the present unequal and impoverishing conditions, but must pose the problem of finding alternative ways for improving our lives and for making our experience of the shared world more fruitful and satisfying for everyone.

1. What is 'aesthetic experience' for?

Let us begin from the first formula, which is 'aesthetic experience'. I shall start by arguing that, if we wish to understand what Dewey meant when talking of 'aesthetic experience' or, better, of those aesthetic aspects that are inherent in our experiences, we must not refer to Monroe Beardsley's definition. Rather, we should turn again to George Mead's interpretation, which may be found in a brief but significant essay published in 1926, "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience", a text that was written under the explicit influence of Dewey's *Experience and Nature*.[5]

The problem with Beardsley's approach is that he actually used some indications proposed by Dewey in *Art as Experience* in order to define an alleged "aesthetic value". But in Dewey's book these traits are meant to characterize what he called "an experience", that is an interaction that is marked out from most comings and goings of our environmental exchanges; it may be eminently artistic or peculiarly aesthetic, but it refers more generally to every kind of experience which comes to its consummation. Beardsley's displacement may be understood as an answer to the central problem of defining the concept of art, which became a pressing issue with Morris Weitz's famous article exploring the possibility of defining art after Wittgenstein, given some of the implications of his *Philosophical Investigations*.[6]

Beardsley adopts a general pragmatist point of view, that is an instrumentalist perspective with regard to the problem of understanding "what it would mean to say that something is a good aesthetic object, and how this could be shown to be true".[7] According to him, in order to answer this question we should focus on the peculiar kind of function an aesthetic object can perform that is on its capacity to engender an aesthetic experience. Indeed, in Beardsley's opinion the common feature characterizing the class of objects we call works of art would consist precisely in their ability to generate an aesthetic experience.

In order then to explain what such a peculiar experience might consist in, Beardsley expressly refers to Dewey (surprisingly comparing him with Kant), by recovering some of the underlying features which according to the American pragmatist characterize a complete experience, making it stand out from the continuous, habitual and often inconclusive flow of our interactions with the environment.

[5] See G.H. Mead, "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience", *International Journal of Ethics*, 36/4 (1926), pp 382-393 and M.C. Beardsley, "Aesthetic Experience Regained", *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 28/1 (1969), pp 3-11, M.C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics. Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (Hackett P.C., Inc.,, Indianapolis-Cambridge, 1981), in particular § 28, "The Instrumentalist Theory", pp 524-543.

[6] See M. Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 15/1 (1956), pp 27-35.

[7] M.C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics. Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, p. 524.

In this move from every experience, which can be identified as "an experience" to specifically artistic experiences, a number of restrictions come into play. The phenomenological relevance of a given experience and a person's awareness of how it stands out in his or her own memory or imagination are envisaged in terms of the peculiar attention elicited by a piece of art capturing one's aesthetic attention or causing an aesthetic experience. The vital intensification or enhancement of meaningful exchanges with the environment turns into the intensity of an artistic experience or into the peculiar kind of concentration inspired by works of art. The unitary and consummatory features of an experience change into the hallmark of that peculiar experience generated by a work of art, capable of producing its differentiation from other experiences: "The experience detaches itself, and even insulates itself, from the intrusion of alien elements".[8]

But as Richard Shusterman has argued,[9] Dewey's intention was not to distinguish art objects and the aesthetic experiences they generate from other kinds of things and other sorts of human practices. Using some of Dewey's ideas in order to define aesthetic experience and artistic objects means using a blunt weapon, an unsuitable tool that has been more or less rightly criticized on several fronts.[10]

On the contrary, the concern guiding Dewey's investigation is simply the continuity thesis, which is probably so familiar as to appear almost naïve, namely the thesis that you cannot understand orogenesis unless you start by investigating mountains rooted in the earth's crust, of which they are an integral part. In other words, you cannot understand those "refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art" unless you start from "everyday events, doings and sufferings, that are universally recognized to constitute experience".[11] But the peculiarity of Dewey's approach is not merely the fact that this continuity is based on the "biological obviousness" of human organisms' structural dependence upon the natural and social environment of which they are basic parts. The point is that his leading scientific questions converge with ethical and political ones. Why did so-called works of art turn into "ethereal things" that are separated from everyday practices and constitute the privileged possession or enjoyment of a few? Why do we consider it an obvious fact that there is no enjoyment in work, but that it must essentially coincide with exertion? Why do we also assume that satisfaction in a well-done work must remain alien to the logic of scientific research, for otherwise the work would risk losing its seriousness? Are we to give up in the face of the compartmentalization of artworks and their confinement to special places and times, or can we imagine more satisfying forms of engagement with our world? How can we contribute to enhancing our personal and shared experience?

Mead focuses his attention on just this kind of issue, stressing an intentionally broad and hopefully pervasive conception of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic aspects or phases of our ordinary experiences relate to the ability to enjoy things immediately, to appreciate what we are doing by avoiding solely focusing on the ends we are pursuing, in such a way as to enjoy (or suffer, I might add) only the experience constituting a particular practice and the situation in which it occurs – that is by enjoying, according to Mead's interpretation, the means

[8] Ibid., p. 528.
[9] R. Shusterman, "The End of Aesthetic Experience", *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 55/1 (1997), pp 29-41.
[10] See G. Dickie, "Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 62/5 (1965), pp 129-136 and N. Carrol, "Aesthetic Experience Revisited", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 42/2 (2002), pp 145-168, N. Carroll, *Beyond Aesthetics* (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 2001), esp. the chapter "Four Concept of Aesthetic Experience".
[11] J. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, *Volume 10:1934* of *The Later Works, 1925-1953* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1989), p. 9.

themselves instead of merely using them instrumentally, while being in fact completely absorbed by the results we have to achieve. Aesthetic appreciation, therefore, does not concern a particular class of objects, but the aptitude to let enjoyed meaning be a part of everyone's life.[12] In aesthetic appreciation we do not almost blindly pursue an end, regardless of the means used, but rather enjoy what we are doing; we stop in order to appreciate and contemplate what we are doing and undergoing, says Mead. But it is quite clear that the contemplation he is speaking of is not a disinterested gaze, turned to a particular set of objects. It is rather an ability to enjoy human activities as such.

Besides, in his characterization of aesthetic experience as consummatory experience Mead remained faithful to Dewey. The isolated individual is not a natural fact. He or she is the result of the competitive conditions of industrial society, and this is also true of the separation of enjoyment from work, which reduces the latter to mere exertion. In the actual situation where the division of labour has become an obvious given, it seems natural that the fruits of labour can only be enjoyed by a privileged few. But if we recover the basic biological idea that human interdependence is structural, i.e. that it is linked to the largely deficient constitution of our organism – as stated in *Human Nature and Conduct*[13] – then it is evident that "shared experience is the greatest of human goods" and that enjoying it is a way to enhance the experience of life itself.

From this point of view the aesthetic attitude appears a basic and healthy attitude, of which the so-called fine arts constitute a development, a refinement. But while the aesthetic attitude in contemporary society has been turned into a separate field and removed from other human practices, "the thirst of enjoyment is still there":[14] hence, it will look elsewhere for other possible satisfaction. In this perspective, the celebration of great artists can become a mere compensatory enjoyment for the absence of consummatory experiences in our ordinary life.

It is true, however, that in *Art as Experience*, which Mead could not have read when writing his article, Dewey poses the problem of distinguishing, albeit within the context of a basic continuity, between what is eminently artistic and the aesthetic, understood as a "primary phase in experience". Dewey reaches a solution by drawing upon the concept of having an experience that stands out in comparison to our usual and often inconclusive comings and goings with the world. But it is an answer that is explicitly based on differences of degree. It is certainly an unsuccessful solution if it is intended to draw a definite distinction between art and non-art, because it admittedly also applies to reading a novel, to confident participation in an election campaign, to a dinner with an old friend or to quarrelling with one's lover.[15]

But the point is still that Dewey does not wish simply to describe a state of affairs. He is much more interested in the question of what can we do, even on a philosophical level:

> … it is safe to say that a philosophy of art is sterilized unless it makes us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience, and unless it indicates why this function is so inadequately realized, and unless it suggests the conditions under which the office would be successfully performed.[16]

[12] G.H. Mead, *The Nature of Aesthetic Experience*, cit., p. 384.
[13] J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, *Volume 14* of *The Middle Works, 1899-1924* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1988).
[14] G.H. Mead, *The Nature of Aesthetic Experience*, cit., p. 387.
[15] See J. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of an Experience", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 17/3 (1957), pp 316-330 and D.C. Mathur, "A Note on the Concept of "Consummatory Experience" *in Dewey's Aesthetics*, 63/9 (1966), pp 225-231.
[16] J. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, cit., p. 17.

In my opinion this is the one aspect really qualifying Dewey's 'pragmatic' aesthetics. In this perspective it appears fully consistent with Pierce's thesis that the intellectual scope or the meaning of a theory must be measured against the effects that it is able to achieve in our life conduct.[17]

II. On aesthetic qualities

I am going to say some words now about 'aesthetic qualities', a term that significantly already appears before *Art as Experience* in *Experience and Nature*, where it plays a basic role in Dewey's conception of experience. On the other hand, the analytical discussion on the alleged aesthetic qualities was extensive and articulated and led to the introduction of the notion of aesthetic supervenience or emergentism. The major contributions here are those first by Frank Sibley and later by Jerrold Levinson.[18]

In a preliminary survey of this debate, the issues at stake ambiguously appear sometimes to relate to the same things and sometimes not. What I mean is that both Dewey and the two aforementioned authors often propose a number of adjectives to illustrate what is meant by aesthetic qualities, in the absence of criteria of definition; most significantly, their proposed lists appear partially analogous. Dewey states that in our continuous relations with our environment, things are naturally perceived as "poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful".[19] In "Being Realistic About Aesthetic Properties" Levinson provides a varied list of aesthetic attributes, which he distinguishes according to their greater or lesser evaluative force. These adjectives range from "striking, splendid, excellent, miserable" to "balanced, chaotic, unified" and "melancholy, anguished, cheerful" and "graceful, gaudy, garish".[20]

It is evident, however, that while for the American pragmatist the point was to detect a basic structure behind our interactions with the environment on which we depend, and, I would add, a basic trait of the common language in which we move, Sibley's and Levinson's main field of investigation is the art critic's vocabulary. Besides, their most important problem is that which underlies our modern aesthetic tradition, namely the possibility or impossibility of justifying our judgements about works of art, and of finding any realistic or subjective bases for supporting them. I nonetheless wish to argue that Dewey's reflections can be useful not in resolving difficulties in the analytical debate, but in resetting the terms of the debate itself.

In what follows, I shall broadly summarize some basic elements of the analytical debate on aesthetic qualities.

1. First of all, both authors present what should be meant by aesthetic concepts, qualities, judgements or expressions (Sibley) or by aesthetic attributes and properties (Levinson) by means of lists of examples such as those mentioned above. Whereas Levinson declares he is not addressing the question of "what counts as an

[17] See J.P. Cometti, *Qu'est-ce que le pragmatisme?* (Gallimard, Paris, 2010), p. 18. Thomas Alexander has expressed some doubts as to whether Dewey's aesthetics may be defined as 'pragmatist', because of the limited presence of this formula in *Art as Experience*.
[18] See F. Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts", in *The Philosophical Review*, 68/4 (1959), pp 421-450, F. Sibley, "Aesthetics and Nonaesthetics", in *The Philosophical Review*, 74/2 (1965), pp 135-159, J. Levinson, "Aesthetic Supervenience", in *Music, Art & Metaphysics. Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Oxford UP, Oxford-New-York, 2011), pp 134-158, J. Levinson, "Being Realistic about Aesthetic Properties", in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 52/3, 1994, pp 351-354, J. Levinson, "Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and Difference of Sensibility", in E. Brady, J. Levinson (ed.), *Aesthetic Concepts: Essays After Sibley*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001, pp 61-80.

[19] J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, cit., p. 82.
[20] J. Levinson, "Being Realistic about Aesthetic Properties", pp 351-352.

aesthetic attribute"[21], Sibley states that it is not possible to define this rigorously, adding that he believes there is "no need to defend the distinction".[22] According to him it is quite clear from our use of these kinds of words that when we say that something is "large, circular, green, slow, or monosyllabic", we are not formulating aesthetic judgements, while when we say that something is "graceful, dainty, or garish, or that a work of art is balanced, moving, or powerful" we are indeed doing so. The qualities that are expressed in this second set of cases would imply "an exercise of aesthetic sensitivity or perceptiveness", an exercise in taste. Non-aesthetic judgements are based on "natural, observable, perceptual, physical, objective and neutral" qualities.[23]

2. Both authors note these sorts of words are rather common in ordinary language too, but this kind of occurrence is clearly not the object of their scholarly interest. Levinson, in particular, considers these sorts of attributes in everyday conversation to be ambiguous, because both descriptive and evaluative aspects are typically intertwined with them.[24]

3. Sibley argues that there is a dependency relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic qualities or that the former emerge out of the latter. "Emergence" here means that while there are "non-aesthetic features which serve as conditions for applying aesthetic terms"[25], they cannot be considered as necessary and sufficient conditions. When I try to justify the judgment that a certain sculptural work is harmonious because it presents a good integration of full and empty spaces, the relationship between harmony and the integration of solids and voids is not a necessary and sufficient condition, but only a characteristic or typical one. In other words, there is no predetermined rule for correlating an aesthetic aspect to a non-aesthetic one.

Levinson's basic thesis is that "the aesthetic attributes of an object are supervenient on its nonaesthetic ones"[26], in the sense that the non-aesthetic properties of an object would not even provide any negative conditions for the government of aesthetic properties. Therefore aesthetic properties are in no way reducible to subvenient properties, that is to perceptive ones, or to subperceptive, microphysical ones.

4. Levinson argues that aesthetic qualities are not inherently evaluative, or at least that it is always possible to distinguish a descriptive component from any attached evaluative connotations of the term, so that we can talk about aesthetic terms that are valuation-added. On this basis, Levinson later argued that aesthetic attributes should be understood realistically as properties possessed by objects that are judged "striking", "splendid", or "chaotic".[27] They are not to be interpreted idealistically, as if the judging subject were projecting subjective attributions on what he is judging.

Dewey's approach is very different and may possibly appear surprising given its context. At the risk oversimplifying things, I will try to identify some traits by distinguishing this new context from the previous one. I will focus my attention on *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience*.[28]

First of all, it must be said that when Dewey speaks about aesthetic qualities, he is talking about experience in general, that is about continuous exchanges taking

[21] J. Levinson, "Aesthetic Supervenience", cit., p. 134.
[22] F. Sibley, "Aesthetics and Nonaesthetics", cit., p. 135.
[23] Frank Sibley strongly supported this thesis, even though he explicitly stated his dissatisfaction with all terms used to illustrate the distinction he aims to point at. See F. Sibley, *Aesthetic Concepts*, cit., p. 421.
[24] See point 4 below.
[25] F. Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts", cit., p. 424.
[26] J. Levinson, "Aesthetic Supervenience", cit., p. 134.
[27] See in particular J. Levinson, "Being Realistic about Aesthetic Properties", cit.
[28] Two particularly incisive passages can be found in J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* cit., p. 82 and in J. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, cit., pp 21-22.

place between human organisms and the natural and social environment on which their survival depends at all levels.[29] Obviously, he is not only talking about specific artistic practices or the vocabulary adopted by the art critic, but also about careful observers. At this level aesthetic qualities are clearly primary or basic, not supervenient on supposed merely perceptual or purely physical properties. Because our survival radically depends on the environment we belong to, including other individuals from whom we receive nourishment and protection from birth,[30] it is simply inevitable that the environment itself will have an immediate impact on us, and that situations in which we find ourselves in constant interaction with it will be perceived as friendly or dangerous, favourable or harmful, sweet and comforting or hostile and disturbing, embarrassing and annoying. For this reason, before you can postpone this impact, before you can plan or implement new strategies, by using what elements are available in a certain situation as means in view of further aims, you will experience these situations in terms of the way they directly operate on you, against you or for you. It is properly this aspect that Dewey identifies as the aesthetic or qualitative characterization of every experience.

Aesthetic qualities are not descriptive and neutral, but in themselves revealing of the way in which our exchanges with the environment are carried out. In other words, they imply a primitive form of evaluation that is not cognitive but rather affective. This is exactly Dewey's point when he says that "Even such words as long and short, solid and hollow, still carry to all but those who are intellectually specialized, a moral and emotional connotation".[31] Our immediate experience has a sort of proto-evaluative extent; it implies rejection or acceptance, rejection or approval.

In this context, even the alleged merely sensory or purely physical recording of a situation appears to be an abstraction. First of all, I will experience a certain situation as being warm and friendly, for example, and then, by returning analytically to my immediate experience, I will distinguish some aspects I can relate to specific perceptual channels or will investigate the physical or microphysical structure of the objects involved. But it must be clear that those aspects are the results of further operations, or of new experiences distinguishing the different phases of a past experience to solve a problematic or an indeterminate situation.[32]

It should also be recognized that when I feel a certain environment to be hostile or comfortable, I do not consciously perceive it as a cognitive content: first of all I experience and feel something, and only then can I know it explicitly or reconsider it analytically and reflexively; but the point is that knowledge is not the only factor in play. For this reason Dewey constantly stresses that as long as our exchanges proceed normally, without any problems arising, there is no need to *know* "immediate qualities, sensory and significant" since they are "*had*".[33] He always thundered against the so-called intellectual fallacy of providing interpretations of experience in exclusively or predominantly cognitive terms.[34]

[29] J.P. Cometti has helped me recognize Darwin's deep influence on Dewey, which is not to be understood reductionistically, deterministically or teleologically. The basic point is not to start with entities conceived as fully possessing their properties, but to consider the emergence of certain characteristics from an organism's interactions with its environment. I would add that these characteristics are not to be understood as a set of properties, but as answer modalities, as behavioural habits.

[30] On this point see J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, cit.

[31] J. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, cit., pp 21-22.

[32] R. Bernstein in his "Dewey's Metaphysics of Experience" (in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 58/1 (1961), pp 5-14) observes that in Dewey "qualities are not limited to those which have been called sense qualities, or to primary and secondary qualities. There are tertiary qualities which are directly felt" (p. 7).

[33] J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* cit., p. 202.

[34] See R. Bernstein (op. cit), insisting on this aspect (p. 6).

In philosophical discourse it is customary to speak about aesthetic 'qualities' as a noun. Dewey, who was very attentive to ordinary language habits, notes that in order to speak about how we experience the manner or tone of a certain interaction between our organism and its environment, we often use adjectives or adverbs. Life circumstances can be sweet or bitter, and this sort of affective tone tends to guide our behaviour, but it can be revised and corrected when things do not work. Yet, there are no abstract or material entities such as sweetness or bitterness, harmony or dissonance, which we could assign to life circumstances.

This last remark brings me to my final point. It could be argued that, if aesthetic qualities have neither stable nor regular correlations with the allegedly physical or sensory substrate supporting them, then they are subjective, as are secondary qualities in our modern tradition. It seems that there is no way out of the alternative between subjectivist idealism and realism. Dewey, however, turns the problem around by arguing that when I feel a certain situation is difficult or a piece of music disturbing, I am neither finding a property of the situation or of the song, nor am I subjectively projecting my private impressions on the objects I am trying to cope with. I am rather perceiving a 'real' characteristic of my ongoing relation with these objects, which both tells me something about the environment I am facing and guides my behaviour within it. And to support this kind of non-dualistic position, Dewey has no need to become a pseudo-idealistic philosopher[35]; rather, he adopts a form of Darwinian naturalism and Jamesian empiricism.

Experience is neither the reign of the subject nor objective reality. It is the open result of a reciprocal exchange between organisms and their environment, both of which contribute to making the world what it is, determining and modifying, and yet no activity can be considered the final one, capable of providing the world with all its supposed properties.[36] Besides, as William James noted in his polemic against classical empiricism, radical empiricism must recognize the reality of relations; they are not a sort of secondary entity, derived from the association of atomic ones, but are realities that are immediately experienced, so that they "must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system".[37]

III. Against aesthetic asceticism

I now come to the last part of my paper, which is devoted to the topic of "consummatory experience", or the "consummatory phase" of experience, with a particular focus on the philosophical issue of enjoyment. In order to provide an idea of the typical continental disrepute of enjoyment, I shall begin by quoting a passage by Hans Robert Jauss, taken from an interesting chapter on pleasure in his book *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*, which very clearly illustrates a certain kind of aesthetic asceticism we are used to:

> […] Today aesthetic experience is mostly considered authentic only when it has left behind itself any pleasure and has raised itself to the level of aesthetic reflection. The most decisive criticism of every artistic experience based on enjoyment can be found, once again, in Adorno: whoever in art works searches and finds pleasure is a philistine, and "expressions like 'ears delight' prove he is guilty". Whoever is not able to free art from taste for pleasure places art near food and pornographic products. After all, aesthetic pleasure is nothing but a bourgeois reaction to the spiritualization of art and therefore it represents the basic assumption of the contemporary culture industry, which serves the vested interests of dominant powers managing the vicious circle of needs and satisfactions and using aesthetic surrogates. In short, we read in Adorno's *Ästhetische Theorie*: "The bourgeois wishes that art is thriving and life ascetic, but the opposite would be better".[38]

[35] On this point see Bernstein's criticism.

[36] See J. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, cit., p. 251.

[37] H. James, "A World of Pure Experience", originally published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, 1/20 (1904), pp 533-543.

[38] H.R. Jauss, *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische*

Dewey's approach to enjoyment, both life enjoyment and the specifically artistic ones, is very different.[39] First of all we must remember that Dewey introduces the term "consummatory experience" in *Art as Experience* to characterize his concept of having an experience, that is in order to distinguish an experience that may be eminently artistic or aesthetic, but which more generally stands out from our inconclusive daily experiences, from ordinary interactions that mostly go further, leaving no trace and giving no satisfaction. Every human interaction with the natural and social environment will have a stronger or weaker immediate aesthetic quality, according to Dewey, because in the first instance our existence is structurally exposed to other human beings and to natural circumstances which can be comfortable or dangerous for us, which will make us suffer or enjoy. However, not every interaction with our world is brought to completion and becomes a "consummatory experience". In the English language 'consummate' means to complete; in this sense, it means to bring a certain process to its perfection, for example a marriage through the consummation of the sexual act, a premeditated murder through its perpetration. 'Consummate' is also used to talk about the culmination of a desire and the correlated efforts made to pursue it that is to fulfil it.

Consummatory experiences are those experiences we can consciously appreciate for their completeness and capacity to enhance our lives. In Dewey's opinion, these particularly include artistic and aesthetic experiences.
Some scholars, such as George Mead, Jack Kaminsky and especially D.C. Mathur, have emphasized that the "consummatory phase" of an experience is the one leading to its fulfilment. As such, it lends the experience its unity and brings a certain relief from the tritest routines. In particular, according to Mathur's reconstruction, in experiencing rhythm we could recognize a first phase of immediate quality of the experience of doing and undergoing, a further stage of reflective experience, where the involved organism reaches the awareness of doing and undergoing relations that are taking place, and a final consummatory phase, "which incorporates the significance and meaning of the reflective phase and is thereby rendered more rich and deepened in its immediacy".[40] Mead on his part, as I mentioned earlier, points out that an experience comes to its end not simply when a certain goal has been achieved, but when the pursuit of it does not preclude an appreciation of the means by which we tend to realize it, that is when we enjoy instrumental activities for themselves, therefore producing an enhancement of life.

From this point of view it is clear that the distance is again very considerable with respect to the typical critical theory approach, which is essentially based on a

Hermeneutik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1982), It. transl., p. 95.

[39] The contrast between this typical aesthetic asceticism and Dewey's approach was increased in my own national context by the Italian translation of both *Art as Experience* and *Experience and Nature,* which led to a misunderstanding on this point. In the two translations by Granese and Bairati "consummation" is rendered with "consumo", that is "consumption", and "consummatory experience" with "esperienza consumatoria", that is "consumption experience". I must confess that when I was reading these translations for the first time I was upset as, I imagine, every philosopher trained in the continental tradition must have been. This embarrassment is due to the fact that Dewey seems to argue that consumption was discovered by human being before identifying what is good and preparing the means to achieve it, or that what marks out a certain experience from most inconclusive comings and goings with our environment is the attainment of a form of consumption. Besides, associating artistic experience with consumption immediately triggers a sort of instinctive reaction in the average European philosopher, because a strong suspicion arises that what is being proposed is a new version of artistic enslavement to consumption, confirming the reduction of culture to an uncritical culture industry. In any case it must be noted that in his new Italian translation of *Art as Experience* Giovanni Matteucci chose "perfezionamento" for translating "consummation", a term that is better connected to "fulfillment", "compimento" in Italian, which is very often used by Dewey in related sentences.

[40] D.C.Mathur, cit., p. 226.

strong dualism between value rationality and instrumental rationality – a dualism Dewey constantly calls into question.

In addition to these comments I would like to recall the natural context in which the American pragmatist introduced the idea of the consummatory phase of an experience, because from this point of view aesthetic needs appear to be basic anthropological traits we can answer more or less critically, but cannot simply neglect.[41] Experiences in general can be fulfilled because we live in an unstable world and our existence depends on the constant exchanges occurring in our world. It is quite natural for interactions to have a rhythmic flow: organic and environmental energies have moments of instability and disequilibrium and moments of deeper integration or balance. And likewise it is quite natural for human organisms not only to pursue forms of equilibrium with their environment, but also to tend to enjoy it, as an opportunity for energetic enhancement. Abstractly denying these aesthetic needs, namely the need to enjoy and expand life interactions, means removing these interactions and uncritically displacing them into other objects and in other forms.

Dewey notes how this point has serious implications especially in the artistic field. Closing the arts in museums, but also making their fruition the prerogative of just a few and precluding their enjoyment by the majority of people, may mean that most people have to search for mere surrogates. From Dewey's perspective these surrogates are not necessarily represented by the popular arts, jazz or the mass media, as Adorno suggested. On the contrary, an aesthetic surrogate may be found in any artistic practice that does not produce an intensification of the vital energies, but rather their impoverishment, dissipation or consumption.

On the other hand, the typical trend in advanced industrial society of erasing enjoyment from daily work, of denying the opportunity for everybody to enjoy his own work results and the connected sense of fulfilment, produces a tendency to search for those pleasures, habitually denied in routine activities, in one's private time, that is in time free from work, now merely perceived as fatigue.

From this point of view, and perhaps with some surprise, we can find a certain affinity between Dewey and Herbert Marcuse, in contrast to Adorno's opposition to all affirmative forms of art. Marcuse's 1978 book *The Aesthetic Dimension* draws a close connection between a sort of biological naturalism and the demand for a fairer and happier society for everybody. Marcuse affirms that "Marxist theory has the least justification to ignore the metabolism between human being and nature" and that a classless society firstly requires the recognition of human desires and bodily needs, as well as "an organic development within the socio-historical".[42]

But we can find some interesting proximities in a paper written many years before, in 1938, entitled "On Hedonism". First it should be recognized that hedonism was able to denounce the spiritualization and internalization of happiness, conceived as only possible in a non-material dimension. However the problem is that hedonism has claimed material or bodily approaches as the only legitimate form of access to happiness, without calling into question the assumption of its mostly private, personal and subjective characterization. But if happiness can have no place in

[41] See Abraham Kaplan's "Introduction" to *Art as Experience*, in which he notes that Dewey's philosophy of art is close to Aristotle's naturalistic biology. Both scholars conceive energy in biological terms, because "Dewey shares with Aristotle (who was also a naturalist in the biologist's sense) an awareness of the primacy in these domains of the developmental psychology of adaptive responses to the environment" (p. xvii).

[42] H. Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension. Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1978), p. 16 and p. 17.

relations between men in contemporary society, if happiness cannot be shared, then it "is restricted to the sphere of consumption".[43] Yet it is a sort of consumption that by seeking to satisfy human natural urges towards consummation produces an impoverishment of living energies rather than their enhancement. From Dewey's point of view, in the current world the consummatory phases of experience are transformed into forms of mere consumption.[44]

I shall conclude my paper with a quotation from Marcuse that will not fail to impress readers of Dewey's *Ethics*. In his analysis of both emancipatory and regressive aspects of hedonism, the German philosopher asks:

> Does not happiness, with it immanent demand for increase and permanence, require that, within happiness itself, the isolation of individuals, the reification of human relations, and the contingency of gratification be done away with? Must not happiness become compatible with truth?[45]

[43] H. Marcuse, "On Hedonism", in *Negations. Essays in Critical Theory* (MayFlyBooks, London, 2009), p. 129. In the same volume see also "The Affirmative Character of Culture".

[45] By formulating a pragmatist suggestion, however, we should perhaps begin to call into question our consolidated and regressive habit to consider consumption only as a form of energy dissipation, which inevitably tends to confirm the existing forms of economic power by exploiting our most urgent needs of immediate satisfaction. I am thinking here, for example, of ethically shrewd forms of consumption, where commodities can be enjoyed because of the environmental or social working conditions they contribute to improving or because they favour our bodily health or forms of wealth-sharing.

[45] H. Marcuse, "On hedonism", cit., p. 129.

WHAT IS PRAGMATIC MEDIA PHILOSOPHY?

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1. Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Media?

Before I try to answer the question in the title of the paper, I would like to clarify a broader question – what actually is the philosophy of media? The philosophy of media developed through the 20th century, and became a response to the call of the powerful development of technologies of communications. Rapid growth and change of various technologies demanded a study of history, of the content and effects of various news media and communications, i.e. media in a conventional sense. Contributions to development of media studies were made by such researchers as Walter Benjamin, Günther Anders, Marshall McLuhan, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Paul Virilio, Vilém Flusser and others.

The philosophy of media, or "Medienphilosophie", is a continental product, the formation of which began in the late 1980s, basically in the German-speaking intellectual world. The bases for the formation of its new direction are:

a) The problematisation of the "materiality of communications" and "cultural technique" that takes place in the works of such literary critics as Friedrich Kittler, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, philosopher Sybille Krämer etc.;[1]

b) The reconsideration of the relations of an image-text in the works of Vilem Flusser, William J. T. Mitchell (pictorial turn[2]), Gottfried Boehm (iconic turn[3]) etc.

An especially powerfully debate occurred at the beginning of the 21st century after a number of works using in their titles the term 'Medienphilosophie' were published. Here one may include Frank Hartmann's *Medienphilosophie* (Wien, WUV Universitätsverlag, 2000), where Hartman undertakes a historical-philosophical study of how media influenced philosophy; Mike Sandbothe's *Pragmatic Media Philosophy. The Bases of New Discipline in the Epoch of the Internet*" (Pragmatische Medienphilosophie. Grundlegung einer neuen Disziplin im Zeitalter des Internet. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2001), and Stefan Münker's, Alexander Roesler's und Mike Sandbothe's *Media Philosophy. Contributions to the Clarification of a Concept* (Medienphilosophie. Beiträge zur Klärung eines Begriffs. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003), among others. The discussions basically concerned the questions – what are media? What value do they have for understanding a human being, for understanding stories and cultures, for perception and thinking, for reality and activity? How does the philosophical discourse change as media change? And they also addressed the necessity of the institutionalization of the new discipline that is "media philosophy".[4] A lot of questions and a variety of answers were advanced that established a multifaceted field of studies with the general name 'media studies', with a

[1] See Friedrich A. Kittler, *Discourse Networks 1800/1900*, trans. by Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens. Foreword by David E. Wellbery (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990) (Original in German: Aufschreibesysteme: 1800, 1900. München: Fink, 1985); *Materialities of Communication*, ed. by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, trans. by William Whobrey (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994). (Original in German: *Materialität der Kommunikation*, hrsg. von Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht u. K. Ludwig Pfeiffer. Aufl. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988) etc.

[2] See: W. J. T. Mitchell, "The Pictorial Turn", in: *Artforum* (New York, März 1992); W. J. T. Mitchell, *The Pictorial Turn*, in: *Mitchell W. J. T. Picture Theory. Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press), 1994.

[3] See: Christa Maar (Hrsg.), *Iconic turn. Die neue Macht der Bilder* (Köln: DuMont, 2004). (The idea of "Iconic Turn" by Gottfried Böhm declared in 1994 in his article: G. Boehm, "Die Wiederkehr der Bilder", in: *Was ist ein Bild?* Hrsg. von Gottfried Boehm (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994), pp 11–38, pp 17–19.

[4] See e.g.: L. Wiesing, "Was ist Medienphilosophie?", *Information Philosophie*, no. 3. (2008), pp 30–38; Margreiter, R. *Medienphilosophie*. Eine Einführung. Berlin: Parerga 2007.

range of possible subfields, such as media archeology, media ecology, media aesthetics, media philosophy, etc.

In the English-speaking world one should mention the American-Finnish duo of philosophers, Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, who formulated an innovative media philosophy in their book *Imagologies. Media Philosophy* (New York: Routledge 1994). Another important work in this process was *New Philosophy for New Media* by Mark B. N. Hansen (MIT, 2004), which is dedicated to the major problematics of the interrelation of a human body and digital media, however, it also draws heavily on the ideas of continental philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The problematics of body and medial actively are developing now in the English-speaking world a so-called 'biomorphic theory of media', particularly in the works of Eugene Thacker (*Biomedia*, University of Minnesota, 2004), etc.

Thus, generally speaking, the main objective of "the media philosophy" is an attempt to rewrite the history of philosophy, the understanding of the human, and of culture and politics, through the prism of media and to comprehend the role of media in human perception and thinking.

There are many tendencies and classifications that deserve a separate analysis, therefore we will not stop here but go directly to the questions that arise in any theorization of media: How can and should the theory today change the situation concerning media?, and What is the function of such theory? Both interconnected questions belong to what can be called the pragmatic philosophy of media. Media are not stagnant; they change and develop and demand a constant contact with reality, which is the central moment of pragmatism. A speculative approach is not applicable in this case.

2. Pragmatic Philosophy of Media 1 (After the Linguistic Turn)

Philosophy of media in the pragmatic key or the pragmatic media philosophy adopts a middle way among a) abstract theorizing, b) prolific search for the definition of media?, and c) the many empirical facts of utilitarian studies of communications carried out within empirical media studies.

Mike Sandbothe's *Pragmatic Media Philosophy: The Bases of a New Discipline in the Epoch the Internet* has become a call for a new fundamental discipline. The central concern of his book is to situate the foundation of the new discipline in the context of the current debate about the self-image of academic philosophy and to institutionalize it.

Sandbothe draws on both "classical" Pragmatismus (Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey) and its revision in the Neopragmatism of Richard Rorty and his linguistic turn.[5] The anti-foundationalist, critical inventory of traditional philosophical questions undertaken in such a way leaves only questions of practical importance.[6] Sandbothe defines pragmatic media philosophy as an active interdisciplinary approach, a "scientifically theoretical service discipline" for the arts and humanities, communications and media, which serves the "rehabilitation of the pragmatic self understanding of modern academic philosophy".[7]

In opposition to speculative theorists of media, in particular to Marshall McLuhan, Sandbothe draws attention to the fact that the use of media is socially and

[5] See: *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method*, ed. with Introduction by Rorty R. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). The Sandbothe book devotes an entire chapter PM, p. 48 ff.
[6] M. Sandbothe, *Pragmatische Medienphilosophie. Grundlegung einer neuen Disziplin im Zeitalter des Internet. Weilerswist* (Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2001), p. 26. (PM).
[7] PM, 2001, p. 48: "Rehabilitierung des pragmatischen Selbstverstandnisses der modernen Fachphilosophie".

historically constructed, and this is how it is used: "Media understanding of this use – the theoretical perspective – is not of perceptive technical extensions of the sense organs, but rather of social constructions".[8]

He understands media first of all as tools for the coordination of inter-human actions; it requires thinking of media as inseparable from these actions. It is through the media themselves and not through their theoretical contemplation that one should follow the concrete, practical and experimental usage of media, carried out not only by media producers, but also by their users, both separate individuals and social groups.

Sandbothe divides all media into three groups:[9]

1. "sensory perceptual media" ("sinnliche Wahrnemungsmedien") – for example, space, time, sense organs;

2. "semiotic communications media" ("semiotische Kommunikationsmedien") – an image, language, writing, music;

3. "technical transmission media" ("technische Verbreitungsmedien") – publishing, radio, television, film, computer, Internet.

All three groups are interconnected. Media are "practically" used in concrete rational acts of humans and in various relations, and they legitimizes as if from within the new actions and relations. Media serve to change the world. These changes are mainly possible due to the Internet, which Sandbothe places in the center of his theory. Conceptualized as a "transmedium", the Internet allows us to carry out concrete rational practice to change the world.

Sandbothe follows Richard Rorty in his affirmation of the political and moral standards of a liberal and democratic society. He proclaims as its appropriate goal the accomplishment of such ideals as equality, tolerance, and freedom of research, discursivity and solidarity. As a result, media are studied as the tools of information and communication, as the ends and means of constructing the possibility of such activity.

In our opinion the orientation of Sandbothe towards the linguistic turn, with an emphasis on linguistic meaning and rational usage, limits the problematics of his pragmatic version of the philosophy of media and reduces it to the superficial technological strategy: "We can understand words from a pragmatic perspective, as media in a handicraft sense [...] used for a new work program, and as a means in the sense of a tool that can change existing realities".[10] Sandbothe understands the Internet in political-cultural practice too optimistically. He considers only its linguistic component and in effect does not pay any attention to the visual, audible and tactile content that frequently erodes and transforms the rationality of messages.

It should be noted that the "linguistic turn" in philosophy is the declaration of the view that philosophical problems can be solved (or eliminated) by reforming scientific language, by the elimination of a linguistic confusion, and by understanding more about the language we presently use. This is shift from speculative philosophical talk about a subject to the conversations

[8] PM, 2001, p. 163: "Medien sind aus dieser gebrauchstheoretischer Sicht nicht als wahrnehmungstechnische Erweiterungen von Sinnesorganen, sondern vielmehr als soziale Konstruktionen zu verstehen".

[9] On the basis of this typology, the author creates a massive 410 pages collection of systematic philosophy of media: *Systematische Medienphilosophie*. / hrsg. von Mike Sandbothe und Ludwig Nagl (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005).

[10] PM, 2001, p. 109: "[…] können wir Wörter aus pragmatischer Perspektive als Medien in einem handwerklichen Sinn verstehen, indem wir sie [...] als, Programm für neue Arbeit und als Mittel im Sinn von Werkzeug gebrauchen, durch welche existierende Realitäten verändert werden können".

about the words with which we speak about a subject. It means that the task of the philosopher from the perspective of linguistic philosophy (following the later Wittgenstein) is not to reform the language according to some logical norm (logical empiricism), but to offer a detailed analysis of the actual use of ordinary language in order to prevent misunderstandings that arise from its improper use. Rorty's task in his anthology is to discuss some of the attempts to substantiate these views, and he explores the nature of this alleged linguistic philosophy, tries to engage the debate between supporters of an ideal language and the analysis of ordinary language. He eventually came to the conclusion (which he greatly expanded some years later in his *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989), in which he combines a later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language with pragmatism and declares that meaning is a social-linguistic product) that that the future of philosophy depends on its linguistic analysis. We can say that Rorty's linguistic turn is a meta-philosophical criticism, aimed not at specific themes, styles, or terminology of philosophy, but at the way in which philosophical problems may be something other than simply an in increase in tension or change in the dynamics of the relationship among these themes, styles or terminology. It is important to emphasize this because it is a mistake to understand linguistic philosophy as reducing philosophy to simply a problem of language.

Sandbothe's media project philosophy, designated as "after the linguistic turn", in my view is too limited by the utilitarian sense of pragmatism as a tool of linguistic strategies. To consider media as just a tool applicable to knowledge, morals or politics means to amputate a part of human practice. Media reduced to the tools of democratization and rational activity become a servant of other activity that is considered more valuable. Meanwhile media possess a relative autonomy and have an independent purpose. Medial experience is irreducible either to aesthetic experience or to any other kinds of experience. Medial experience directly influences our perceptions, thinking and imagination as it triggers the work of embodiment and free play of abilities.

Sandbothe ends his book by saying that is just an introduction, 'Prolegomena', to a future science about media: "The building itself is yet to be built. The pragmatic media philosophy is consistent with the present sketch that is only a beginning".[11] The construction is still in progress. He clearly shifts media philosophy directly into the position of a successor to the philosophy of language, considered as a fundamental discipline of the new epoch.

It is necessary to make the next step from the 'language apriori' of the linguistic turn to the 'media apriori' of the medial turn.[12] So if the linguistic turn has served to clarify the contradictions and differences of linguistic philosophy in their analytical and positivist versions, the project of a medial turn could serve to remove inconsistencies of the analytical philosophy of mind and its bewildering mind/body problem, and point to cultural-analytical directions of research in media and communication. It is necessary to include the bodily, the visual, and the auditory, which is not considered because it is not textual, in the pragmatic philosophy of media. In this regard I consider it fruitful to engage John Dewey's *Art as Experience* (1934) in the context of the problematics of media. This approach highlights the problematics of the experience of media, of fundamental

[11] PM, 2001, p. 239: "Das eigentliche Gebäude ist erst noch zu bauen. Die pragmatische Medienphilosophie steht mit der vorliegenden Skizze erst an ihrem Anfang".
[12] The metaphor of the "medial turn" chronologically follows a series of turns in the culture – linguistic, iconic, pictorial, cultural, etc. For the first reference see: R. Margreiter, "Realität und Medialität. Zur Philosophie des 'Medial Turn'". *Medien Journal. Zeitschrift für Kommunikationskultur*, Jg. 23, H. 1 (1999), pp 9–18 (see other articles in this number); S. Münker, "After the medial turn. Sieben Thesen zur Medienphilosophie", *Medienphilosophie: Beiträge zur Klärung eines Begriffs*, Hrsg. von Stefan Münker, Alexandrer Roesler, Mike Sandbothe (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 2003), pp 16–25.

experience in which both art and science, and everyday life, can be included, because media carry out a de-autonomous function within these systems. Media are the environment that connects and permeates all systems.

3. Pragmatic Philosophy of Media 2 (After the Medial Turn)

In my opinion the task of the pragmatic philosophy of media goes beyond a simple rewriting of a philosophical discourse, simply 'taking media into account', and also beyond simply a service discipline for business media. The task of the pragmatic philosophy of media is the study of concrete medial experiences and of concrete usage of media in order to understand better media effects, the positive and negative sides of media activity. The media influence is not just a linguistic component; it includes visual, audible, and tactile dimensions. This conception of media considers the embodied aspect of media. Human experience is medialized. Media deliver us the world and pre-organize it. I think it is possible to bring together all dimensions of media in a bodily regime, in the dynamism of a live human body in its interaction with the environment. John Dewey described such interaction through the category of experience.

Dewey discusses 'experience' in two major works: *Experience and Nature* (1925/29) and *Art as Experience* (1934). He understands experience not as a bare subjective experience of a given actuality, which is essentially separated from a perceiver, but as an active process of interaction with an environment. He further understands nature not as a given reality, a confirmed order of things, beings and ways of existence, but as an open process of emergence, which develops within the boundaries of evolutionary interactions as an embodiment of natural potential in concrete situations. For Dewey human experience begins with natural interactions, since nature and experience are not opponents or enemies of each other but are essentially one and the same.

In my view Dewey expands the understanding of experience its empiricist heritage. Empiricism understands experience as a subjective, progressive accumulation of sense data of the past and of the present. Pragmatism adds the dimension of the future, of experience as openness to the future, as a kind of rule of behavior for accomplishment of the goals and formation of the self. Experience is not reduced either to contemplation, or to knowledge, which is only one part of it. Moreover, for Dewey experience is defined through the categories of continuity and interaction. "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living."[13] The basis of his concept of experience is activity understood as the interrelation of action and suffering, during which sensation is actively produced.

Man influences the environment consistent with his own structure; in this way changes made in the environment react on the organism and its activity. The live being feels consequences of his behavior and suffers from them. This close connection between action and suffering forms experience. It is a correlated action. It is experience that brings concrete sense into human life. It is directed to the positive as well as to the negative. Experience includes sensual experience, spiritualistic, religious, moral, aesthetic, social and cultural. For Dewey experience embraces all human life, including the inter-relations of the human with nature and nature itself.

The concept of experience is valuable for philosophical reflection on media because it means both the physical conditions and the person who works, communicates, invents, uses things, suffers and enjoys. Experience means everything that is endured. Therefore, the specification made by Dewey is connected with the important understanding of experience as social

[13] John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), p. 35.

practice, as actions of a historically concrete individual. Experience may be yours or mine; it appears in the form of industrial, political, religious, aesthetic, and intellectual experiences, among others.

According to Dewey, concepts emerge as ways to solve a problematic situation. Any concepts, including scientific, are not copies of any independent reality, but exist as tools and plans of action and are created by an experiencer. Concepts are tools for obtaining experience and are subject to constant calibration and updating when they cease to provide reception of the best experience.

Ideas are operational, because by their nature they are projects of intrusion into existing conditions. Ideas are always abstractions from some real problems. The truth lies not in the adequacy of thinking and life but in the reliability of a principal idea to serve as a tool to solve vital problems. The true is a direction in which it is necessary to move. The true is historical rather than eternal. It is subject to updates and changes in the light of new situations, worries, threats, and doubts.

Dewey develops further the concept of experience in *Art as Experience*. In the first three chapters of the book he gives examples of aesthetic experience. He shows the connection between art and life, the continuity of aesthetic experience that includes both the sphere of high art and the sphere of day-to-day life and popular culture. Dewey insists on the indissolubility of traditionally oppositional categories: graceful arts/applied arts, high/popular, body/mind, man/nature, subject/object, ends/means. Sequestering, life fragmentation, and strict distinctions bring mobile, dynamic material into rigid immovability, and finally, into an idolization of separate fragments. It results in an impoverishment of our understanding of the completeness of experience. The danger of creating fetishes appears when distinctions acquire an evaluative character, thus imposing restrictions on perception and obscuring our understanding of the case at issue and of the situation in general.

Dewey's preferences are not to the material object (fetish) as a product of art, but to the dynamic, developing process of experiencing in the course of the production and perception of these products of art. He distinguishes 'art product' and 'work of art'. The first is an external and physically created material artefact that exists separately from human experience; the second is a function, which is executed by this product in the course of its acquisition by men. Thus Dewey understands art as the universal form of communication, which is means and ends simultaneously. It serves not only the conveying of a message, but first of all to the production of sense. An end is a means to reach other ends.

Dewey's ideas about 'art' and 'experience' can be applied to media, which are embedded in human life. Media function as means. However, this does not override the fact that media can be part of the ends. Media are integral parts of the ends of their usage.

Dewey's category of experience allows us to point out and to resolve a problem of means and ends, of the instrumentalism of media, of a widespread understanding of media as bare means. Dewey rejects the narrow utilitarian understanding of a tool as an effective means for gaining advantage. The dichotomy of ends and means (as well as of body and mind) stagnates thinking and human activity. The existing distinction should not lead to oppositions. Media are simultaneously valuable means of satisfaction of human desires and ends. Media serve life in a broad sense, rather than merely an ordered and limited way of life. The enrichment of experience is not only immediate, but continues after the work of media is over because the senses are embodied in us. Media activate the work of our perceptions; they inspire and depress, charge and discharge energy, and recover and lull.

Dewey demonstrates that the path to the true lies in reference to experience, life, functionality and context. The methodological rule considers the true as being made. Thus the pragmatic philosophy of media is not a speculative and dogmatic theory, but the method of study that looks to concreteness and adequacy of the facts and acts. A pragmatic philosophy of media is not opposed to aesthetics and the philosophy of language, but extends them. The object of media philosophy is experience in its totality because media penetrate all spheres of human life.

Taking into account John Dewey's philosophy of experience it is possible to formulate some principles of a pragmatic philosophy of media:

1. One should view media not as static artifacts (technical devices) but as processes of their work in direct connection with the human, as a continuously developing process of action and change, as medial experience.

2. Medial experience is rooted in a socio-historical context and cannot be separated from its genesis in socio-political circumstances and technological conditions; the emergence of media themselves and their subsequent transformation are in experience.

3. Media are open to change and transformation, they are the product of the constantly changing setting of the experience of their usage; it is an interactive game fluctuating within the context of interactions (medium, environment, human).

4. Medial experience stimulates moving forward, getting something new; it encourages new approaches to the environing and the unity of various elements of experience.

5. Research into media should not be hemmed in and idolized in absolute formulas.

The five principles are interrelated and argue that media are not "outside of us" (artifacts), but also not "inside us" (patterns of perception). Media exist in the process of relationships between artifacts and patterns of perception, so I define them as machines of abstractions; they are what exists only in the constant work, in the interaction with other elements of communication. They are machines that operate by abstraction or otherwise automatic "abstracting", as action is selective. Abstraction (as well as media) is inevitable; it is human ability, an ability that allows us to creating a set of realities, the multi-realities of human experience. They transform human worlds both outside and inside. Media reveal a constant (machinery) game of abstract and concrete human thinking. In his short, early essay "Who Thinks Abstractly?" Hegel, without any irony, presented the work of abstract thinking as follows: "This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality." Or, on the contrary, "strewed and bound flowers on the wheel and on the criminal who was tied to it. – But this again is the opposite abstraction" [...] and he who thinks abstractly "clings to this one predicate."[14] Similarly, it would seem that an abstract approach to media ignores its place in concrete experience.

We are talking about the machine not in the usual sense of the everyday life, as a technical product, but in the sense by E. Morin, G. Deleuze, F. Guattari: the machine is not a metaphor. The machine is a practical material being, that is, 'something' to exercise transformations, producing products or performing a task because of its 'organizational competence'. A machine is not understood as a mechanism, but as practice, production and poiesis (the idea of the machine in its most powerful and richest sense: the machine as an organization that is both productive and reproductive, as self-creation /

[14] G. W. F. Hegel, *Texts and Commentary*, trans. and ed. Kaufmann, Walter (NY: Anchor Books, 1966), pp 113–118.

Autopoiesis). A technical machine (artifact) is only a degraded and underdeveloped kind of machine.

Since media are not a thing but a machine or assemblage of processes and relationships, such relationships participate in their transformation and development of each element of the component, whether the operator, the machine, the situation of communication, material apparatus, etc. These are ways of establishing new connections among bodies, institutions, and ideas. Changes in one element respond to the others. For example, the improvement of mobility and price reduction of photographic technique in the early 1920–30s, and its consequently wider use, led to mass photography and to the emergence of many genres and photographic means of communication. They also led to the experiments of media artists, which are changing human perceptions, to commercialized electronics companies, and they are now widely used in advertising. This is a two-way process, highlighting the socio-economic and the political dimension of media.

Thus I would like to say that media, in light of this version of a pragmatic philosophy of media, are not mere instruments that oppose nature and dissect it. They are rather incorporated in it, and by and large are its tools. The human being can for pragmatic reasons choose different tools for their purposes, for research of the same object (this is the end of Sandbothe's pragmatism), but (following Dewey) choice occurs in nature itself, and it ultimately produces a 'natural selection' of the best tools, a point also made in the media archaeology of S. Zielinski and E. Huhtamo.[15] Nature itself is experience, always medial human experience, i.e. it is a process of interaction, communication, history, and integrity that contains and expresses no dualism.

4. Conclusion

How can pragmatic media philosophy help us? What does it give us?

The pragmatic philosophy of media, with its focus on experience, becomes especially important now as we become more aware of the development of technological art such as media art, robotics, bio art etc. The old tools of aesthetics are hardly applicable to this art, balancing as it does on the verge of science, technology and art. The introduction of the category of experience sorts things out and gives us an understanding that in dealing with technological art we deal with new forms of experience. Medial experience includes an actual, everyday experience and expands it in new, non-representable areas in science and art. Thus unlike popular 'post humanistic' ideas of prosthetics and 'extensions of man', one can see a deep correlation between the technological and the anthropological.

The fixation of medial experience, the experience of a concrete media that carries out the interaction with the environment, establishes the importance of actions and their ultimate sense. That sense is sociable, as is the value of experience. Experience is always individual. Media provide a condition for experience in general, while at the same time media change as a result of experience. These changes highlight the variability and contextuality, the socio-political constitution of thinking and acting shaped by chance and accident in the history of media. However, only media fill in the life and thinking of people with real substance. It is because these conditions are not quite comprehended by people that they influence them so effectively.

In the situation of rapid technological changes, the

[15] See e.g.: S. Zielinski, *Deep Time of the Media: Toward an Archaeology of Hearing and Seeing by Technical Means* (MIT Press, 2006) (Original in German: *Archäologie der Medien : zur Tiefenzeit des technischen Hörens und Sehens* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2002)); *Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications*, Ed. E. Huhtamo and J. Parikka (UC Press, 2011).

pragmatic philosophy of media carries out a therapeutic function of contemplating technologies and their influence on various forms of experience. It demonstrates the lameness of a separatist approach claiming the autonomy of art, science and other public systems, their independence from each other and from everyday life. Media are more deeply integrating themselves in our professional and everyday life. An understanding of how media work provides us an opportunity to control (temporarily) their implementation, to direct them to the key life interests and thus to make them more useful, providing pleasure and expanding the sphere of experience. Hence, the role of a pragmatic philosophy of media is not in the criticism of reality and in the affirmation of a certain 'media reality' and similar speculative declarations, but in changing, indeed creating, actuality by way of expanding the sphere of experience.

THE EMOTIONAL BODY AND VISUAL EXPERIENCE

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The pioneer of the conception of art based on experience is John Dewey. In his *Art as Experience* (1934) Dewey lays out the theoretical grounds for the concept of the instrumental. An object of art is instrumental if it causes excitement either from time to time or constantly. Translating into contemporary language Dewey's somewhat old-fashioned terminology, one can say that to be instrumental means to be included into the current sphere of cultural reference. Following John Dewey, Mark Johnson considers aesthetics as "the basis of any profound understanding of meaning and thought". This goes far beyond the study of the arts and reveals "the bodily depths of human meaning-making through our visceral connection to our world".[1] Johnson expands the sphere of the applicability of aesthetics to the boundaries of our placement in the world; however, his primary interest is the visceral connection to the world.

Cinematography creates an interesting case for the study of the "bodily depths of human meaning-making" and the on-going excitement instigated by the instrumental object of art. In the situation of watching movies, the process of "meaning-making" is based on visual experience of the body and its actions. However, the body of the subject that we see on the screen is not ours, and therefore our visceral connection to the environment, which is presented on the screen, is indirect. Moreover, since both the subject and his environment are obviously part of the cinematographic world, whichever of the subject's bodily dynamics we experience while watching movies are experienced in a situation in which we are "as if" staying static. Furthermore, the organism-environment interaction in the situation of watching movies typically holds a multi-subject structure.

Johnson claims that "meaning is not just a matter of concepts and propositions, but also reaches down into the images, sensorimotor schemas, feelings, qualities, and emotions that constitute our meaningful encounter with our world". It is well known that the meaning of a thing is constituted by its consequences through experience. Taking this assumption as a starting point, Johnson positions meaning "within a flow of experience that cannot exist without a biological organism engaging its environment", and he sees meaning as a result of organic activity. Thus reasoning is an embodied process "by which our experience is explored, criticized, and transformed in inquiry".[2] A number of questions arise when one starts to analyze the construction of meaning as an embodied meaning in the process of viewing films. Does the process of watching movies constitute any kind of experience? Does watching any movie necessarily constitute experience? Are there movies that do not constitute any kind of experience? Let us try to answer these questions drawing on Johnson's theory of embodied mind.

The answers to the questions above involve the notions of cognition and enactment. Francisco J. Varela, Evan T. Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in their well-known book proposed the term "enactive" in order "to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs".[3] Daniel Dennett in his "Review of F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, *The Embodied Mind*" pinpoints several key differences between the cognitive and enactive approaches to cognition. The main difference lays in active interaction with the world that is a kind of world making, and is characteristic of the enactivist point of view. In an enactive approach the information is not transmitted by symbols, as in traditional cognitivist views, but is earned through

[1] Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. xi.

[2] Ibid., pp xi, 10, 13.

[3] Francisco J. Varela; Evan T. Thompson & Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (The MIT Press, 1992), p. 9.

enaction on multiple levels of sensorimotor networks. Cognition is seen by enactivists as the result of interaction not with the symbolic forms but with their meanings, and therefore it is not representation but enactment of the world.[4]

Enactivists developed the idea of an active perception. The process of watching movies from this point of view is a way of acting, in the first place, because it involves emotions. In the situation of watching a movie a viewer experiences certain emotions, enacts the events on the screen, and shapes the meaning of what he sees. William James in his "What is an Emotion?" claims that "the emotional brain-processes no only resemble the ordinary sensorial brain-processes", but also "*are* nothing but such processes variously combined".[5] For James, emotions have a distinct bodily expression; the standard emotions he distinguishes, e.g. surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed, and the like, are manifested through identifiable body language. James proposes a disputable thesis that "*the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion*".[6] James is opposed to the standard view that an emotion is mental perception and that bodily expression follows mental affection. James says that such a sequential order is incorrect; he argues that "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be". In the case of ignorance of the bodily component, a perception is purely cognitive in form and lacks emotional warmth. As he states, "We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually *feel* afraid or angry".[7]

From the point of view of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who developed James's ideas, consciousness is multi-layered. Since there are several levels of the self, we may suggest that there are several levels of watching movies. Thus, depending on the level of consciousness involved in a certain period of the process of movie watching, we may speak about emotional immersion (core consciousness) and back-to-reality surveillance (extended consciousness). In the case of enactment, the core consciousness is necessarily involved in this process. Enactive cinema in general means that the flow of narration is made as the result of the subconscious psychological involvement of a spectator, along with conscious surveillance. It also means that subconscious involvement inevitably comprises emotions that are happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise. Damasio distinguishes between feelings and emotions and argues that emotions are the fundamental basis for all cognition. He sees an emotion as brain process, and the interaction between the individual and the environment as the interaction between the body and the brain. Consciousness of bodily changes and emotional expressiveness emerges in the neocortical environment as an extension of the organism's unconscious awareness of the environment. Immersion of the viewer into a cinematographic reality leads to the birth of emotions caused by the interaction of the subject with the environment in the virtual reality of the movie. The cinematographic emotions have a biological basis that is to some extent recognized by contemporary cognitivist theories.[8]

[4] Daniel C. Dennett, "*The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. Book review", *American Journal of Psychology*, no. 106.1 (1993), pp 121-125. Discussed by Pia Tikka in: *Enactive Cinema: Simulatoriam Eisensteinense* (Juväskylä, 2008), pp 178-179.
[5] William James, "What is an Emotion?", *Mind*, vol. 9, no. 34 (April 1884), p. 188.
[6] Ibid., pp 189-190.
[7] Ibid., p. 190.
[8] Cf. Torben Grodal, *Moving Pictures: A New Theory of Film Genres, Feelings and Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ed S. Tan, *Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film As An Emotion Machine* (Routledge, 1995); Greg M. Smith, *The Film Structure and the Emotional System* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

According to James's theory, emotions emerge at the physiological level as the result of motor and sensory activity, and as such constitute individual experience. Yet laboratory investigation of emotions with the help of contemporary scientific methods has failed to provide supporting evidence for James's theory of emotions. And for a while it seemed that James's theory had arrived at a dead end. However, in the situation of watching movies, first comes the perception of the "exciting fact" on the screen, then this perception is followed by bodily changes, and afterwards comes the feeling of these changes, which is, according to James, the emotion. The viewer immerses himself in the film's milieu and identifies himself with one or another character of the film. The interaction of the character with the environment on the screen, and his movement in space, may cause bodily response in the viewer. The viewer subconsciously mimics and lives through the bodily changes of the characters that he watches. He may instinctively respond by moving aside or back to the attack on the film character, may wiggle, vibrate, fidget, hum and flap in excitement or impatience.

Furthermore, the film director may employ close-ups, certain angles of camera, or other strategies in order to enforce a particular kind of psychophysiological response. The mission of some episodes, e.g. the famous "shower scene" in Hitchcock's *Psycho*, is to keep the spectator in a certain emotional mood. In Lev Kuleshov's well-known experiment, known as "Kuleshov effect", an emotional connection is established on the basis of brick-on-brick montage. When the spectator watches interchanging shots of the face of the actor Ivan Mosjoukine, and of a plate of soup, funerals, etc., he construes the emotional link between the shots and prescribes certain emotions to the unchanging face of Ivan Mosjoukine. The emotional link that incorporates the subject (Ivan Mosjoukine) into the contextual milieu holds the shots and sequences together.

The psychophysiological reactions of the viewer, even if minor ones and not quite visually noticeable, that echo psychophysiological reactions of the characters on the screen come first, and they are then followed by the spectator's emotions. Thus, bodily changes precede emotions in the situation of watching movies. The spectator, on the one hand, mirrors the bodily mechanics on the screen; on the other hand, as the film director manipulates the emotions of the spectator and envisages them, cinema becomes a kind of exposure of the inner emotional space of the spectator. An enactive approach helps us to understand the nature of the embodied emotions of the spectator. The term 'enactive' in this case means that there is no pregiven independent milieu; rather there is a perceiver-dependent milieu where action is perceptually guided. The interaction with the environment is carried out at the level of the character's actions and at the level of the emotional line in film narration. The perceiver (who is the character and the film viewer) is both internal and external in relation to the film milieu; "the organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment".[9]

While in the situation of direct interaction with the environment, the link between imagination and bodily processes is rather obvious; it is less obvious in the situation of the interaction with the film sequences and with the environment on the screen. The experience of direct interaction in the situation of watching movies is reduced to the viewer's interaction with a particular media device, and it differs from whatever interaction the viewer may have with the film's content. However, following a body's dynamics on the screen, we do experience interaction with the environment, though it is mediated. The question about the kind of engagement that we have with the cinematographic reality can be answered by saying that what we have is in the first place "emotional engagement". James's theory of emotions, though it fails in laboratory investigation of

[9] Francisco J. Varela; Evan T. Thompson & Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (The MIT Press, 1992), p. 174.

emotions in everyday life, works when we speak about cinematographic experience. It brings the emotional component to the center. In the end it is not worth arguing whether or not emotions are in the first place bodily changes. What is important in James's theory is the connection he makes between body and emotion, or embodied mind and emotion.

Damasio updated James's views with the metaphor of 'movie-in-the-brain'. According to Damasio, movies can be regarded as external representations of the process of narration that takes place on the level of core consciousness, or simple consciousness of the self, that defines the spatial coordinates of the self in the present. Consciousness recognizes itself and reaches the level of extended and then higher extended consciousness in the act of interacting with the world. 'Movie-in-the-brain' is a metaphor used to denote the story of the interaction of core consciousness with the environment. Movies serve as "the closest external representation of the prevailing storytelling that goes on in our minds. What goes on within each shot, the different framing of a subject that the movement of the camera can accomplish, what goes on in the transition of shots achieved by editing, and what goes on in the narrative constructed by a particular juxtaposition of shots is comparable in some respects to what is going on in the mind, thanks to the machinery in charge of making visual and auditory images, and to devices such as the many levels of attention and working memory".[10]

In cognitive narratology it is assumed that experience of events and human relations necessarily takes a form of a narrative. Experience inevitably requires narration. The principle figure in narrative is the presence the anthropomorphic figure of an *experiencer* – somebody who experiences whatever happens in the story. The emotional and bodily reactions of an experiencer to the events as well as his actions form a dynamic component of narrative. Narrativity then is a mediated experienciality. Narratives, including film narratives, are one of the forms of transferring experience. The stories are initially aimed at expressing "what it is like?" from the position of the experiencer and sharing a way of experiencing certain events. That is why "qualia", or a what-it-is-like, is one of the basic elements of narrative.[11] James, who did not speak about films in his works, anyway raised the question that should be taken into account in the discussion of the emotional body in connection to movie watching. This is the question of emotion sharing in the process of perceiving the work of art.

Emotional narration is one aspect of a complex film narration. Since the events in everyday life occur in chronological order, the chronological film sequences are more easily perceived. Disruptions of natural succession take place in flashbacks, in narrating past events, in transposition of sequence. Roman Jacobson states that cinematographic time is linear in "Is the Film in Decline?".[12] However, it is possible to suggest that film linearity is historically sensitive, and in contemporary film narrative several narratives can be developed. One of the examples can be found in Roman Polanski's films *The Pianist* (2002) and *The Ghost Writer* (2010).

In *The Pianist*, alongside the story line of a Polish-Jewish pianist Władysław Szpilman, who survived the Nazi invasion of Poland, Polanski creates the narrative line of fear of the cornered. In *The Ghost Writer* Polanski creates rooms and spaces that are meant to convey the feelings of suspicion, fear and alienation experienced by the ghostwriter (Ewan McGregor), who is supposed to finish the memoirs of the former Prime Minister Adam

[10] Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999), p. 188.

[11] David Herman, *Basic Elements of Narrative* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp 143, 156.

[12] Roman Jakobson, "Is the Film in Decline?", in: Roman Jakobson, *Selected writings*. Volume III: *Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry* (Mouton De Gruyter, 1982), p. 737.

Lang (Pierce Brosnan) after the strange death of the previous ghostwriter. The house where everybody seems to shadow one another is shown as full of undisclosed and unspecified danger. Polanski shoots film sequences so as to bolster the line of fear and suspicion. Though the fear turns out to be true, it is a product of the consciousness of the ghostwriter and not a trait of the milieu itself. Polanski projects the character's feelings onto the space and thus creates the emotionally colored surroundings. Even the gloomy landscapes of Martha's Vineyard (shot on the island of Sylt in the North Sea), with permanently windy, rainy and foggy weather, seem to reflect a general gloominess of the situation that the ghostwriter finds himself in. The final scene, where CIA people supposedly kill the ghostwriter, is portrayed like a disappearance of a ghost. In a sense it is one more case of mimicry as the character, which is in the beginning of the story a ghost due to his profession of a ghostwriter, turns into a ghost (in a different sense), and finally ends as a ghost merging into the milieu that seemed inhabited by "ghosts" from the very start. Besides, the final scene embraces the story in a ring and retrospectively strengthens the ghost-motif; the film starts with a scene where the police looking for the ghostwriter discover the empty car he has just left.

In *The Ghost Writer*, what allows us to follow the "ghost track" of the film is an emotional component of film narration. According to William James, passion helps focalization as "*no one can possibly attend continuously to an object that does not change*".[13] Damasio supports the idea that emotions help "deliberation by highlighting some options".[14] Emotion sharing in the process of watching a film instigates the construction of a cinematographic milieu that is an introspection of characters' consciousness. In *Principles of Psychology* James stated, "as emotions are described in novels, they interest us, for we are made to share them. We have grown acquainted with the concrete objects and emergencies which call them forth, and any knowing touch of introspection – which may grace the page – meets with a quick and feeling response".[15] The emotional narration creates emotional milieu, emotional landscapes and cityscapes, like the milieu in *The Ghost Writer*. The emotional component allows us to decode the meaning of the episode giving us track or direction.

There are various forms of spectators' engagement with the content of the film, e.g. intellectual, sensitive, emotional, etc. Intellectual engagement is characteristic of detective stories; sensitive engagement takes place in films expanding our possibilities of perception, e.g. *Avatar* (2009); and emotional engagement is characteristic of the films that are structured as multi-path narratives where are one of the paths is emotional. On the one hand, it serves as a leading line of the narration; on the other hand, it is a path for the experiencer to travel.

Thus the imagination in the situation of watching movies is tied to bodily processes, and in this capacity is "creative and transformative of experience".[16] As a result of an active perception the viewer acquires and expands his experience. Films that fail to entice interest, emotional immersion, and active perception do not constitute any experience. Our experience of the events and characters in the film is transformed into inquiry predominantly with the help of the emotional link. Inquiry in this case is a journey travelled by emotional path.

[13] William James, *The Principles of Psychology*. In two volumes (New York: Henry Holt and company, 1890), vol. I, p. 421.
[14] Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon, 1994), p. 174.
[15] William James, *Principles of Psychology*. In two volumes (New York: Henry Holt and company, 1890), vol. II, p. 448.
[16] Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 13.

ART AND SOUL:

JAMES AND SCHELER ON PRAGMATIC AESTHETICS

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Max Scheler read pragmatic philosophy in the context of William James,[1] and there is excellent scholarship on his use of pragmatic notions in relation to the sociology of knowledge and philosophical anthropology, but his aesthetics has not been previously looked at with a pragmatic approach.[2] My understanding is that Scheler describes process aesthetics, of the sort developed later in the 20th century, which echoes James's views on pragmatism as including a valuation of lived experience.[3] Such an investigation serves to further the conversation of virtues in aesthetics and, more specifically, in relation to art practice and reception.

Although neither thinker wrote protracted texts on art, I have found that both combine art and soul as lived experience, thereby assimilating the material effects of aesthetics with creative beliefs for the betterment of culture. To introduce Scheler's idea's into discussions on pragmatic aesthetics I investigate how his ideas look toward artistic production and reception by studying philosophical discourse and looking at paintings.

To begin, Richard Shusterman investigates James' writings in a way that brings forward the aesthetic aspect of his philosophy in relation to embodiment and perception, thereby revealing the entwinement of aesthetics and art with lived experience. Shusterman sees a prominent dynamic of pragmatist aesthetics as

> The continuity and combination of the aesthetic with the practical, a theme expressed in the integration of art and life, the recognition that bodily appetites and desires can also be aesthetic, and the appreciation of the functionality of art and aesthetic experience.[4]

I would say that there needs to be additional inclusion in the discussions on James' aesthetics of ideas and imagination. I would also suggest that Scheler's writings on aesthetics expand current notions in this regard. I look at three main comparisons between James and Scheler's aesthetics, thereby explicating a synthesis and disclosing a main axiom of Schelerian aesthetics, which is that ideas are embodied with things through reflection and materiality. For Scheler, aesthetics is not a matter of either perception or representation but of combined creativity, which involves an ongoing process of existential reflection or valuation. I continue with a pragmatic connection between Scheler and John Dewey (in that the latter's aesthetics is influenced by James), by paying particular attention to Thomas Alexander's writings on the moral imagination and community. Throughout this essay I think about aesthetics through paradigms of art and artistic making. The social critique of the painter Otto Dix is especially relevant in that his work raises moral issues, such as questions surrounding the virtues that are called for in living as an individual

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[1] See, Kenneth W. Stikkers' essay, "Dialogue Between Pragmatism and Constructivism in Historical Perspective", *John Dewey Between Pragmatism and Constructivism*, Ed. Larry A. Hickman et all (New York, Fordham University Press, 2009), pp 67-83. See also: Max Scheler, *Cognition and Work: A Study Concerning the Value and Limits of the Pragmatic Motivation in the Cognition of the World,* English translation unpublished manuscript, Zachary Davis (St. Johns University, Queens, New York City).

[2] Kenneth W. Stikkers's reading in the Preface to *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Manfred S. Frings, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. As well as other essays; i.e. Larry A. Hickman's essay "The Homo Faber Debate in Dewey and Max Scheler", *Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey.* (New York, Fordham University Press, 2007), pp 231-240.

[3] See Randall Auxier's general overview of process aesthetics in an essay critiquing Suzanne Langer. He quotes Langer, to explicate a central tenet of a "process aesthetic"; "since it is only when we are aware of the structure or form of a thing that it becomes available for comparison, the process of symbolization is dependent initially on the logical analysis of a single entity." *Process Studies*, 26 (January 1998), pp 86-106. Cf. Langer. *The Practice of Philosophy,* p. 115.

[4] "The Pragmatist Aesthetics of William James", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* (2011) 51 (4), p. 356. "A key theme of pragmatist aesthetics is the continuity and combination of the aesthetic with the practical, a theme expressed in the integration of art and life, the recognition that bodily appetites and desires can also be aesthetic and the appreciation of the functionality of art and aesthetic experience."

and as a member of a community. I focus my interpretations through Scheler's understanding of art as self-contained in its own aesthetic structures yet imbued with imminent connections to the essential drives of life and the possible virtues of communal living.

If we think of pragmatism, as James did, as a method that finds meaning in notions and actions by tracing their practical effects, we can understand Scheler's views on art and aesthetics in a similar light. For Scheler, active virtues, which are given in experience (as meaningful approaches to life) engage and build aesthetic structures (ways that we feel and interpret things) that affect culture. This phenomenological approach uses a pragmatic lens by explaining creative experimentation as artistic endeavor. Scheler finds meaning in art through the influence of aesthetic intuition interacting with materials or mediums, and this process engages a 'working out' of values; e.g., "the painter "sees" with the point of his brush, a drawer "sees" with the point where his pen touches the paper he draws on."[5] Through the creative making of art, the active medium participates with us bodily, telling us something about ourselves and opening up new possibilities for valuing existence. This is a phenomenology of art and culture that folds into pragmatist aesthetics.

Shusterman, as I have said, concentrates on James' perceptual orientation when referring to experiences that please or displease, and he quotes James as recognizing such experiences as far ranging, from the aesthetic pleasures of philosophy and wonderment to the pleasure of movement and consummated action. However, Shusterman leaves open the door for a phenomenological approach to aesthetic experience in regards to an intuitive sense of value. He recognizes in James's writing a reticence about 'aesthetics' in the abstract, schematic, cognitive sense while at the same time tracing James' theory of a unity of consciousness to its influence on John Dewey's "seminal theory that aesthetic experience is essentially constituted by a nameless, unifying quality."[6] Shusterman notes that James finds that the "nameless qualities of aesthetic experience make works of art so different in value and spirit."[7] Such "nameless" qualities are explained indirectly through highlighting the perceptual aspects of embodied cultural habits. I seems clear that James's attention to the originality and understanding of embodiment goes further than the recognizably perceptual, and of what is presently evident in experience, by recognizing creative, imaginary qualities of the unity of commonly lived experience (pure experience). These qualities are unifying as well as being *in the making*, and this a possible reason James talks of such qualities as unidentifiable.[8] Scheler's insights into metaphysics, aesthetics and art can be read as answering James' "namelessness" in this respect. Hereafter, I describe this phenomenological creative opening of aesthetics as an artistic valuation of soulful action, and I explain how each thinker approaches this valuation.

[5] "Metaphysics and Art", *Max Scheler (1874-1928) Centennial Essays*, edited Manfred S. Frings (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1974), p. 112.

[6] Shusterman, p. 348.

[7] Ibid.

[8] See John Daniel Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press, 1969, 1980), p. 395. I refer to John Wild's explanation of *pure experience* with reference to a phenomenological approach to James' thought. Wild clarifies, "In opposition to traditional rationalism, as well as traditional empiricism, James maintained from the beginning that relational patterns are directly felt and perceived. Immediate experience cannot be dismissed as a set of isolated data. It involves relational structures of the most basic kind, including selective attention, consciousness, continuous transition, and the search for truth. These patterns have always been a central concern of philosophy, because it is only through them that our discrete experiences are gathered together into a meaningful world. In the past, however, they have been identified with the sense-giving activity of a separated mind. According to James this supposition is unnecessary, for these patterns are already known by direct acquaintance independent of language and conceptual thought, and may become articulate and communicable by a certain kind of conceptual analysis."

Throughout this discourse I find helpful some hermeneutic disclosures made through art history. Scheler and James advance a cultural dynamic with their views on aesthetics and lived experience in respect to creating a better world, and art helps trace this cultural experience.[9] Both philosophers have the curious similarity of having been close friends with famous painters. John LaFarge was James's long time friend and painting companion, and Otto Dix enjoyed the company of Scheler.

The paintings of George Inness, which reflected the spiritual monism of Swedenborg's followers, surely influenced LaFarge and James. Swedenborgism is at the heart of the spiritualism James was taught by his father, Henry James Sr., and while he reacted against these teachings, they still influenced his concepts of "pure experience" and the "fringe" of experience.[10] James thought of all experience, physical and mental, as inter-connected and pluralistic, in that what is not paid attention continues to exist in relation to one's sense of the world. Psychologically James formulates a map of un-chartered territory into the unknown influences that play on a consciousness rooted in a unity of experience. In a similar way, at the turn of the 29th century American painters explored what it meant "to have soul"[11] in relation to a unity of nature and spiritualism, and the Tonalist styles of Inness and LaFarge exemplify such queries. By way of a like-minded quest, Tonalism resembles the Germany Magic Realism painting of the fin de siecle.[12] In turn, German Post-expressionism and surrealism were partly influenced by these movements in painting in the early 20th century.[13]

While I am unable to fully describe these cross influences in this introductory exploration, I can make visual reference to Inness' late painting *Sunset in the Woods* (1891) as a metaphor for James' aesthetics.[14] The painting is of the last light of a late afternoon in a New England wood, and it was completed in the artist's studio many years after its first conception.[15] The oil on canvas emphasizes Inness's mastery of employing chiaroscuro and sfumato to capture photographic-like passages of atmosphere, while capturing a mood of the natural phenomenon. The sunlit area in the picture

[9] In respect to James and community see John J. McDermott, "The Promethean Self and Community in the Philosophy of William James", *The Rice University Studies,* vol. 66, no. 4 (1980), pp 87-102. Although James's is know for his "individualism" of perception, the relational aspects of his psychology bring forth the common element between his views and Scheler's, i.e. that the individual's choices are not choices at all unless they are functional in society among the plurality of relationships.

[10] Such influence is complex, but the thrust of Henry James Sr.'s influence on William James' philosophy lies in the area of virtues and metaphysics. Accordingly, this is the relevance of this matter in regard to this comparasion of William James and Scheler. For how the influence relates generallly see Gérard Deledalle, "William James and His Father: A Study in Characterology*", The Philosophy of William James,* Walter Robert Corti, Editor (Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1976). For explanations of the Swedenborgian influences on specific Jamesian concepts such as *pure experience* and *fringe* see Armi Värila, *The Swedenborgian Background of William James* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1977).

[11] See David A. Cleveland, *A History of American Tonalism 1880-1920* (New York: Hudson Hills, 2010).

[12] I refer those interested in this, to date, undeveloped connection to Dennis Crockett, *German Post-Expressionism* (Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania, 1999).

[13] For a brief exploration into John Dewey's pragamtic aesthetics, which were influenced by James, and European art movements of the first half of the Twentieth Century see Krystyna Wilkoszewska, "Dewey's Philosophy of Art as a Challenge for European Aesthetics", *Pragmatism and Values, the Central European Pragmatist Forum,* ed. John Ryder and Emil Visnovsky (Rodipi, Amsterdam; New York, NY, 2004). Please note that Wilkoszewska can be debated on several accounts; mainly in regards to Dewey's association with progressive art trends and her omittion of Dewey's important passages on aesthetics in *Nature and Experience.*

[14] Corocoran Gallery of Art, Washington D.C., 1891, 48 ½ x 72 1/8 in (122.2 x 183.2 cm), Museum Purchase, Gallery Fund 91.10.

[15] Orville O. Hiestand, *See America First*, Kessinger Publishers, before 1929. 77. Now part of the Guttenberg Project; Original url:http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3547.

presents a clearing of verdure foliage, as it also presents the conscious attention of the artist and viewer. At the same time, the darkened forest shows what surrounds one's focused attention and what continues to spur the imagination. Similarly, the Jamesian notion of a unity of consciousness, which includes unknown aspects of consciousness, can be seen through his concept of *the fringe*, as a deepening or enrichment of lived, experiential, phenomena. Metaphorically the painting portends both the attention and curiosity of the artist and viewer, along with embodying a feeling of how one's mood is actively disposed through the art experience.

Although by way of a different style, there is an evocation of such phenomenological aesthetics to be experienced by viewing the paintings of Otto Dix. Dix lived and painted in Berlin during the Weimar Republic. Like George Grosz, he was named a *Verist* in that their work from that time was often social critique and included elements of graphic realism that revealed the hard truths and hypocrisies of post-war society. Yet along with employing techniques influenced by journalism and comic books such as collage and animation, Dix and Grosz drew with a hyper-naturalism of form and had a penchant for landscapes. Dix painted and drew as a social critic, by utilizing drama and techniques of magical realism. The romanticism of German paintings, the emergence of popular culture, and the urgency of social critique fused, thereby resulting in the outspoken socio/political/aesthetic movements of Dadaism and surrealism.

Culturally, prior to Hitler's rise Americanism was a key theme of the Weimar milieu, as the artists, intellectuals and citizens welcomed America's music and movies and its innovative spirit and progressive directions for society. Dix was a reader of philosophy and he knew Scheler well, even doing a famous portrait of him in the late Twenties.[16] As active members of the intellectual movement of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis considered both to be undesirables. Americanism also spread through philosophy and Scheler embraced pragmatism as perhaps no other German philosopher. However, both Scheler and Dix were critical of the calculating, competitive side of American culture, and they were skeptical of an emphasis on domination by wealth, mass production, and manipulation of the status quo. An interpretation of Dix's work, throughout this essay, brings Scheler's pragmatic aesthetics to light in relation to such paradoxes, specifically with regards to culture and human nature.

Scheler's treatise *Cognition and Work* exposes a love-hate relationship with pragmatism.[17] On the one hand he criticizes the general pragmatic perspective as being too utilitarian and consequential, and on the other he champions James' thinking on the integration of the theoretical and the practical.[18] In his essay on aesthetics, "Metapyschics and Art," he critically aligns general

[16] Most notably Dix and Scheler shared an interest in Nietzsche's philosophy. Dix modeled busts of Nietzsche from bronze. See "Nietzche and the Future of Art", *Hyperion: On the Future of Aesthetics*, a web publication of *The Nietzsche Circle*: www.nietzschecircle.com (December 2007). Copyright © 2003 Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen.
http://www.nietzschecircle.com/hyperion0728.html
09/29/2012: 5:24 pm Central Europe Time.

[17] Scheler, *Cognition and Work*, 293. Scheler makes clear his critique; "Pragmatism bears a close affinity to the advancement of Kantian philosophy, an advancement Fichte had completed. For pragmatism, the world is only the material for a free activity of the ego, and, under pragmatism, the task of theoretical cognition loses its independence from the practical, moral consciousness. Also for pragmatism and its modern successors such as Chr. V. Sigwart, W. Windelbrand, H. Rickert, H. Münsterberg, the concept of being is reduced to the concept of value, the concept of 'object' is reduced to the experienced ought of the recognition of a content through the judgment that should be a type of 'assessment."' We will describe in the future the above mentioned theses as pragmatism in the broader sense to which we contrast, as pragmatism *in the stricter sense*, the pragmatism of James, Schiller and Dewey."

[18] Stikkers, p. 76.

pragmatism with empiricism and a latent, passive subjectivity, while conversely going on to outline an aesthetics that echoes James's approach.[19]

Scheler's general use of the term pragmatism does not fit with James's method of understanding meaningful cognitive particulars conjoined with practical experience. James distinguishes contextual ideas from the kind of redundancy of thought and action Scheler infers by asserting that we select and focus on particular relationships that our ideas have with things through testing those relationships.[20] Scheler would be wrong if he suggests that pragmatic aesthetics focuses on either a theoretical or an associative stance that would measure art merely by its symbolic value or social capital, in that James recognizes all aspects of cognitive *and* practical experience that stand out as significant as a matter of chosen, meaningful relationships.[21]

Regardless of Scheler's objections to what he terms general pragmaticism, he understands aesthetics (feelings and emotions, which are enlivened in experience specifically through artistic practice and reception) as pragmatically constitutive of embodied meanings and collective values that have immediate effects in the world.[22] Scheler's aesthetic philosophy is pragmatic and similar to James' on three inter-connected accounts. Initially, there is the vital connection between the functionalization of values through objects, which can be compared to James' notion of *ideas cum rebus* or ideas with things. Further, Scheler proposes a top down valuation that explains the artistic embodiment of value and a materiality of value making. This is an active yet cognitive aesthetic, similar to James's preferring of one way to look at our experience over another as a means to better the world. Finally, Scheler's notions on the *vital soul* and *fantasy* have a curious connection to James's belief in the possibilities of experience. While James and Scheler have nuanced views on imagination, they both agree that the unifying aspects of aesthetic structures and art are creative, directional, and purposeful.

All three comparisons imply virtues or meanings that interweave with values of community. Despite the emphasis on individualism throughout James' mostly psychologically oriented writings, acknowledging the self as a character built on active, productive relationships necessarily understands the individual and culture in a community minded respect.[23] Similarly, Scheler's personalism is built on individual dignity and responsibility to the solidarity of cultural relationships. Aesthetically, for James and Scheler, art and soul (as lived experience) are pragmatic in both individual and communal respects.

Ken Stikkers explains the connection between Scheler's thinking and James's notion of *ideas cum rebus*, saying that both realize that unless ideas are "with things" they are idle and non historical. There is no object/subject divide in that ideas are "with things" rather than coming before the physical world, as with Platonic Forms, or after, as with a positivist bias.[24] In this respect, James understands the agent as creatively sketching her world. James also describes an ongoing process of meaning making that has a place in the world because of the

[19] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", *Max Scheler (1874-1928): Centinnial Essays*, ed. Manfred S. Frings, The Hague: Martinus Nijhof.
[20] Shusterman, p. 350.
[21] See William James, *Meaning of Truth* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), p. 210.
[22] Ibid. As mentioned, James thinks of these intuitions as harmonies between "objects of thought", and Scheler thinks of intuitive feelings or emotions as apriori. However both understand that the agent is pulled toward immediate experience by an aesthetic valence that is preferred, and that is consquentially acted on.
[23] See William James, "A World of Pure Experience (1904)", first published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, *1*, pp 533-543, pp 561-570 and McDermott, "The Promethean Self and Community in the Philosophy of William James" as cited in ft 9 of this essay.
[24] Stikkers, p. 77.

world's state of affairs.[25] In such an aesthetic process, practice and ideas evolve with the making and using of objects to bring forward contrasts, critiques, and similitude from the flux of experience, not merely as practice but as a utilitarian implementation of *homo faber*. In relation to art, such ideas and habits are not a matter of stored knowledge but of directional action or making, that is done to explore the effects of what is preferred in cognition and brought into focus creatively from the absolutely real, or what James terms *the fringe*. *The fringe* is a description of the 'giveness' of the world where we find the acting, emotional person already in experience. This Jamesian view seems to echo through Scheler's mode of phenomenology, which is attitudinal rather than eidetic.

Although Scheler states that art "with ideas" is a falsification, because art symbolically represents or points to an ideal realm "through concrete contents of intuition", he does takes up a concept similar to *ideas cum rebus,* by explaining the functionalization of essences/values in the making of art.[26] Scheler understands an apriority that is functional through individuals' dispositions, revealing a hierarchy of values that are the personal and the ethical responsibility of the person. This hierarchy is axiological in that it is based on a formal, abstract apriori, but it is relative to lived experience and action. Each person has a value disposition coming from the core values of utility, pleasure, life and nobility, spirit and the divine. However, I must stress that Scheler's axiology is dependent on democratic, free actions within lived experience. His notion of art as "*poiein*", meaning an activity of embodied making, stands at the center of his process aesthetics as an ongoing, embodied yet constructive functioning of such existential values. Scheler's understanding of artistic making is as follows,

> Art is "poiein" building, the producing of a sense structure out of material, a structure that at least cannot be matched for its correspondence with the "fortuitous reality" of the world.[27]

Scheler sees the artist as both an idealist *and* a realist who realizes experimental ideas that posit values, or "aesthetically worthy meanings," that are conscious.[28] Moreover, art objectifies ideas and/or values through an aestheticizing process that is *telic,* as art changes reality by directing dispositions to a goal of understanding and appreciation. Scheler sees art as more than experimental and as truly creative. Art is more intelligent than the descriptive exercises of metaphysics or science, since those discursive structures are based on the "fortuitous reality" of the world, whereas art is based on the perfecting of a new world made with virtuous ideas.

For example, a landscape painting does not describe or symbolize nature as geographical data; it transfigures the ideas, factors, or virtues of nature of a particular time and place through its medium and aesthetic structure, leaving an indication of an aesthetic/value structure to be acted upon by its reception. For Scheler, the *vital-soul* and *fantasy* are primal life forces entering into the service of the values of culture and community through creative, aesthetic productive imagination, and such value-laden aesthetic structures can be seen in the landscape paintings of the German Magic Realists.[29]

[25] See William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, ed. Frederick Burkhardt et al., *The Works of William James*, vol. 6 (1897; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 115.
[26] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 106.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] See Scheler. "Metaphysics and Art", pp 116-119. For a precise explanation of creative, aesthetic productive imagination that includes valuation of life, Scheler provides a full description of his thinking, i.e. "On the contrary, there is *productive* imagination in every living being of higher, more complex structures – driven forward through the automotoric functions of drives in the vital soul. Only gradually does this imagination become subjected to correction, critique, or selection, during the maturation of sense perception and noetic acts of the mind. It is not extinguished, however, in the mature and optimal state of a human being. Rather, it

Dix's "Randegg in the Snow with Ravens" (1935), makes clear a contrast between the virtues of the ideal *Gemeinschaft* and the society of ravens that feign the fire and warmth for life outside of community. When he painted this landscape-portrait, Dix was separating himself from the Nazi regime while living with his family in the Swiss borderlands. His painting immerses the viewer in the scene with the mood of a foreboding, snow-laden sky, and a somewhat shallow perspective of distance that reflects on itself, continually returning the viewer to the action in the foreground. Here the ravens dive bomb for a patch of food in the snow. Yet, at the center of the picture are the village's hearth and a wagon with winter reserves, depicting a feeling of community virtues alongside the life of the ravens. Unlike a geographical map, the viewer experiences direction toward the existential significance of the ideal world. Are the virtues of community that are shown in the picture's contrast eternal? One could say so for this picture, not in the sense of being detached from the physical existential world, but through an ongoing relationship of feelings about a perfected world, in contrast to a society where values and virtues are less understood as relational.

This brings us to the second major aspect of comparison: both James and Scheler think of aesthetics as relative to a world more valued than the present world. Scheler explains a top-down aesthetics that is "a building of what is not there, but what would be worthy to be there according to aesthetic ideas of value,"[30] and this is comparable to James' notions of meliorism. The major crux of the comparison here returns the discussion to Scheler's thinking on art as funding and being founded on primordial essences of virtues that are soulful or driven by meaning in lived experience, and James has a very different take on essences and essential values. In Scheler's *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, the value essences are ranked in an *ordo amoris*, which is a non-rational order that is in accordance with a love of all that exists. Preferring certain values to others exemplifies the advancement of a person's disposition through the apriori that the ideal points to, yet the practical realm remains unintentional until it is affected by art and action. However, as has been said, these values do not present an abstracted reality, rather they are embodied through persons in lived experience and are signified and built upon by art. These values can direct the free *vital soul* and *fantasy.*

Scheler finds that art has its own aesthetic values that bind value-laden autonomous worlds. The process of creating these worlds is a matter of presentation by which we add value to the real world. The aesthetic values of art serve as "leading and guiding factors of selection and composition."[31] Proceeding with the primal values each artist is best able to work with, the artist works through conscious intuitions which through sensation take on forms, such as language and signs, to create a new world in which primordial essences are vital and active. The artist is never "disinterested" in setting the actual world aside, and the process of lived experience has its effects in the art's "immediacy of giveness" of its essence of value.[32] This ontology develops an aesthetic anthropology of sorts, not a judgment of taste. In the same respect, art history is a matter of revealing the wonderings of our hearts and souls as being involved with the "variations of creative feelings of style – and not variations of the 'taste' which forms itself only on the basis of the works of art created and enjoyed."[33] So artists create worlds free of judgment, yet more aesthetically valued than the present world.

more and more enters into the service of the mind which, in the function of reasonable willing, restrains and regulates drive-impulses and directs fantasy to the mind's own goals: through spiritual, aesthetic value-feeling fantasy enters into the service of aesthetic goals."

[30] Ibid.

[31] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 113.
[32] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 106.
[33] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 114.

Pure experience is the complete flux of life and world, and according to James someone's disposition is made through relating to certain aspects of this flux. Essences, if there are any, are valued properties that are selected psychosomatically from amongst the relationships of experience, and they differ from situation to situation and person to person. Therefore, trust and belief in the possibilities of experience and an inter-connected community of human affairs is foundational to the values of a meaningful reality.[34] James also points out that these relational properties or essences are not associative or static but able to be analyzed, and they are directional for the course of the state of affairs.[35] Likewise his notion of *ideas cum rebus* includes a notion of an ideal world alongside an absolute world that can be perceived by many people knowing the same value of the meaning of a thing in a myriad of reflections. In relation to art making and reception there is a preferencing from this common sense that can be understood as a striving for what Shusterman explains as "better worlds of experience."[36] Shusterman references James from *The Principles of Psychology* on this point:

> The world of aesthetics is an ideal world, a Utopia, a world which the outer relations persist in contradicting, but which we as stubbornly persist in striving to make actual. (pp 123-125)[37]

The upshot of the comparison here, in light of their differences concerning aproiri essences and common meanings, is that James, as Scheler, finds utopian worlds of art not abstracted from the real, but made of the real, in respect to an ideal.

A third aspect of Scheler's philosophy of art that relates to pragmatist aesthetics is his thinking on the creative autonomy of *fantasy*. *Fantasy* is the activity of the imagination, yet *fantasy* and imagination can hardly be separated in that conative action is Scheler's ground of aesthetics. *Fantasy* is active as a matter of consciousness partly based on memory in order to reproduce feelings or sensations; it is a sense and a way of being. Furthermore, it is a source of creativity funded from the *vital soul* of life, and through *fantasy* we "can feel what we never experienced, and wish what we never encountered."[38] Values imbued with drives are given to experience in the working out of *fantasy*. It is what one is driven to act on from the utopias of fantasy that persists against chance events of the world, which are often not experienced artistically.

This view might seem to be in contrast with James' concept of imagination in his early writings in *The Principles of Psychology*, wherein imagination is based on memories that are rearranged in novel ways. Yet James was consistently opposed to associationism, and he comes to add value to imagination by way of the creative agent finding new directions in the continuity of experience that are valuable. For James' radical empiricism, the imagination is praxial as it finds the world a phenomenon to be acted upon creatively. The difference between a thinker like Hume (who searches for sources of value in a reconstructive imagination) and James is that the latter finds the reconstruction of imagination to be valuable in an experimental sense, since we invest our actions not only through the actual, but also through the possible. James' core aesthetic value is how persons look toward a ground of belief for our ideas, experiments and dreams within lived experience. In *The Principle of Psychology* this is what James calls *Soul*.[39] For James *Soul* is a relational aesthetic ground of belief in the possibilities of actuality. James describes his meaning of *Soul* in the *Principles of Psychology,*

[34] James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt 7 Co., 1890), vol. II, p. 329.
[35] James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. II, p. 333.
[36] Shusterman, p. 355.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 118.
[39] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, pp 345-346.

> But what positive meaning has the Soul, when scrutinized, but the *ground of possibility* of the thought? And what is the 'knocking' but the *determining of the possibility to actuality*? And what is this after all but giving a sort of concreted form to one's belief that the coming of the thought, when the brain-processes occur, has *some* sort of ground in the nature of things? If the word Soul be understood merely to express that claim, it is a good word to use.[40]

James's *Soul* is the source of imaginative action, just as the *vital soul* is the drive behind *fantasy* for Scheler.

Thomas Alexander credits James with producing one of the most, if not the most, rational understanding of thinking as aesthetic imagination. Alexander reflects on James' impact on epistemological theories;

> Our rationality is a process then, which is driven by an aesthetic eros. For James this includes a banishment of uncertainty towards the future, a harmonious anticipation of the world acting "congruously with our spontaneous powers." (In quotation William James, *Will to Believe, pp 75-76/66).*[41]

But this certainty of belief is not unconnected with the real world of situational flux, and as Alexander rightly points out James was not putting forward a "voluntaristic nihilism". Instead James is explaining that people's creative thinking on life's problems matter in realizing possible worlds of experience. Alexander looks towards John Dewey to extend James' notions of the possibilities of experience to a moral community.[42]

Dewey brings the imagination into the matter of choosing possibilities because we have learned how to make choices in relation to others. According to Alexander, Dewey's realm of imagination is primarily a matter of community".[43] In fact Alexander views all three of the classical pragmatic thinkers, Peirce, James and Dewey, as finding community building as necessarily indebted to imagination and aesthetics. For these thinkers, inquiry into perceptions of experience and the testing of new innovations through experience is a matter of creative action as learned with others. Alexander explains,

> To acquire sensitivity to the developmental meanings of events, which define the significance of the situations in which we find ourselves and the values they possess, is what I have called here "the moral imagination.[44]

Values for Dewey are the qualities of continued practice that persist, as the past takes on the expectations of the future in the present moment. Dewey's aesthetic experience involves a unity of meaningful value-laden habits that allow for improvised projections into an innovative future. Dewey conceived imagination as a source of social and moral growth, in that it is an artful approach to life. This is a democratic ontology in that creativity factors in practical qualities of experience as recurring because they are consistent with communities' active values and conditions. Alexander makes Dewey's intentions clear, "The democratic community for Dewey is the community which understands itself as actively pursuing life as art."[45]

Scheler also saw an artful existence as the most imaginative approach to bettering the moral and social fibers of communities. In his axiology Scheler's theories

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Thomas M. Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,* vol. 26, no. 3 (Summer, 1990), p. 333.

[42] See Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination", p. 335. Alexander connects James with community as do other scholars such as McDermott. He does this on an aesthetic basis and he then traces this pragmatic aesthetic to an influence on Dewey's aesthetics of experience and the formulation of what he calls the "moral imagination." For a full understanding of his term "moral imagination" see Thomas M. Alexander, "John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics", *Transaction of the Charles S. Pierce Society,* vol. 29, no. 3, (1993), p. 391. "A moral imagination requires experience, a body of developing habits, education, an ability to understand the way other people think and live, and the ideal of discovering through cooperative action solutions to conflicts."

[43] Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination", p. 340.

[44] Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination", p. 390.

[45] Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination", p. 341.

place cultural values of the *life-community* as the second highest tier of virtues. Without cultural solidarity of belief in the betterment of community, there is no possible ground for actual moral progress or creative artistic experience. However, communities must constantly reflect on what their world "ought" to be and are responsible for making that belief a reality. Art is a testing ground for stronger values and a moral compass as well, and it can be understood as a pathway to understanding and comprehending the possible virtues imbued in the existential activities of life. Scheler exclaims,

> A work of art says, as it were: "This, You Eternal Ground of all Things is what You just wanted to tell me – be it without quite being able to do so, or, being able to do so in Your rational and Impenetrable 'Fiat' of Your willing". Or it addresses us by saying: "This also You could have told us without violating the idea of a possible world of essence".[46]

By recognizing Scheler's aesthetics as a positing of qualities that are embodied forms, which function as they are conceived intuitively through belief and imagination, we can deem a close relationship between his aesthetics, James' sense of melorism, and Dewey's moral imagination. For James and Dewey aesthetic experience is the forward-looking aspect of life and for Scheler "art creates a *new* world added to the real one".[47]Aesthetics and pragmatism take on a unique voice through such views on *fantasy* and imagination, as art and soul work together through the creative, directional and experimental actions of the artist. How does this experimental yet value-laden aesthetics play out in practice? Let us turn to another example in the paintings of Dix to disclose the directional qualities of artistic valuation.

In Scheler's and Dix's era, human drives were played out through a full throttle madness, as two World Wars and a cultural disintegration ended in a kind of mass suicide of the Nazi regime. In Dix's "Lustmord" of 1929[48] we find the fascination of the Weimar culture with the procreative and destructive, mixed with Dix's method of painting that he claims unleashes a Dionysian spirit. Maria Tatar's interpretation informs the viewer that Dix, like his Weimar milieu, associates "woman" with the unruliness of biology and earth, while the bourgeois setting of the room and architecture outside of the window depicts the opposite, showing the *Geist* of spirit and mind. Tatar thinks the murderer is victimized by what is perceived as the woman's disruptive and disorderly dead presence. This is a probing and complex interpretation and it deserves mention in light of the rationalization of murder that is a cultural phenomenon during war, and in respect to feminist concerns. However, in relation to an aesthetic that looks to purge such drives, thereby acting as a deterrent, as Dix proposed, one can think of the murder scene as a contra-ideal world.[49] In an interpretation that reflects Scheler's aesthetics, which is not necessarily completely contrary to Tatar's, Dix acts as a surrealist and social critic. It is clear that the overturned chair to the left of the gashed and violated victim shows that the viewer flees from the scene of the crime, both from the reality of the cultural sleaze that surrounds it and from the false solutions that serve only to devastate all virtues of the heart. There is a subversion of love and togetherness, both with the macabre murder and the vacant urban setting. Talking about Dix's painting, the Weimar art critic Ilse Fischer wrote:

> And he attacks everything, though without any sort of system. With persistent brooding he strives to scrutinize all things chance pushes to

[46] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 108.
[47] Scheler, "Metaphysics and Art", p. 109.

[48] Otto Dix, *Lustmord (Sex Murder*), 1922, oil on canvas, 165 x 135 cm (65 x 53 1/8 in.). Missing. The quote was gathered by the art historian Olaf Peters. It makes clear the re-valuation of values converging with phantasm that is depicted in opposition to the ideal.
[49] Maria Tatar, *Lustmord: Sexual Murder in Weimar Germany* (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1995), p. 19.

> the forefront of his restlessly groping mind, searching for their true reasons. He pounces violently and impulsively on his object – never mind whether person or thing – brutally eliminates all decorative trimmings, rummages cruelly and critically around the exposed strands, disintegrates, dismembers, dissects everything he encounters with the ecstatic thrill of the sex killer. But like the latter, who horribly sobered walks empty from the crime, he too stands, in the end, before things and people, before himself, sobered, hopeless. Do you now understand the dreadful truthfulness of his sex killing pictures, you who think a bit contemptuously of the choice of such a motif, a motif that seems dishonest to you, unnecessary, because you know very well that this good-natured fellow will never murder a woman?"[50]

Dix's art makes such a terrible and pointless crime meaningful and despicable. Dix does not depend on a psychic distance in order to create a facsimile of activism to cure social evils; he critiques in the strong terms of an ideal world by revealing the problems of the real world. He creates a morality tale based on the possibilities of a particular act, and shows the destructive side of aesthetic experience in terms of virtues. The painting presents a view of aesthetics based solely on egoistic desires, in that there is no understanding here of the values that make life possible for the *life-community*.[51] Scheler and Dix imagine the implications of the Dionysian woman/man in that a realization of the anti-rationalistic life force can push woman/man to revalue its values. In this regard Dix asks here a question that Scheler answers pragmatically; namely, if one separates spirit from the forces that drive the *vital soul* there is a lesser valuation of lived experience. And as importantly, the drives of the *vital soul* depend on valued feelings and shared actions in respect to community.

Community as a cultural space of sympathy and caring must be built on respect for the otherness of others, and on the foundations of trust and belief in one another, as well as a love of life that gives persons a disposition to assume such mutual respect. This is a big order if there is no imagination through an active manner of relationships. Scheler and James practiced a pragmatic aesthetic that finds such creative values in the making through art, as an embodiment of people's ideas about community and a life well spent together. Art and soul work together to actualize such a creative realization and participation in life.

[50] "Painting, A Medium of Cool Execution", *Otto Dix*, ed. Olaf Peters, Munich et al.: Prestel, p. 102.
[51] For a full account of the *life-community* and its virtues see: Max Scheler, *Philosophical Perspectives* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 89.

GADAMER'S AND SHUSTERMAN'S AESTHETICS

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1. Introduction

If we look at Gadamer and Shusterman from the point of view of the history of Western philosophy, it is beyond question that they both belong to the relativist traditions of post-Nietzschean European and post-Darwinian American philosophy. Nonetheless, there are far more common features than differences, and the common features result in overlappings between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and Shusterman's neopragmatism. Such common features are first of all their antifundationalism, panrelationism, and antiessentialism.

Yet the aesthetics of these two philosophers are seemingly very different. Gadamer (1900–2002) tries to integrate aesthetics into a hermeneutic philosophy of art, while Shusterman (b. 1949) builds his somaesthetics on the somatic naturalism of Dewey's aesthetics. The hermeneutic and somatic are seemingly two absolutely different approaches. There is, however, a point where they meet each other, and this is *experience*. They both accept the importance of experience regarding art and artworks.

Analyzing this common point, I will show, on the one hand, that there are far more similarities between Gadamer's philosophy of art and Shusterman's somaesthetics than we might have thought. On the other hand, I will demonstrate that Gadamer is not a hermeneutic universalist in Shusterman's sense, but his standpoint is closer to Heidegger's, whom Shusterman calls a "revered progenitor".[1]

[1] Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics. Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, 2nd ed (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 129. Hereafter: *PA*

2. Similarities of Gadamer's Philosophy of Art and Shusterman's Somaesthetics

Truth and Method – Fundamental Characteristics of a Philosophical Hermeneutics[2] is Gadamer's main work published in 1960, which gradually made him and philosophical hermeneutics well known in the international arena. Its main aim was to renew philosophy, which Gadamer accomplished by making us aware of its hermeneutic presuppositions and of the philosophical presuppositions of hermeneutics. Regarding the details, we can say that Gadamer has legitimized the humanist tradition, while opposing it with the dominance of the natural scientific method, and in this way he has created his philosophical hermeneutics. In the first part of the three main parts of *TM* ("I. The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art") Gadamer demonstrates the hermeneutic approach to *art*, and in the second part ("II. The extension of the question of truth to understanding in the human sciences") he applies it to *history* and *philosophy*, while the third part ("III. The ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by language") emphasizes the special significance of *language* in our relationship to the world. The train of thought in *TM* permanently widens the territory of hermeneutic procedure from the experience of artworks to the universal aspect of hermeneutics. However, we have to distinguish the Gadamerian meaning of the "universal aspect of hermeneutics" from the meaning of Shusterman's expression, "hermeneutic universalism".

The first part of *TM* contains two chapters: "1. Transcending the aesthetic dimension" and "2. The ontology of the work of art and its hermeneutic significance". In the first chapter Gadamer writes a kind of general introduction to the legitimization of the humanities contrary to the dominance of natural sciences, and it also contains his criticism of traditional subjectivistic aesthetics. The second chapter is the explication of the essence of his own philosophy of art.

[2] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London-New York: Continuum, 2006). Hereafter: *TM*.

Applying Heidegger's existential-phenomenological ontology, Gadamer's main aim is to show, while working out his philosophy of art, that "aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics" (*TM*, p. 157). Behind this idea we can find the recognition that the general connections of understanding and interpretation have to function in the particular field of art as well as in the particular case of the appreciation of an artwork. *An appreciation of an artwork is only a special occurrence of the general hermeneutic connections*.

By denouncing the subjectivistic trend in aesthetics that began with Kant, Gadamer contrasts the very special, primarily *experiential meaning* of artworks with the exclusiveness of their formal criteria. This means that understanding and interpretation of an artwork's special meaning have a distinctive (but not exclusive!) significance for Gadamer. At the very beginning of the real understanding of an artwork there is always, according to Gadamer, some kind of experience. It follows from this that it is beyond question for Gadamer that experience already includes understanding in itself:

> We have seen that it is not aesthetic consciousness but the experience (Erfahrung) of art and thus the question of the mode of being of the work of art that must be the object of our examination. But this was precisely the experience of the work of art that I maintained in opposition to the levelling process of aesthetic consciousness: namely that *the work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who experiences it. The "subject" of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself*. (*TM*, p. 103. – my emphasis)

It stands to reason for Gadamer! Why? The reason is that he has based his philosophy of art, which transcends the aesthetic dimension, on the young Heidegger's existential-phenomenological ontology. What does it mean in detail? It means that Gadamer has taken and applied Heidegger's very thoroughgoing analysis of experience. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), as it is well known, achieved the ontological turn in Western philosophy, created philosophical hermeneutics, and wanted to answer the question of Being throughout his whole life. He combined his ontological approach with his transformed version of Husserlian phenomenology and his philosophical hermeneutics. The early Heidegger (1919–1929) wanted to fulfill his project in *Being and Time*,[3] that is, to create a fundamental ontology through an existential analysis of *Dasein*, but his fundamental ontology remained a torso. However, he did complete the existential analysis.[4] Heidegger, who had criticized and rejected the *conscious intentionality* of Husserl's phenomenology, replaced it with *experiential intentionality* in his existential phenomenology. According to the young Heidegger we can have, in the most basic approach, exclusively phenomena about the world, which are essentially experiences, that is, lived, non-discursive "meanings and significances". I have to emphasize here that the meaning of experience is threefold in Heidegger. It includes the being who experiences, as well as the object and the process of experiencing.

Gadamer has taken this Heideggerian analysis of experience, and just like Dewey did in *Art as Experience*, Gadamer has embedded aesthetic experience into the whole of the human life. If we read in Gadamer that "aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics" (*TM*, p. 157.), then it is essentially the same striving that we can find in Dewey's work. As Dewey speaks about the priority of "The Live Creature" and wants to grasp the aesthetic experience as embedded in this creature's life, so does Gadamer, because his philosophical hermeneutics is a description of how we gather experiences, understand and interpret the world.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. by Joan Stambaugh (SUNY Press, 1996). Hereafter: *BT*.
[4] After "the Turn" (die Kehre, 1929–1935), the late Heidegger (1935–1976) evaluated his early work, *BT* as a subject centered philosophy, and absolutely neglected the existential analysis. The late Heidegger focused directly on Being, on the history of Being and Ereignis.

Aesthetic experience may be grasped only as a part of human life. What is more, they both understand the work of art not as an independent objective entity, but first of all as a special, experiential meaning, which comes to life in the process of experience, and this experience is in the first real moment an immediate and non-discursive experience that always includes understanding.

Shusterman's somaesthetics is built in this respect on Dewey's aesthetics, and the similarities are also self-evident between Gadamer's and Shusterman's views. It is beyond question at the same time that Shusterman, who also builds his aesthetics on the dominance of experience, focuses in his somaesthetics, contrary to Gadamer, on aesthetic experience in a wider sense. Shusterman has obviously emphasized the differences between his and Dewey's views as well, for example that he does not accept Dewey's "experiential definition of art and essentialist theory of aesthetic experience" (*PA*, p. ix).[5] Furthermore, Shusterman questions "his half-hearted approach to popular art," and contests "his excessive reliance on immediate experience as the foundation for all thought and the criterion for justifying aesthetic value" (*PA*, p. ix). However, all these differences do not affect or alter the essential similarity between Gadamer's and Shusterman's views regarding the central position of experience and the artwork's relational mode of being.

3. Gadamer is not a Hermeneutic Universalist

Let us return, however, from aesthetic experience to experience in general, and let us demonstrate that Gadamer is not a hermeneutic universalist. In the third part of *TM*, we can actually find a sentence from Gadamer that says that "all understanding is interpretation" (*TM*, p. 390), but my interpretation differs from Shusterman's. According to Shusterman this Gadamerian expression, which is taken out of context, shows that Gadamer claims the absolute identity of understanding and interpretation. He calls this view is "hermeneutic universalism":

> Considerations of this sort have led Gadamer and other hermeneutic universalists to the radical claim that "all understanding is interpretation. (*PA*, p. 130)

However, considering two important contexts will result in a different interpretation. One of the contexts is naturally the context of the quoted expression ("all understanding is interpretation"), the other one is Gadamer's philosophical development. If we read thoroughly the mentioned paragraph of *TM*, then it becomes recognizable that Gadamer understands his expression ("all understanding is interpretation") from the point of view of German romanticism and, primarily, from that of the young Heidegger. The very important beginning of the paragraph, which was highlighted by Gadamer himself, goes this way:

> Since the romantic period we can no longer hold the view that, *in the absence of immediate understanding*, interpretive ideas are drawn, as needed, out of a linguistic storeroom where they are lying ready. *Rather, language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting*. (*TM*, p. 390. – The first emphasis added, the second emphasis in the original.)

By "German romanticism" we have to understand among others Schleiermacher, one of whose hermeneutic theses is quoted by Gadamer: "Everything presupposed in hermeneutics is but language" (*TM*, p. 383). However, it is beyond question that the young Heidegger's influence is much more important for Gadamer's intellectual development. In this case it is obvious that the last sentence of our Gadamer quotation ("*Understanding occurs in interpreting*") stands in absolute harmony with Heidegger's description in *Being*

[5] See for example, when Shusterman says that "Unfortunately, Dewey does not confine himself to transformational provocation, but also proposes aesthetic experience as a theoretical definition of art". ("The End of Aesthetic Experience," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 55 (1997), p. 33.)

and Time. "The project of understanding has its own possibility of development. We shall call the development of understanding *interpretation*" (*BT*, p. 139), claims Heidegger, and the next sentences of the 32nd section in *BT* ("Understanding and Interpretation") offer on a tray the right interpretation of the focused Gadamerian sentence:

> We shall call the development of understanding *interpretation*. In interpretation understanding appropriates what it has understood in an understanding way. *In interpretation understanding does not become something different, but rather itself.* Interpretation is existentially based in understanding, and not the other way around. *Interpretation is not the acknowledgment of what has been understood, but rather the development of possibilities projected in understanding.* (*BT*, p. 139 – my emphases)

It follows from this that Gadamer does not think that all understanding is always and definitely interpretation, but he thinks that the development of understanding happens in the best way in interpretation if we explicate understanding at all! Not only for Heidegger, but also for Gadamer there exists a non-discursive, experiential understanding, and he also knows that not every understanding needs and is followed by interpretation. (Pay attention to Gadamer's words in our quotation: "in the absence of immediate understanding"!) However, a real experience is always a new one, that is a negative experience (and it is never an experience that only repeats an earlier experience), and its most suitable development is interpretation, linguistic at all times. (It is *the most suitable development* in the sense that it is *the most human one*, because other beings on Earth do not have the ability of and possibility for discursive, linguistic interpretation!) It means that the Gadamerian expression, "all understanding is interpretation", does *not* identify understanding and interpretation. *Rather*, Gadamer's statement means only *that if we need and want to explicate the details of an understanding*, which is non-discursive, experiential understanding in many cases and related to the actual relative whole of our practice, then the most suitable, the most human way is interpretation, at all times discursive. *This is actually Heidegger's standpoint, and as long as Heidegger is not a hermeneutic universalist in Shusterman's opinion, Gadamer cannot be evaluated in this way either.* However, it is obvious from his *Pragmatist Aesthetics* that in Shusterman's opinion Heidegger and Wittgenstein were only "*two revered progenitors* of hermeneutic universalism who I think wisely resisted that doctrine". (*PA*, p. 129) That is why I am persuaded that Gadamer also belongs to the revered progenitors with his standpoint, and not to the hermeneutic universalists understood in the extreme Shustermanian sense. Proof is offered by Gadamer himself, because he claims in one of his interviews as follows:

> – H-G. Gadamer: Das ist Hermeneutik, zu wissen, wieviel immer Ungesagtes bleibt, wenn man etwas sagt. Nach dieser Richtung geht sehr vieles, was durch den Wissenschaftsbegriff der Neuzeit fast ganz unserer Aufmerksamkeit entgeht. So habe ich es geradezu als das Wesen des hermeneutischen Verhaltens bezeichnet, daß man nie das letzte Wort behalten soll.
> – J. Grondin: Wenn ich recht verstehe, heben Sie damit auf die Grenzen der Sprache ab, während man in *Wahrheit und Methode* den entgegengesetzten Eindruck bekommt, daß das Universum der Sprache grenzenlos sei.
> – H-G. Gadamer: Aber nein, das habe ich nie gemeint und auch nicht gesagt, daß alles Sprache ist. Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache. Darin steckt eine Begrenzung. Was also nicht verstanden werden kann, kann eine unendliche Aufgabe sein, das Wort zu finden, das der Sache wenigstens näher kommt.[6]

[6] "Dialogischer Rückblick auf das Gesammelte Werk und dessen Wirkungsgeschichte", in: *Gadamer Lesebuch*, ed. by Jean Grondin. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), p. 286.
– H-G. Gadamer: In hermeneutics the thing is to know that much more always remains unsaid when one says something. From this aspect there are lots of things at issue that avoid our attention almost entirely, due to the concept of science in modernity. That is why I have described as the essence of hermeneutical attitude that one shall not insist on having the last word.
– J. Grondin: If I understand it correctly, you are emphasizing the limits of language this way, whereas one gets the opposite impression, that the universe of language is boundless, when reading *Truth and Method.*
– H-G. Gadamer: Not at all, I have never thought and

also never said that everything is language. Being that can be understood is language. Therein lies a limitation. Therefore what cannot even be understood can be an infinite task, looking for the proper word in order to bring the thing at least closer.

CENTRAL PARK IN THE DARK:

THE AESTHETIC INTERSECTION OF CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE

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> *For better or worse, American man is now urban man, or at the least, megapolitan man… The city is now our home; in the most traditional and profound sense of the word, it is our land.*
>
> John J. McDermott
> "Nature Nostalgia and the City"
>
> *One of the truly great cities of the world, Rome, can teach us how to build a human city. In Rome, the old and the new, the elegant and the proletariat, the monumental and the occasional are married day by day as people of every persuasion, of every ability and every desire, mingle in a quest for the good life.*
>
> John J. McDermott
> "Glass Without Feet"

I would begin with a series of introductory comments. The first is that we take as our point of departure the work of John McDermott; he is the contemporary philosopher who best exemplifies, indeed embodies, the spirit of pragmatism, and he has done so for more than 50 years. His work combines the philosophical acumen of a James or Dewey, the poetic sensibility and rhetorical skills of Emerson, and the appreciation of the quotidian of Franklin. Across McDermott's many essays he takes up a wide range of themes; the two that will most interest us here are the aesthetic emphasis on the ordinary and the relation of city to countryside.[1]

The second introductory point has to do with the geographic scope of our interests. On the one hand pragmatism has been and in some ways remains a distinctly American philosophical perspective. On the other hand, as the location and national origins of most of the participants in this conference attest, there is reason enough to put to work pragmatist philosophical perspectives anywhere in the world. So there is something American at least in pragmatism's origins and initial contexts, but there is nothing uniquely American about its intellectual potential and ramifications. Both McDermott and I are Americans, and he especially has American contexts in mind when he writes, but I confess to having the same orientation in some measure. So while examples and other points of reference may tend to be American, let us understand that the broader meaning and implications are generally not geographically bound.

Finally by way of introduction I would like to say a word about the contrast between city and countryside. When McDermott deals with this topic he tends to talk about city and nature, but I prefer not to speak about nature in this way. I do not mean to say that nature does not properly have the meaning as something that can be contrasted with the urban; it certainly does have that meaning. But it has many meanings, and when I use the word "nature" as a philosophical concept I tend to use it to mean "whatever there is", as would be appropriate in the context of philosophical naturalism. So to avoid any conceptually awkward moments that might result from these different meanings of the term "nature" I will speak about the relation not between city and nature but between city and countryside.

I.

McDermott is, we may say affectionately, a city boy. He was born, raised, and educated, and he spent nearly his first fifty years, in New York City. In his late 40s he moved from New York to what to a typical New Yorker would appear to be the wilds of rural Texas.

[1] A valuable collection of McDermott's essays is John J. McDermott, *The Drama of Possibility: Experience as Philosophy of Culture*, ed. Douglas R. Anderson (NY: Fordham University Press, 2007). See especially "Nature Nostalgia and the City: An American Dilemma" (167-184), "Glass without Feet: Dimensions of Urban Aesthetics" (204-218), "To Be Human is to Humanize: A Radically Empirical Aesthetic" (pp 345-371), and "The Aesthetic Drama of the Ordinary" (pp 390-402). For an insightful discussion of McDermott's aesthetic ideas and their background see Richard E. Hart, "Landscape and Personscape in Urban Aesthetics", in James Campbell and Richard E. Hart, eds. *Experience as Philosophy: On The Work of John J. McDermott* (NY: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp 140-161.

McDermott's sensibilities were well enough attuned to America as a whole, however, that for him such a move was not a banishment to the wilderness but an opportunity to expand his direct experience of America in more of its variety and diversity. Nevertheless he remained profoundly urban, and his appreciation for the many experiential virtues of the city informs his sense of the aesthetic and aesthetic experience.

Indeed much of his writing on aesthetic matters is directed to articulating the aesthetic significance of the city, to some extent by contrast with the countryside. At first glance it would appear a bit odd that someone writing on art and aesthetic experience in the latter half of the 20th century would find it necessary to highlight the urban in aesthetic experience. After all, modernism in 20th century art was a decidedly urban phenomenon, as were the post-WWII developments, especially in the visual and performing arts. Furthermore, in the American context New York City was the center of much of it. Abstract Expressionism of the 1950s, Pop Art in the 1960s, Conceptual Art in the following years, and a good deal of performance art and installations, are all to a considerable extent New York products. And this is not to mention the impact and influence of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Museum of Modern Art, the Whitney, the Guggenheim, and all the smaller museums and galleries throughout the city. The situation in music is similar. With its construction in the 1960s Lincoln Center became the beating heart of the American musical world, with the Metropolitan Opera on one side of the plaza, and Leonard Bernstein's New York Philharmonic in Avery Fisher Hall adjacent to it. The third building on the plaza, the New York State Theater, currently named for David H. Koch, was and remains the home of George Balanchine's New York City Ballet, which, along with the Martha Graham, Alvin Ailey, and other New York based modern dance troupes, defined the American dance world for decades. And one need only mention Broadway and its impact on the rise and development of both modern musical theater and serious theater in general. Why, given this rich urban aesthetic environment, and in his own hometown, would McDermott feel the need to highlight the significance of the urban in aesthetic experience?

There are two reasons, one of which concerns the broader context while the other deals with the character of aesthetic experience. Concerning the context, in the years around the time that McDermott began to write about these matters there was a decidedly romantic, "back to nature" mood in American culture. The American counter-culture of the 1960s had a distinct non- and even anti-urban character, and it drew on an American strain of romanticism that had its most profound expression in the nature writings of Henry David Thoreau in the first half of the 19th century. There was in the counter-culture a strong pull of the sensibility Rousseau had stated as directly as one can imagine in the opening sentence of *Emile*, in which he said, and I paraphrase, that everything is good as it emerges from God, and everything is corrupted in the hands of man. Thus Rousseau recommended that the most important thing one could do for the education of Emile was to get him out of the city. Much of American counter-culture had the same idea.

Furthermore, at this time the American city was in a severe crisis, in some measure social and in some measure economic. For much of the 20th century black Americans had been migrating from the rural south to the northern cities. By the 1950s and 60s the deep racism in American culture had its effect as white urban dwellers tended to leave the cities for the suburbs, thus to some extent undermining the economic strength of the cities and changing their social character. At the same time the economy was undergoing a profound transformation, and in many American cities the industrial base that had made their development possible eroded, leaving what is still often referred to as the "rust belt" across the northeastern part of the country. The racial tensions in the cities and the

economic malaise, combined with the civil rights movement, caused a series of urban problems that in the middle years of the 1960s left many cities literally in flames. Even ten years later, in the mid-1970s, the problems had not been solved because at that point New York City itself was on the verge of bankruptcy.

In such a context it was not surprising that many people would find it difficult to see the city as a place of aesthetic significance. It was, rather, and as Rousseau had prescribed, a place to flee. If there was indeed an aesthetic dimension and value in the urban experience, it was not obvious. Thus it is entirely sensible that McDermott would make a special effort to articulate it. The other reason he would do so has to do with his understanding of the significance of the aesthetic, a sensibility he derives more than anywhere else from John Dewey. The most obvious point to make in this regard is that for McDermott, as for Dewey, the aesthetic is a dimension of experience, not a kind of experience distinct from the ordinary. The aesthetic dimension of experience is not something that can be set off from the quotidian, but something that permeates it. This is the reason that the many fine museums and theaters that we have mentioned do not suffice to encompass what is important about art and the aesthetic. While no one, including McDermott, would deny their importance, they also present a danger for, even a threat to, our understanding of aesthetic experience because by their nature they set off art and our interaction with it from our daily, normal, and routine experience. The danger is that they can reinforce the mistaken impression that art and the aesthetic are something that properly belong in museums and not in our streets and homes, indeed in our ordinary experience. Thus much of what McDermott wishes to do is to rescue, we may say, art and aesthetic experience from its museums and theaters and to direct our attention to the fact that our homes, streets, and daily experience are imbued with the aesthetic. And this is the case in urban environments no less than elsewhere, in the cities no less than in the countryside.

From McDermott's point of view, again drawing on Dewey and to great extent William James, the aesthetic must be understood in terms of experience, and there is a distinctive conception of experience in the background. As James famously said, experience grows at the edges. It is not, as the empiricists had it, and too much of recent philosophy also posits, a matter of sense perception. Experience, rather, is a relational matter, a 'transaction' in Dewey's terms, with the environment; it is in fact a constitutive relation between an experiencer and her environment. Experience is by its nature creative because the ongoing relation is continuously broadening, constricting, changing, and developing. Both the experiencer and her environment are in a constant process of development, with consummatory experiences, again to use Dewey's term, along the way. It is in this process that the creative, aesthetic dimension of experience lies.

We may still find something of aesthetic value in the cyclical, peaceful, and bucolic sense of the countryside that we derive from the romantics, but to regard that as the model or proper home of aesthetic value is to miss the creative character of daily experience. And if, as McDermott says, most of us by now live in urban environments, then an adequate understanding of the aesthetic dimension of our own experience requires that we grasp it in our urban contexts; thus the importance of an urban aesthetic. For most of us in our current time our daily experience is in the city, often many cities. It is in this or these urban environments that through our interactions we create our lives and their meanings. It is in and through these shifting boundaries and the creative dimension of our experience that its aesthetic dimension is to be found.

II.

McDermott no doubt has done a great service by giving voice to the aesthetic character of the city and of urban experience. He has made it possible for those many of us, perhaps as he suggests the majority of us, who live in cities to understand our own daily experience in its aesthetic dimension without banishing the aesthetic to the museum, or to a weekend at the theater or a concert, or to occasional visits to the countryside. I would like to push McDermott's insights one step further, though, and think about not a rural aesthetic or an urban aesthetic, but about the relation between the city and countryside in aesthetic experience. There is an obvious justification for looking into the relation between city and countryside, which is that whether we inhabit a rural or urban locale; our societies and our lives are complex enough that none of us are simply "urban" or "rural". In the contemporary world, and probably long before the contemporary world, it is impossible to make sense of our experience without taking account of the constitutive relation between city and countryside; neither prevails without the other. And if relations are constitutive, as James, Dewey, McDermott, I, and in fact the entire pragmatic naturalist tradition, think they are, then the city and the countryside constitute one another. Their relation contributes to their identity. Given that fact, it is not surprising that artists in their own exploration of experience would find the relation significant, and relevant to their own understanding of nature, of themselves, and of aesthetic experience.

To be more precise, I would like to consider not aesthetic experience in the abstract in this regard, but to look at several works of art that themselves inhabit, express, or develop the relation between the city and countryside. What, I would like to ask, have insightful artists had to say about the interaction between the two? We may find that the aesthetic consideration of the relation between city and countryside can push our understanding of the aesthetic dimension of experience beyond merely the rural or urban and into the creative relation between them, while at the same time revealing meaningful dimensions of both.

There is no doubt a great number of works of literature, poetry, visual art, music, and dance to which we could turn to examine this question, and I hope that at some point I or some other interested soul will be in a position to do so more thoroughly and systematically. For now, I would like to turn our attention to three works of art that take as a theme the city and countryside in their relation to one another: Claude Monet's paintings of the Thames, Charles Ives' *Central Park in the Dark*, and Bedrich Smetana's *Vltava*. We will also say a few words about Aaron Copeland, easily the most important American composer of the 20th century, whose whole body of work encompassed the complex, constitutive relation between city and countryside.

Probably the most well known of Monet's paintings are those of water lilies and other aspects of his extraordinary garden in Giverny. However Monet, like other French Impressionist painters, was no less interested in urban scenes and settings, often in, though not restricted to, Paris: Camille Pissarro was seemingly as much at home depicting street scenes in Paris and London as he was among the fields and farms of northern France; Renoir is as famous for depictions of dance scenes and other crowds as for anything else; Degas is most well know for his dancers and scenes in the theater; and Toulouse-Lautrec, if we may regard him in the same company, belonged more than anywhere else in the night life of Montmartre. The pictures that interest us here, though, are those Monet made of the Thames during his visits over several decades to London.

The earliest such pictures date from 1870-71, when Monet had traveled to England to escape the impact of the Franco-Prussian War. He returned, and completed the bulk of his paintings of the Thames, around the turn of the century. The interesting feature of these

paintings, for our purposes, is that they address explicitly the relation between the urban traits of central London and the river itself. He did not travel outside the city to depict the river in its rural character, but studied it as it appeared in the heart of the city. Industrial London at this time was rather a mess, and the environmental impact of its factories and industry was fouling both water and air. The pollution in London had an effect on sunlight as it was perceived in the center of the city, and Monet's Thames paintings portray, among other things, the river as it might be seen in the light refracted through London's smog. Monet's interest in light, its perception, and its depiction, is well known, and it is one of the defining traits of the impressionist style in Monet and the others. That interest was as crucial for the Thames paintings as it was for everything else Monet painted. He was interested in how the river would appear at different times of day, when the sun was in various points in the sky, and from different points in the city. This is the reason there are so many Thames paintings. Some were done in the morning, others in mid-day, and others still in late afternoon and twilight; different paintings depict different bridges and were done from different sides of the river, and the most well known of them have a view of Parliament.

From whatever angle and at whatever time of day, the paintings explore not just the Thames, but also the Thames as it passes through central London. We might be tempted to say that the river is a feature of the countryside that as it happens passes through the city, though the relation is not as haphazard as that if only because the city is where it is because of the river. In any case, the river has some traits in the countryside and quite others in the city, as the light plays differently on it surface and movement in the complex relations among the river, the city, its atmosphere, and the light. We may describe the aesthetic impact of the paintings in many ways. We may emphasize the fact that through his distinctive vision and methods Monet is able to pick out for us dimensions of the river, the city, and their interaction, that we may not have noticed otherwise. Or we may point out that the paintings help us to realize dimensions of our own experience with a city and its river that we may have passed over. In this respect the paintings can enrich our experience and provide it with an aesthetic character we may otherwise have overlooked.

The same may be said of the potential impact of other artistic forms. Like Monet's Thames paintings, Smetana's portrayal of the Vltava and its journey through Prague explores the relation between river and city. In Smetana's case, because he is working with an artistic medium that is by its nature temporal, unlike painting, he can bring to our attention the changes in the river as it passes through the city. In this respect he is able to describe both the city's effect on the river and to use the river as a vehicle through which to announce the profundity of the Vysehrad Castle in Prague, a symbol of Bohemian national identity. The relation between city and countryside in this case takes on a political dimension.

The *Vltava* (Ger: Moldau) is the second movement of the symphonic poem *Ma Vlast* (My Country), which Smetana composed in the 1870s. It depicts the river as it emerges from two springs south of Prague, travels through the countryside, enters and passes through Prague, and eventually flows into the Labe (Ger: Elbe) in the north of Bohemia, now the border with Germany. The piece begins with sprightly and light passages in the woodwinds that depict the springs from which the river arises. Soon the strings enter and we hear the full theme that depicts the river, a beautiful melody that because it is partially in dotted rhythms is able to convey marvelously the sense of flowing movement. The river passes through a village and a village wedding (we can hear dance music along the way), and before long reaches its dynamic climax as it enters Prague and passes below the castle and under the Charles Bridge. The music at this point is dramatic, and we know that it

represents the castle because it uses themes from the first movement of the poem, which is devoted to the Vysehrad Castle. As the river leaves the city and as day passes into night, the music becomes quieter, we can 'hear' the moonlight rippling on the flowing water, and the river fades into the Labe.

This is a thoroughly nationalistic piece, as is the entire symphonic poem, and it uses the relation of the countryside and the city to express a general sense of Bohemian pride. Prague and the castle clearly convey the Czech sense of the importance of historical place, and as the river arises and flows through the fields and villages it serves to unite countryside and city and to portray the critical importance of both to Bohemian and Czech identity. Art is clearly political in this case, and in Smetana's hands political identity is thoroughly aesthetic, an understanding that he accomplishes through the interrelation of city and countryside.

Charles Ives' *Central Park in the Dark* is something different. In this case the countryside is the park, which is itself an engineered effort to imbue the urban with an experience of the rural. The park is itself an urban phenomenon because of its location and purpose, and the city is enhanced by the presence in its heart of the fields, woodlands and water that constitute the park. In this short piece for chamber orchestra Ives uses the park not as a representation of the countryside, but as a vehicle through which to convey a dimension of the experience that is New York City, more specifically mid-town Manhattan, at night.

If one asks oneself what comes to mind as the prevailing sounds of mid-town Manhattan, the answer is likely to be traffic sounds – automobile horns, the thousands of passing cars and busses, and the sirens of police cars, ambulances, and fire trucks. A century ago, in 1906 when Ives composed *Central Park in the Dark*, and before the combustion engine dominated the aural character of the city, the experience would have been different. The piece uses the park as its setting because the relative peacefulness and quiet encountered there allows one to bring into focus the many sounds that emerge from the surrounding city. Ives was a musical visionary and an early master of atonal and polytonal techniques in composition, all of which are used to great effect in the piece. Even before car horns and sirens, the sounds of the city were chaotic, the representation of which begs for atonality and polytonality to capture its character. And Ives does not disappoint. One hears different sorts of sounds emerging from all directions, from bands playing to jazz themes, popular songs of the day to the cries of newsboys. We are able to hear this chaos, and to make experiential sense of it, by hearing it in the context of a more or less rural setting. The park gives the surrounding urban environment a chance to emerge, just as the urban setting gives the park its character and purpose. And the whole has an aesthetic dimension in our experience that Ives captures profoundly.

I indicated earlier that I would also like to mention Aaron Copeland in the context of the aesthetic in the relation of the countryside and city. There is no one piece that I want to discuss, but I would draw your attention to the whole body of Copeland's work because as a whole it is an extraordinary illustration of the way the rural and urban, the countryside and the city, engage one another in the development of our aesthetic experience. Copeland was easily the greatest of 20th century American composers, and his music has become iconic of American experience. This is especially true for rural America, which Copeland's music embodies so well in his ballets and his only opera. *Appalachian Spring* and *Rodeo*, two of Copeland's ballets, contain themes, some of which he composed and some of which he borrowed, that are used over and over again in many contexts from films to advertising to convey an American atmosphere. The music of *The Tender Land*, his only opera, has the same effect, underscored by its setting on a Midwestern American farm.

All of this, combined with such pieces as *Lincoln Portrait* and *Fanfare for the Common Man*, present Copeland as a musical embodiment of Middle America in the central decades of the century. Yet this is only a partial picture of Copeland, and one that if not filled out misrepresents his art. Copeland was a product of the city, New York as it happens, and his musical development was immersed in the artistic tendencies of his time. He grew up around the jazz and developing modernist trends of the early years of the century; soon after the Great War he traveled to Europe where, as so many other great composers of the century did, he studied composition with Nadia Boulanger in Paris. He returned to the US and spent most of his life living in Manhattan and immersing himself in the musical, and to some extent political, life of the city. Many of his compositions reflect his mastery of the compositional developments of his time. In fact the pieces that have come to represent America, even "Americana", are themselves steeped in the modernist compositional techniques and styles that Copeland mastered in Paris and New York. This American composer and American music are in the end products of the urban aesthetic experience and rural motifs of America at the time. If there is a person in the American context whose aesthetic achievements reflect the interrelation of city and countryside it is surely Aaron Copeland.

III.

I have discussed several examples of the aesthetic dimension of the intersection of town and country, and the selection of examples has been idiosyncratic. Others might have chosen differently. If I were to go on, the next examples to discuss would be the photographer Alfred Stieglitz and the painter Georgia O'Keefe. And we could indeed go on indefinitely.

The point, to draw this to a close, is that the conception of aesthetic experience that emerges from pragmatism and from the relational understanding of things that defines pragmatic naturalism opens for us a range of conceptual possibilities. John McDermott has done us the considerable service of highlighting the urban dimension of aesthetic experience. I would simply like to have complemented McDermott by taking seriously his emphasis on relationality and the urban, and to have pointed to the importance of the relation of city and countryside in the great art of our traditions and by implication in the aesthetic dimension of our own experience.

IN PRAISE OF QUOTIDIAN AESTHETICS

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> *Quotidian: "Of an everyday character; commonplace, mundane, ordinary."*
>
> (Oxford English Dictionary Online Edition, 2012)

Yes, it is true, as John J. McDermott has reminded us, "yea, painfully true that the 'things' of our everyday experience are increasing de-aestheticized, not only by misuse and failure to maintain, but forebodingly in their very conception of design and choice of material […]"[1] But it is equally true, as he also takes pains to remind us, that things not only are; they happen. Enter the realm of aesthetic. Enter "the rhythm of how we experience *what* we experience."

Dewey knew it. Dewey said it.

In order to *understand* the esthetic in its ultimate and approved forms, one must begin with it in the raw; in the events and scenes that hold the attentive eye and ear of a [hu]man, arousing his interest and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens: the sights that hold the crowd – the fire-engine rushing by; the machines excavating enormous holes in the earth; the human-fly climbing the steeple-side; the men perched high in air on girders, throwing and catching red-hot bolts. The sources of art in human experience will be learned by him who sees how the tense grace of the ball-player infects the onlooking crowd; who notes the delight of the housewife in tending her plants, and the intent interest of her goodman in tending the patch of green in front of the house; the zest of the spectator in poking the wood burning on the hearth and in watching the darting flames and crumbling coals.[2]

At the risk of taking liberties with Dewey's Whitmanesque riff – at the risk of supplanting his implicit metaphor of the raw and the cooked with one that is aquatic – I suggest that he is keen to remind us that these experiences and many more like them are the "plankton" of the grander and more "refined" arts. Plankton, of course, are "drifting organisms (animals, plants, archaea, or bacteria) that inhabit the pelagic zone of oceans, seas, or bodies of fresh water. Plankton are thus defined by their ecological niche rather than phylogenetic or taxonomic classification. They provide a crucial source of food to larger, more familiar aquatic organisms such as fish and whales. Though many planktic […] species are microscopic in size, plankton includes organisms covering a wide range of sizes, including large organisms such as jellyfish".[3]

With Dewey, I suggest that the objects and rhythms of quotidian aesthetics are the plankton of our extended and refined aesthetic environment. They are instrumental, in the sense that they nourish those works of art that Dewey calls "ultimate and approved" and that we also tend to call "refined" and "spiritual". But they also share in what we call "final" or "fine" or "consummatory". They have their own delights. Aesthetic plankton are the many and varied "things", large and small, that are defined by their ecological niche rather than by common structure or appearance. They provide the energy, the rhythm, the nourishment that makes possible the more abstract and refined arts, lesser

[1] John McDermott, *Streams of Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 130.

[2] John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, LW.10.11. Standard references to John Dewey's work are to the critical (print) edition, *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–1991), and published in three series as *The Early Works* (EW), *The Middle Works* (MW) and *The Later Works* (LW). These designations are followed by volume and page number. "LW.1.14," for example, refers to *The Later Works*, vol. 1, p. 14.

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plankton. Retrieved 04.18.12.

as well as greater. Put another way, they can be instrumental to larger and more comprehensive aesthetic productions. But they also have their own delights, and they provide the kind of raw enjoyment that Dewey mentions: the giant earth moving machine, the tense grace of the ball-player, the zest of the spectator in poking the wood burning on the hearth. They are both consummatory and instrumental to the development of further aesthetic meanings.

The street sounds and cries of vendors that inspire the work of Mexican jazz pianist Hector Infanzon. The folk melodies and rhythms that stimulated the Hungarian Dances of Brahms and the Slavonic Dances of Dvořák. The speech rhythms of Missouri backwoods and Mississippi river bottoms that motivate and populate Mark Twain's seminal novels *Huck Finn* and *Tom Sawyer*, those works themselves ultimately resonating in the work of writers such as William Faulkner. We sometimes say that it is the mark of a successful artist to take the vulgar, the banal, the quotidian, and refine it, and then refine it still further until it becomes "real art", "fine art". Each of those quotidian things – the street cries, the folk dances, the backwoods speech patterns – is instrumental. But those things are also what they are because of something final, fine. They are the source of immediate aesthetic enjoyment.

So it is here that we must take special care. We must take care, as Dewey tells us, to avoid a "conception of art that 'spiritualizes' it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience". What we require instead is a conception of art, he says, that "discloses the way in which these works idealize qualities found in common experience".[4] What we need is a conception of art that recognizes that even humble quotidian objects and events have aesthetic qualities and that they, too, can be the source of experiences that are consummatory as well as instrumental.

[4] LW.10.17.

We call the sonnet sublime and spiritual, for example, but dismiss the button as banal and boring. Historian Lynn White, Jr. cheerfully admits that "it is doubtful whether the chilly 13th century Northerner who invented the button could have invented the sonnet then being produced by his contemporaries in Sicily". "But," he quickly adds, "it is equally doubtful whether the type of talent required to invent the rhythmic and phonic relationships of the sonnet pattern is the type of talent needed to perceive the spatial relationships of button and buttonhole."[5]

Despite thousands of years of brilliant technical innovations, for example, painstakingly documented in Joseph Needham's monumental work *Science and Civilization in China*, the Chinese never invented the button and button hole – more properly, the button*hold* – nor did they adopt their use when Portuguese missionaries arrived in the 16th century. The Japanese, on the other hand, were so delighted with that humble object that they not only adopted it, but took over the Portuguese name.[6]

Shall we speculate on which of these inventions is the finer, the more spiritual, and the more capable of consummatory experience? The button we call commonplace, mundane, ordinary, and quotidian. The sonnet we know as a "dialectical construct which allows the poet to examine the nature and ramifications of two usually contrastive ideas, emotions, states of mind, beliefs, actions, events, images, etc., by juxtaposing the two against each other, and possibly resolving or just revealing the tensions created and operative between the two."[7] The sonnet we call "fine" and "spiritual". But White insists that we take account of the aesthetic

[5] Lynn White, *Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), p. 130.
[6] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[7] Nelson Miller, "Basic Sonnet Forms", http://www.sonnets.org/basicforms.htm. Retrieved 4.18.12.

qualities of the button – consummatory as well as instrumental: "The billion or more mothers who, since the thirteenth century, have buttoned their children snugly against winter weather might perceive as much spirituality in the button as in the sonnet and feel more personal gratitude to the inventor of the former than of the latter."[8] There is perhaps no better example than the humble button of the interpenetration of the instrumental and the fine, or final, in quotidian aesthetics.

It was in this vein that Dewey refused to accept the received distinctions between those arts we refer to as "fine" and those that we call "useful", or "technological". He thought that what matters instead is the "degree of completeness of living in the experience of making and of perceiving that makes the difference between what is fine or esthetic in art and what is not."[9] The real issue involves expansion of the meanings of life in ways that contribute to their continuing enrichment.

Dewey did not shy from providing a definition of art that incorporates this idea. Art, he wrote, is

> a process of production in which natural materials are re-shaped in a projection toward consummatory fulfillment through regulation of trains of events that occur in a less regulated way on lower levels of nature. Art is "fine" in the degree in which ends, the final termini, of natural processes are dominant and conspicuously enjoyed. All art is instrumental in its use of techniques and tools. It is shown that normal artistic experience involves bringing to a better balance than is found elsewhere in either nature or experience the consummatory and instrumental phases of events. Art thus represents the culminating event of nature as well as the climax of experience.[10]

It has been a source of scandal among some partisans of the "fine" arts, such as Lewis Mumford, that Dewey compared the emergence of works of art out of ordinary experiences to the invention and development of tools and techniques, that is, to the refining of raw materials into valuable products. To Mumford and others this has seemed unworthy, and perhaps even "an actual attempt to reduce works of art to the status of articles manufactured for commercial purposes."[11]

In *The Golden Day*, for example, Mumford characterized Dewey's approach to aesthetic experience as surrendering to a type of "industrial utilitarianism'. He charged Dewey with being "bound up with a certain democratic indiscriminateness in his personal standards: a Goodyear and a Morse seem to him as high in the scale of human development as a Whitman and a Tolstoi: a rubber raincoat is perhaps a finer contribution to human life than 'Wind, Rain, Speed.' What indeed is his justification for art?"[12]

Mumford was particularly offended by Dewey's remark that "fine art *consciously* undertaken as such is peculiarly instrumental in quality. It is a device in experimentation carried on for the sake of education. It exists for the sake of a specialized use, use being a new training of modes of perception. The creators of such works of art are entitled, when successful, to the gratitude that we give to inventors of microscopes and microphones; in the end, they open new objects to be observed and enjoyed". It is telling, however, that Mumford ignored the sentence that followed the quoted passage: "This is a genuine service;" Dewey continued, "but only an age of combined confusion and conceit will arrogate to works that perform this special utility the exclusive name of fine art."[13]

There is something deeply ironic about the examples that Mumford deploys to attack Dewey's affection for

[8] White, *Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered*, p. 130.
[9] LW.10.34.
[10] LW.1.9.
[11] LW.10.17–18.
[12] Lewis Mumford, *The Golden Day* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926), p. 262. Reference is to J. M. W. Turner's painting "Rain, Steam, and Speed".
[13] LW.1.293.

the quotidian. A first irony is that Mumford was one of the 20th century's great historians of technology. His magisterial work *Technics and Civilization,* for example,[14] is replete with examples of technical objects. A second irony is his reference to J. M. W. Turner's painting "Wind, Rain, and Speed' (also known as "Rain, Steam and Speed – The Great Western Railway"). Turner's painting in fact depicts – "celebrates" may not be too strong a word – the advance of a great railway locomotive of the Western Express crossing the Maidenhead Railway Bridge over the Thames during a thunderstorm. In Turner's painting the forces of nature and technical production are fused into one magnificent visual display. This tribute to the meeting of nature and industry is the late-career work of a great landscape painter.

Here are the interpretive notes of one perceptive critic: "The lesson of Rain, Steam and Speed is that speed – mechanical motion and its action on the flesh – unlike the tectonic and meteorological forces of the Romantic landscape, cannot be 'represented'. By an irony of History and the unique genius of an old man, it was given to one of the creators of the 'Romantic landscape' to understand this. In the 'Romantic landscape,' the elements – wind, fire, water, earth – were the actors. Speed is not an 'actor' on the scenery of nature, but a force organizing its perception. What we, today, call 'the environment' is perhaps the landscape seen through the looking glass of speed by the successive generations which came and passed since Turner painted a train. Or better: 'speed' – the vision of nature through a vehicle's window – changed people's gaze."[15] Turner's painting thus celebrates the very sort of object that Mumford dismisses as inferior to the "fine' arts: the speeding train and the technical expertise that went into its development.

For his part, Dewey simply registered Mumford's complaint and remained unapologetic. Deflecting the charge of "instrumental utilitarianism", he deployed a move that his readers encounter frequently. He distinguished what is experienced, what is valued, from those experiences to which intelligence and emotion have contributed structure, or put another way, what has been enriched and secured through processes of evaluation. "Flowers," he wrote, "can be enjoyed without knowing about the interactions of soil, air, moisture, and seeds of which they are the result. But they cannot be understood without taking just these interactions into account – and theory is a matter of understanding."[16] Here you have it. Flowers provide aesthetic enjoyment that is fine or final in the sense that nothing more is required. But they are also instrumental to further, enhanced aesthetic enjoyment once their context is understood and taken into account.

Depending on one's location, locomotives may be quotidian. But they are not humble. They may be experienced as both instrumental to travel and as consummatory to those who have a profound appreciative eye for beauties of mechanical objects in general and more particularly for the magnificence of the "iron horse."

Other objects, however, present themselves to us as both quotidian *and* humble. The candle, a source of domestic light that has a much longer history than that of the electric bulb, is one such object. Lighted candles have their own delights, and in that sense their appreciation is final, or consummatory. But they are also instrumental to lighting otherwise dark spaces, and also, perhaps, to romantic evenings. The immediate delight of candles is thus one thing, but an appreciation of their

[14] Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967).
[15] Jean Robert, "Rain Steam and Speed and the New Scopic Regime", <http://www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/robert88Ra.pdf>, retrieved 04.26.2012.
[16] LW.10.18.

historical and cultural context and their role in the visual arts is another.

Viewing Rembrandt's *Student at a Table by Candlelight*, for example, we see we see a young man seated at a table reading a newspaper.[17] The scene is dimly illuminated by a single candle on the wall. The remainder of the space, all about the young man, is shrouded in darkness. Rembrandt's etching can be *enjoyed* without knowing the subtleties of depicting the interactions of light and shadow, or about the innovative techniques that he used in producing his untutored etchings. But it cannot be *understood* without taking account of the very quotidian artifact – the candle – that is one of its focal points.

In his magnificent book *At Home*, for example, Bill Bryson helps us expand our appreciation of this scene. He reminds us just how dim the world was before electric lighting. He estimates that a good candle provides approximately one percent of the illumination of a 100-watt lightbulb. "Open your refrigerator door," he writes, "and you summon forth more light than the total amount enjoyed by most households in the eighteenth century. The world at night for much of history was a very dark place indeed."[18] Perhaps it is not too much to say that Bryson's account allows us to see Rembrandt's etching in a new light. Without an aesthetic appreciation of the quotidian artifacts in Rembrandt's image, I suggest, our understanding of it is impoverished.

In all of this, of course, I am echoing Dewey's call for greater appreciation of the aesthetic qualities of our quotidian, lived experiences – not just because the meanings of "ordinary", "useful" objects and events about us are the "raw materials" that carry the potential for refinement by artists into objects and events we call "fine", but, perhaps less obviously, because appreciation of such quotidian events and objects and the "aesthetic plankton" enriches our experience more generally. Marcel Duchamp was pleased to communicate this fact to us, with his found objects, as was the photographer Man Ray.

That quotidian aesthetic is not "disinterested" bothered Dewey not one whit. Perhaps as a corollary to his remarks on the reflex arc concept in psychology, he thought that all meaningful aesthetic experience is marked by selective interest. If it were otherwise, such experience would have no context. It would have no energy. Nor did he shy from acknowledging that quotidian aesthetic can be instrumental. He argued that "a consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experiences."[19]

Failure of quotidian artifacts to do their work, to be meaningful, is ultimately a failure of properly conducted inquiry. It is a failure of evaluation. It is a technological failure.

[17] http://www.relewis.com/rembrandt-student.html. Retrieved 4.18.12.
[18] Bill Bryson, *At Home* (New York: Doubleday, 2010), p. 112.
[19] LW.1.274.

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