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INTRODUCTION: FOOD AND AGRICULTURE – OPENING AVENUES FOR RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC INTERVENTION

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Cooking is a distinctly human activity. Turning the raw into the cooked gave rise to social bonds and culture. Today we know that human evolution has had its twists, turns and varied options, rather than having been a linear process. Contrary to Claude Lévi-Strauss's belief that the formation of society started with the exchange of women in marriage, Richard Wrangham argues that it was cooking that made us human and produced society.[1] The invention of thermal food processing proved a truly revolutionary turning point, and the ultimate reproductive success was reaped by cooking trines. Richer in energy and flavor, the new diet was a launchpad for a considerable civilizational leap. The historian of culture Felipe Fernández-Armesto posits a similar thesis in his *Near a Thousand Tables: A History of Food*. He contends that that the domestication of fire and the invention of cooking produced a breakthrough not only in terms of culinary culture but also, first of all perhaps, in terms of social transformations: "Culture begins when the raw gets cooked. The campfire becomes a place of communion when people eat around it. Cooking is not just a way of preparing food but of organizing society around communal meals and predictable mealtimes. It introduces new specialized functions and shared pleasures and responsibilities."[2] Cooking promoted cooperation, division of duties and, consequently, mutual dependence of people.

All major events in people's lives take place at the table. What we eat and what we exclude from our diets are strongly differentiating factors. Although globalization progresses, the foods that find their way onto our plates reflect the religions we embrace, the places we inhabit and the classes we belong to. Diets serve to construct individual and collective identities. As Robert Nozick aptly observes: "Eating food with someone can be a deep mode of sociability (…) a way of sharing nurturance and the incorporation within ourselves of the world, as well as sharing textures, tastes, conversation, and time"[3].

The sensation of hunger and the need to feed bind us closely to the rest of animals, but the ways in which this need is met free humans from subjection to nature. *Food is Culture*, as the eminent food history scholar Massimo Montanari proclaims in the title of his book. And he adds: "Even Nature is Culture."[4] Cooking is the most human of all activities. By cooking, we detach ourselves from the natural world and "master nature." Food preparation is a similar thing. Ever since the first farmers domesticated animals and started to cultivate land, developments have progressed, aimed to achieve effective and economical agricultural production. As food production became industrialized, food prices dropped and food products became more easily and more widely available. However, the processes have had negative social and environmental ramifications as well. Such effects as the mass-scale use of fertilizers, the misuse of abuse of pesticides and the loss of biodiversity have affected both the taste and people's health.

Evoked by Montanari, the privilege of "mastering nature" must go hand in hand with ethical reflection and responsibility for actions people undertake. We should improve our knowledge of the natural world and re-consider both our place within nature and the obligations of our species toward the natural environment.

Contributions in this issue partly overlap in three categories: a meta-ethical search for normative

[1] Richard Wrangham, *Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human* (London: Profile Books, 2008).
[2] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Near a Thousand Tables: A History of Food* (New York-London-Sydney-Singapore: Free Press, 2002), 4-5.
[3] Robert Nozick, *The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations* (New York – London – Toronto – Sydney: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), 56.
[4] Massimo Montanari, *Food is Culture*, trans. Albert Sonnenfeld (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 9.

frameworks to tackle impending global and environmental problems arising from climate change and the transformation of agricultural systems; technology assessment especially of soft impacts of new tendencies in food production and life-stock framing; and finally reflection on the aesthetics of authentic culinary experience in an age of globalization and culinary mass production.

The first two contributions, by Paul Thompson and Samantha Noll pose meta-ethical questions about philosophical frameworks to be used when addressing ever more pressing problems of impacting the biosphere. Pragmatist approaches are proposed as ways of starting meaningful dialogue and entering transformative inquiry with the power to address problem situations without the need to wait for the resolution of philosophical disputes. Thompson develops his Dewey-inspired pragmatist approach to food ethics by contrasting it with analytic methods of treating issues in applied ethics. His discussion points out how analytically oriented authors, like Singer or McPherson treat answering of ethical questions, such as whether one should give up eating meat, as logical deductions from plausible normative premises. Thompson objects that demonstrating the soundness of ethical arguments by demonstrating their validity and establishing their premises as commonsensical precepts misses the boat in situations that require individual behavior change and redirection of public deliberation. Not only do we lose most people, who are not in a position to make consequential decisions on their lifestyle and/or their political orientation based on such analytic expositions, but it is also unhelpful to see the role of philosophy in searching for logical starting-points from which to arrive at secure conclusion. As an alternative, Thompson proposes to redefine the role of philosophers as mediating in public debates that have no natural beginning or end point. Following Dewey, Thompson stresses the importance of embarking on intelligent processes of philosophical inquiry by using criticism to ignite a genuine sense of puzzlement and a sense of indeterminacy, which do have a compelling force to ignite public imagination and drive meaningful inquiry. These situations arise more from a reflection on empirical conditions, like the origin of our food, the determinants of our agro-food systems and the consequences of our eating habits than from principles like Singer's requirement to help at little cost to serve a greater moral good. For Thompson it is essential **for** a pragmatist food ethics "to actually learn something about food."

Samantha Noll also focuses on meta-ethical arguments that take their departure from an empirical analysis of the urgent environmental problem of climate migrant species. She thoroughly investigates and compares prominent but discordant ethical frameworks and comes to the conclusion that an applied ethics approach will only sophisticate and perhaps entrench the moral disagreements. A discussion of libertarian approaches that focus on the effects of migration for property holders and egalitarian and deep-ecology views that give priority of endangered species themselves makes this point. A timely consensus cannot be expected from these competing approaches. Problems of great urgency, like mitigating the worst consequences of climate change before we reach the natural deadline of the extinction of species, require an alternative approach that may reach common-sense without settling central epistemic and ethical disputes of competing paradigms. Pragmatism is proposed as just such an overarching approach. Noll argues that "pragmatism is a method for coming to consensus, when situated communities recognize a common problem and work to solve this problem, rather than cling to an individual ethical ideology."

Another recurrent theme in this issue is the assessment of progressing technological developments in food- and agricultural production, and in particular its soft impacts on democracy, communal life and human experience. Michiel Korthals and Bart Gremmen both champion philosophical approaches that open public

dialog to strengthen democratic participation in increasingly technocratic forms of food of production.

Understanding pragmatism as a pluralist approach that synthesizes different ethical frameworks is also the aim of Bart Gremmen's article. As his title declares, he attempts to outline "a moral operating system of livestock farming", consisting of four component approaches: "an *internal* professional *care* ethics combined with an *emergent* ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation, and *external* boundary conditions based on societal values and concerns in *animal* ethics and *environmental* ethics". Throughout the article he focuses not so much on developing this system but on elaborating the place of its most innovative aspect: the emergent ethics in life-sciences, which makes use of technology assessment as a resource and as a source of ethical problems.

The crux with ethical technology assessment is that in early stages of technological development we often do not know the ethical consequences of our innovations yet, whereas in later stages facts have been created, investments made and lock-in effects taken place. How to keep an ethical discussion on negative consequences alive throughout the maturing process of a technological development and implementation process? The case of precision farming, were animals become integral part and genetically coded elements in an internet of things is a case that calls for a wide societal response. Germen suggest that a moral operating system that includes the above mentioned elements is best in bringing together stakeholders from varying directions in an open-ended public dialogue which serves to keep technological systems open to reflection and re-direction.

Negative effects of the global food economy are addressed by Michiel Kothals in "Deliberative and pragmatist agriculture." In his contribution, Korthals builds on John Dewey's creditable idea of organizing edible gardens, which were meant to provide food and promote the personal and social development of children. Korthals appreciates the idea, but he believes at the same time that, obviously, small gardens are hardly an alternative to the industrial production, whose debilitating influence was overlooked by Dewey. Korthals compiles a sizeable catalogue of consequences brought about by the activities of the global food industry. The fact that food production is so considerably monopolized and the recipients of its produce are uninformed consumers damages democracy, which is, after all, based on engagement and opinion-sharing. Korthals goes also beyond pure criticism, and proposes developing "a deliberative pragmatist theory of the food processing and retail sector," which should in effect help to produce healthier and more sustainable food and to bridge the gap between production and consumption. In other word, he insists on initiating dialogue.

Korthals's attention to the experiential aspects of food production and consumption is matched by Dorota Koczanowicz's thematic focus on culinary experience. Globalization entails long-distance and mass-scale movement of goods and people. Mass tourism is an element of this global movement. Contemporary eating practices combine two distinct tendencies: aestheticization and mass-production/use. Though divergent as such, the two tendencies converge in culinary tourism. Dorota Koczanowicz's article "Eating Abroad: In Search of Culinary Experience" focuses on the paradoxical situation in which the egalitarianism of mass tourism clashes with the desire for an elitist, authentic culinary experience fueled by the tourist industry as authenticity has become a commodity for sale. A solution to this impasse can be found in the pragmatist notion of experience. If we acknowledge that every meal can become an element in the creative fashioning of the soma, sources of satisfaction must be searched for not only in the external circumstances but in the mindful work on one's own experience.[5]

We hope that this issue makes a contribution to a growing body of literature that aims at more than commenting on contemporary developments of great

[5] Cf. Richard Shusterman, "Somaesthetics and the Fine Art of Eating," in: *Body Aesthetics*, ed. Sh. Irvin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 261–280.

concern but that tries to make constructive suggestions on how to re-appropriate a pluralist democratic voice within technology driven age. It is the sincere aim and effort of the contributing authors to outline how we can make use of the resources of philosophy to mediate solutions to pressing environmental problems, particularly were we cannot hope for timely resolution of divergent intuitions. Authors point at avenues to re-enfranchise a public of diverse stakeholders in market- and technology dominated environments in order to create room for responsible public deliberation. Finally, the contributions of this issue do not lose out of sight the centrality of human experience in a meaningful approach to evaluating and transforming systems of food production and consumption today.

I. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE – PRAGMATIST PERSPECTIVES

ANALYTIC VS. PRAGMATIST FOOD ETHICS: METHOD AND APPROACH

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ABSTRACT: Analytic food ethics emphasizes the construction of logically explicit arguments, with great emphasis on establishing normative premises, and relatively little weight placed on the domain of application (e.g. food). A pragmatic food ethics begins from instances of genuine doubt about food practices and presumes that the task of ethics is complete the task of normative inquiry. Analytic and pragmatist discussions of food security are compared. While logical consistency becomes the sine qua non for analytic food ethics, a pragmatic tolerance for inconsistencies can be grounded in recent studies on the role of habits in decision making from cognitive science.

Although it may not have been noticed by academic philosophers, there has been a robust and growing literature in food ethics ever since the early 1970s. This paper will make a half-hearted attempt to draw a distinction between an *analytic* school that has emerged in that literature and a *pragmatist* school that draws its philosophical inspiration from the thought of C.S. Peirce, William James, Jane Addams and especially John Dewey. There are, of course, variations in the terminology that might be used to indicate the distinction I have in mind. One reviewer suggests the term "principalist" instead of "analytic", but the term *principalism* has a specific meaning in bioethics that differs from the sense I will outline below.[1] And there are philosophers making contributions on food that exemplify neither of the contrasting methodological tendencies discussed in this paper.

Whatever terminology one uses, my attempt to maintain a distinction between two philosophical approaches in applied ethics is half-hearted because no follower of Dewey could endorse a dichotomizing strategy for philosophical inquiry. In this respect this essay is uncharacteristic of food ethics done in the pragmatist tradition. The observations that follow are also uncharacteristic of a pragmatist approach in that they have relatively to do with food practices as such. What follows is best interpreted as a meta-theoretic discussion of recent philosophical work on the production, consumption and distribution of food. Although several writers are discussed, Peter Singer is taken as the paradigmatic example of an analytic ethicist, while the role of the pragmatist will be played by myself.

Singer's work will be familiar to most readers. In a highly productive career he has made many distinguished contributions on a wide array of topics, and is probably the single individual who deserves the most credit for reinvigorating philosophical work in applied ethics. Although his work touches on food at several junctures, he has made especially significant contributions on the ethics of hunger and on the use of domesticated livestock for food. This work dates to the start of his career with the publication of "Famine, Affluence and Morality," in the very first volume of *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* and "Animal Liberation," in *The New York Review of Books.*[2] Singer has revisited both subjects many times. His 2010 book *The Life You Can Save* rehearses the basic argument in "Famine, Affluence and Morality,"[3] while his 2007 book with Jim Mason, *The*

[1] In bioethics, principalism is a heuristic that enjoins biomedical professionals and anyone conducting research on human subjects to test their protocol against four independent principles (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice). As developed by Beauchamp and Childress, it was not intended to be interpreted as an ethical theory. (see *Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Beauchamp and Childress' approach was extended to "the ethical matrix" approach by Ben Mepham, and is widely used in food ethics (see Ben Mepham, "A framework for the ethical analysis of novel foods: the ethical matrix." Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12 (2000): 165-176). Here, too, the applications differ from what I am calling "analytic food ethics."*

[2] Peter Singer, "Famine, affluence, and morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1(1972):.229-243; "Animal Liberation," *The New York Review of Books* 50, No. 8 (1973): http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1973/04/05/animal-liberation/

[3] Peter Singer, *The* Life *You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty*. New York: 2010, Random House Incorporated.

Ethics of What We Eat is, along with hugely successful books by Eric Schlosser, Marion Nestle, and Michael Pollan, responsible for initiating the upsurge of interest in food ethics, especially among analytically trained and academically employed scholars in applied ethics.[4]

My own work is considerably less well known, and I am far from the only philosopher making pragmatist contributions to food ethics. However, I have been steadily contributing published work on ethical issues related to the production and consumption of food since accepting a joint appointment in the departments of philosophy and agricultural economics at Texas A&M University in 1982. I was rapidly swept into a cadre of scholars at U.S. public universities who were undertaking critical studies on global food systems.[5] Through the 1990s, my research was concentrated on the philosophy of agricultural science and technology, with particular emphasis on newly emergent methods for altering the genomes of the plants and animal that we consume for food.[6] Although I have made occasional contributions to the literature in pragmatist ethics,[7] my most overtly pragmatist work in food ethics is the relatively recent *From Field to Fork*.[8] Even there, the references to philosophical pragmatism are sparse, though the argument of the entire book is structured by discussions of Dewey's theory of inquiry.

Analytic Ethics in the 20th Century

Analytic philosophy can be characterized as the expression of an ethos that arose early in the 20th century. It emerged as one among several philosophical programs hoping to provide secure epistemological foundations for the physical sciences. While Edmund Husserl pursued an approach emphasizing phenomenology, Gottlob Frege charted a different strategy that eventually became analytic philosophy. Frege pointed out a way to calve off the *reference* of terms from their *sense*. Although "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" connote distinct meanings with respect to their sense, both expressions refer to the same object, e.g. the planet Venus. A focus on reference promised a means for specifying the empirical content of key terms used in science. Non-empirical (e.g. *a priori*) terms would be thought of as logical and mathematical axioms. The meaning of scientific theory and data could then be specified through an analysis that reduces all claims to empirical reports and logico-mathematical relations resting on a limited set of axiomatic definitions. Statements that could not survive the withering fire of analysis would be consigned to the dustbin of meaninglessness.

Although this program began to collapse even as it was being articulated, modifications and critiques of it dominated much of the philosophy that was done in the English language throughout the 20th century. Indeed, *pragmatism* came to be thought of as a more-or-less coherent body of doctrines that emerged from criticisms and concessions that were part and parcel of the philosophical exchange that ensued. C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson developed the notion that meaning could not be dissociated from practical contexts of linguistic or communicative practice. As Cheryl Misak has argued, even prototypical

[4] Peter Singer and Jim Mason, *The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter*. Emmaus, PA: 2007, Rodale Press; Eric Schlosser, *Fast Food Nation: What the All-American Meal Is Doing to the World.* New York: 2002, Penguin Books; Marion Nestle, *Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health*, Berkeley: 2002, University of California Press; Michael Pollan, *The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals,* New York: 2004, Penguin Press.

[5] Jeffrey Burkhardt, "Coming Full Circle? Agrarian Ideals and Pragmatist Ethics in the Modern Land-Grant University," in *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism,* P. B. Thompson and T. C. Hilde, Eds. Nashville, TN: 2000, Vanderbilt University Press, pp. 279- 303; Paul B Thompson,. "Agricultural Ethics—Then and Now," *Agriculture and Human Values* 32 (2015): 77-85.

[6] Paul B. Thompson, *Food Biotechnology in Ethical Perspective.* London: 1997, Chapman and Hall.

[7] Paul B. Thompson, "Pragmatism, Discourse Ethics and Occasional Philosophy," in *Pragmatist Ethics for a Technological Culture*. J. Keulartz, M. Korthals, M. Schermer and T. Swierstra, Eds. Dordrecht, NL: 2002, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 199-216.

[8] Paul B. Thompson, *From Field to Fork: Food Ethics for Everyone*. New York: 2015, Oxford University Press.

representatives of analytic philosophy such as Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein came to hold views on language that were pragmatic in just this sense.[9] There is thus a sense in which pragmatism came to be the dominant view among people who thought of themselves as analytic philosophers, rather than as an alternative to it.

It is less clear, however, that the same thing can be said in ethics. Although Sellars made important contributions in ethics, there are a number of ways in which the analytic ethos of the early 20th century has had more pervasive influences on philosophical ethics than it did on metaphysics and epistemology. The mere fact that ethics, epistemology and philosophy of mind continue to be practiced as largely distinct disciplines within many philosophy departments is one of these influences. As the above sketch of analyticity suggests, ethical terminology (words such as 'good', 'justice' or 'welfare') lack a Fregean object of reference. Ethical language demanded special treatment, and a number of meta-ethical theories arose among analytic philosophers during the 20th century. Deriving from a doctrinal and categorical separation of fact and value, these theories of normative or prescriptive language (such as intuitionism, emotivism and non-cognitivism), relied implicitly on analytic characterizations of argumentation and logical validity, while remaining silent on the basis for empirical claims, which were thought to lie within the epistemologist's home turf. Analytic philosophy continues to recognize ethics as a specialty that can be pursued in isolation from the problems and inquiries that characterize either epistemology or the respective philosophies of the biophysical and social sciences.

While analytic ethicists have conducted robust debates about the meaning and authority of normative concepts, they tend to take a united front on applied questions. The answer to any practical question is an argument consisting of both normative and empirical premises. The conclusion is a prescription: a command to perform actions of a specified type. The argument must meet criteria for validity derived from formal logic (hence not a matter for ethics). The craft of the applied ethicist *qua* ethicist does not trouble itself with the accuracy, precision or warrant of the empirical claims. They must be true, of course, in order for the argument to be sound, but their truth or falsity is not regarded as a matter of relevance to ethics as such. This forces philosophical attention to the normative premises which are presumed to be the province of ethical theory. Thus even so-called applied or (as I would prefer) practical questions are of interest to analytic philosophers only in so far as they bear upon matters that must be decided entirely apart from experience. It is in this manner that ethics maintains its status as a distinct specialty, while the non-theoretical components of the applied ethics argument are consigned either to other specialty areas in philosophy (such as logic) or are deigned to be either the province of the special sciences or simply matters of common sense.

There are, of course, important exceptions to this generalization. Alisdair MacIntyre wrote a trenchant critique of applied ethics[10] and analytic philosophers who have pursued "virtue ethics" have followed him in offering an alternative approach. These exceptions speak to the sense in which the dichotomy that motivates this paper is at best half-hearted. Nevertheless, the model described in the previous paragraph does in fact characterize a significant portion of the work that philosophers are currently producing on food ethics, as will be illustrated below. One additional feature of the model is that the subject matter to which ethical theories are being applied is largely arbitrary. Food, racism, abortion, and capital punishment are going to be treated rather much the same. Applications are of interest to the analytic ethicist to the extent that they

[9] Cheryl Misak, *Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein*. New York: 2016, Oxford University Press.

[10] Alisdair MacIntyre, "Does applied ethics rest on a mistake?" *The Monist*, 67 (1984): 498-513.

generate interesting challenges to the general picture of a given theoretical approach. The well-known "trolley problem", for example, is a stylized application that can be tweaked to elicit contrasting intuitions about whether it is acceptable to intervene in an ongoing course of affairs on ethical grounds.[11] These intuitions can be interpreted as a test of the theory, or as the upshot of habits and mores that need to be reformed. The question of *which* interpretation to offer for inconvenient intuitions itself becomes the type of generalized philosophical question that analytic ethicists love to sink their teeth into.

Alternatively, the analytic approach to formulating ethical arguments can be applied in a persuasive mode. Here, the analytic philosopher has already made up his or her mind about what should be done in a particular situation, and the task is to construct an argument that will convince others to agree with the preferred course of action. This persuasive orientation is evident in food ethics, where the goal is often to convince readers to adopt a given perspective on some issue in the production, distribution or consumption of food. Singer's work exemplifies this latter approach in analytic applied ethics, and dozens if not hundreds of analytically trained academic philosophers have followed his lead by constructing arguments for dietary prescriptions. The model is especially conspicuous in prescriptive arguments against slaughtering livestock, raising food animals in confined settings and the consumption of meat. There are also counterarguments that contest specific premises in these pro-vegetarian exercises in applied ethics. This literature is now too large to review in a summary format, though a few recent titles testify to the philosophical community's continuing interest in making additional contributions to it.[12]

Analytic Food Ethics

An essay entitled "Why I Am a Vegan (and You Should Be One Too)" by Tristam McPherson is illustrative of the pattern described above. The title of the article announces its persuasive intent. He follows a strategy typical in analytic applied ethics by producing a numbered list of premises in support of "Modest Ethical Veganism," the claim that it is typically wrong to use animal products. McPherson explains how, in combination with empirical claims in the list, normative premises that he develops in the article entail the conclusion "You should be a vegan." Indeed, the bulk of the text is devoted to producing sub-arguments for these normative premises. McPherson then offers a marvelously clear statement of the ethos and moral epistemology of analytic applied ethics: "[T]he argument is *valid*…This means that anyone wishing to reasonably reject my conclusion must explain which premise they wish to reject, and how my argument for that premise is flawed," (McPherson, p. 83).[13]

While professors are certainly able to use their power over students' grades to enforce this norm within their classrooms, it is far from clear that it either is or should be followed as a guide to critical thinking or evaluating arguments in practical decision making. An alternative approach might be to begin by looking at McPherson's references before one even bothers to read the essay, much less work through its careful logic. Here one would see that although he is citing scholarly sources from the philosophical literature, his empirical claims all come from advocacy groups. Although professional journals such as *Animal Welfare* or *The*

[11] Phillippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy,* Oxford, UK: 1978, Oxford University Press; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The trolley problem," *The Yale Law Journal*, 94((1985): pp.1395-1415.

[12] Stephen Sapontzis, Ed. *Food for Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat.* Amherst, NY: 2007, Prometheus Books; B. Bramble, and B. Fischer, Eds., 2015. *The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat*. New York: 2015, Oxford University Press; Andrew Chignell, Terrence Cueno and Matthew C. Halteman, Eds. *Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments about the Ethics of Eating.* Abingdon, Oxon UK: 2016, Routledge.

[13] Tristram McPherson, "Why I Am a Vegan (and You Should Be One, Too)," in *Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments about the Ethics of Eating.* A. Chignell, T. Cuneo and M. C. Halteman, eds. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: 2016, Routledge, pp. 73-91, quote on p. 84.

Journal of Applied Animal Welfare routinely publish studies on the condition of animals being raised or slaughtered for food, these sources do not inform McPherson's argument, nor does reporting by mainstream media outlets such as *The Guardian* or *The New York Times.* The essay does not meet critical thinking standards for informed journalism, and as such it is at least questionable as to whether it warrants the effort and logical rigor McPherson demands from readers when he asserts that they must identify which premise they will reject, and then develop their own argument to expose its flaws.

McPherson might with some justice claim that this is a roundabout way of questioning his empirical premises. But roundaboutness is philosophically significant to a pragmatist, and a second problem with the argument's framing underlines an issue with insisting that the only way to reject the argument is to find fault with one of the premises. One of the good things about McPherson's article is his sensitivity to reasons why some people might find veganism to be burdensome in a morally significant way. He notes that people whose opportunities are economically constrained (consider food deserts) or who have specific medical conditions might be exempt from the normative principles he articulates. This is why he limits his argument to what he calls the *typical* case. But I will attest that in my large public university I teach many students who have virtually no access to healthy vegan options in their urban neighborhoods, neighborhoods that are often the product of structural racism. To imply that their situation as *atypical* itself reflects a kind white privilege that might be sufficient reason to dismiss McPherson's entire presentation out of hand, rather than patiently working through it on a premise-by-premise basis. This sort of insensitivity to the lived experience of others is one of the bases on which pragmatists have criticized analytic ethics.[14]

Singer's work is often more carefully framed, but he, too, is focused on developing an argument and defending it premise by premise. "Famine, Affluence and Morality," offers a moral principle—that when one can do a significant good at very little cost one should do so—that with some additional empirical premises about the relative cost of aiding famine victims implies that affluent people should be donating some of their wealth to relieve hunger. Much of the philosophical sophistication in the article derives from a secondary argument that Singer offers in support of the claim that one should accept his moral principle even if one is not committed to preference utilitarianism (Singer's own moral theory). This secondary argument relies on the famous "drowning child" example. Wallowing in a shallow pool, the child's life can be saved by any passerby who will suffer the temporary inconvenience of dampening their clothing.[15] Who would argue otherwise? Singer uses the example to support the putatively indisputable claim that whatever else one thinks about morality, when one can prevent a great harm a little cost to oneself, one should do so.

In fact, Singer's drowning child has elicited a robust literature of response from analytic philosophers, and an even representative survey of this literature would far exceed the remit of this essay.[16] Peter Unger develops an extended series of variations on the drowning child to defend Singer's claim that affluent people have a moral obligation to give much more to relieve the hunger of needy people than they normally do.[17] Although Unger again crafts his analysis as an essay on one of most salient issues in food ethics, the issue that motivates philosophical interest is the counterintuitive conclusion

[14] V. Denise James, "Theorizing Black Feminist Pragmatism: Forethoughts on the Practice and Purpose of Philosophy as Envisioned by Black Feminists and John Dewey." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* 23(2009): 92-99.

[15] Singer, *Op. cit.* 1972.

[16] Some of this literature is discussed in Paul B. Thompson, "Food Aid and the Famine Relief Argument (Brief Return)," *The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 23(2010): 209-227.

[17] Peter K. Unger, *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*. New York: 1996, Oxford University Press.

that helping the poor is a strict moral duty, rather than being supererogatory or an instance of non-obligatory charity. The actual circumstances of hungry people and the structural features that reproduce food insecurity enter the discussion barely at all in Unger's treatment.

In fairness to Singer, *The Life You Can Save* is somewhat more sensitive to structural determinants of poverty, and the argument there is broadened considerably beyond a duty to offer aid to the victims of famine.[18] Singer's personal commitment to aiding the poor and his grasp of the structural complexity involved in doing so are not at issue. His example is to be admired. Nonetheless, the philosophical task in *The Life You Can Save* is still one of persuasion, rather than joint inquiry or the realization of a democratic ideal. What is more the literature that Singer's work has spawned rarely addresses the question "What should be done about hunger?" but is instead focused on whether Singer's arguments should be judged successful in achieving their persuasive task. That is precisely what I take to be an expression of the analytic ethos in applied ethics.

Pragmatism, Pedagogy and Food Ethics

For decades, Singer's "Famine, Affluence and Morality," was paired with one of several similar articles by the population ecologist Garrett Hardin in readers intended for classroom use by philosophy professors. Notoriously, Hardin had argued that continuing to feed hungry people would only contribute to a continuing cycle of population growth: People fed today would only go on to have even more children in the future. Since Hardin believed that the carrying capacity of the planet Earth would soon be overtaxed by this expanding human population, he concluded that feeding people today would only insure that an even greater number of people would eventually succumb to starvation and the attendant diseases of malnutrition at some point in the future. Hardin's reasoning appeared to be a straightforward application of the utilitarian maxim to do that which does the greatest good (or in this case, the least harm) to the greatest number of people. Since more people would eventually starve if the hungry are fed today, Hardin concluded that we must practice a form of triage in which human lives are sacrificed.[19]

It is not entirely clear what use philosophy teachers made of this pairing, though in my own experience it would divide the class. Those who felt the tug of emotion would side with Singer, while those resisting the injunction to open their wallet would opt for Hardin. Ironically, neither author articulated a philosophical rationale that would support the opinions being voiced by students in either group. The class discussions seemed to reflect the tension between "tough-minded" and "tenderhearted" mentalities discussed by William James far more than the way that Singer and Hardin were each reaching opposite but equally counterintuitive conclusions. As someone who was asking students to read these articles as part of a course that was dedicated to the ethics of food and agriculture, I became increasingly frustrated by the way in which this pairing of articles led students further and further from any practical engagement with the dilemmas of hunger, even if it did achieve some modest success in presenting a philosophically puzzling dilemma.

A more positive result of pairing Singer and Hardin might be to stimulate genuine doubt about what *should* be happening in response to famine and food deprivation. Taking the advice of John Dewey, a philosophically pragmatist approach in ethics follows the same general pattern of inquiry that would be appropriate for any situation in which human beings (working as individuals or social groups) find themselves in circumstances of genuine doubt about how to proceed. The idea of genuine doubt, as opposed to feigned or shame doubt, derives its role in philosophical

[18] Singer, *Op. cit.* 2010.

[19] Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor," *Psychology Today Magazine*, 8 (September 1974): 38–43, 123–126.

pragmatism from the founding work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Both Peirce and Dewey argued against the Cartesian ideal of full certainty, with Dewey especially claiming that pursuit of it had motivated analytic philosophy's program to develop secure epistemological foundations for science. Genuine doubt, however, is always framed against the background of habits, institutions and the results of prior inquiry. While any element in this background *might* be questioned and eventually found wanting, it is functionally impossible for inquirers to throw everything into abeyance in pursuit of absolute certainty. What should be done in response to the hunger of famine victims and of those who experience persistent or recurring episodes of food insecurity is, indeed, a question that raises genuine doubt and as such, it is a salient target for ethical inquiry.

We thus might question whether Singer's drowning child is an apt metaphor. Is it, in fact, as if we happen to pass a drowning child one afternoon, or is it more like the case where the fountains are filled with drowning children, many of whom throw themselves back into the shallow pool again immediately after being saved? Brad Hooker points out that Singer's response of patiently pulling out the drowning children hardly seems adequate to a situation in which we are confronted by an endless succession of drowning children,[20] though Hooker does not go on to explore how this weakness in the argument is relevant to the ethics of hunger or to the views of Hardin. As I have argued, this endless (and indeed escalating) sequence *is* the situation as Hardin imagines it. But this adaptation of the drowning child thought experiment hardly supports Hardin's conclusion that we must simply let them die. Draining the fountains seems like a more warranted response to repetitive cases of drowning children, and a pragmatist should look for analogous responses to the dilemmas of hunger.[21]

Of course, to extend the fountain-draining metaphor into the ethics of hunger, we must actually learn something substantive about the circumstances of hungry people. In the 1970s, these circumstances were still being imagined as being similar to the hunger experienced by Europeans during the two great wars of the 20th century. European agriculture endured a virtual collapse during both World War I and World War II, leading to severe shortages in the amount of food. The U.S. Food Administration established by the Food Control Act of 1917 undertook a massive public information campaign to inculcate the idea that those with food (e.g. Americans) have a moral obligation to assist those without. In the 1950s this message was incorporated into a U.S.-led effort to address global problems of food insecurity based on the Marshall Plan, which had successfully accelerated the economic recovery of war-torn Europe following World War II. The centerpiece of the U.S. contribution was Public Law 480, better known as "Food for Peace." U.S. farm surpluses would be used both to feed and to fund relief and development efforts in less industrialized nations.[22] In this manner, food aid became a weapon in Cold War politics, as American farm surplus came to be viewed as way to support client states in a worldwide competition between neoliberal capitalism and communistic socialism.[23]

There are significant flaws in this overall understanding of world hunger. The most egregious one concerned the very circumstances of food insecure people in less industrialized economies. In most of these countries, as much as 80% of the population either were food producers or were in significant ways dependent on the food economy. A sudden influx of free food into these economies might well have brought relief to some hungry people, but it also contributes to a substantial

[20] Brad Hooker, "Sacrificing for the Good of Strangers-Repeatedly," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59*(1999): 177-181.
[21] Thompson, *Op. cit.* 2010.

[22] Helen Z. Veit, *Modern Food, Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, And The Rise of Modern American Eating in the Early Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill, NC: 2013, UNC Press Books.
[23] Paul B. Thompson, "Of Cabbages and Kings," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 2(1988): 69-88.

destabilization of the local market. In short, why buy food from local farmers (who might be as poor or poorer than a food insecure urbanite) when the Americans are standing there giving it away for free? Although economists had begun to identify this flaw in the basic logic of food aid in the early 1960s, it has taken well into the 21st century for most national governments and many private charities to restructure the programs that they use to address hunger.[24] Perhaps it is time for philosophers to learn this lesson, as well.

Between Analytic and Pragmatic Food Ethics

The preceding discussion focuses on Singer's "Famine, Affluence and Morality," and the subsequent attention given to the drowning child argument. The pragmatic reconstruction of food ethics emphasizes a number of ways in which this argument is misleading. It is worth stressing that I have not subjected Singer's argument to the types of critique that analytic philosophers would typically regard as "philosophical." I have not questioned the validity of the argument, at least not in so far as validity is construed as a formal relationship specified in terms of logical consequence. I have not challenged Singer's key normative principle, his claim that if one can do something of moral significance at little cost to oneself, one should do so. I have not pursued the thought that social or geographical distance limits the applicability of this principle. Although the critique I offered in my 2010 paper mirrors Brad Hooker's in certain respects, unlike Hooker, I was not arguing that repetitive instances in which the principle is invoked limit its relevance. That is to say, the point is not to make a purely philosophical observation on the generalizability or the applicability of either Singer's principle or the drowning child metaphor. My goal is to move toward a more adequate account of the ethical questions that arise in connection with food security.

[24] Thompson, *Op. cit.* 2010; see also C. B. Barrett, and D. G. Maxwell, *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role*. London: 2005, Routledge.

If there is any sense in which my discussion does contradict claims that Singer has made in his 1972 article, it must be in terms of his account of the facts. But analytic philosophers do not typically regard this type of challenge as philosophically significant. Indeed, one characteristic of analytic ethics is that one can still do good philosophy by continuing to discuss cases that are wildly at odds with *any* facts. This points to a further difference between pragmatism and analytic philosophy: a contrast in views on what philosophy actually is. Analytic applied ethics sees the philosopher as a master advocate, as someone who is judged on the persuasiveness of his or her argumentation. Dewey characterized the philosopher as a liaison officer, as someone whose role in socially conducted inquiries resides in making connections among the increasingly specialized sciences, and in assisting the process of integrating knowledge that emanates from distinct quarters into a more functional and satisfying whole. This picture of the philosopher's role can be derived both from Dewey's writings on the theory of inquiry as well as his conception of democracy. It will be useful to consider each in turn.

Although Dewey did make a number of significant remarks about schoolyard gardens in the process of developing his views on education,[25] the following discussion relies mainly on elements of his thought that hardly require exposition for readers of *Contemporary Pragmatism.* Dewey's theory of inquiry is nested within his account of the organism/environment interaction. As dependent on a metabolic process, all living things are poised for exchange with the world that envelops them. Even non-sentient organisms are oriented toward their surroundings in a manner that distinguishes them from

[25] Hickman, Larry A. "The Edible Schoolyard: Agrarian Ideals and Our Industrial Milieu," in *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism,* P. B. Thompson and T. C. Hilde, Eds. Nashville, TN: 2000, Vanderbilt University Press, pp. 195-205; Ralston, Shane J. "The Pragmatic Pyramid: John Dewey on Gardening and Food Security," *Social Philosophy Today* 30(2014): 63-76.

"a marble in a box", to quote Dewey's metaphor.[26] Situatedness is what characterizes the organism/environment totality, but as organisms become more complex, their situation or orientation reflects a repertoire of possible responses to opportunity or change in their environing conditions. A human being is certainly capable of responding to his or her environment in an enormously diverse number of ways, even if many of them remain under the sway of biological mechanisms or neurologically ingrained habit. To the extent that opportunities in this repertoire are responsive to the executive functions of the mind, inquiry becomes possible.

Dewey describes "the method of intelligence" as an explicit and consciously considered approach to discovery, ideational representation (or planning), rehearsal and execution as a thinking organism's reply to opportunities or challenges that emerge from its environing world. The theory of inquiry is a characterization of this method from the standpoint of logic, which for Dewey is largely equivalent to critical thinking as performed by either individuals or groups. Socially conducted inquiries expand the repertoire of response by allowing for multiple perspectives or points of view to be considered and incorporated into a plan of action, and they become especially powerful when participants in the group can bring deep knowledge or unique experience to bear on the group's preparation for action. However, as specialization in knowledge and experience increases, so does the opportunity for an internal breakdown or miscommunication within the social learning process.[27] Dewey believed that while philosophers were no better equipped to assume the role of executive or "king" in a group inquiry than anyone else, their training did prepare them for identifying gaps, misinterpretations and failures in the process of collective learning and coordination of behavior. Philosophy, in other words, can be understood as a discipline for asking the questions that will allow a diverse group to formulate the problem, agree upon an end in view and creatively collaborative in responding to a problematic situation.[28]

This picture of intelligence leads directly into Dewey's conception of democracy, which is better understood as a collectively maintained ethos than as a specific set of governmental institutions. It is always useful to begin a discussion of Deweyan democracy by reminding ourselves that he views social groups, including political communities, through the same organism/environment lens discussed above. A family, a firm, an organized group and a polity are all social organisms, but since they are composed of individuals, their social capabilities will depend on those of their individual constituents to a significant extent. Individuals' ability to participate in collaborative inquiry will depend upon their willingness to engage with one another in cooperative problem solving, as well as upon each individual's capacity for making a contribution to the group effort. People who already share a mindset characterized by the work habits conducive to social inquiry are more likely to deploy the method of intelligence in social settings than those who do not. As such, communities that are able to establish institutions that reliably produce these epistemic virtues are much more likely to avail themselves of the advantages that

[26] From *Experience and Nature,* ""to see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never finished process" John Dewey, *The Later Work of John Deweys, 1925-1953, V. 1.Experience and Nature,* J. Boydston, Ed. Carbondale, IL: 1981, Southern Illinois University Press. Quote on p. 224.

[27] Though this is a persistent theme in Dewey's thought see especially "Experience and Education," in John Dewey, *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 13: 1938-1939, Essays, Experience and Education, Freedom and Culture, and Theory of Valuation,* J. Boydston, Ed. Carbondale, IL: 1988, Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 49-60.

[28] Thompson, Paul B. and Zachary Piso, "Dewey and environmental philosophy," in *The Oxford Handbook of John Dewey,* S. Fessmire, Ed. New York: Forthcoming, Oxford University Press.

inquiry confers upon thinking organisms. Education is, for Dewey, a social institution that builds such capacities while also reproducing and strengthening the ethos, mentality or culture that allows them to be deployed cooperatively.

This is, of course, only a bare sketch of how Dewey links education to democracy. What is relevant here is the contrast between the analytic ethos and the democratic ethos. Analytic ethics not only privileges persuasive argumentation but goes on to dictate the standards that all subjects must use to determine whether or not they have been persuaded. The democratic ethos is geared toward recognizing situations that call for action and then working collectively to respond in a way that maintains a common faith. The role that falls to philosophy given Dewey's vision of the need to construct and reconstruct the dispositions that incline individuals toward cooperative inquiry is one of helping maintain and improve the institutions that reproduce these dispositions day after day, generation after generation. That role is often as educators who participate in the democratic culture through a discipline of self-criticism and respectful pedagogy. In the schools, philosophers must model inquiry even as they convey established truths in a somewhat didactic fashion. As I have interpreted this role, it implies that the professor of philosophy should foreswear purely persuasive applications of logic, rhetoric and epistemology and concentrate on problems of genuine puzzlement. There are, of course, elements of classroom practice that dictate simple conveyance of these capabilities to one's students, yet for me, at least, when philosophers write for one another and for the larger and more inclusive groups that form the various publics of the contemporary world, they should never be writing purely to persuade.

This is not to say that there are no occasions on which persuasive speech or writing would ever be appropriate. Indeed, the performance of democracy offers many such occasions. Yet on the pragmatist understanding of philosophy, in these occasions we act in our capacity as citizens, rather than as philosophers, per se.[29] Thus, if I have been at all faithful to the practice of analytic ethicists, their conception of where philosophy begins and ends is almost directly contrary to that of a pragmatist. When dealing with contentious or complex issues—and persistent hunger is certainly one—the role of the philosopher is not to convince others to take a particular position, but to undertake or perform an open ended inquiry in manner that invites all comers who will accept the norms of discourse to participate as equals. In this respect, Habermasian discourse ethics is a welcome adjunct to Dewey's conception of democracy.[30]

Getting Pragmatic about Our Food

It would be disingenuous to end this essay with the concluding thought of the previous section. While I sincerely believe that applied ethicists trained in analytic graduate programs bring a different spirit to their philosophical writing than those who have more pluralistic influences, it would be false to claim that pragmatists never encounter situations in which giving an argument is precisely the right thing to do. As inquiries spawned by genuine doubt wear on, parties develop entrenched positions. Even people who are fully committed to the norms of democratic discourse will find themselves needing to persuade others of a finding that they have reached at some time in the past. As already mentioned, Dewey's democracy accommodates argumentative engagement as a function of our role as citizens, but there are quite similar circumstances that arise when people gather to inquire about how to conduct themselves as philosophers. In this vein, I want close by calling attention to some of the ways that pragmatist ethics *can* be tied to work in analytic philosophy.

[29] For an application in food ethics see Michiel Korthals, "Taking consumers seriously: Two concepts of consumer sovereignty." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 14 (2001): 201-215.
[30] Thompson, *Op. cit.* 2002.

One of early pragmatism's distinguishing features concerns the role of habit. Peirce, James and Dewey each developed distinctive accounts of the role played by non-deterministic regularities. For James and Dewey, the habits of greatest theoretical importance are personal and social dispositions that both orient an organism or organization toward a particular repertoire of possible responses toward their surrounding environment, and produce a form of soft determinism or behavioral conditioning that explains the organism's selection of a given form of conduct, absent contravening conditions. There are several respects in which an attention to food should be of significant interest to any philosophy taking this general approach.

First, it is feeding behavior that provides a key unifying biological framework for making sense of organism/environment interactions as they are studied across various phylogenetic classification schemes. Many non-vertebrate organisms are oriented within their environments primarily in terms of their need to capture the nutrients necessary for the metabolism that fuels the life process. In short, to be an organism is, in important respects, to be situated within a food world.[31] Given the importance of the organism/environment relationship for Dewey's general philosophy and his general strategy of interpreting both individual human beings and social activities according to a schema that denies a metaphysically grounded human exceptionalism, it is surprising that he does not give more attention to feeding behaviors than he does. However, references to food do occur in Dewey's works with some regularity, especially when he is discussing the organism/environment interaction in a manner that is intended to be inclusive of non-human or non-sentient organisms. As such, philosophical attention to food and metabolic process is a key to understanding Dewey's general orientation to conduct.

Following immediately on this point, food activity implies the strong sense in which pragmatism is committed to a naturalistic embodied understanding of the human being. Raymond Boisvert and Lisa Heldke refer to the human condition as one of "stomached being." They stress how this conception of embodiment underlines the contrast between a pragmatist conception of humanity and the disembodied subject of the Cartesian abstraction. Even in contrast to a Continental philosophical tradition that also foregrounds embodiment, this portrayal of the human subject as one who eats draws our attention to a more visceral notion of the body, and leads us to consider biophysical interdependencies that oppose a more abstract notion of embodiment.[32] Boisvert and Heldke build upon this metaphysical point to discuss further aspects of food that take us into the aesthetics of preparing and enjoying food, as well as the social ethics of conviviality and hospitality associated with eating together.

As valid and important as these observations might be, there is also a more direct way in which the habituated nature of foodways becomes pragmatically significant. Because the practices of obtaining and eating food are done frequently and are highly contingent upon one's socio-economic milieu, they inevitably serve as habits or institutions that occupy a philosophically significant middle-ground. By middle-ground here I mean that they are less deep, less ingrained and less foundational than the motor responses of which pragmatic psychologists like James and Dewey were fond of discussing. While Pavlovian salivation is, indeed, a food-related reflex, the practices that I am calling attention to here are the quotidian habits that one goes through in getting one's breakfast, making a sack lunch or ordering from a menu at dinner. These are, in crucial respects, fully *conscious* activities, yet they are also routinized, even as they may encompass quite a bit of

[31] Margaret Crouch discusses the symbolic aspects of human food worlds in "Food Worlds, Film and Gender" in *The Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics,* P. B. Thompson and D. M. Kaplan, Eds. Dordrecht, NL: 2014, Springer, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_497-1

[32] Boisvert, Raymond D. and Lisa Heldke. *Philosophers at Table: On Food and Being Human.* London: 2016, Reaktion Books.

opportunity for divergence in the particular response that an individual or group makes on a given occasion. Thus frequent travelers engage in the conversation or the Internet search for an appealing eatery with the virtually the same level of habituated familiarity that peasant farmers exhibit when they prepare and consume a daily bowl of rice. Without minimizing the expanded range of opportunity that accompanies the privilege of wealth, both are undertaking complex actions that involve elements of planning and deliberateness, while at the same time neither undertaking is so problematic or unfamiliar as to require deployment of what Dewey's method of intelligence. An adventurer in a truly unknown food environment might experience things differently, but food practices are, for most of us most of the time, paradigm examples of the prosaic day-to-day that forms our background consciousness. They are middle-ground in being more prominent and more interesting than a reflex action, but less important and requiring much less reflective engagement than a truly problematic situation.

Elsewhere I have called attention to this aspect of food, claiming that the ethics of food consumption behavior is not perspicaciously described as rational choice.[33] This claim rests upon recent work in cognitive science that draws a distinction between so-called fast and slow thinking. This still-developing theory suggests that many intentional actions that are controlled by rapid and "lazy" mental processes system that rely on readily available sensory data and conceptual resources.[34] In replying to Jeffery Brown's worry that portion control regulations might be paternailistic,[35] I call attention to Daniel Kahnemann's popular summary of this research in suggesting that fast thinking is characteristic of the pragmatists' emphasis on habit.[36] "Fast thinking" is characterized by "biases" that can generate well-known fallacies in some well-documented cases where more careful, quantitatively probabilistic and logical thinking would lead individuals to make decisions that conform to the traditional criteria of rational choice. However, execution of more careful, analytic thinking is both slow and experienced as difficult or taxing by the subjects of psychological research.

There are, of course, different philosophical strategies for making sense of this new work in cognitive science. Brad Hooker has drawn upon it to argue for "two-level" utilitarianism, where "fast" thinking may be morally justified by the additional cost that more careful thinking imposes on the decision maker, potentially off-setting the greater nominal utility that could have been realized by making a quantitatively correct assessment of decision options.[37] While Hooker's work draws analytic two-level utilitarianism closer to pragmatist epistemology, I argue that we simply should not expect people to deploy careful analytic procedures of evaluation in what I have called middle-ground cases where we are neither solving the detailed problems that call for slow thinking nor mindlessly executing a motor response. Food behavior is a particularly cogent example of situations in which we should tolerate a fair amount of inconsistency in any given individual's conduct. Here, the highly contextualized nature of action can resolve inconsistencies without needing to think much about them. Developing a line of reasoning that accords well with pragmatism, Patricia Churchland suggests that such conflicts will be characteristic of cognitive systems that reflect not only the evolutionary history of the human species, but also the evolution of habit and pattern in each individual's acquisition of multiple capabilities for modulating their responses to the circumstances they encounter in their environment.[38]

[33] Thompson, *From Field to Fork, Op. cit.* pp. 241-247.
[34] Jonathan S. B. T. Evans and Keith E. Frankish. *In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond*. New York: 2009, Oxford University Press.
[35] Brown, Jeffrey M., "Paternalism, health and dietary choices: Commentary on Paul B. Thompson's *From Field To Fork: Food Ethics for Everyone*," *Social Philosophy Today*, 33(2017): 217-224.
[36] Thompson Paul B. "From field to fork and on to philosophy: Response to commentators," *Social Philosophy Today* 33 (2017): 225-232.
[37] Hooker, Brad. *Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality*. New York: 2000, Oxford University Press.
[38] Churchland, Patricia S., *Braintrust: What Neuroscience*

In a summative conclusion to my book *From Filed to Fork: Food Ethics for Everyone* inspired by Dewey's article "Three Independent Factors in Morals"[39] I argue that food-related behaviors are prime candidates for evaluative routines that combine consequentialist, deontological and virtue-oriented patterns of moral reasoning. We should regard changes in our routines as experiments that can only be evaluated in light of subsequent learning, as opposed to being evaluated in advance in terms of their conformity to the utilitarian maxim, the categorical imperative or some other ideal principle. Some behaviors will be better approached through the lens of virtue ethics. One might reconcile this pattern of response with utilitarianism through behavioral economics, as Hooker does, but does one *need* to do so? I simply reject the claim that we can reasonably (much less ethically) hold individuals to standards of rigor and consistency such as those articulated by MacPherson in his case for veganism. Teaching students that they must engage in careful logical analysis in order to act ethically is a recipe for social disaster. It is possible to explicate logical principles and to demonstrate their utility in ethical reasoning without issuing commands telling someone what they must or must not do.

This is not the place to launch a detailed comparison of alternative ways to interpret recent work in cognitive science. A pragmatist approach in ethics suggests that when it comes to actual practice, the situational complexity will swamp many of the fine points that are currently being debated by ethical theorists. Dewey's original articulation of the theory of inquiry suggests that the work of the philosopher may come as much in holding the early stages of problem formulation open for innovative alternatives as it does in defending a prescriptive principle. In such cases the first priority for a pragmatist food ethics is to actually learn something about food, where it comes from, how ways of producing and distributing it are constrained by multiple contingencies and how attitudes toward food are ecologically interwoven among many habits and institutional tendencies. Perhaps given that background we will encounter situations of genuine doubt about what we should be doing in the food system, and the skills we have acquired as philosophers will prove useful in conducting the collective inquiries needed to resolve those doubts.

Conclusion

University-based departments of philosophy continue to pursue strands in moral theory that have roots in the early 20th century's commitment to a sharp separation between empirical fact and subjectively grounded normativity. Pragmatists of the early 20th century were already articulating a host of reasons why even the most factually-oriented statement was permeated by prior commitments having rich ethical significance. In applied ethics—including food ethics—the analytic ethos is expressed through prescriptive arguments. detailed discussion of their normative premises and general disinterest in whether the framing of the argument lends itself towards actual improvement in the practical situations to which the prescriptions nominally apply. The pragmatist ethos is one of building capacity for collective, democratic problem solving. One should not be entirely dismissive of theory-driven, argument focused approaches in analytic applied ethics. There is no doubt that Singer's work has influenced many people toward greater attentiveness and reflection on important ethical issues. What is more, the argument oriented approach does not preclude responsiveness toward situational complexities. MacPherson's argument for veganism is couched within a lengthy discussion of how the circumstances of many individuals (including

Tells Us About Morality. Princeton, NJ: 2011, Princeton University Press.

[39] John Dewey, *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 5: 1929-1930, Essays, The Sources of a Science Education, Individualism, Old and New, and Construction and Criticism* J. Boydston, Ed. Carbondale, IL: 1981, Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 280-289.

relative poverty) limits their ability to make practical vegan choices. As such, his suggestion that "you should be a vegan, too" is highly qualified in ways that are reminiscent of my own writings on ethical vegetarianism.[40]

Nonetheless, thoroughgoing pragmatists will be less likely to develop prescriptive arguments, especially in the absence of a fairly detailed and context-sensitive account of the empirical circumstances in which actions would eventually be taken. What is more, there are reasons why pragmatists really *should* be taking a closer look at food issues than classical figures like Peirce, James or Dewey ever did. Not only are foodways paradigmatic forms of habituated practice that should be of intrinsic interest to pragmatists, recent work in the cognitive sciences illustrates novel strategies for being pragmatic and practically relevant at the same time.

[40] See Thompson, *From Field to Fork, Op. cit.* at pp. 146-158.

CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION:
A PRAGMATIC STRATEGY
FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION ON FARMLAND

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ABSTRACT: This paper turns to pragmatism for strategies to assist with the timely implementation of conservation efforts, as it provides tools to unfreeze policy decision making so that stakeholders, from farmers to wildlife organizations, can readily address impacts associated with climate induced non-human migration. The first section of this essay introduces readers to the topic of climate induced migration and provides an overview of how agriculture could either inhibit or help facilitate migrating species. The second section then applies Thompson's analysis of water policy, specifically his triangular structure of libertarianism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism, to the problem of non-human climate refugees to identify positions that could be taken, as producers, policy makers, and other stakeholders determine if they should adopt strategies to assist migrating species. This analysis ends with the argument that the field of applied ethics, while useful for identifying key policy positions, can provide little insight to stakeholders facing issues associated with climate induced migration. The final section of the paper turns to pragmatism for strategies that could help guide wildlife conservation decisions on the ground. It is the author's hope that a wide range of readers will find this paper useful, as it brings together work in environmental ethics, wildlife conservation literature, and public policy.

Climate Induced Migration: A Pragmatic Strategy for Wildlife Conservation on Farmland

Climate disruptions continue to impact agricultural systems and commodity production, as weather patterns shift, temperatures fluctuate, and extreme weather events become more common. According to the 2014 National Climate Assessment, "many regions will experience declines in crop and livestock production from increased stress due to weeds, diseases, insect pests, and other climate change induced stresses." (p.1). Such changes could affect the overall stability of agricultural systems and thus negatively impact food availability and food security. For this reason, a wide range of researchers, policy makers, and stakeholders are currently working to develop strategies to help producers adapt to shifting environmental realities (and thus reduce the negative impact on yields) and to curb agriculture's large contribution to total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Barling 2010). However, there is another environmental impact that could a) add to stress on agricultural systems and b) where agriculture could play a key role in either addressing or exacerbating ecological disintegration. This is the "problem of climate induced migration" or when species migrate due to climate disruptions.

The first section of the essay introduces readers to this important topic and provides an overview of how agriculture could either inhibit or help facilitate climate induced migration, as agricultural areas can act as barriers to migration. The second section then applies Thompson's (1996) analysis of water policy to the problem of non-human climate refugees to identify positions that could be taken, as producers, policy makers, and other stakeholders determine if they should adopt strategies to assist migrating species. This analysis continues with the argument that the field of applied ethics, or work that applies traditional philosophical approaches to ethical problems (Altman 1893; Douglas 2010), can provide little assistance to stakeholders, beyond outlining normative positions, as it a) freezes debates and b) lacks the tools necessary to make time-sensitive decisions.[1] Finally, the paper builds on

[1] Historically, "applied ethics" could refer generally to work that applies "traditional philosophical approaches" or pragmatism to current ethical issues (Altman 1983). However, in several philosophical sub-fields, applied ethics is generally understood to include work that uses traditional approaches (such as utilitarianism, rights theory, etc.), in contrast to pragmatist work. Indeed, scholars, such as Thompson (1996), Douglas (2010), and Arras (2003), often separate the field of applied ethics from pragmatism, before arguing that pragmatism is a more prudent strategy to use in certain contexts. For example, Thompson (1996) clearly separates the two approaches in his work and bioethicists have recently offered pragmatism as an alternative to applied ethics (Wolf 1994; Dickstein 1998), with Arras (2003) going so far as to argue against the position that pragmatism could potentially address pitfalls associated with applied ethics & principlaism (Arras 2003). In this vein, then, this paper uses the term "applied ethics" to signify analyses that use traditional philosophical approaches, in contract the pragmatist approaches that, as Altman (1983) argues utilize a methodology "conceived in opposition to that traditional approach" (p.227).

Thompson's (1996) analysis, arguing that insights from pragmatic philosophy could be useful in outlining a new strategy to help address issues associated with climate-induced migration, in particular, and, the "value problem" in wildlife management on farmland, more generally.

Non-Human Climate Change Refugees Definition

For the purposes of this paper, the term "non-human climate refugees" should be understood as the "flora and/or fauna that are induced to leave their current geographical range due do the impacts of a changing climate" (Anonymized Forthcoming). Climate change impacts continue to be linked to environmental "push" factors, such as extreme weather events and "slow-onset events" (desertification, rising sea levels etc.) (Gemenne 2012; Gregory 1991). These "push" factors induce individuals and communities, both human and non-human, to migrate to new areas where environmental conditions are better suited to the survival of the species in question. It is important to note here that a wide range of species historically responded to weather fluctuations, extreme events, and slow-onset events by shifting their ranges, or migrating to areas more suitable to their survival (Angetter et al. 2011, Palmer and Larson 2014). However, humans rarely intervened, as push factors (other than those leading to mass-extinction events) were often limited to specific regions, in contrast to the widespread impacts (and extinction events) that we are experiencing today.

As of 2017, climate change is exacerbating push factors to the point where widespread migrations are currently underway across the globe, as species attempt to stay in their ideal temperature range (Minteer and Collins 2010). When coupled with other stressors associated with climate change (such as fluctuations of food availability, competition from new species, and habitat loss), climate induced migration can be understood as an emergency response to untenable changes that are increasingly leading to the rapid increase of species extinctions (Barnosky 2009, Hannah et al. 2007, FAO.org 2016). In fact, "one influential review predicts that, depending on the rate and magnitude of planetary warming, up to 35% of the world's species could be on the path to climate-driven extinction" (Minteer and Collins 2010, p. 1801; Thomas et al. 2004). More recently, Urban (2015) found that "if we follow our current, business-as-usual..., climate change threatens one in six species (16%)" (Urban 2015, p. 571). While the above percentages are predictions, it is important to note that if even a small percentage of the extinctions come to pass, this could greatly affect levels of biodiversity and potentially lead to the degradation of ecosystem services, such as water purification and crop pollination.

With extinction rates rising to "event" levels, a wide range of scholars, from scientists to philosophers are worried that biodiversity levels (Botkin et al. 2007, Bellard et al. 2012, Palmer and Larson 2014) and ecosystem functioning (Nelson 2013) could be negatively impacted. For these reasons, normative or value arguments in support of the adoption of mitigation strategies are on the rise. For example, Minteer and Collins (2010) argued that "we have spent decades trying to preserve wild species from direct threats like habitat destruction, overhunting, and pollution… [but] if climate change continues unabated and as rapidly as a few models predict, saving at least some species will require solutions more radical than creating parks" (p. 1801). In addition, conservationists are increasingly turning to conservation on farmland, as they grapple with how to balance food production, while simultaneously preserving rich biodiverse landscapes & the ecosystem services upon which food production relies (MacDonald et al. 2015). A recent EPA report argues that "climate change could make it more difficult to grow crops, raise animals, and catch fish in the same ways and same places as we have done in the past" (EPA.gov; 2017, p.1). As ecosystems rely intrinsically on climate, climate change is currently threatening the biodiversity and services ecosystems provide (Grimm et al. 2013). This, in

turn, threatens a wide range of agricultural practices and livelihoods globally (Nelson at al. 2013). What we are seeing then is a return to Leopold's position where conservation (and now climate change mitigation) will increasingly have to be integrated into agricultural production (Meine 1987).

Agriculture as a Barrier or Mitigation Strategy

In addition to climate change's negative impacts on ecosystem services and agricultural production, agricultural lands are also exacerbating biodiversity loss, as they often act as barriers to migration (FAO 2016). With climate change inducing mass migrations, the probability is high that species will a) attempt to move through or b) be barred by agricultural lands (Anonymized 2017). In point of fact, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016), agricultural production is exacerbating the problem of non-human species migration, as intensive crop and forest cultivation (when coupled with urban development) create "barriers (physical, chemical and ecological) [that] will prevent the natural movement of individual animals in the short term and prevent the gradual shift of populations of plants and small territorial animals in the medium term" (FAO.org 2016; Anonymized 2017). The role that agriculture now plays as a "barrier" to species migration only exacerbates the loss of biodiversity that has historically been correlated with intensive practices (Macdonald et al. 2015). Thus, it appears that we are locked in a cycle where agricultural production negatively impacts ecological resilience and climate induced species migration, in turn, negatively impacts agricultural production. This is especially the case, if migrating species act as "pests" and ecosystem system services are undermined by species loss (Anonymized 2017).

This potential for farmland to act as a barrier is especially problematic, as around 11 percent of the world's land surface (13.4 billion ha) is being used for food production (FAO.org 2003). In the context of the United States, "about half the landmass is used for agriculture [and] in the United Kingdom, the figure is 40%" (Thompson 2010). In contrast, around 4,002,828 hectares worldwide can be categorized as areas not habitable by humans and/or land set aside for preservation and recreation. In the United States, only about 20% of land has been set aside for conservation or preservation. Of this natural land, McGuire et al. (2016) found that only approximately 41% retains the connectivity needed to facilitate species migration, such as in the case of the Florida jaguar. What this means on the ground is that, in the context of the United States, less than 10% of land is currently conducive for species migration. While this percentage will fluctuate widely, depending on the country, if the United States is any indication, areas conducive for migrations may be seriously lacking in many areas.

Yet agricultural production areas can also help facilitate species migration, thus mitigating some of the impacts of climate change. The desire for increased yields can be balanced with other goals such as the following: Increasing the sustainability of farming practices, improving animal welfare, promoting ecological resilience etc. While current farming systems are diverse, they are often guided by what a community values, such as increasing productivity, maximizing yield, social justice concerns, improving biodiversity, and a broad spectrum of other social, cultural, and aesthetic concerns (Anonymized 2015). When taking the diversity of farming practices and systems into account, farming management strategies could be utilized to increase ecosystem resilience, restore habitat, and/or support local non-human communities (Macdonald et al. 2015). In fact, according to the 2014 National Climate Assessment, producers will have to employ various strategies to deal with climate induced impacts, such as temperature changes, declining precipitation, and impacts from novel weeds, diseases, and insects. In this context, employing strategies to improve biodiversity

can be understood as one of several changes that will have to be made in light of the above impacts. Macdonald et al.'s (2015) work in the United Kingdom is an excellent example of how practices can be employed as part of a larger conservation plan to improve overall biodiversity of surrounding ecosystems, while meeting production goals. This and similar work could potentially be expanded to help transform agricultural areas from migration barriers to part of a larger network of wildlife corridors.

Non-human Climate Refugees: Should We Help?

It appears then that farmers, agricultural conservation experts, and/or policy makers will have important land management choices to make.[2] Due to climate change, agricultural areas are now in a unique position, where shifting practices could help mitigate biodiversity loss and ecosystem service degradation in areas well beyond the farm. For this reason, wildlife management on farmland, while always important, is becoming imperative for wider biodiversity conservation efforts. However, whether or not farmers institute conservation practices arguably comes down to value questions or how we address what is called the "value" problem in wildlife management on farmland. Macdonald and Willis (2013) have gone so far as to argue that "uncertainties in how to deal with the ethical imperative to conserve nature is one of the 'elephants in the room' in wildlife conservation (Macdonald et al. 2015). Popular valuation strategies in the field, such as ecosystem services and other economic strategies for valuing intrinsic aspects of habitats, can be difficult to actualize, as citizens are often frugal in their valuations (Duton et al. 2010).

While determining the worth of wildlife is of considerable importance to mitigate damage, framing value questions in the purely economic sphere can "exclude other reasons and intrinsic motivations for conserving ecosystems" (Luck et al. 2012). In fact, Rakham (1994) has gone so far as to argue that both economics, as well as aesthetics, are "too brittle" to be an adequate motivator for wildlife conservation efforts. What is needed then is an expansion of economically based approaches, such as ecosystem services, to include individual, societal, and cultural aspects (Macdonald et al. 2015).[3] The purpose of the section below is to partially answer this call, as it attempts to illuminate specific normative positions that could guide agricultural decision-making when addressing climate induced migration before presenting a pragmatic approach. These ethical considerations could help, hinder, or otherwise impact conservation efforts on the farm and thus form an important part of the picture.

In addition to illustrating pitfalls with an applied ethics approach, the following section's larger purpose is to provide a detailed theoretical analysis that producers and other stakeholders could find useful when making conservation and/or mitigation decisions on the ground. It draws upon Thompson's (1996) analysis of water policy and applies this triangular ethical structure to the problem of climate induced migration. In particular, Thompson identified three key theories that line up well with dominant value positions that inform current agricultural debates, though it should be noted that there are a multiplicity of values and ethical stances represented in this literature (Paarlberg 1987; Thompson

[2] The terms "farmers" and "agricultural custodian" will be used interchangeably in the next section of this essay to signify the wide range of stakeholders making agricultural land-use decisions. This definition is intentionally vague as the purpose of this paper is to explore the wide-reaching problem of climate induced migration and to provide theoretical tools that could be useful during decision-making. As this is a theoretical paper and as these decision-makers could change, depending on the specific context, providing further specificity is necessarily impossible.

[3] However, it should be noted here, that climate induced migration brings up a host of issues beyond the conservation of specific locations, as migrating species may seasonally rely on areas or may be temporarily passing through, as they follow their climate niche. For this reason, questions concerning wildlife corridors, invasive species management, and novel "pest" control may increasingly come to the forefront.

and Anonymized 2015; Rosenberg 1997). While it focuses on water issues, I argue that the triangular structure of libertarianism (property owners), utilitarianism (state sovereign rights), and egalitarians (environmentalists) illustrates three prominent ethical positions that could be taken, as producers, policy makers, and other stakeholders determine if they should adopt strategies to help facilitate climate induced migrations, whether or not they share this burden equally.

While this section primarily presents an analysis from an applied ethics perspective, it is nonetheless directly relevant to the issue of climate induced migration, in general, and the subsequent discussion concerning pragmatist approaches for the following reasons: a) The analysis illuminates normative positions that often guide conservation decision making, thus partially answering the call above, and b) explores how these positions often come into conflict with one another, potentially freezing or deadlocking debates. In contrast, as I will argue, pragmatic philosophy could provide useful strategies for addressing time-sensitive issues, such as climate induced migration. Both understanding what positions are at the table and adopting the best strategies for making time-sensitive decisions are necessary aspects of attempting to address problems associated with climate induced migrations. Thus, while applied ethics and pragmatism are treated as separate in this paper and in the wider literature (Altman 1987; Wolf 1994; Dickstein 1998), they each bring important contributions to the table and this is reflected in the paper. In fact, the analysis below coupled with pragmatist strategies could potentially provide a valuable framework for larger conservation efforts, beyond addressing questions concerning non-human wildlife refuges.

With this in mind, the analysis below (and subsequent discussion concerning pragmatism) utilizes a specific case-study to provide concrete examples a) of the ethical positions and b) how pragmatic strategies are better suited for making time-sensitive decisions. In particular, the subsequent analysis focuses on a climate induced issue currently impacting farmers in California. Wetlands in this state once supported between 50-80 million waterfowl during winter months (Heimbush 2015). However, 95% of California's wetlands are currently being used as farmland. Today, "over 200 bird species in California depend on agricultural habitats for at least part of their annual life cycle... Millions of water birds rest and feed in wetlands provided by winter flooded rice fields in the Sacramento Valley and it's estimated that 70% of the food needed to support the more than 5 million waterfowl wintering in the Central Valley every year is produced by private agricultural land" (Audubon 2015, p.1). To help mitigate negative impacts of development and drought on waterfowl, government agencies, land grant institutions, land owners, and conservation groups, such as The California Rice Commission, The Nature Conservancy, Point Blue Conservation, and The Cornell Lab of Ornithology, have come together to develop strategies for increasing available habitat on farmland during critical months (Heimbush 2015). However, if adequate strategies aren't put in place in the California's Central Valley, which is a major stop-over, "over 60% of the Pacific Flyway and 20% of the nation's waterfowl population" could be at risk of extinction (Audubon 2015, p.1). In this situation, there are clearly several stakeholder groups taking part in land use decisions. The following analysis categorizes and illustrates how these can largely be placed in the categories identified by Thompson (1996). The analysis follows the following structure: a) It will first provide an introduction the three ethical positions, b) outline how these approaches could influence the climate migration debate, and then goes on to c) illustrate how this framework is reflected in the wetlands case-study above.

Applying Ethical Theory to Species Induced Migration

The first ethical theory that makes up Thompson's (1996) triangular affair is liberalism. A common concern in agricultural debates involving conservation and biodiversity often centers on personal liberty or property rights (Thompson 1996; Rissman 2013). In fact, Horak et al. (2013) have gone so far as to argue that "ecologists and land managers are becoming increasingly aware that the landscape context within which a habitat fragment exists could be as important as the habitat fragment itself" (p.71). A key part of landscape context involves property rights, as individual producers have a wide amount of control, within the bounds of state and federal policy, over how land is used (such as being used as cropland, pasture, woodlot, etc.), what agricultural products are grown, and any strategies employed during each stage of the process, from planting/raising to distribution. From a practical standpoint, land ownership, and thus control over the parcel, is thought to stimulate economic development, as it provides producers access to credit and incentives to improve the productivity of the parcel (Rissman 2013). In addition, this personal freedom, or liberty, and the "normatively basic" institutions that protect it are a key part of the larger social structure of liberal societies, such as the United States (Cranston 1967, Gaus 1996, Rawls 2001). In such societies, rights are intended to ensure that specific liberties of citizens are not violated. Examples of common fundamental rights include the freedom of religion, the right to bear arms, the right to private property, etc.

For those espousing a libertarian or rights-based approach, then, the key question that needs to be addressed when determining if laws or polices are ethical, concerns whether or not they are justified in limiting personal liberty (Thompson and Anonymized 2015). In the context of agriculture and food systems, rights-based ethics commonly enter into discussions concerning the implementation of new policies, standards, or technologies that may limit or violate the basic rights of individuals. For example, questions concerning whether agricultural practices should be banned, such as the use a specific pesticide, could be seen as problematic from a rights-based position, as it would constrain the choice of inputs allowed to be used, and thus limit farmers' liberty. From this perspective, questions concerning land use should fall within the purview of the property owner, regardless of larger utilization or ecological concerns.

However, those that accept a utilitarian position often justify the violation of an individual's basic rights, if these limits ensure that resources are used in the most efficient manner (Thompson 1996). Drawing on Anderson and Leal's (1991) analysis of water disputes, Thompson (1996) argues that utilitarian arguments on the ground often include "the doctrine of allocative efficiency as the norm for effective resolution of conflicts" (p.194). This theoretical position combines the a) utilitarian maxim ("right" action is the one that produces the greatest good for the greatest number of citizens) and b) the allocative efficiency mandate (that resources should be distributed so that their utility is maximized) in order to bring about the just distribution of goods.[4] In this case, "just" distribution should be understood in terms of the maximization of efficiency and not in terms of addressing larger structures of oppression, as is discussed in the wider literature (Rawls 2001). Anderson and Leal (1991) then combine this argument with a neo-classical economic analysis, as a basic tenet of their analysis is that disputes are instantiations of a market failure. From this perspective, if market mechanisms are working properly, then property rights can be used as part of a larger structure to maximize utility (Thompson 1996). While utilitarian theorists do not, as a whole, accept neoclassical economic theories, coupling utilitarian theory with

[4] It should be noted here that this definition of distributed justice is contentious. For example, theorists who hold Rawls' difference principle, would argue that just distribution entails that only those least well off should benefit from the unequal distribution of goods.

economic analysis illustrates how both utilitarianism and libertarianism could potentially utilize property rights as a tool to bring about positive outcomes. In addition, it is important to note this economic turn, as conservationists trained in resource management often apply the value system and concepts associated with economic reductionism (Norton 1991).[5]

As agriculture makes use of resources and produces various products, it's understandable that the above discussion of ethical theories has largely focused on what constitutes just distribution and resource use. However, resources can also be treated as social goods, meaning that their use should not be controlled by market mechanisms (Thompson 1996). As Michael (2000) argues, within a Rawlsian liberal framework, questions concerning what should count as resources should be treated as *a priori*, or those that need to be answered before questions of just distribution (Anonymized 2014). From this position, one could argue that ecosystem services are social goods and thus resources necessary for their functioning should be removed from discussions of just distribution. However, ecosystem services are framed as services precisely because they can now be valued in economic terms (Macdonald et al. 2015).

Thompson (1996) labels positions that prioritize social goods as egalitarian. In addition, when determining right action, such theories also include a detailed discussion concerning the just distribution of harms to the larger community. For example, Shrader-Frechette (1993) applies Rawls' "difference principle" to a wide range of environmental issues. Roughly, this principle, which is part of Rawls egalitarian ethic, mandates that society should only institute policies that benefit those in the least advantaged group (Lamont and Favor 2016). This policy is aimed at creating egalitarian distribution of power, wealth, and opportunity over the long run. Shrader-Frechette's (1993) application of Rawlsian theory often involves an analysis of policy that illustrates how the weak bear a disproportionate share of risks and/or a limited amount of the benefits resulting from a specific policy. In the context of the food system, egalitarian (also labeled as justice arguments) are often martialed as a critique of the risks that farm and slaughterhouse workers take on in proportion to the benefits they receive.

Environmental philosophers, such as Leopold (1968), and later Callicott (1989) and Naess (1973), expanded egalitarian ethics to include the wider environment, in that they broadened the ethical sphere to include ecosystems, non-human animals, and/or biotic communities (Thompson and Noll 2015). Here "broadening the ethical sphere" should not be understood to signify the recognition that the wider environment has intrinsic value, as environmental philosophers craft both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric or biocentric arguments (Norton 1991; Warren 2000). With this being said, environmental philosophers have made strong arguments for intrinsically valuing ecosystems, individual animals, and entire species. For example, deep ecologists (Naess 1973) and ecofeminists (Warren 2000) emphasize the view that the natural world does not exist solely for the use of humans, but accept a biocentric view of the natural world where it has intrinsic value (Norton 1991). Concerning non-human animals, rights based and animal liberation theorists, such as Regan (2004) and Singer (2009) start from the position that non-human others have intrinsic value and thus should be included in

[5] However, it is important to note here that utilitarian arguments, when decoupled from economic theory, could easily be used as justifications for constraining the rights of property owners. For example, in the case of water, following the maxim to produce the greatest good for the greatest number could be used to justify the mandate that producers upstream need to implement conservation strategies. Additionally, arguments could be martialed to justify other constraints that may be problematic from a libertarian perspective, such as the control of agricultural inputs (if overuse reduces the overall efficiency of the input), the reduction of specific practices (such as dumping waste into waterways, if it harms downstream operations), or the production of certain crops (such as growing hemp, or other water loving crops, during a drought).

ethical decision-making. Regarding species, various philosophers have argued that species have subjective intrinsic value, meaning that humans "subjectively value them" (Callicott 1989; Sandler 2012), and that species have objective intrinsic value, meaning that they are valuable independently of whether or not humans subjectively value them (Rolston 1986). As you can see from this brief survey of intrinsic arguments, let alone arguments coming from preservationists and conservationists, environmental ethics houses a wide range of positions. On the whole, "environmentalists often begin by implying that there is something morally wrong in the systematic exploitation of nature" (Norton 1991, p. 5). Thus, they share a common starting point, attempts to address larger environmental concerns within the ethical sphere.

Now that we've explored Thompson's (1996) triangular structure (of libertarianism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism) that can be found in policy discussions, let us return to the problem of non-human species refugees. As discussed above, the probability is high that climate change impacts are going to induce flora and fauna to leave their current geographical range to follow their shifting climate niches. Agriculture could act as a barrier to these migrations, and thus play a key role in biodiversity loss, or could help mitigate impacts, if conservation practices are put into effect. As a wide range of species are forced to migrate or face extinction, agricultural lands "may have to shift their role from human-made barriers to areas that play a key role in mitigating species loss and thus help to ensure their ecological resilience" (Anonymized 2017). When making decisions, it is imperative that we explore positions that could be taken, as delays could directly translate into extinction events: What this means is that the ethical issue is time-based. Building off Thompson's (1996) analysis of water policy, what probable positions would producers, policy makers, officials, and other stakeholders take when determining whether we should adopt strategies to help facilitate climate induced migrations?

For those espousing a libertarian approach, or those prioritizing property rights, the mitigation of impacts to non-human climate change refugees (or the facilitation of their movement) would largely fall under the purview of the property owner. From this position, one could argue that strategies for mimicking local biospheres (such as intercropping, conservation tillage, use of wildlife corridors, etc.) are already commonly used in sustainable agriculture. If this this the case, then property owners have the option to adopt mitigation practices, if they so choose. Those who care about protecting biodiversity are free to adopt such practices, while those who prioritize other outcomes (such as an increase in yields, pest control etc.) are free to not adopt these practices. Even if only a small number of farmers adopt mitigation strategies, this change could potentially increase the acreage suitable for migration. Thus, there's no reason to adopt policies that would impinge upon the property rights of producers. In fact, when prioritizing property rights, the justification for limiting these rights would have to be strong. Seeing as the option to adopt strategies are already available to farmers, there appears to be little incentive to adopt policies mandating these changes. However, it should be noted that a myopic focus on property rights essentially ignores harms that individual producer decisions can have to both the larger ecological and human communities, especially when those making the decision are invulnerable to these impacts, such as those who live upstream. Aldo Leopold (1968) describes this problem when he argues that "we abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect" (p. viii). Thompson (1996) supports this critique when he argues that such externalities can be understood as the imposition of the liberty of others.

In contrast, those arguing from a utilitarian position could justify the violation of an individual's property rights, if these limits ensure that resources are used in the most efficient manner (Thompson 1996). For example, policy makers who hold this position could

mandate that producers add conservation buffers, corridors, windbreaks, and/or greenways to their properties. These landscape changes may take some area out of production, but they provide a wide range of goods and services for the larger community of farmers, such as "protecting soil resources, improving air and water quality, enhancing fish and wildlife habitat, and beautifying the landscape" (Bentrup 2008, p1; Bennett and Saunders 2010). For this reason, one could argue that these "improvements" increase the overall utility of the region and, therefore, should be adopted. Coincidentally, these changes could also help support local ecosystem services, provide corridors for migrating species, and increase local biodiversity levels, which are all activities that arguably could help mitigate climate change impacts. Indeed, when one takes this long-term ecologically based view, it's relatively easy to justify the ethical position that increasing the sustainability of farming regions, to ensure that farming families and non-human communities are able utilize the land for generations, is the most prudent position, even if it limits the individual property rights of current owners.

In contrast, those adopting an egalitarian position, or one that prioritizes social goods, could argue against the utilitarian argument above, depending on which group is understood to be the least advantaged. If policy makers and stakeholders prioritized the maintenance of social goods, then one could accept the utilitarian argument, since increasing utility also contributes to other social goods, such as ecosystem services, the availability of local game animals, etc. However, when we move away from benefits and focus on the just distribution of harms in the wider community, other arguments could be made from this position. For example, the economic climate in some parts of the world is such that the loss of a few cattle or a crop failure could cause the loss the farm (Pimbert 2010, Comstock 1987). In this context, a family farm advocate, who sees local farmers as the least advantaged (in the larger economic structure), could potentially utilize Rawls' (2001) difference principle to support the position that farmers should not take on the extra burden of implementing conservation strategies. Similar arguments could be cursorily made by advocates of various food related causes, from those who argue that we need to increase our yields to feed human climate-refugees to those advocating for global food security. In each case, limiting yields would directly harm the least well off identified by these interest groups and thus could be labeled unjust.

Whether or not an egalitarian would accept the ecological argument, or one made by an interest group focused on human populations largely depends on if they accept an anthropocentric or biocentric view of the world. This leads us to environmental ethics positions and what they would mandate in this situation. If one accepts a biocentric worldview, then non-human others facing extinction would be placed in the larger ethical sphere. As the problem of non-human climate refugees has both an individual, species, and larger ecological component, stakeholders who accept the view that ecosystems, non-human others, or species have intrinsic value could all contest the anthropocentric egalitarian position above. For example, one who argues from an animal rights position, such as Regan's (2004) could claim that not providing corridors violates the rights of non-human animals (or that this causes suffering, depending on the theory) and thus we have an ethical duty to adopt measures to ensure that these beings can migrate. Similarly, to return to Leopold (1968), a biocentric egalitarian could argue that "the land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants and animals, or collectively the land." As such, one could argue that adopting wind barriers, greenways, corridors etc. could provide benefits for the entire community—one that is made up of humans *and* various other organisms. Finally, if we accept the position that species have objective or subjective intrinsic value (Sandler 2012; Rolston 1986)

one could make a case for adopting measures aimed at limiting the scope of climate induced extinctions, such as the conservation measures above.

The California wetlands case can provide more concrete examples of stakeholders that fit the above categories. In this situation, the California Rice Commission largely supports the interests of local rice farmers and mills located in the Sacramento Valley (California Rice Commission 2017). In contrast, The Nature Conservancy, Point Blue Conservation Science, and The Cornell Lab of Ornithology are organizations which primarily focus on protecting wildlife and habitats necessary for their survival. However, Point Blue Conservation is also committed to addressing climate change impacts for the benefit of both humans and other species (Point Blue Conservation 2017). Utilizing the applied ethics approach above, as a point of reference, the California Rice Commission's stance largely maps onto the libertarian stance, as it represents the needs of farmers and other commercial ventures. In contrast, The Nature Conservancy, Point Blue Conservation Science, and Cornell Lab of Ornithology accept an environmental or biocentric egalitarian position, as they advocate for habitat restoration and the reduction of threats to ecosystems. Additionally, these interest groups are required to develop strategies conforming with California State and local laws and thus could be understood to be working within a larger utilitarian or egalitarian framework, depending on the policy. With these various ethical interests at play, one could easily imagine situations where discussions on how to balance the production of rice with the needs of migrating birds might stall.

Applied Ethics: No Easy Path

Indeed, while ethicists can debate the finer points of the above ethical positions, as Thompson (1996) himself notes, the purpose of the analysis is to illuminate ethical commitments that motivate or inform policy positions. As such, even with this cursory analysis, it should be apparent that there are a wide range of positions that stakeholders could take when faced with problems associated with non-human refugees. It's not hard to imagine a situation where a wide range of interest groups, each with their own priorities and ethical commitments, could bring the policy implementation process to a standstill. An expanded treatment of the triangular structure of libertarianism, utilitarianism, and egalitarians illustrates a) potential positions that could be taken and b) how these different positions call for sometimes conflicting recommendations on the ground. In fact, Thompson (1996) ends his analysis with the larger argument that this impasse illustrates how applied ethics, as a field, often "freeze[s] the actual debate into stasis" and how this clarity "only hardens a dispute that might have been resolved" (p.200).[6] Thus one could argue that the field is of limited use in policy and other decision-making circles, beyond the identification of specific ethical frameworks. As applied ethics pushes policy debates from stakeholder conflicts of interest to the realm of theory, where consensus can only be achieved after one ethic reigns supreme, it's not hard to find justification for Thompson's critique. This is especially the case when one reflects on the plurality of ethical positions in the field.

Armed with valuable insights gained from awareness of these positions helps illuminate areas of potential conflict during land-use debates. Specifically, if water disputes can be used as a model, the conflict of positions utilizing different theoretical foundations could, in fact, freeze or needlessly prolong debates aimed at mitigating impacts. While this may not be an issue for non-time sensitive debates, the problem of non-human climate refugees is time-sensitive, meaning that this paralysis, itself, could exacerbate the very problem being

[6] It should be noted that this argument is currently gaining traction in the wider literature, with Douglas (2010) echoing the critique, when she argues that it has become increasingly apparent in all branches of applied ethics that the "application of traditional theories rarely provides either the philosophical insight or the practical guidance needed" (Douglas 2010, p.322).

addressed. Migrating species often do not have the luxury to wait (or will not wait) until consensus can be reached, as they attempt to follow their ecological niches. As such, I argue that the rapid production changes and policy shifts needed in the face of climate disruptions provides further support for both Thompson's (1996) and other environmental pragmatists' argument that "theoretical debates are hindering the ability of environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives" and thus we need "a new strategy in environmental thought" (Light and Katz 1996). In fact, this analysis is mirrored in other fields, with Douglas (2010) going so far as to question applied ethics usefulness for addressing ethical issues on the ground. Building off of these critiques of applied ethics, the new strategy will have to perform at least the two following functions: a) Bringing disparate stakeholder groups together (rather than freezing debates) when addressing problems and b) finding the means to make difficult or forced choices, when making such a choice is imperative.

A Pragmatist Framework for Wildlife Conservation Decision-Making

What would an environmental pragmatist approach to wildlife conservation decision making look like? I argue below that such an approach or framework should consist of at least the following components: a) Pragmatic necessity, b) the epistemic criterion of serviceability, and c) the self and societal reflection necessary for habit revision. However, before exploring these, we first need to start with the basic question that guides this ethical framework. As Thompson (1996) argues, in contrast to the field of applied ethics that focuses, not surprisingly, on the application of ethical theories (Douglas 2010), the pragmatist recognizes that different views and positions are in contention (Altman 1983; Light and Katz 1996). When starting from this point, the guiding question becomes "how can the contention be resolved in a manner that is consistent with our political ideals?" (Thompson 1996, p.200). This second question is particularly important for pragmatism (and as we'll see for time-sensitive problems) because it has what James (1979) labels pragmatic necessity, or the recommendation to shift our focus from the validity of "facts" and instead focus on their usefulness.

What this means is that the pragmatic philosopher is not limited by the rule that they must only accept justified beliefs or, more loosely, only those propositions that are strongly supported by evidence. One is warranted in accepting unjustified beliefs in circumstances when accepting or not accepting this belief will positively impact psychological wellbeing or, importantly, our conduct. As James notes, "we cannot… remain uncommitted on matters such as what is right or wrong in the conduct of personal affairs; we must do one thing or another" (p.200). While this conception of knowledge can be problematic (McDermott 1986), for Thompson (1996), this shift has the benefit of capturing how people adopt or discard beliefs in practice, as non-philosophers often focus on the serviceability (or the impact) of beliefs to complete a task, rather than on whether they're justified, true, beliefs.

In the context of climate change discussions, one could argue that pragmatic necessity allows producers to accept contentious beliefs (if accepting these promotes wellbeing). This epistemic move then allows producers *to act* from the position that x is the case. For this reason, pragmatic necessity could move climate change discussions from epistemic gridlock (where stakeholders question whether there is even a problem to solve) to a position where mitigation strategies are on the table, as stakeholders are in a position where they can now accept the belief that climate change is happening, if this belief promotes wellbeing. This shift could be particularly useful in contexts, such as the United States, where climate change is a hotly debated issue and mitigation strategies are often halted by parties that intentionally cultivate epistemic doubt concerning climate science (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, pragmatic necessity

could give us the flexibility needed to make decisions quickly when not acting could negatively impact our wellbeing, such as climate disruptions.

In addition to pragmatic necessity, Dewey's (1929) pragmatic philosophy could contribute valuable components of a pragmatic strategy (McKenna 2004; Thompson 1996). His work can help us to devise ways of a) bringing desperate stakeholder groups together and b) gradually changing behavior that has harmful environmental consequences and thus contributes to situations where pragmatic necessity is a reality. In particular, decoupling our concept of truth from logical necessity and, instead, placing greater importance on serviceability results in the increase in importance of community, as community is part of the pragmatic scientific method and the primary component of a pragmatic theory of truth (Hickman 1991; Thompson 1996). As Thompson (1996) argues, "the theoretical position is that truth is for and by a community of inquiry; hence, relative… In practice, however, communities that include practitioners… have a reliable mechanism of self-criticism: the ideas must work" (p.203). This focus on community as an epistemological entity helps to ground propositions and to guard policy discussions from polarization, as any discussion that does not take the wider community into account is "philosophically flawed." Here policy and/or land-use discussions are not framed in such a way where different groups are in opposition to one another, but as a community coming together to offer up, support, and/or refute knowledge claims and to use these claims as starting points to solve problems faced by members of that community. This process is collaborative and keeps open the possibility of reappraisal, as it grounds the discussion in instant peer review. Though, when coupled with pragmatic necessity, decisions will ultimately have to be made.

Additionally, Dewey's (1929) insights on connectiveness and altering habits provides insights useful for wildlife conservation discussions (McKenna 2004). According to Dewey, "it is our awareness of our connectedness that enables us to direct our behavior to certain goals" and this is what makes humans uniquely different from other species (Mckenna 2004, 164-65). In addition, as our behavior/habits can alter our environment, humans have a responsibility to be mindful of the impacts of these alterations, as society progresses. McKenna (2004) argues that the idea of "altering habits" is a key part of pragmatic philosophy, as "what is needed is the intelligent examination of the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions and customs" (p.166). This self and societal examination, or what Thompson (1996) calls pragmatist deconstruction, could help to unfreeze positions, open up new solutions to address problems, and change our habits, if these habits bring about negative consequences.

Non-human Climate Refugees Revisited

From a pragmatic perspective, then, do we have an ethical duty to mitigate impacts on species induced to move due to climate disruptions? Remember that applied ethics outlined a wide range of positions that decision makers could take on the problem of non-human climate refugee and illuminated a clear tension between anthropocentric and biocentric approaches. In contrast, the pragmatic strategy outlined above consists of a decision-making framework that incorporates the concepts of a) pragmatic necessity, b) the epistemic criterion of serviceability, and c) the self and societal reflection necessary for habit revision. As it focuses on serviceability, pragmatism is a method for coming to consensus, when situated communities recognize a common problem and work to solve this problem, rather than cling to an individual ethical ideology. For this reason, it's difficult to supply a universal answer to the above question. At best, one could answer the question above in the following way: If the numbers of non-human climate refugees are going to increase in the future, then employing strategies to help mitigate negative effects to agricultural areas and wider ecosystems, biodiversity levels etc. (depending on your

goal) is of pragmatic necessity for producers and those who rely upon the land (aka all of us). Accepting this position at the beginning of discussions could help induce conduct that may reduce psychological and physical harm brought about by climate change. In contrast, not working to mitigate impacts on or by migrating species could increase the severity of their effects on those that rely upon the land.

When the framework is taken as a whole, mitigation decisions will have to be made in the areas impacted by climate induced species movement, as these communities will ultimately determine whether or not a strategy is serviceable and will be able to reflect on how this strategy impacts their context. (Indeed, this will be illustrated below, when we return to the wetlands case study.) While this may be problematic from an applied ethics position, from a wildlife conservation standpoint, conservation decisions are necessarily bound to the ecosystem or context within which one is working (McDonald et al. 2015), as different problems arise and diverse strategies are employed in the different climate-zones, such as the deserts of New Mexico, Pacific Northwest forests, etc. In this context, the three-part pragmatist method outlined above could be of use, as it could map on to (and thus contribute to) these "on the ground" wildlife conservation discussions.

In this vein, it should be noted that pragmatic necessity and the criterion of serviceability shifts non-human climate refugee discussions from those where vested interests are calcified, to the more productive ground of conflict resolution and the limiting of negative consequences to the wider community. The pragmatic strategy above asks decision-makers to reflect on what is valuable to them; to be mindful of the consequences of their actions, customs, and larger social structures on the world; and to determine whether our actions are a serviceable strategy for achieving our goals. With this being said, how would a pragmatist strategy be employed when addressing the problem of non-human climate refugees?

To provide an example, let us return to the wetlands case-study in California. As discussed above, the California Rice Commission largely supports the interests of local rice farmers and mills located in the Sacramento Valley (California Rice Commission 2017). In contrast, The Nature Conservancy, Point Blue Conservation Science, and The Cornell Lab of Ornithology are organizations which primarily focus on protecting wildlife and habitats necessary for their survival. However, Point Blue Conservation is also committed to addressing climate change impacts for the benefit of both humans and other species (Point Blue Conservation 2017).

With these various ethical interests at play, it is easy to imagine how discussions might stall. However, these disparate groups have already come together to implement a wide array of strategies aimed at increasing available habitat during migration stop-over periods. One successful plan is "pop-up habitats" or the temporary renting of land (by conservation groups) during the migrating season to open it up to birds. This provides farmers with an additional revenue stream, while opening up over 10,000 acres for the season and increasing the numbers of shore-birds by 30% (Heimbush 2015). Additional strategies they have come together to implement include easements aimed at protecting producers who use irrigated pastures, the creation of ecological reserves (and preserves) among farmland, and the building of partnerships between conservation groups, ranchers, and farmers.

What could a pragmatic approach contribute to the above conservation efforts? In key ways, the collaborators are already using a pragmatic approach, as they are setting aside differences to address a time-sensitive issue. The California Rice Commission and local farmers involved in these efforts are beginning to shift their practices, such as flooding fields in the winter, to ensure that their farms can help provide habitat (California Rice Commission 2017). From this position, one could argue that stakeholders are coming together to change their conduct in such a way as to increase the

serviceability of California's Central Valley. These are great first steps. However, the current strategies may not be enough. California continues to experience drought and water allocations to farmers are being cut. And, despite efforts, key species, such as the tricolored blackbird, have been experiencing steep declines over the last decade.

Non-human climate migration may only exacerbate this situation, as limited resources are further taxed. One benefit that the pragmatic framework could provide is that it nudges decision-makers to reflect on what is valuable to them; to be mindful of the consequences of one's actions, customs, and larger social structures on the world; and to determine whether one's actions are a serviceable strategy for achieving goals. This reflection may help stakeholders identify larger aspects of their lived world that is contributing to the crisis and to reflect on how these practices could change. For example, if water allocations are being cut, one could ask how water based policies, distribution and treatment practices, and larger conservation efforts could be changed to help ensure that there is enough of this resource to provide habitat. Thus, the process of group reflection could help decision-makers identify workable strategies. This analysis illustrates how pragmatism includes processes already producing successful strategies on the ground and could enrich future wildlife conservation efforts.

A Final Theoretical Consideration

In addition, another strength of the pragmatic approach that should be at least cursorily mentioned is that it succeeds in balancing both anthropocentric and biocentric considerations. For example, the pragmatic approach is anthropocentric, as humans are beings who are aware of their connectedness (Dewey 1929; McKenna 2004), yet also mandates a larger ecological view, as we are pushed to examine the consequences of our actions to the wider environment. This is especially useful for decision-making in agricultural contexts, as strategies for maintaining one's farm necessarily include the wider environment that farming depends upon, such as your fields, waterways, weather patterns, etc. This flexibility allows both positions to be weighed, as situations arise, without polarizing anthropocentric and biocentric views, at least within the context of agriculture. As Leopold argued (1968), people are in relation to one another *and* in relation to the land.[7] The pragmatist lens exposes these connections, while including the social component of this larger picture. The integration of the anthropocentric with the biocentric, coupled with having stakeholders reflect on how their actions and the larger social structures impact the wider environment, could also help address the "value problem" in wildlife management on farmland (Macdonald et al. 2015) precisely because it gives people the opportunity to reflect on how their actions impact the larger environment.

What this provides us then is a general argument for working to mitigate the impacts on and produced by migrating species and a decision-making framework that can handle time-sensitive problems and is flexible enough to recognize different positions at the table, while rigorous enough to demand that each of these positions be examined to determine their consequences and if they work to maintain community. Indeed, the prioritization of community, and the epistemological assumptions guiding the approach, nudge decision makers to collaborate and allow for the critique of rigid positions that do not take other groups into account, such as those myopically focused on property-rights. As Thompson (1996) argues, deconstruction is always coupled with reconstruction in pragmatic thought.

A critique of the above approach is that it is too flexible, as it allows space for a wide range of ethical positions and thus does not provide guidance—guidance that is especially needed as we are increasingly faced with climate change impacts. However, it is important to remember that pragmatism provides a strategy for

[7] However, it should be noted that discussions concerning the efficacy of farming, as a practice, could still be on the table.

problem solving as a community, rather than a universal theory that can be applied to various situations, such as in the case of applied ethics. Rather than a limitation, this should be seen as a strength, especially in policy circles, as this bypasses problems with applied ethics discussed in detail. However, it should be noted here that environmental ethicists may not accept the claim that this is a strength, as leaders in the field, such as Callicott (2002) and Hargove (See Light 2004) have continued to attack "the relevance of policy to the work of environmental ethicists," (Light 2004, p.120) and thus could use this critique as a reason to discount Thompson's (1996) analysis of applied ethics discussed prior. While I do not provide a full critique of the position, as it is not the aim of this paper, I want to acknowledge this tension in the field and to note that the above pragmatic strategy offers a tacit reply.

Conclusion

It is the author's hope that a wide range of readers will find this paper useful, as it brings together work in environmental ethics, wildlife conservation literature, and public policy. Specifically, this paper makes a contribution to the wider environmental philosophy literature, as current work on the topic of climate induced species migration predominantly focuses on providing a theoretical apparatus that could help address ethical questions that arise during managed relocation projects and not on situations where species move on their own.[8] Finally, and most importantly, this paper builds on Thompson's (1996) work on agricultural policy and uses insights from pragmatic philosophy to outline a new strategy that could help address the "value problem" in wildlife management on farmland. The conservation scientists (Macdonald and Willis 2013) have gone so far as to argue that inadequate handling of ethical arguments for the conservation of nature is an 'elephant in the room' in wildlife conservation (Macdonald et al. 2015). In contrast to the field of applied ethics, pragmatism has a unique set of tools that can be of particular use in wildlife conservation discussions.

[8] Here "managed relocation" (also known as "assisted migration") should be understood as a conservation strategy that involves the transportation of species to different ecosystems prior to an anticipated climate range shift (Minteer and Collins 2010).

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A Moral Operating System of Livestock Farming

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Abstract: Societal views about livestock production systems in Europe are changing dramatically in a negative direction. Based on the tradition of pragmatism in applied philosophy I develop a Moral Operating System of animal production systems in cooperating a plurality of ethical views. This moral operating system of animal production systems consists of two interactive, dynamic parts: an internal professional care ethics combined with an emergent ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation, and external ethical boundary conditions based on societal values and concerns in animal ethics and environmental ethics. I focus on the emergent ethics in life sciences because it most normative ethical theories have problems in dealing with the future. In moral reasoning about innovations in the making, the relevant moral facts and the appropriate principles are more or less still unknown, as also the relevant moral consequences. Only by doing ethics in life sciences in future projects will the moral dilemmas emerge in the trajectories of responsible innovation like molecular technologies in animal sciences and precision livestock farming.

1. Introduction

The number of animals in the world has grown to an all-time high. Billions of animals play an important role in different activities as pets, in sports, as hobby and companion animals, but they are also used in clinical trials and tests, especially in agriculture (Eijsackers and Scholten 2011). To mention only a few trends in the European Union that will reduce animal numbers in the long run: a ban on wild circus animals, a ban on mink (six million animals each year), a restriction on keeping certain species as pets, and a 20% reduction in dairy cows. Besides their role in society, animals are also found in nature areas, where humans are causing the sixth global mass extinction of wild animals. A future without the need to care for large and medium sized animals seems to lie ahead.

Most societies in the Western world are changing dramatically in a negative direction in relation to societal ideas about agricultural production (Ankersmit 2010), especially about genetic modification and the use of animals (Bruijnis et al. 2015). Who still cares for livestock? The answer to this question may be interpreted in a more cynical way: Does this correspond with the thoughts of Francis Kint, the CEO of Vion, on the filmed animal abuse in a Belgian slaughterhouse? In a recent interview in a Dutch newspaper, he said that his first thoughts were that this was bad for the industry, and that it could have been prevented by a better layout of the slaughterhouse (Tuenter 2017). Although this is not the empathic reaction that concerned people from *outside* the production system would have expected, it is a typical reaction of a professional *inside* the production system who *cares* for a better system (Bergstra et al. 2015). In the same interview, he suggested some innovations to prevent stress, like no bends in the walkway to the slaughter site.

The take home message of this paper is that we need to develop a Moral Operating System of animal production systems bases on a plurality of ethical views. An ethics of livestock farming needs more than just animal ethics. We need an ethics of animal production *systems* consisting of two interactive, dynamic parts: an *internal* professional *care* ethics combined with an *emergent* ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation, and *external* ethical boundary conditions based on societal values and concerns in *animal* ethics and *environmental* ethics. Together, these four ethics are the Moral Operating System of a production system.

Hereafter, the focus will be on the *emergent* ethics in life sciences aimed at tackling the immoral aspects and moral dilemmas of animal production systems. An example can be found in *Boer zoekt vrouw internationaal*, a Dutch television series based on the English series *Farmer wants a wife*. In the episode of Sunday, April ninth, Alberdien decides to leave Olke, a Dutch dairy farmer, in Texas. She cannot cope with the fact that the nice, healthy young bulls that she fed in the morning will be killed, simply for economic reasons. More examples are: the thousands of pigs burning in stable fires, the mutilation of piglets, and the death of more than fifty million day-old male chicks annually. These immoral aspects and moral dilemmas arise when

societal values clash with the principles of an animal production system, because of unintended consequences and risks (Alders 2011). To tackle these immoral aspects and moral dilemmas as an ethicist, it is necessary not only to be part of a life sciences trajectory of responsible innovation, but also to strengthen ethical reflection along the agricultural production chains and among the involved stakeholders. What do I mean by ethical reflection in the field of life sciences?

2. Doing Agricultural Ethics

Ethics may be studied from several disciplinary backgrounds: law, theology, psychology, philosophy, and social science. In this paper ethics is studied from a philosophical background (Petersen and Ryberg 2007) and is defined as the critical, systematic reflection on implicit and explicit moral assumptions about what we do. Many of the societal and scientific challenges in relation to agricultural domains involve value conflicts. Scientific understandings and technological solutions are often contested. In a pluralistic society, philosophy can offer proactive and constructive ways to deal with such value conflicts. The mission of philosophers is to strengthen reflection on, and deliberation about, these problems and about scientific and societal responses, and thus to contribute to responsible policies and practices. This is done by engaging in dialogue with societal groups, policymakers, professionals, and scientific disciplines, enriching their reflection with philosophical questions and perspectives. The nature of values such as animal welfare and environmental integrity needs to be clarified, and possibilities for responsible innovation in plant and animal production systems need to be explored.

The tradition of pragmatism in applied philosophy (Keulartz 2002) is the philosophical background of this paper. This term is not to be taken in a strict sense (i.e. 'pragmatism' as a very specific philosophical denomination connected with the work of James, Dewey, and others), but rather in a more general and broader sense (Thompson 1998). This pragmatic approach starts from case material and concrete actual developments, and aims at interdisciplinarity, dialogue, and collaboration (Gremmen 2002 and 2007). Philosophical concepts are used as flexible tools that can be adapted to specific contexts. This empirical way of doing philosophy is applied to ethics in the life sciences. Whereas academic debates often revolve around the question of whether these sciences are benign or a threat (Singer 1975; Sandoe and Christiansen 2008), ethics *in* life sciences is done as an embedded ethicist, discussing life sciences from within (Gremmen 2007). This means that *the societal impact* is strengthened by a bottom-up approach. Starting with interviews and stakeholder surveys (see Blom and Gremmen 2012), the ethical arguments in the results are analysed, tested, and deepened. Afterwards, the stakeholders and relevant others are informed to strengthen a constructive ethical dialogue and offer them a framework to make responsible decisions. Also, this research is often part of consortia aiming to provide companies, policymakers, NGOs with information and tools to solve their problems. Is there a suitable ethical approach available?

3. Ethics of animals:
animal ethics and environmental ethics

Clashes of different ethical approaches may be observed in societal debates about animals (Thompson 1998), and will be illustrated by the case of Johannes, a humpback whale. On 12 December 2012, Johannes beached on the shoreline of De Razende Bol, a small uninhabited island between the island of Texel and the city of Den Helder in The Netherlands. The whale was stuck on the beach and could not return to the water on its own. Not so long ago, humans living nearby would have killed the animal immediately, and its remains would have been used for all kinds of purposes. In our modern times, we try to save such animals' lives. Over the course of just a few days, Johannes became a national symbol for helping a wild

animal in need. Political parties, civil servants, scientists, and members of societal organizations were engaged not only in debates, but also in rescue and euthanasia attempts. All these attempts failed, and the whale eventually died. In the ensuing debate, ecologists and nature conservationists still argued against killing dying wild animals in distress, whereas the majority of the other participants in the debate argued for a humane death for these animals.

At first sight, it seems that humans do not need to be involved at all when wild animals die: wild animals are wild precisely because they *take care of* themselves in areas where they are outside human control. In such situations, wild animals die for several different reasons: hunger, thirst, disease, predators, and also as a consequence of old age. Humans are often unaware of the fact that, out of their sight, animals could be dying. However, sometimes people are confronted with dying wild animals, like the beached humpback whale in 2012. What is our moral reference for killing wild animals? It seems that, in order to answer these questions, we can rely on animal ethics: the moral framework for the killing of domesticated animals. According to the law in many European Union countries, based on this theory, humans are obliged to help an animal in distress. From this ethical perspective, the first duty of humans is to save or help individual wild animals in situations where humans are present. When all help fails, our second duty is, if possible, to kill these animals in a humane way. The example of the humpback whale seems to fit into this scheme because it was an individual animal surrounded by humans. However, from the perspective of *environmental* ethics, wild animals are part of ecosystems. Therefore, the focus is on groups and species rather than on individual animals. In general, this ethical framework advocates respect for the wildness of animals. In the case of dying wild animals, like the humpback whale, the *environmental* ethics ethical framework advises a hands-off strategy. This seems to lead to a stalemate between two rival ethical frameworks, thus leaving nature management caught between two sets of norms governing animals and nature.

If we see some ethological distance in the dualism between 'wild' and 'tame', all kinds of intermediary shades appear. Also, the number of situations in which humans have to decide to kill wild animals increases considerably. The humpback whale is an example of an individual wild animal in distress. We may consider this situation as bad luck and exceptional. But what about lost or abandoned baby seals on the shores of the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark? When we locate these animals, do we help them by bringing them to a shelter? Do we have to kill them on the spot or leave them alone to die? Other examples are weak or dying animals in nature parks like the Oostvaardersplassen in The Netherlands and exotic animals that are destroying the biodiversity of an area. In earlier research I argued that the relation between *animal* ethics and *environmental* ethics in these cases is not a dichotomy, but a continuum. Because *animal* ethics is about individual animals in hands-on situations, and *environmental* ethics is about groups of animals and species in hands-off situations, groups of animals in agricultural hands-on situations do not belong to either ethics. What is a suitable ethics of animals in agricultural production systems?

4. Ethics in agriculture: care ethics and ethics of life sciences

Recently, *care* ethics has been developed as an ethical approach (Loewy and Springer 2004). Hans Harbers (2009) argues at length that *care* ethics is the most promising integrative framework for ethics of animal production systems. *Care* ethics focuses on values that are important for the maintenance and flourishing of (care) relationships, such as commitment, dependency, responsibility, and care (Devettre 2009). An important aim of caring is to create shared values for all stakeholders involved in the production chain. In agricultural systems, people care for plants and animals

in the two senses of the word 'care': 'care for' and 'care about' (being concerned). Good farming is a matter of endless care, in various shapes and sizes (Scholten et al. 2013). Good care requires the involvement of all stakeholders in the production chain, but also of citizens, consumers, civil society, and government (Harbers 2009). As a consequence, care is always accompanied by societal concerns. This can be illustrated by the Wakker Dier campaign. Six obituaries of organic cows appeared on 3 April 2017 in the Dutch newspaper *Trouw*. Miep 140, Rikkie 65, and Witkop 36, cows from the organic dynamic dairy farm, Schermereylandt, were slaughtered to comply with the European Union's manure regulation. Although care is firmly embedded in economic activity, this does not automatically imply the primacy of the economy (Harbers 2009). Caring also means the responsibility to take care of the situation in farming by contributing to innovative processes, and thereby contributing to society. This entails clarity about responsibilities as an essential element for an excellent organization of a caring farming system (Goede et al. 2013)

In a number of innovation areas, such as genomics, synthetic biology, and animal welfare, ethicists are asked to help to solve moral problems in the early stages of innovation (e.g. Singer 1986). Can ethicists help to solve moral problems in the early stages of innovation? In the past, ethics often seemed to lag behind technical progress, and, according to Grunwald (2010), as a response ethics joined the move towards 'upstream engagement' in the field of Science and Technology Studies. As early as 1980, David Collingridge wrote a book on the social control of technology with the objective of avoiding the harmful social consequences of a new technology (Collingridge 1980). This may be done by changing technology in its infancy by imposing on it all kinds of controls and restrictions. Two conditions are necessary to avoid the undesired consequences of a new technology: "It must be known that a technology has, or will have, harmful effects, and it must be possible to change the technology in some way to avoid the effects." (Collingridge 1980, 18) One or both of the conditions are often lacking, and attempts to control technology seldom succeed: the 'dilemma of control'. The first horn of the dilemma is that the harmful social consequences of the fully developed technology cannot be predicted with sufficient confidence to justify the imposition of control. The second horn of the dilemma is that, by the time a technology is sufficiently well developed and diffused for its unwanted social consequences to become apparent, it is no longer easily controlled. Control may still be possible, but it will have become very difficult, expensive, and slow. What happens is that society and the rest of its technology gradually adapt to the new technology, so that, when it is fully developed, any major change in this new technology requires changes in many other technologies and social and economic institutions, making its control very disruptive and expensive (Collingridge 1980, 19).

An important assumption of the Collingridge dilemma is the consequentialist/utilitarian perspective in ethics. The normative starting point of the dilemma is the need to avoid the harmful social consequences of a technology, but the message of the dilemma is that a consequentialist/utilitarian perspective is impossible. In the early phases of a new technology, ethical deliberations become speculative because we lack the required knowledge (Grunwald 2010). In the later phases of a new technology, ethical deliberations often come too late, namely, when all of the relevant decisions have already been made, when it is too late to avoid harmful consequences of the technology. Collingridge's own normative response to the dilemma is to maintain the 'freedom to control technology', because the essence of controlling technology is to retain "… the ability to change a technology, even when it is fully developed and diffused, so that any unwanted social consequences it may prove to have can be eliminated or meliorated." (Collingridge 1980, 20/21) He suggests developing organizational structures and scientific tools to deal with

the resistance to such control (ibid, 19). Experts, decision makers, and end-users all are entangled in controlling the new technology.

However, Collingridge did not foresee that some experts were going to use a version of his control dilemma as a normative tool in their attempts to exclude prospective users from the innovation process. Experts sometimes stress that they are willing to include users in the early stages of the new technology (Gremmen 2007), when there is still a lot of room to take the voice of prospective users into account in the design of the product, but the experts can offer little concrete information that would allow prospective users to imagine how they could integrate the end-product in their everyday life. This version of the Collingridge dilemma depicts the end-users in the emergence of new technologies as the end-point of a linear process. However, the world of the users and the world of technological innovation are by no means separate entities that only merge when a final product is delivered to the users; they are already entangled from the start. Technology assessment, and, later, constructive technology assessment, recognized the importance of involving users in the innovation process to encourage integration of new technologies in users' everyday lives (Rip et al. 1995; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003). The case has been made that technologists need to study responses to science in order to learn from them (Levitt 2003) and to discover missing propositions in their own reasoning (Locke 2002). Everyday-life concerns that inform people's responses to emergent technologies may be at odds with scientific and technological standards but can and should be understood on their own terms. In this way, experts could benefit from the active involvement of prospective users (Veen 2010).

It is difficult for ethicists to assist innovators, because most normative ethical theories have problems in dealing with the future. Not only do the results of an innovation trajectory have unknown consequences, but, more importantly, we do not know the results of innovation at the start of the innovation trajectory (Wathes et al. 2008). This means that, in moral reasoning about innovations in the making, the relevant moral facts and the appropriate principles are more or less still unknown, as also the relevant moral consequences. For that reason, the third part of the Moral Operating System of animal production systems is described as emergent. Only by doing ethics in life sciences will the moral dilemmas emerge in the trajectory of responsible innovation. Future projects will describe and analyse the main characteristics of an emergent ethics of animal production systems. Examples of these characteristics are moral lock-in, the slippery slope, instrumentalization, and commodification. These are discussed in the following two research themes, molecular technologies in animal sciences and precision livestock farming.

5. Molecular technologies in animal sciences

In plants and animals, the basic genetics is more or less the same, but the application of some methods and technologies differ (Barnes and Dupre 2008). For example, mutation breeding – increasing the mutation frequency through chemicals or radiation – is a common and legal method for plants, but it is not possible in animals, for both ethical and economic reasons (Shu et al. 2011). Marker assisted selection and genetic modification (GM) have been used in plant breeding (Gremmen 2005) for many years, but genetic modification has not yet been applied in livestock on a large scale (Gremmen 2009). The only approval given for a GM animal for food production is Canada's approval of AquAdvantage salmon eggs, with a focus on growth enhancement (Goubau 2011). Other examples of GM animals are pigs (i.e. increased growth rates and higher utilization of phosphate in their feed), dairy cows (enhanced resistance to mastitis and improved udder health, and improved milk quality), goats and sheep (improved wool production and disease resistance), and chickens (resistance to diseases and feed efficiency) (Thompson 2007).

There are different kinds of ethical arguments about controversial life sciences technologies (Rollin 1995). On the critical side, some people have objections to a particular technology as such. In the case of genetic modification for example, this argument amounts to the claim that it is unnatural and therefore morally problematic (Siipi 2004; Haperen et al. 2012). Many critics might not be so much opposed to GM technology as such, but more to its different applications (Rollin 2006). From a consequentialist stance, this means that even people who do not have an objection in principle to the technology can still be critical of its use in agriculture in general, and in food production in particular (Sandoe and Christiansen 2008). Current applications of agricultural biotechnology have also been criticized from the viewpoint of justice, in particular with respect to the distribution of economic benefits from its use (Thompson 2007). Some critics emphasize the risks and uncertainties with this new technology, and argue either that there are risks to human health or the environment, or that there might be such risks, and that for this reason some version of the precautionary principle should be applied (Gremmen 2006). Ethics may clarify and test such arguments and explicate normative and epistemic assumptions. In livestock farming, genetic modification may contribute to all kinds of efficiency benefits but, at the same time, may be used to circumvent certain ethical problems (Hanssen and Gremmen 2013). Our case study on the ethics of genetically modified chickens illustrates this (Bruinis et al. 2016).

In response to the increasing demand for safe and cheap food in sufficient quantities, the intensification and mechanization of poultry farming began in the mid-twentieth century. The number of chickens kept by any one farmer has increased considerably since then. Efficiency and specialization were enabled by developments in feeding, breeding, housing of the animals, and increased knowledge of veterinary medicine. Genetic selection enabled egg production by layer-type chickens and chicken meat production using specialized meat-type chickens. Therefore, male chicks from layer-type chickens became less attractive for meat production. With the available sexing techniques, which made it possible to distinguish males from females immediately after hatching, it became common practice to kill these male day-old chicks.

In the European Union, over 400 million male chickens are killed annually immediately after hatching. Societal opposition to this practice has prompted the development of innovations. Several alternatives to the killing of day-old chicks have been proposed (Leenstra et al. 2010); this leads to the question of whether these alternatives are morally superior. We have developed a framework to evaluate the technical and socio-ethical aspects of alternative directions of more responsible innovations to solve this issue, selected on social desirability and technical potential compared to the current situation (Leenstra et al. 2010). One alternative direction aims to use genetic modification in the breeding of laying hens in such a way that the hatching eggs containing males can easily be identified with spectroscopy, a non-invasive technique compared to the technique of taking a sample from the egg to find the difference between male and female eggs. The GM alternative takes advantage of the genetics of birds to ensure GM-free laying hens, and also that their eggs are GM free.

This clear case of a morally inferior practice has potentially morally better alternatives. Besides the GM alternative, there are several others: raising the male chicks, dual use of chickens, taking a sample from the egg, etcetera. Each alternative has its advantages and disadvantages with respect to technical and socio-ethical aspects, and each has a specific importance for various stakeholders. Solving one issue raised by the current situation throws up new issues. For example, by acknowledging arguments against the killing of such young animals and starting to rear the males, issues arise around the impact on the environment and the marketing of the chicks. The issue of killing day-old chicks

and its alternatives thus seems to be an example of choosing the least of several possible evils and can be explained by a special type of moral lock-in.

Since the mid-1980s, technological lock-in has become an important subject of growing academic enquiry in the field of innovation studies, especially by economists working within an evolutionary tradition (David 1985; Arthur 1989). The general idea of lock-in is that technologies and technological systems follow specific paths that are difficult and costly to escape (Perkins 2003). Even if potentially superior alternatives are available, these technologies and technological systems often survive for a very long time. The famous examples in the literature are the triumph of the QWERTY keyboard layout over the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard layout (David 1985) and the race between VHS and Betamax as a video cassette recorder standard (Arthur 1990). In the literature, lock-in is explained by the increasing returns of an initial lead in the competition between technologies (David 1985; Arthur 1989). "This arises because early adoption can generate a snowballing effect whereby the preferred technology benefits from greater improvement than its competitors, stimulating further adoption, improvement, and eventual leadership "(Perkins 2003, 23).

There are many ways in which locked-in technologies may be inferior to their alternatives. I focus on *moral* lock-in: the way a production system can be locked-in to technology standards that are potentially morally inferior. In some cases, there is consensus on the potential for moral improvement that could be achieved through the development of alternative technologies. The question then becomes: What is holding back the development of these morally better technologies? Many debates about the transition to these new technologies focus only on the costs involved (Carrillo-Hermosilla 2013). Our hypothesis is that a kind of moral lock-in may explain the survival of morally inferior technologies. I consider Responsible Innovation, a concept for balancing economic, socio-cultural, and environmental aspects in innovation processes (EC 2011), as an approach to morally 'unlock' alternative innovations. By involving stakeholders in the innovation process and by considering ethical and societal aspects during this process, the socio-ethical acceptability and the societal desirability of innovative products will increase significantly (Schomberg 2013; Blok and Lemmens 2015).

Recent genetic engineering techniques, like CRISPR/Cas9, have come into use in plant breeding in a short time (Zhang et al. 2014). These so-called genome editing techniques are cheaper, faster, more accurate, and more widely applicable than older techniques because of their ability to cut and alter the DNA of any species at almost any genomic site with ease and precision (Jasanoff et al. 2015). They have been developed to overcome the problem of randomness that results from mutation breeding and to be able to determine the site of mutation or insertion of genes. Applications of animal gene editing techniques are many, varied, and rapidly evolving, including applications that promise benefits in welfare, in disease resistance, and in feed efficiency. Although the gene editing technology promises significant benefit, this promise will not be realized unless the technology is firmly and fully embedded in society. The existing ethical frameworks on biotechnology (Holland and Johnson 1998; Rollin 1995) have to be adapted and broadened to these new scientific methods and technologies. This will help scientists, stakeholders, and policymakers to understand, evaluate, and monitor the integration of the technical, social, and ethical aspects of the modern GM toolbox.

In a new research project we are refining and applying the responsible innovation approach to the technique of animal gene editing to guide the development of the technology and help ensure that applications are embedded in society. Animal scientists, social scientists, and ethicists will work together to anticipate possible impacts and implications, open up inclusive dialogue with stakeholders and wider publics, develop reflexive scientific and corporate cultures, and ensure that the science that develops is responsive to

these processes. We have set out an integrated programme of research, applying the use of animal gene editing across three waves of research application: (a) editing to improve animal welfare (starting with the one-edited gene enabling dehorning in cattle); (b) editing for disease resistance (involving more complex traits); and (c) editing for feed efficiency (involving really complex traits). In this project, we will develop a responsible innovation approach to animal gene editing that will guide the responsible development of the technology and support responsible decision making at the level of breeding companies and governments.

6. Precision livestock farming

Precision livestock farming, the second research theme, is the application of smart farming technologies and a relatively new phenomenon in the agricultural sector (Reichardt et al. 2009). In smart farming, computers, sensoring devices, GPS systems, but also robots and even animals, communicate with one another and function autonomously in an integrated farm management system. In this way, farmers can reduce farm inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) and increase yields, while reducing emissions to the environment (Bos and Munnichs 2016). In precision livestock farming, the internet of things is extended to farm animals. PLF can be defined as the management of livestock production using the principles and technology of process engineering. PLF treats livestock production as a set of interlinked processes, which act together in a complex network.(Wathes et al, 2008) The introduction of this type of integrated farm management system enables farmers to control the production process by monitoring and controlling animal growth, behaviour, and health, the production of milk and eggs, the physical environment of livestock buildings, and greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution to the environment. Furthermore, the exchange of information about health and milk quality enables supply chain actors to optimize coordination and efficiency throughout the supply chain.

An example of PLF can be found in the dairy sector, where PLF has emerged with the concept of automatic or robotic milking (De Koning and Rodenburg 2004). Rising labour costs in the mid-1970s in Europe was one of the main reasons for increasing automation in the milking sector (Sauer and Zilberman 2012). An automatic milking system is equipped with electronic cow identification, cleaning, and milking devices and computer-controlled sensors to detect, for example, abnormalities in milk. The system also provides remote notification to the farmer if intervention is required (De Koning 2011). The largest number of dairy farms using automatic milking systems is found in the Netherlands, with almost 2,000 farms. Automatic milking relies heavily on the cow's motivation to visit the automatic milking system. The main motive for this is the supply of concentrates dispensed in a feed manager in the milking box during the milking process (De Koning 2011).

A more comprehensive application of PLF, so-called precision dairy farming, focuses on the transition from a group-oriented perspective to a perspective where intensive consideration is given to individual cows, and where particular goals, such as tapping individual potential, diagnosing diseases early, and using minimum medication, are pursued (Sauer and Zilberman 2012). Hence, advanced automatic milking systems are equipped with various sensors ranging from sensors that control the milking process to sensors that analyse the milk quality in several ways, such as milk composition, cell counts, blood detection, conductivity, progesterone, and so on. Because of increased information density, all these sensors require smart data-handling solutions to help the livestock manager to make the right decisions (De Koning 2011).

Although smart farming technologies provide economic, social, and environmental opportunities for the agricultural sector, they also raise ethical issues associated with the increased corporatization and

industrialization of the agricultural sector. PLF facilitates the slippery slope of further intensification of livestock farming and the emergence of mega stalls with various socio-ethical consequences (Bos and Gremmen 2013). Another ethical issue is the possible alienation of animals, farmers, and citizens because of the robotization and digitalization of farm management systems. Finally, farmers have to share all kinds of information about their farm management with processors and retailers who can take (economic) advantage of this information. In this respect, PLF may lead to the concentration of economic power in the process industry, with retailers as linchpins in matching supply and demand within the supply chain (Bos and Munnichs 2016). Therefore, we may expect society to be reluctant to accept smart farming technologies because of the ongoing industrialization of the agricultural sector. This will lead to a call for a human and natural scale of agricultural practices, notwithstanding the potential of smart farming technologies to feed the increasing world population and to mitigate climate change, for instance.

This reluctance to accept the industrialization of farming practices can be understood as a resistance against the conceptualization of the natural environment as a commodity for human needs, in which nature's own strategies and principles of operation are neglected – natural animal growth and behaviour for instance – and, instead, nature is challenged to supply efficiently agri-food products as commodities in an instrumental economic exchange among chain actors. A consequent call for farming practices that are better embedded in the natural environment, like multi-functional agriculture, organic farming, and so forth, can already be recognized in current Western societies, even if these practices are disadvantageous for feeding the world and mitigating climate change. Because of the potential advantage of smart farming technologies, we raise the question of how to conceptualize smart farming technologies that are no longer characterized by the instrumentalization and commodification of nature, but instead are embedded in, and in accordance with, the natural environment.

7. Conclusion

Although the absolute global number of animals in the near future is expected to decline, the global number of animals in livestock farming systems is still rising. The past few years, the resistance in Europe against the immoral aspects of these systems is also growing. These immoral aspects arise when societal values clash with the principles of an animal production system, because of unintended consequences and risks. The strategy of organisations aiming to protect animals in society is to battle against animal abuse or even to promote the end of all livestock farming systems. From an animal ethics point of view it certainly is worthwhile to fight against all forms of abuse in livestock production systems. However, next to an animal ethical approach based on incidents, we need a more long term strategy, integrating a plurality of ethical perspectives. The Moral Operating System of livestock production systems proposed is based on four ethical perspectives. It is an ethics of animal production *systems* consisting of two interactive, dynamic parts: an *internal* professional *care* ethics combined with an *emergent* ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation, and *external* boundary conditions based on societal values and concerns in *animal* ethics and *environmental* ethics,. Together, these four ethics are the Moral Operating System of a production system.

I focused on the emergent ethics in life sciences because it most normative ethical theories have problems in dealing with the future. We do not only know the results of innovation at the start of the innovation trajectory, but also do not know the consequences of the results of an innovation trajectory. In moral reasoning about innovations in the making, the relevant moral facts and the appropriate principles are more or less still unknown, as also the relevant moral consequences. Only by doing ethics in life sciences in future projects will the moral dilemmas emerge in the trajectories of responsible innovation like molecular technologies in animal sciences and precision livestock farming.

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DELIBERATIVE AND PRAGMATIST AGRICULTURE

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ABSTRACT: It is well known how stimulatingly John Dewey could write about gardens, in particular school gardens ('edible gardens', not flower gardens). Edible gardens provide children opportunities for the full development of social, cognitive and manual skills, which in his view are the most important skills that together bring something like republic attitudes.
I will first give a short introduction into Dewey's thoughts about edible gardens and then will try to construct his view on farming and industrial food processing on the basis of the scarce remarks that he made about these activities. Inspired by his thoughts, but also radically transforming them, I will elaborate a pragmatist view on agriculture, by outlining the current challenges on global and regional level. It turns out that edible gardens are important, but in general cannot be seen as an alternative for the food processing and retail sector and they cannot definitively deal with food security. It is therefore necessary to develop a deliberative pragmatist theory of the food processing and retail sector.

John Dewey about edible gardens and farming

Edible gardens

Dewey is eager to stress the contribution of gardening to personal and social development of children. With gardening he does not mean raising flowers but vegetable and fruits, edible things thus (Thompson 2000). While most of his comments on edible gardens are done in connection with war and crisis times in US and Canada (during which industry was dedicated to other products), he stresses that also in peaceful times gardening has great social, psychological and civil effects. Nevertheless the contribution of farming children can give relief to the war effort on the US (first world war). First, gardening implies an openness to experience and discovery. Manual work has a cognitive side and is not merely routine but should be open to learning (Dewey 1996, Middle Works 1899-1924 (=MW), Volume 8, 133). Gardening also has a community enhanced effect; social integration is learned by collectively taking care of local food (Ralston 2014). Dewey not only thought about schools as a place for edible gardening but also about community garden projects. Communities giving opportunities to meet people from other backgrounds could also help them in communicating and organizing with each other. (Dewey 1996, MW 8, 269). In 'The School and Society' he outlines an even more ambitious idea:

> "[W]hen the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious" (Dewey 1996, MW 1, 19-20).

Farming

His ideas have implications for the rural areas; here more attention should be paid to education: '… improvement of the intellectual and educational conditions in rural districts and the small villages.' (Later Works, 1925-1953, 7, p. 394). Again, he emphasizes that farmers should not stick to the some standardized way of farming:

> 'standardized farming, (is) unsuited to local conditions'. (MW 10, p. 128). 'Agriculture is the basic industry of our life, and that agriculture cannot suffer, the rural interest cannot suffer, without the whole nation suffering. The days have long gone by when our farming can be carried on in the hit and miss way of the past.'

In *Interpretation of the savage mind* (1902, MW), Dewey stresses that in agriculture the process of being busy with preparing the soil, seeding, taking care of the upcoming plants, harvesting implies a loose relationship with the final aim, proving food. All kind of 'intermediate terms' seemingly disconnects these activities and the final end process of consumption. A split occurs because of these activities necessary to have a successful harvest. Dewey perceives a relation between hunting and a direct, animistic relationship with animals and nature, and agriculture and more impersonal, abstract relationships and thinking.

Lots of his ideas about agriculture are quite time and context bound; mostly he is reacting to US agriculture in a time of economic and war crisis. For example, in his comments on the Farm Allotment Plan, he speaks out against speculation and in favor of a government Marketing Organization that buys agricultural products, processes and sells them.

So, Dewey conceives farming in accordance with his general philosophy, as a way of life, that is contextual and science-driven. Not standards and routine but learning and experiencing should be the main methods. Farming is a way of life, where labor incorporates both physical, cognitive and normative skills. He discerns a certain distance between farmers and city people, however, there are sufficient overlaps of interests between the two.

However, what I miss in his plea for edible gardens are two aspects: first, on the individual human level, the impact of being busy with agriculture on our respect for natural processes inside and outside ourselves. Gardening also means realizing that we as individuals are living organisms with all the vulnerabilities and capacities that the concrete living organisms we work with have as well. Secondly I miss on the translocal level, the impact of gardening on (and contribution of) a sustainable food production and nature friendly inclusive agriculture.

A peculiar naiveté can be discerned in his treatment of food processing industry. He signals historically a distance between famers and large processing industry; which according to him is an inevitable development. He states: 'From the very necessities of machine industries, mass production and huge factories and other plants, the most effective methods and agents of production are enormous corporation controlling millions or even billions of capital and employing thousands of labourers.' (p. 387, Later Works, Volume 7, 1925 – 1953). As is clear from the illuminating study of Kloppenberg, *First the seed*, (1998), already in the thirties big business made farming an industry not in the general interest but in favour of particular interests. And didn't Dewey see that?

Current developments

This naiveté (with hindsight!) becomes clear in particular when one takes into account what has happened since Dewey wrote these words. In the course of the last sixty years, globalization of information and action sequences, expropriation of the national states, the rise of international companies, and neo liberal international regulation in favour of them stimulated a huge increase in large scale farming enterprises, food processing industries and retail industries (Bauman, 2005). Ecological problems are galore. Simultaneously, the distance between production and consumers that Dewey thought self-evident has become a systemic alienation of consumers from production and vice versa. In the West this system provided cheap, unhealthy (too much salt, sugar and bad fats) and tasteless food, in the South the system contributed to poverty, hunger and malnutrition by outcompeting small farms and businesses.

Small farmers oriented towards the global market are eaten up by bigger ones, and the bigger ones have to participate in the economical rollercoaster and eaten finally by the still bigger ones (the 'economic treadmill' according to Cochrane 1993). The same happens with retail and processing industries, with as consequence more industrialized ultra-processed food and its aftermath huge increase in food related chronic diseases.

Path dependencies and economic treadmills make it very difficult for farmers and small retailers to leave the system once they entered it. However, farmers who stayed outside the internal food production and started for example Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), or other types of multifunctional agriculture (like agritourism and health services) could have a stable income.

So, after the second world war, it became clearer that the food sector in hands of international corporations wasn't the most effective method (in Dewey's words) to deliver healthy, sustainable and tasteful food.

The other deficits as I may call them comprise problems that now are a lot more pressing than in Dewey's time. Many people don't have respect for organic processes, for example with respect to their bodies, bodily health and non-human nature. The gap between consumers and agriculture and food processing is huge. Modern farmers are seen as entrepreneurs that conceive their animals and land as commodities to empty as much as possible. Youngsters think that milk comes from the supermarket and lack connection with living organisms. People lack more and more *food capacities or capabilities* (Korthals 2017), like selecting the food items they want to use in preparing a good meal according to their own view of life. Industry encourages them to neglect these capacities with ready-made meals and fast food. Moreover, the ecological crisis (including global warming) requires a more respectful attitude to natural processes at large, and an understanding that even individual actions contribute to this crisis.

Food wars or food democracy?
The divided agrifood system

The industrial food system

The developments in the West of on the one hand a very dominant global industrialized food system and on the other hand a much smaller section of local farm and food production are to be taken into account by a pragmatist and deliberative approach. It is clear that the industrialized food system has some advantages and many disadvantages. Among the advantages I reckon the huge production, the possibility of overall change in specific cases, and the possibility of monitoring standards of hygiene and safety. Al these advantages have also their direct disadvantages, like, huge production means monocultures and risk of contagion by plagues (and landscape destruction); radical change to new challenges is impossible (the system is like a huge oil tanker: the internal disease management goes rather easy (killing all sick and healthy animals), changing the course of the tanker is not so easy); the overall presence of uniform standards means that innovation and small case business are constantly hampered (UNCTAD 2013; IAASTD 2009). Other disadvantages are the effects on the environment (pollution, global warming, see Steinfeld 2006), no commitment to human rights, not health and taste driven but money driven, waste of people's (food) capacities, and a deeply anchored feeling of alienation and distrust from the side of consumers (De Schutter 2010). The science behind this regime is seed oriented (like via genetic modification) and oriented to devices like 3d food printing that in their emphasis on convenience of consumers risk the chance to take over more and more food capabilities of consumers.

Ethically seen, the modern industrialized food system scores far below the local approaches with short food chains connecting producers to consumers.

Agroecological food systems

Many local systems, especially the ones in the South, have a very different outlook, and are farmed from a very different worldview. When in South America, or Uganda, one suddenly can stumble compact food green areas, where from beneath the soil to ten meters above the soil plant, shrubs and trees show their edible fruits. Often you don't see black soils, because a plants grow on every inch; no irrigation is necessary, because the intelligent designed systems itself regulates water supply; harvesting is done often manually, but in large quantities. This system is called in different areas differently, in South America it is called originally 'milpa' (Mann, 2005), in Europe and USA it is called permaculture or agroforestry (Crawford 2010; Shepard, 2013). For larger areas agroecology is an approach has upholds the same principles (Tittonell 2013). The system is an example of a circular economy; it is sustainable, in the biological, social and economic sense. In adapting food production to sub soil and super soil metabolisms and communications systems of plants and organisms (Mancuso 2015) it produces big mass of fruits, nuts,

fresh leaves and vegetable-like food. It provides food for neighborhoods, stimulates cooperation between villagers and due to its harvest is economically feasible. The science needed for this type of agriculture is soil oriented and directed to enhancing food capabilities of consumers. Wherever there are small pockets of land, or vertical spaces, this type of farming can get started. So from an ethical point of view, the system scores very positive.

Some authors argue that this local system of for instance food forests, edible gardens and CSA can replace or at least reduce considerably the role of the industrialized food system. So Ralston proposes a tentative pragmatist model for understanding how gardens can make our food system more secure—a model inspired by John Dewey's writings on school gardening (Ralston 2014). Carlo Petrini, Founder and President of the Slow Food movement leader argues in his book *Terra Madre* (Petrini 2010) that consumers must transform themselves from passive buyers in "coproducers" in localized but globally networked, or glocalized "food communities". However, they are unclear how consumers can become coproducers, and moreover, what should be done with mainstream food production. Should all consumers spend sufficient time to produce collectively their own food? This would for many require an enormous shift in daily activities and many activities that are now quite normal to do, like watching tv or gaming, should be reduced in time spent. Next, can coproduction fully replace industrial production? Should it be totally dismantled? What about the people now employed in this sector? What about the financial losses (in the Netherlands the industrialized system is approximately good for 5% employment and 70 billion budget)? Certainly, this intensive systems produces material and immaterial costs (in the Netherlands these are estimated a little less than 70 billion) (www.louisbolk.org). Nevertheless, the organized interests of industrial agriculture are very powerful. How to organize such a revolution in a peaceful and fully legal way?

Food democracy: challenges

In the current governance system, consumers and farmers have no control over the priorities what to produce and to invest in and therefore no control over the relation of society with nature and agriculture. This lack of control and involvement makes of citizen-consumers a debilitating force. Democracy cannot be realized when citizens are fully dependent on industrial food production. For citizenship to be realized it is not only necessary to maintain positively public conditions like health, education, and mass media that offer interesting facts about important social issues (and not only about careers of soccer players or film stars).[1] Democratic citizenship cannot thrive on the basis of a regime of an anonymous and distantiated agro-food system that increases the gap between producers and consumers due to the economic value of profits and comparative advantage. [2] Free from democratic input and motivation, this regime is stimulating individualistic greed, creating a poor and malnourished underclass and is more and more insensitive to judgments, worldviews, fears and emotions from its end-users.

Food democracy as a function of food sovereignty mixes social justice and communitarian ideas. The concepts tries to connect traditional political methods of representation with participation, inclusion, involvement and cooperation. In the West this would mean a mix of a sustainable form of large scale, international agriculture and small scale, local production. Moreover, it stands for new bridges between food production and consumption and consumer oriented science.

The issue is not, do we need intensive farming systems and food processing, or the industrial agro-food regime, but in what form and measure. Therefore, the question of either reforming the current dominant industrial regime to a sustainable system or starting

[1] John Dewey develops in his *The Public and its problems* a theory of media still relevant for today's media.
[2] Against Axel Honneth, *Das Recht der Freiheit*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 546

localized alternatives is not an important issue; both are necessary. The pressing issue is to organize the fair representation of food and farming styles, which means to deal with the different food and farming styles in a constructive way that gives *opportunities to all in a fair and just process* (Sen 2009, 228). Food democracy from table to soil and from soil to table starts with the idea that 'there may not indeed exist any identifiable perfectly just social arrangement on which impartial agreement would emerge' (Sen 2009, 15). Food and farming styles will differ, and it is meaningless to try to overcome these differences by an appeal on mostly controversial facts or some other rock-bottom. Deliberation about deeply felt frictions between styles and cooperation are more fruitful strategies as is looking for common ground.

With respect to food production and consumption, it means that the deliberative approach cannot stand on its own. Sure, it needs tools like scenario building, and looking for positive matches between technologies and deliberative openings, and deliberations about uncertainties, fears and new ideas and opinions.[3] But more is necessary. Cooperation, working together and collective action with regard to food give meanings and experiences to democratic control and formation of beliefs. In bringing together eating, cooking and farming personal and social identity activities are affirmed, maintained and renovated. It is this connection of food production, of the *soil*, with the life world where philosophy can make a difference, because it shows that what is made according to current industrial agricultural definition of efficiency is not the best for having a good life. Cooking and eating are not simply activities that keep our day-to-day life going but they are identity-achieving activities: they contribute to what we are and how we appreciate ourselves.

Local food production is challenged by both ecological and social factors. Some biologists warn that when the local ecosystems do not respect biodiversity and only concentrate on crops that deliver fast and usual products, other partners of the ecosystem, like bees and birds, will suffer (Anzelone 2013). The ecosystem approach requires that the interests of all partners in an ecosystem are taken into account, not only men's short term interest.

Deliberation about food is only fruitful when participants actually do in the agriculture and food sector: cooking, farming, producing some food or organizing some process or product. This practical knowledge is an inspirational basis of being able to remain connected and to acquire new insights and to put forward fruitful opinions. Deliberations on food enhance their quality when fed by embodied knowledge. This knowledge improves when it is daily exercised and it deteriorates when not exercised, just like a bodily condition needs exercises to remain in good shape. Shared internalized norms are helpful, but they are not necessary, cooperation and exercise does.

Food democracy: requirements

The governance of food should be a polycentric affair, where civil society actions and movements together with governmental policies implement the right to adequate food and where governments organize this public good and provide a regulatory frame work for food companies and other private enterprises to do their work on markets (Ostrom 2009). Ostrom remarks: 'We need to ask how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.' She discovered that 'local incorporated communities can contract with larger producers and change contracts if not satisfied with the services provided, while neighborhoods inside a large city have no voice.' Life sciences in close cooperation with social sciences can encounter a lot of opportunities on the basis of this governance structure.

[3] These are the main ethical tools that Dewey in his *The Public and its problems* recommends and which Habermas has updated.

Science and technology can work in both ways, either reducing the labor force by focusing on monocultural plantations or encouraging social and biological biodiversity by improving the quality of labor and food by making farming more pleasant, more productive, and less tiresome.

Food democracy can balance more equally the attention, money streams and governmental support that until now goes to industrial agriculture. In particular the permaculture, agro ecological approaches can have a more representative part of these streams (Tittonell 2013). Urban agriculture can have more prominence on health, environmental and food policies. In the Netherlands this would mean that the numerous initiatives on local production should get a boost.

Education and continuous training for both adolescents and adults is moreover also necessary.

Food capabilities need practices to stay in good order; they are like muscles that are in need of maintenance. Edible gardens with an integrated curriculum that integrates chemistry, biology, sociology and psychology focused on food gardening is a good device for children. Adults should be offered cooking workshops, food processing workshops (brewery, making sausages, bread and pizza). Media should pay much more attention to these trainings.

Entrepreneurship start-ups involved in local food provision, consultancy and communication should be facilitated and honored. Public spaces to discuss food issues in particular innovations, platforms in new media should be facilitated. Very important is also that research in plant-plant and plant-organisms interaction should be stimulated for small scale farming and urban farming. Quantity of production should be coupled with quality of production.

A relevant requirement for food democracy is the stimulation of small farmers. The trend towards larger and larger farms should be discouraged. The trend means that more people lose their job and migrate to slums in cities which often provide them no livable opportunities. The huge cities in the South are traps: without assistance from outside people in the slums cannot escape poverty, deskilling, crime and corruption. Respecting and supporting small farmers is a better solution by establishing democracy in the sense of food sovereignty. *Food sovereignty* is a concept that originated with small and medium farmers in Latin America, and it covers 'the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict the dumping of products in their markets; and to provide local fisheries-based communities the priority in managing the use of and the rights to aquatic resources. Food sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather, it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production' (Desmarais, 2010; De Schutter 2010; IAASTD 2009). This pro-poor, pro-rural and pro-small farmers approach is already a success in south-western China (Donaldson 2011).

Finally, international developments should always be connected with local developments: This implies for international organisations like WO, WHO, and FAO that their agencies should take into account the local implications of their worlds wide action for local contexts, in particular the weakest part of the population. Food and the processes that produce food are intrinsically connected with the identity of people (Korthals 2004).

Conclusion

Pragmatists like Dewey started to encourage the idea of edible gardens by stressing the civil, political and economic meaning of gardening. However, they neglected the huge power of agro food industry and its detrimental influence on climate, nature and food capacities of people.

It is now to time to reconsider the pragmatist meaning of gardening an local agriculture, in particular with respect to stimulating ecological agriculture, individual self-respect, self-knowledge and love for nature and to strengthening the translocal impact of democratic governance of the food system. Agroecology and agroforestry are forms of food production that don't have the negative ecological impact of intensive, large scale agriculture. Moreover they can be implemented in a community friendly way, that close the gap between consumption and production and stimulates food capabilities. The device should be from farm to table and from table to farm.

Not all food can be produced locally. National and international developments require a new steering model of agriculture not only on the local level, but also on national and international level. Deliberative, pragmatist democracy can offer some instruments to realize these ideas. Bridging the gap between production and consumption by all kinds of less radical and more radical types of participation and CSA is one; they encourage the development and maintenance of food capabilities. Another is the use of worldwide communication systems.

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EATING ABROAD: IN SEARCH FOR CULINARY EXPERIENCE[1]

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ABSTRACT: The article addresses the aporia of taste in culture. Drawing on theoretical texts and artworks, it explores the (im)possibility of a tourist's authentic culinary experience. The notion of authentic culinary taste, which is highly appreciated in today's culture, harbors an obvious, irresolvable contradiction. This challenge is related to two factors. Firstly, authenticity is historically contingent and, as such, bound up with change; and, secondly, authenticity has become a marketable commodity in our culture. As the imperative of authenticity becomes more and more pressing, it grows increasingly difficult to meet the requirement of uniqueness while the risk of disappointment soars. The solution is a consciously and actively created experience.

Travelers tend to be torn between a craving for familiar tastes associated with the home and a desire to get steeped in local culinary customs. Admittedly, a clash with an unfamiliar culture can induce admiration, which was the case with, for example, Gertrude Stein, Alice B. Tolkas, Julia Child, and Alice Waters. Yet, though the list of aficionados of French cuisine could be extended nearly ad infinitum, French cooking can also cause problems and stir aversion, as evinced by the story of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. His biographers like to relate a culinary catastrophe the German philosopher experienced in Paris, the capital of the world's gastronomy. The French delicacies cost him a nasty bout of indigestion.[2] Even though a Francophile captivated by the beauties, panache and affluence of Paris, Hegel could never fully embrace the French life-style. Having the main meal at 5 p.m. seemed far too late to him. Also, he could never muster competence to navigate restaurant menus. His command of French sufficed to read Montesquieu and Rousseau, but failed him when it came to studying the bafflingly elaborate menus of Parisian restaurants. Ultimately, Hegel acknowledged himself defeated by French cuisine and found a venue where German dishes were served.[3] The club of the defeated was joined also by Mark Twain. His trip to Europe in 1878 turned out to be a huge culinary disappointment. Overcome by homesickness for American food, he compiled a list of splendid dishes he was going to treat himself to on return. Among its many items, the list included broiled Virginia bacon, soft-shell crabs, Philadelphia Terrapin soup, a canvasback duck from Baltimore, Connecticut shad, green corn on the ear, butter beans, asparagus, string beans, American butter (he did not like unsalted European butter), apple pie (predictably), and frogs (rather surprisingly).[4]

Beyond the comfort zone

Reflecting on the risks incurred when one ventures into unknown territories, Lisa Heldke concludes that trying foods of a foreign culture seems far more hazardous than listening to its music, looking at its art or reading its literature; and it is indeed more hazardous.[5] The food can be awful or, worse even, poisonous. Incorporating a particle of the external world into one's organism entails making it an integral part of one's self. Such a gesture takes daring, but it also takes trust.[6] In this context, "…the traveler can make contact with the 'not-me,' and can hone the edges of her identity through the contact, either by absorbing the flavors of the Other into own identity or by rejecting them as 'what-I-am-not'."[7]

Stepping out of one's familiar, secure ethnic and cultural zone is compelling and perilous at the same time. During a holiday abroad, one is exposed to problems and pleasures alike as they are likely to surface side by side when eating at an exotic restaurant, being

[1] Preparing this text was supported by NCN grant: *Aesthetic value of food. Pragmatist Perspective*, No. 2013/11 / B / HS1 / 04176.
[2] Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 553.
[3] *Ibid.*, 551-3.
[4] Leslie Brenner, *American Appetite: The Coming of Age of a Cuisine* (New York: Avon Books, 1999), 15-16.
[5] Heldke, Lisa; 2005, "But is it Authentic? Culinary Travel and the Search for the 'Genuine Article,'" in *The Taste Culture Reader. Experiencing Food and Drink*, ed. Carolyn Korsmeyer (Oxford-New York: Berg), 387.
[6] Carolyn Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 101.
[7] Heldke, "But is it Authentic?" 387.

invited to a dinner party by a foreigner, or visiting an acquaintance who wants to treat us to regional specialties. Despite the potential menace, affluent citizens of the Western world are increasingly inclined to take the risk and get to know foreign countries through their food. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that culinary tourism is boldly asserting its distinct place within cultural tourism.

Culinary tourism

The famous Michelin guide that confers the celebrated stars onto the best restaurants states straightforwardly and confidently that the food served in those boasting three of them is so exceptional that it is worth a deliberately planned trip. In prosperous, highly developed societies, many people are willing to spend considerable amounts of money to dine at a renowned restaurant. Up to two million people used to fight zealously to grab one of the 8,000 seats available at the tables of the cult restaurant elBulli over one season. All places used to be booked in advance within a single day.[8]

One or another culinary component is to be found in each type of tourism, except those rare cases when the traveler fares on the foreign soil sustained only by canned food and dried sausages. Research shows that also in Poland the attractions of local cuisines are more and more frequently taken into account as a criterion when planning a holiday trip.[9] Culinary tourism, focused on learning other cultures through gustatory experiences, is robustly developing, too.[10] Mentioned above, the wish to visit a superb restaurant and try dishes cooked by a famous chef is but one among the various motivations and activities subsumed under the umbrella term of culinary tourism. Its equally prominent component is participation in culinary fetes and festivals, markets promoting local produce, food fairs, and cooking workshops. Also, tourists follow culinary routes and visit food and cooking museums. The origins of culinary tourism date back to the 17th-19th centuries, when British aristocracy journeyed to the vineyards of France and Italy.[11] Currently, it is developing in rural areas renowned for one or another regional product, but it also thrives in big cities that entice with good local cuisine, or, like New York, are appreciated for their cosmopolitan character and inclusive offer of foods from around the world.[12]

A culinary tourist avoids like the plague the most popular tourist venues, which do not enjoy good repute. The food they offer is usually expensive and substandard. Restaurateurs do not have to put in any effort because a well-known piazza, a famous memorial or another exquisite sight will always bring tourists in. Tourist restaurants do not need to cater to regular customers, for their clientele, by definition, is there only in passing. As such, today's customers are not likely to ever come back while the new ones are bound to come along. In such locations, a culinary tourist can find refuge in a personalized offer of home restaurants.

The restaurant came into being by shifting what had been a domestic activity – dining – into the public sphere.[13] Among its advantages is the possibility to

[8] Lisa Abend, *The Sorcerer's Apprentices. A Season in the Kitchen at Ferran Adrià's elBuli* (New York-London-Toronto-Sydney: Free Press, 2011), 4.

[9] Equally strong, however, is Poles' tendency to close themselves off within the national enclave abroad. Travel agencies cater to the wishes of those willing to travel provided they take the home along by offering packages in which Greek beaches and sun are combined with Polish food, films and music. Cf. e.g., Grzegorz Szymanik, "Greckie Wakacje Polaków z Disco Polo, Wódką i Kiełbasą," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 3, 2017.

[10] Małgorzata Durydiwka, "Turystyka Kulinarna – Nowy (?) Trend w Turystyce Kulturowej," *Prace i studia geograficzne* 52 (2013): 9-30.

[11] *Ibid.*, 14-15.

[12] Andrzej Kowalczyk, "Od Street Food do Food Districts – Usługi Gastronomiczne i Turystyka Kulinarna w Przestrzeni Miasta," *Turystyka kulturowa* 9 (2014): 10, http://turystykakulturowa.org/ojs/index.php/tk/article/view/493 (10.08.16)

[13] For a more detailed discussion, see Dorota Koczanowicz, "Przewodnik smaku," in *Przewodniki w*

choose dishes of one's liking, select convenient dining times and enjoy professional service. Supper clubs and home restaurants – only recently charted on culinary maps – operate in the opposite manner. Strangers are invited into the domestic space to share a meal cooked by an amateur. New dedicated Internet websites pop up, usefully mediating between cooks and guest. The best known of the websites – Gnammo – posts information about the proposed menus, the meal prices, and the number of people the hosts are capable of admitting. Images of dishes, table arrangements, and cooks themselves encourage to come and try the foods. Using a special tab, the guests can assess the meal they have partaken of.

Home restaurants are designed to expand the catering offer both for tourists and for the local residents. They are run chiefly be women, who in this way overcome the traditional division into women's domestic cooking and men's "restaurant" cooking. "Erudite" cuisine meets "popular" cuisine, and a new space opens up to women who cook for their families on a daily basis.[14] While remaining home-based cooks, they turn into chefs and get a chance to earn their own money.

According to Jean-François Revel, restaurateurs tend to cave in to customer pressure and alter classic dishes, which often wrecks the harmony of flavors honed over years upon years of tradition. This happens because "[u]nfortunately, an immense majority of the clientele of restaurants around the world confuse gastronomy with exoticism."[15] In Revel's view, what should really matter are tried-and-tested local ingredients and recipes perfected from generation to generation. Similar problems plague home restaurants, which, counterintuitively perhaps, do not offer genuine home-made food. *The Guardian*'s article titled "'Airbnbs for dining' give Italian female chefs chance to shine" describes menus prepared by two highest-ranked home chefs of the Gnammo website: Claudia Proietti of Rome and Benedetta Oggero of Turin.[16] Inspired by the carnival and the colors of nature, the feast prepared by Claudia started with a velvety orange pumpkin soup with ricotta crostini, and finished with a chocolate semifreddo with ginger and green pistachio sauce. Benedetta went for a themed dinner. The highlights of her chocolate feast were prawns glazed in whisky, sugar and cocoa, and a pork roast with peppers in chocolate sauce. As these menus show, the need of authenticity intersects here with the need of refinement. This allegedly home cooking abandons the safe ground of "popular" cuisine and ventures into the salons of "erudite" cuisine. Embarking on a journey, the tourist seeks to break away from the quotidian and experience something exceptional, new, and, even, bizarre. The same tendency is visible in the cooks' approach as, planning their menus for "strangers," they definitely forsake simple, everyday staple dishes cooked quickly after homecoming from work. This may be the reason why they invite for dinner not to their homes, but to home restaurants.

Hosting foreign guests, we tend to wish to share the quintessence of vernacular cuisine with them even if its canonical dishes are not our everyday treats. The first meal described by Doris Lessing in her novel *The Summer before the Dark* was untypical, consisting of a cold Turkish cucumber soup, shish-kebab "over the fire," and an apricot water-ice. The meal was served in the garden of the London house of the book's protagonist Kate Brown, when an American friend of her husband's joined the family for Sunday lunch. If it had not been for a power outage, Kate "would have provided a traditional Sunday meal, not for their own benefit, since they no longer used the old patterns, but for their guest's: the

kulturze. Prace kulturoznawcze XVII, eds. K. Łukasiewicz and I. Topp (2015): 209-19.

[14] Jean-François Revel, *Culture and Cuisine: A Journey Through the History of Food*, trans. Helen R. Lane (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 13-24, quotation on p. 18.

[15] *Ibid.*, 18.

[16] Stephanie Kirchgaessner, "'Airbnbs for dining' give Italian female chefs chance to shine." *The Guardian*, January 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jan/22/social-eating-networks-italian-female-cooks (Retrieved 7 August, 2016).

family often joked that when they entertained their many foreign friends, they served traditional dishes like peasants dependent on tourist trade."[17] Tourists easily fall into the traps the locals set either out of pure politeness or for profit. In our culture, authenticity is slowly becoming a commodity like any other one.

Authenticity as a commodity

A shrewd observer of contemporary capitalist societies, Luc Boltanski in his seminal *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, co-authored with Eve Chiapello, rehearses the paradoxes of authenticity in contemporary capitalism. The core of Boltanski's theory of capitalism lies in the argument that contemporary capitalism has been able to co-opt a considerable part of the critique of capitalism advanced in the 1960s and 70s, and, moreover, to use this co-optation to multiply its profits. The French social scientist insightfully analyses various modes of the commodification of experience.[18] The fundamental mechanism behind making us uncertain of the "authenticity" of the goods we are offered is based on the following contradiction: the authentic must elude commodification and mass production. If "authenticity" becomes a commodity on sale (either as goods or as services), its real uniqueness gets undercut. *The New Spirit of Capitalism* demonstrates this interdependence with the following example:

We can see a typical illustration of this phenomenon in the transition from mass tourism to so-called "adventure" holidays, requiring a constant renewal of destinations as and when they become tourist attractions in their turn, losing the authenticity (of which an absence of tourists was precisely the sign) that made them so precious.[19]

Boltansky highlights here an irresolvable contradiction: goods sold on the market as authentic and advertised as such in mass marketing must paradoxically pretend not to be subject to the rules of mass commodification. They must make an impression of being embedded in the earlier stages of the market organization, when "the purchaser was face to face with an artisan, at once manufacturer and tradesman, in a marketplace."[20] The tourist wants to become, for a while, part of the life lived by the residents of the country he or she has arrived in, or at least to be able to see it for what it really is. Yet, how can "the spontaneity of existence" be distinguished from a designed and crafted product? How can one really know whether a native's gesture of friendship is an expression of unalloyed kindness or, perhaps, a pre-planned item of a marketing strategy aimed to multiply financial gains? How can one be certain that the space of the comer's experience is part of the native experience, rather than an element of a purposefully fabricated decor?[21]

Boltanski observes that "the effect of capitalism's assimilation of the demand for authenticity, by means of a commodification (…) has been to introduce into people's relationship to goods and persons *rapid cycles of infatuation and disappointment*."[22] Authenticity requires a disinterested, personal involvement, and, as such, cannot be only an element of trading transactions. Yet, if a thing becomes popular, the overriding tendency is to institutionalize it, whereby its spontaneity, uniqueness, and originality fade away. As a result, authenticity must be sought in ever new places. We live in a constant fear, seeking a continually authentic life. It is not about a well or poorly executed function. The disappointment comes from the discovery "aura" is missing. The tourist is in fact a threat to him/herself. In the quest to experience something authentic, the tourist

[17] Doris Lessing, *The Summer before the Dark* (New York: Knopf, 1973), 12.
[18] Luc Boltanski and EvevChiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London-New York: Verso, 2005), 443-7.
[19] Boltanski and Chiapello, *New Spirit*, 446.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] Cf. Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1999), 91-102.
[22] Boltanski and Chiapello, *New Spirit*, 445.

avoids typical tourist venues, looks for restaurants frequented by the locals, not tourists, and forgets that as soon as he or she – a tourist par excellence – appears, the place's pristine nature gets corrupted. It can no longer be described as free of tourists. Tourists do not like tourists. The locals do not like tourists, either. The locals approach tourists with a sense of moral superiority: it must have been a stranger, for none of us would do this or that, wear this or that, eat this or that, etc. They do not want tourists in non-tourist restaurants.

Immersion

We didn't know what to expect the first time we arrived at Yves Camdeborde's Le Comptoir on the Left Bank of Paris. Would it be like La Regalade with dozens of guidebook toting foreigners lined up impatiently at the door and with harried staff trying to cope with the increasing lines and full tables? It was not to be. Most of the tables were occupied by locals seeking the "vrai" cuisine that Yves Camdeborde is famous for.[23]

This is how Sue Dyson and Roger McShane, editors of foodtourist.com (a website dedicated to culinary tourism), reviewed Le Comptoir in November 2006. The following year they returned and continued to come back every year up to 2012. They insisted that the food was always great, the wines organic, and the staff professional and tolerant of their poor French.

I do not know when exactly things started to change, but they must have, for when I came to Le Comptoir in 2014, I had to queue in a long line of Asian and American tourists, who had been tipped (perhaps by *The New York Times* like myself) that this was the place to visit. The restaurant was swarming with people, and the staff were visibly annoyed at the surging wave of customers. Weary with handling the throng, the waitresses behaved in the way now popularly referred to as assertive, and once simply termed rude. There was no condoning poor French, nor explaining the menu. With no advice offered, the tentatively ordered dishes (what on earth might that or another enigmatic name mean?) were served efficiently, if unsmilingly.

Never approvingly assessed, the desperate search for authenticity is always doomed to failure. The news of rewarding places spreads fast. The long lines queueing for *vrai* food, described in guides, kill its home-grown character. Le Comptoir, a local bistro, ceases to be one, for locals have neither time nor determination that tourists have to wait for the table. Yet, is a genuine experience indeed out of the question in a tourist-overrun restaurant?

Let us return to Lisa Heldke's paper "But is it Authentic? Culinary Travel and the Search for the 'Genuine Article.'" Pondering, fundamentally, whether an authentic culinary experience is at all possible, Heldke asks also whether eating a local dish really transfers us amidst the local community's way of life. Is the flavor enough to get steeped in local culture? How can the authenticity of a recipe or a dish be established beyond reasonable doubt? Is such authenticity guaranteed by the use of genuine ingredients and application of techniques "they" would use?[24] Problems continue to proliferate. Even if we can ascertain, claims Heldke, that the food has indeed been *cooked* following an authentic recipe, we cannot know for sure whether the eater is ready to experience it as authentic (with authentic denoting the way it would taste to one familiar with a given cuisine).[25] In explaining her doubts, Heldke draws on the definition of taste put forward by Korsmeyer, where taste designates a complex "cognitive activity," inclusive of sensory, emotional, cultural, social, and other elements. Crucially, authenticity is bound up with historicity and, consequently, with change. Polish *bigos* (hunter's stew), Greek moussaka, French cassoulet, and countless other culinary classics have transformed over

[23] Sue Dyson and Roger McShane, "Le Comptoir: Review" 2007-2012, http://www.foodtourist.com/ftguide/Content/I2277.htm (Retrieved 7 September, 2016).

[24] Heldke, "But is it Authentic?," 387-9.
[25] *Ibid.*, 388.

time to acquire what now passes for their "authentic" form. Still, as all dishes are obviously being modified in everyday cooking practice, this "authentic form" is anything if not mutable. Likewise, the entire cultural complex known as cuisine is subject to changes and fads.[26]

Unwilling to relinquish the idea of an authentic experience and, at the same time, determined to break the deadlock, Heldke comes up with her own strategy, where the process of experiencing replaces the "environment's" conditions of authenticity as the focal point of inquiry. Singularity, locality, and authenticity are contrasted with a new quality that ensues from a clash of various traditions. Experience is always an individual's experience, and, as such, is inevitably enmeshed in his or her life history. This is what Anna Wieczorkiewicz highlights when she writes: "One can try many foods and get to know the tastes of local specialties, and yet the chief framework of reference will be provided by the gustatory grid formed by the distinct tastes of the traveler's culture."[27] To seek authenticity by eliminating the traveler's uniqueness from experience is to head into failure and disappointment. Inspired by John Dewey's concept of experience, Heldke does not preclude an authentic experience comprehended as resulting from a clash or negotiation of two actors: the eater and the dish representing the cook.[28] Two concepts of authenticity dovetail in this vision: authenticity defined as fidelity to oneself and authenticity understood as a necessary self-effacement for the sake of adjusting to the local requirements.

A different issue is whether Heldke's authentic experience is identical with what Dewey calls *an experience*, necessarily predicated on aesthetic completion, which brings about a harmonious integration. Such exceptional experiences are distinct in that they constitute a fulfilled, expressive whole that has its beginning, development, and end.[29] I believe that an authentic culinary experience is not always harmonious and smooth, which does not mean that it cannot be etched in memory as exceptional. The traveler is exposed to tastes that can take a longer time to fully accept and give pleasure – a time the traveler does not have as a rule. Choosing dishes from the menu, the tourist tends to sacrifice his or her own food preferences for the sake of local favorites. A journey into the territory of the Other is bound to be ridden with various inconveniences and surprises.

I would describe my visit to Le Comptoir as an authentic tourist experience. It involved in equal measure superb food (a chicken terrine with *foie gras*, lettuce with vinaigrette and shallots, and crunchy toasted bread), fresh chilled white wine, prolonged queuing, and the staff's masterful strategies of ignoring customers. After all, Parisian bistros are known to be crowded, and Parisian waiters are notorious for their impertinence. The only thing that has lost its undisputed status is the French cuisine's position as nonpareil.[30]

Homecoming

Small food manufacturers take pride in their produce, and view it as a means of promoting the region that bred it. As early as in the 18th century, when food preservation methods were improved, "the nobility of Perigord sent their relatives and friends truffle-stuffed turkeys and pies, small gifts that strengthened family bonds and, at the same time, helped the local produce garner acclaim. In this way,

[26] Changes in the sphere of taste and the shift in the idea of what it means to eat well that took place in Poland at the turn of the 17th century are masterfully and compellingly surveyed by Jarosław Dumanowski. Cf. "Kucharz doskonały Wojciecha Wincentego Wielądki," in *Kucharz doskonały pożyteczny dla zatrudniających się gospodarstwem z francuskiego przetłumaczony i wielą przydatkami pomnożony przez Wojciecha Wielądka*, ed. Jarosław Dumanowski (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałac w Wilanowie, 2012), 15-23.

[27] Anna Wieczorkiewicz, *Apetyt turysty. O doświadczeniu świata w podróży* (Kraków: Universitas, 2008), 282.

[28] Heldke builds on Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience developed in his *Art as Experience*. See John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (Penguin: New York, 2005).

[29] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 57.

[30] Michael Steinberger, *Au Revoir to All That: Food, Wine, and the End of France* (New-York-Berlin-London: Bloomsbury, 2010).

powerful, albeit unobtrusive, mechanisms of boosting the promotion of local gastronomy came into being."[31] This shows that the belief in the uniqueness of one's local products, which now leads to applying for registered trademarks, boasts a long tradition, indeed. Today, the tourist industry helps one not only enjoy on the spot what a region has to offer, but also take home culinary keepsakes of the visited area. Just before boarding the plane, travelers are encouraged to visit customs-free zones and purchase typical alcohols, spices, and foods vacuum-packed for a long journey. Knowing that the genuineness of the traveler's experience is dubious even if he or she tastes food in its original interior, we can even more appreciate the complications involved in it after return home.

The tourist's fridge brims with exotic preserves, her cupboard is packed with strange spice, and her liquor cabinet overflows with alcohols she enjoyed drinking on holiday. All this is designed to sustain contact. Yet, the first glimpse will tell you quite a lot about how problematic this can get. Dishes are closely associated with the *genius loci* of the venue they stem from.[32] Taste does not travel easily, tied to the region and the season.[33] Re-creating a recipe in another, remote location will inevitably transform experience. Tasting is not only a pure palatal pleasure, for it is entrenched in the entire, not just culinary, history of a given community. We are warned against the temptation to transfer a bit of a foreign country to our homes by Julian Barnes in *The Pedant in the Kitchen*. Among his "words of advice" for those starting to collect cookbooks, he urges: "Resist, if possible, attractive anthologies of regional recipes, which you are tempted to buy as souvenirs of foreign holidays."[34] The advice is justified by the self-evident "Cantal food tastes best in the Cantal."[35]

Appropriation

It seems worthwhile to change our analytical optics at this place. A persistent quest for authenticity is a whim affordable to the wealthiest only. A typical foodie has a white face of a member of the Western middle class, which "systematically scavenges the earth for new experiences to be woven into a collective, touristic version of other peoples and other places."[36] Uch an individual is addressed by the protagonist of *Just Eat It*, a comic by Shing Yin Khor: "'But is it authentic?' you ask, wanting my stamp of approval, so my authentically asian self can help gain your authentic asian food expert points. Whose authenticity you're dipping into? What pre-colonial fantasy have you conjured up in your head – all spices and exotic flavours?"[37] The following episodes reveal the artist's mounting doubts. She does not understand the obsession with and assessment criteria of authenticity. She fears that the concept of authentic food is underpinned by another form of Orientalism. In *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, Dean MacCannell explains that "[t]ouristic consciousness is motivated by its desire for authentic experiences, and the tourist may believe that he is moving in this direction, but often it is very difficult to know for sure if the experience is in fact authentic."[38] As such, the tourist needs an expert, and this circumstance, paradoxically enough, can be a source of further concerns. Namely, Khor she worries that, as the food of her ancestors is meticulously scrutinized, she will also be assessed and subjected to procedures aimed to establish whether she – a Malaysian American – is authentic enough to judge about Asian foods and products. Anxious and upset, she concludes her comic with an appeal: "Stop thinking. Just slurp the noodle in your mouth. I don't need you to tell me about your spiritual awakening, or your surprise at

[31] Michael Figeac, ed., *Codzienność dawnej Francji. Życie i rzeczy w czasach ancien régime'u*, trans. Dorota Sieńko (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2015), 207.
[32] Revel. *Culture and Cuisine*, 18-19.
[33] *Ibid.*, 5.
[34] Julian Barnes, *The Pedant in the Kitchen* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 29.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] MacCannell, *Tourist*, 19.
[37] https://www.bitchmedia.org/post/a-comic-about-food-and-cultural-appropriation (Retrieved on 16 July, 2017)
[38] MacCannell, *Tourist*, 101.

how modernized our cities are, or how charmed you were that English was so widely spoken ... Eat, but don't expect a gold star for your gastronomical bravery. Eat, but don't pretend that the food lends you cultural insight into our 'exotic' ways. Eat, but recognize that we've been eating too, and what is our sustenance isn't your adventure story. Just – eat."[39] The focus on the authenticity of food can eventually trivialize culture which has produced it and marginalize its essential component – people with their daily lives, which evade the hierarchizing doctrine of authenticity as changeable and varied experiences.

Avoiding authenticity

Formulated ever since the 1930s, the ideas of liberating authenticity permeating art have failed to resist the assault of capitalism, which has absorbed them as part of its market strategies. Moreover, as Boltanski points out, art as conceived within the authenticity framework has opened up possibilities of generating novel forms of control and new "authentic" consumption models, where uniqueness is actually diluted in abundant returns from the sale of customized products. This dead-end can be avoided by critically minded art. As the French social scholar writes, "the artistic critique should, to a greater extent than is currently the case, take the time to reformulate the issues of liberation and authenticity, starting from the new forms of oppression it unwittingly helped to make possible."[40]

Such an engaged artistic position is exemplified by the work of Rirkrit Tiravanija. The Argentina-born son of a Thai diplomat was raised in his grandmother's kitchen in Bangkok. He studied in Canada and the US, and now lives alternately in Berlin and New York. It is thus hardly surprising that, as he admits, he has been beset with identity problems ever since childhood. Many of his projects explore intercultural dialogue, the colonial past, and the contemporary hegemonies of global markets.[41]

In his artistic practice, Tiravanija often relies on food products and frequently cooks. On the one hand, cooking is highly contextualized as it is intimately associated with local culture, the environment, seasons, etc. On the other hand, there is something universal in food cooking and sharing. This belief informs Tiravanija's attempts to facilitate access to the Other and to create a space of intercultural dialogue through arranging meetings at the table. Tiravanija's best known performance is Untitled 1992 (Free). In New York's 303 Gallery, he served red and green curries, dishes typical of his native Thai cuisine. One pot contained original Thai products – vegetables and spices largely unavailable in an average American store. The other pot was cooked with local ingredients, such as peppers, cauliflowers, and broccoli. The work addressed the idea of food's authenticity and mechanisms of accommodating foreign traditions to local settings. As Thomas Kellein claims, "Tiravanija's artistic power definitely consists of having a 'feel' for the situation ans a 'sense of the style of the people or place.' He respects the 'ethos' of a group; he tries to 'understand' their issues or concerns."[42] Even though, to his taste, the "Thai" pot's texture and flavors were superior, the artist calls the other one interesting as it embodied authenticity forged in an interaction with the local conjuncture.[43]

Similar issues preoccupied Tiravanija also when working on *Untitled 1993 (Flädlesuppe)*, an installation displayed at the group exhibition *Backstage* held by Hamburg's Kunstverein. The installation involved serving soup made of meat-and-vegetable stock powder and

[39] https://www.bitchmedia.org/post/a-comic-about-food-and-cultural-appropriation
[40] Boltanski and Chiapello, *New Spirit*, 468.
[41] Hans Ulrich Obrist and Rirkrit Tiravanija, *The Conversation Series: 20* (Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2010).
[42] Thomas, Kellein, "Essay," in *Cook Book: Just Smile and Don't Talk*, ed. Rirkrit Tiravanija (London: Edition Hanasjörg Mayer/Bangkok: River Books, 2010), 150.
[43] Rirkrit Tiravanija, ed., *Cook Book. Just Smile and Don't Talk* (London: Edition Hanasjörg Mayer/Bangkok: River Books, 2010), 16.

ready-made mix for pancakes in the setting filled with kitchen utensils, spices, hot plates, a typical German biergarten-style beer-drinking bench, and a screen running *Drachenfutter* (*Dragon Chow*) (1987) directed by Jan Schütte. The film's protagonist are an Afghan dish washer and an African assistant to a German chef. The team is joined by a Pakistani refugee. The action takes place at a Chinese restaurant in Germany. The illusion of the Chinese character of the place is produced by a waiter and the owner, both Chinese, who are the only staff the guests ever get to see. Out back, nobody has a clue about Chinese cuisine. The emigrants are busy with something else. Talking about the possibilities and ways of assimilation, they conclude that one can tell a real German by the person's ability to cook *Flädlesuppe*. As Tiravanija admits, he feels that the film is essentially about survival – going to a strange place and striving to survive there by adapting, by blending in its culture, and, consequently, by being accepted and allowed to stay.[44] At the Hamburg show, Tiravanija served *Flädlesuppe*. Yet, he added a pinch of cayenne pepper to the traditional German recipe for a broth with pancake strips, whereby he mixed an exotic element into the German flavor. Combining the ingredients originating in different cultures did not only affect the taste, but also caused symbolic structures rooted in the respective cultures to mingle in one dish.[45] Still, the gesture was hardly a promise of an easy union of cultures. As Kellein insists, in Tiravanija's works, cultures, instead of being reconciled, clash with each other even though the artist's focus is co-existence rather than conflict.[46] Tiravanija highlights the polyphonic character of contemporary culture and, consequently, the tensions inherent in it. The promise of co-existence stems from readiness "to recognize and accept otherness as radically other."[47] Taking such position entails "the possibility of recognizing and attempting to enter into a dialogue, on an equal footing, with forms of intelligence absolutely different from my own"[48] and lifts the imperative of looking for authenticity (and thus satisfaction) criteria beyond my own experience.

[44] Tiravanija, *Cook Book*, 11.
[45] Combining flavors and symbols in the currently fashionable fusion cuisine is discussed by Richard Shusterman in "Somaesthetics and the Fine Art of Eating," in *Body Aesthetics*, ed. Sherri Irvin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 274.
[46] Kellein, "Essay," 152.
[47] MacCannell, *Tourist*, xxi.
[48] *Ibid*.

II. BOOK REVIEWS

SUSAN DIELEMAN, DAVID RONDEL, AND CHRISTOPHER (EDS.): PRAGMATISM AND JUSTICE
VOPARIL, OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017.

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Introduction

In the introduction to *Pragmatism and Justice*, the editors, Susan Dieleman, David Rondel, and Christopher Voparil, note that, surprisingly, there are "no distinctly pragmatist theories of justice."[1] They elaborate that this claim is only true if having a theory of justice means offering a set of necessary principles plus conclusions as to what institutions are needed to realize justice. In contrast, they argue that pragmatists offer various types of responsiveness to injustice. So why is there so little pragmatist writing on justice as a concept? The editors claim that this is because of pragmatism's prioritization of concrete problems and injustices and distrust of apriori theorizing combined its emphasis upon pluralism, fallibilism and experiment. Given these aspects of pragmatism, a theory of justice is not central to the project, even if concrete issues of justice are thought central. Further, as opposed to ideal theory or the aim of a completely theorized conception of justice, pragmatists are, according to the editors, "comparativists" and are therefore comfortable with vagueness and indeterminacy in areas that are not amenable to tight line drawing.

Pragmatism and Justice is divided into three sections: (1) "The Pragmatist Turn to Justice"; (2) "Resisting Oppression and Injustice"; and (3) "Pragmatism, Liberalism and Democracy." This organizational strategy was somewhat frustrating. One salutary aspect of pragmatism is its organic quality with a concomitant resistance to easy conceptual distinctions. I found it informative for this review to rearrange the articles in terms, first, of a set of earlier and previously published articles thinking of them as initial constructions and then looking at the new chapters in the book as offering challenges to these articles as well as responses useful for constructing an up to date pragmatist theory that can engage fruitfully with contemporary issues of justice.

Initial Constructions of Pragmatism and Justice

The earliest article in the book is Peter T. Manicas's 1981 piece, *Dewey and the Problem of Justice.* As is appropriate given its date, Manicas places Dewey's social theory in relationship with John Rawls's theory of justice, indeed he rightly claims that Rawls created a veritable theory of justice industry and therefore his theory should be explicitly compared with Dewey's.

How does Dewey deal with the issue of justice? Manicas notes the surprising lack of justice theorizing in Dewey's voluminous writings. He identifies the reasons for this lack as the following. First, Dewey aimed at offering a method rather than a doctrine. And second, Dewey tried to displace justice as central issue because of the baggage he thought it carried from past theories. Manicas argues that prior to Dewey there were two prevailing conceptions of justice - the organic and the atomistic or contract conception. But Dewey could not accept either. The liberal or atomistic based contract ideas were too narrow – ignoring all the social aspects of human life and self-construction. Not only does this tradition underestimate the social embeddedness of the individual, but it is often based upon ideas of individual desert and Manicas describes this aim or conceptual foundation as unworkable because issues of social position, of opportunities and abilities, cannot be disentangled from issues of production and desert.

Manicas explicitly contrasts Rawls's difference principle with a somewhat similar aim seen in Dewey and Tuft's *Ethics*. Whereas Rawls finds that justice demands equality unless inequality makes everybody better off, Dewey and Tufts argue for equality unless inequalities will allow each individual to develop their own powers as far as possible. Therefore, Manicas

[1] 1.

argues that for Dewey the main target is distribution of wealth. For Rawls, on the other hand, income is the crucial factor. Further, for Dewey the aim is a working program responsive to issues of injustice, whereas for Rawls the aim is a foundational theory of justice. Indeed, because for Dewey method and a working program are the preoccupations, the content of justice seems to disappear. But for Manicas to see this as a problem is to make the mistake of thinking that theory aims at a complete concept of justice that then just gets applied to various issues whereas a working program gets investigated and developed through inquiry experiment. That is, it is to accept the Rawlsian project's presuppositions – presuppositions that Dewey and the pragmatists find wanting. Instead, the Deweyan working program is a social project that necessarily involves democratic and contextually rooted experience. Here the philosopher has no special expertise – is not in a position to bring special expert insight or conceptual closure. The only way to pursue justice is through the practice of pragmatic inquiry as a working program implemented democratically – through listening to testimony of concrete experiences.

Ruth Anna Putnam's article reinforces Manicas's analysis.[2] She notes that when pursuing justice, the project can be thought of either as one where you apply an a priori concept or, as William James characterized it, alternatively as a practice of responding to the cries of the wounded. Indeed, instead of a philosophical expertise, that latter conception requires that the disadvantaged, those experiencing the wound, press the situation. This process does not start from readymade content, such as an elaborated conception of justice, but rather starts from concrete experience that then requires symbolic formulation of the problem and construction of an end-in-view and then the further creation of a hypothesis as to solution. Indeed, even for the cries to be seen as a public problem requires construction. Common features must be developed so as to demand public attention. Furthermore, the end-in-view combined with a hypothetical solution functions to form a plan, a goal. But a successful solution to a specific problem often, in turn, becomes an obstacle to further ends because of new demands.

Putnam develops this pragmatist theory of justice in relationship to judging. She notes that traditionally formalism is thought more stable for judges to adopt as an interpretive strategy. But she implores us not to confuse practical certainty with purported theoretical certainty. Because pragmatism understands the judge has rooted training and practice in a professional and institutional context, she argues that real world stability is possible through pragmatist judging even in the face of new demands and challenges. Instead of a concept to be applied, the judge has a working set of tools to inform inquiry of even the most novel situation. Formalism, on the other hand, cannot handle the demands of the novel situation in any stable manner and will have to resort to ad hoc strategies. Putnam, that is, places the pragmatist judge in the context of a social practice of inquiry rather than in a realm of conceptual theory.

In the third earliest article in the book, Hilary Putnam develops what he labels Dewey's "epistemological justification of Democracy."[3] Putnam claims that Dewey argued successfully that democratic practice is a "precondition for the full application of *intelligence* to the solution of social problems."[4] That is, full human flourishing requires the use of scientific method which, in turn, requires democratic practices. Democracy is, according to Dewey, "simply the method of experimental inquiry combined with free and full discussion-which means, in the case of social problems, the maximum use of the capacities of citizens for proposing courses of action, for testing them, and for evaluating the results."[5]

As in the previous two chapters, to pursue solutions to social problems does not require overarching

[2] *Justice in Context.*

[3] *Reconsidering Deweyan Democracy,* 249.
[4] 249.
[5] 254.

theories, therefore, but rather requires an understanding of how to solve problems. Putnam notes that Dewey's theory is not that effective in acts of individuals where individuality is at stake, and that Dewey was too attached to a narrower idea of human goods than can be justified (here he turns to William James to develop a more pluralistic and open theory). He claims, nevertheless, that Dewey's theory of democracy is an excellent philosophy of democratic social practice. Indeed, because it requires experiment and open communication to be embodied, Putnam notes that it also requires oppressed and marginalized groups be given opportunity to develop their capacities. Therefore, though it is not a great theory for individual choices it is an effective theory for constructing and understanding quite thick requirements of social justice.

In this Putnam notes that Dewey had a clear awareness that democracy demands the social conditions necessary for ensuring democratic capabilities far beyond those characterized in theories offering "negative" or minimalist ideas of freedom. That is, full and developed capacities are a necessary precondition for democracy. Therefore, education is central to democratic aims. Indeed, Putnam concludes poignantly, "Education must be designed to produce men and women who are capable of learning on their own and of thinking critically. The extent to which we take the commitment to democracy seriously is measured by the extent to which we take the commitment to education seriously. In these days, saying these words fills me with shame for the state of democracy at the end of the twentieth century."[6] One can only wonder what he would think today as educational support has dwindled further from the time his article was written.

Interestingly, Richard Rorty's version of pragmatism seems to pretty much eliminate the very epistemic justification of democracy that Putnam deems central. In *Justice as a Larger Loyalty,* Rorty notes that it is standard to see a conflict between social loyalties and the demands of justice. He argues that it is better to see this as a matter of conflicting loyalties rather than choice between loyalty and justice. As an example of this he asks that if democratic government requires affluence, then what happens between nations if a choice between alleviating world poverty and protecting affluent democracy becomes necessary? Rorty argues that rather than a conflict between loyalty and justice this is just a question of competing loyalties. Under this description, justice might be described as just the loyalty to our largest group, that is, our broadest loyalty. In this sense justice is not a difference in kind with loyalty, just a broader perspective. Further, Rorty argues that all morality is thick, socially embedded, and determined by group membership. Dilemmas of loyalty are, therefore, actually choices between alternative selves, meanings, and groups. But as loyalties get more abstract and less concrete they also get broader. Therefore, descriptions such as "citizen of world" become very abstract, detail is lacking and therefore loyalties are more tenuous.

Rorty contrasts this analysis with Rawls's theory of justice which he sees as resting on a trans-cultural conception of what is reasonable. This Rorty describes as an attempt to identify reasonable people outside of ethnocentric stories. He argues that this view from outside of culture is not available. Indeed, just as loyalties are "thick" and culture-bound, so are conceptions of reason. Therefore, there is no question-begging position from which to judge justice or reasonableness. Just as Rorty offers a description of justice as competing loyalties, he offers a redescription of rationality as inclusive conversation based upon offers rather than threats. Reason should be seen simply as "reaching agreement through persuasion."[7] Ultimately, he hopes that this brings about an attempt to bridge differences and enlarge loyalties through attempting to build a "community of trust" via the telling of instructive stories.

[6] 263.

[7] 32.

Nancy Fraser builds upon another of Rorty's ideas in her article, *Abnormal Justice.* Drawing on Thomas Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts in science, Rorty famously argued that intramundane or normal discourse contrasted with non-normal discourse. Normal discourse was discourse where the understandings were standardized and mutually understood. Non-normal discourse was discourse that could not assume mutually understood assumptions.

Fraser extends this distinction to the discussion of justice. Normal justice discourse, therefore, rests upon mutually accepted assumptions. But this is problematic, she asserts, because such agreement very well might rest upon "suppression or marginalization of those who dissent from the reigning consensus."[8] Therefore, the traits of abnormal justice discourse must be investigated. Indeed, Fraser finds that the contemporary situation is one where most justice discourse is abnormal because most often there is no shared understanding of what justice claims should look like, who and what should get redressed, who should be included in the conversation and who should get consideration.

Fraser goes on to identify "three principle nodes" of abnormality in justice discourse. First, there often is no shared view of the what of justice is. Second agreement might not be available on "who" should be considered. Finally, a shared understanding of "how" is not always available. She notes that an earlier normalized justice debate was centered upon distributive issues, but this went along with an exclusion of the issues of recognition and representation. Because of this, it is important to be suspicious of normalizing assumptions. The positive side of non-normal justice debate is that it offers a more inclusive and expanding field of contestation.

But not all is positive. For Fraser the negative aspect is that non-normal contestation without a background of stable frameworks and institutional agencies cannot be effective. Therefore, Fraser thinks that non-normal justice debates need a common measure that "overarches them all."[9] To serve this overarching framework she proposes a "parity of participation" principle. All effected, that is, must participate as peers. This is described as a "multidimensional social ontology with normative monism."[10] In terms of who is considered she offers an "all-subjected" principle requiring that "all those who are subject to a given governance structure have moral standing as subjects in relation to it."[11] This is to be interpreted broadly and includes nonstate agencies. Subjection is to be interpreted broadly as well. Further, it must be ensured that this overarching structure offers fair procedure and representative structure with the capacity to make binding decisions. On the other hand, this structure must have reflexive self-problematizing capacities and treat every closure as provisional therefore preserving the positive side of non-normal justice discourse. Of course, this seems to commit Fraser to an overarching normalized frame within with non-normal discourse must function, perhaps threatening the openness that noting the non-normal aspects of justice theorizing requires.

In the final reprinted paper, *Social Inequality, Power, and Politics: Intersectionality in Dialogue with American Pragmatism*, Patricia Hill Collins argues that pragmatism and intersectionality analysis have a lot to offer each other. Most basically, Collins argues that conceptions of freedom are less central to contemporary thought as compared to issues of inequality and power. She argues that earlier versions of pragmatism were not sufficiently engaged with power and inequality. More specifically, Pragmatists did not give enough attention to race, gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, or nationality. This made the classical pragmatists unable to imagine concrete black lives or female human beings, and "As a result, social inequality, power, and politics were defined out of the *center* of American pragmatism."[12] But, Collins

[8] 38.

[9] 48.
[10] 49.
[11] 52-53.
[12] 150.

admits, of course individual pragmatists became important in these areas. Further, for her pragmatism overly emphasizes rationality to the detriment of emotion. Her conclusion as to pragmatism's weaknesses; "In essence, the discourse lacked a self-reflexivity on its own universalistic assumptions."[13]

Importantly, Collins does admit that this analysis of pragmatism's weaknesses may be unfair, as I would argue her picture of emotion and reason in pragmatism is, but properly argues that much more important is the constructive project of utilizing pragmatism in support of intersectionality analysis. According to her, pragmatism offers intersectionality a helpful and demanding analysis of community and the socially situated and constructed self. This thick conception of self and community to can be used as a "template" to understand power relations. In addition, pragmatist analysis is aware of the importance and centrality of symbolism's function in the creation of community. Indeed, for Collins the notion of community itself functions as a powerful and flexible symbol that can combine appeal to emotions, values, and action. Community is therefore always in the physical and symbolic making. Indeed, as also noted by Putnam, Collins emphasizes that community and participatory democracy are "always bundled together."[14] Further, Collins offers that pragmatism's robust concept of experience can help intersectionality analysis and help highlight the connections between social structure and the various knowledges of communities.

Challenges and Responses

It is informative to treat the articles newly published in the *Pragmatism and Justice* anthology as responding to the reprinted articles outlined above. For example, in *A Pragmatist Account of Legitimacy and Authority: Holmes, Ramsey, and the Moral Force of Law,* Cheryl Misak follows up and elaborates upon the themes that Ruth Anna Putnam wrote about – law and pragmatism. Misak rightly notes that the common law has much in common with the theory of inquiry offered by Wittgenstein, Dewey and Frank Ramsey. And David Rondel, in *William Janes on Justice and the Sacredness of Individuality,* furthers the turn to William James seen in Hilary Putnam when the need is to emphasize the importance of the specific individual. Rondel links James's radical subjective inwardness and "cosmic egalitarianism" with democratic individuality.[15] Rondel also notes, though, that this Jamesian aversion to bigness renders social structures, negative or positive, somewhat invisible thus giving a somewhat mirror-image analysis to that offered by Hilary Putnam.

Robert Talisse's Chapter, *Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Need for a Theory of Justice,* can be read as a counterpoint to Manicas's analysis of Dewey's take on justice theory. Talisse agrees with Manicas that it is surprising that there is not more justice theory from the earlier pragmatists. But he disagrees on the import of this lack. For Talisse, Dewey was good at analyzing democracy as intelligence in Putnam's sense of epistemological justification. But for him the lack of justice talk is why "Dewey takes no account of the ways in which socially and economically entrenched forms of exclusion, marginalization, and homogenization block access to membership in publics; similarly, he provides no analysis of the social mechanisms that would be required in order to assure citizens of the kind of equality necessary to make democratic participation effective. And, further, he gives no analysis of the multiple ways in which material disadvantages are causally connected to democratic deficits."[16]

According to Talisse these all are ultimately issues of justice. The epistemic view of democracy needs therefore, he claims, a concept of justice to enable an understanding of the necessary aspects constitutive of

[13] 150.
[14] 153.
[15] 310, 313.
[16] 283.

democracy. Indeed, "it is the role of a theory of justice to examine how the material and social resources of society must be apportioned if democracy, here understood as shared social inquiry, is to commence."[17] Dewey, that is, needs a theory of justice to be able to understand the necessities of democracy without which his theory is fatally incomplete. Talisse offers his own conception – "democratic egalitarianism" - where citizens are treated as equal participants and stakeholders, as a conception of justice that would properly inform Dewey's democratic theory. Talisse is explicit in his claim that a just democratic society requires a basic structuralist answer. That is, certain specific and identifiable agencies of government such as courts, education, etc., are required in any just democracy. Furthermore, if democracy is justified epistemologically, he concludes that its scope must be cosmopolitan. But this renders quite explicit the problem of the need for shared experience versus the Deweyan emphasis upon the uniqueness of local experience.

But here Talisse ignores important points made by Manicas. Further, he overstates his own claims and conclusions. In terms of the analysis Manicas offers, Talisse ignores the fact that for Dewey the aim was to develop a working program, not to develop a concept of justice. Dewey thought theorizing justice rather than developing democratic tools of analysis was to make the mistake of thinking that theory aims at a concept of justice that then just gets applied to various issues. To the contrary, a working program develops content through actual concrete experience, inquiry and experiment. Here the philosopher has no special expertise –therefore the only way to pursue justice is through the practice of democratic inquiry. Furthermore, Talisse argues that democracy to be legitimate must be evaluated through the lens of justice which he claims he shows is necessarily required. To the contrary, if the epistemic justification of democracy is correct, it is just not the case that Dewey cannot critique material disparities or account for the ways in which social and economic exclusion, marginalization, and homogenization block access to membership in publics. In fact, thick democratic practice requires proper critique of these forms of epistemic blockage, just as scientific practice would require proper openness and sustaining conditions to be properly practices. Ultimately, it is not clear what work adding the word "justice" to the mix really adds. And, of course, it might - if too normalized - help exclude inquiry in to further necessities for full democratic society.

Indeed, the articles by Jose Medina and Paul C. Taylor go a long way in showing how pragmatism can be understood to react to just such inequalities and structural experiments without invoking anything near a thick theory of justice. In, *Pragmatism, Racial Injustice, and Epistemic Insurrection: Toward an Insurrectionist Pragmatism,* Jose Medina argues that to be considered legitimate, pragmatism needs to face the tragedy of injustice and satisfy the need for insurrectionist potential. Therefore, the question becomes how to justify insurrectionist action in light of the pragmatist requirements of experimentalism and meliorism. If it is the case that pragmatism needs insurrectionist ability to handle United States racism and white supremacy, can it provide the necessary tools? Medina argues that bringing together Dewey, Jane Addams, Alain Locke, and Maria Stewart, especially Stewart's concept of full personhood and human flourishing, pragmatism does indeed carry insurrectionist potential.

Medina, once again, asks how the standard pragmatist meliorism and demand for evidence of effectiveness or duty can be compatible with insurrection in the face of grave exploitation or abuse. Would not an obsession with prediction and control get in the way of uncertain acts in service of an unknown future? He claims, quite plausibly, that "*the epistemic requirement of predictability and controllability must be given up in situations of radical exclusion and oppression*

[17] 285.

that call for insurrectionary actions and practices."[18] Required are reasons that allow for "insurrectionary action." But, of course, one only has to think of William James and his will to believe to show that pragmatism has the ability to offer such tools. As Medina states, concrete lived experience and a commitment to human flourishing are sufficient sources of motivation when faced with injustice. While one might argue with the soundness of such statements as, "the more radical the injustice in question, the more radical the response needed."[19] Certainly rephrased as, "the more radical the injustice the more urgent the effective response" is warranted. And clearly one proper response is his epistemic resistance defined as the "epistemic self-empowerment of oppressed subjects and groups."[20]

Paul Taylor's "friendly amendment" of Medina's theory adds another tool to the pragmatist quest for democratic society.[21] He argues that in addition to Medina's epistemic resistance the aesthetic can serve as an effective tool of resistance. He notes that Dewey's *Art as Experience* properly and importantly highlights the "ubiquity of the aesthetic." Therefore, it is important to realize the areas of aesthetic practice that are habitual and that can be intervened on with "counterhabituation." Taylor gives as an example black aesthetics, which he describes as a pluralist area where aesthetic creation has been expressly utilized to develop tools of resistance. If, he concludes, "social life and aesthetic experience are reciprocally constitutive" then story and other aspects of the aesthetic become areas of powerful possibility.[22]

Gregory Fernando Pappas expands upon Taylor's point in that he highlights the radical experiential resources that pragmatist thought makes available to problems of injustice.[23] For instance, he critiques Elizabeth Anderson's theory because she overly focuses upon the evidence available from the social sciences. It is not that this does not count as evidence. Rather, the evidentiary resources go well beyond social science. For instance, he notes the way Jane Addams gained experience because she "put herself in to the world." Pappas argues that a broadly mixed-methods research agenda avoids the vice of allowing theory to become a blinder. And, as with Taylor, the realm of evidence and action goes well beyond the epistemological. Further, Pappas finds it essential to emphasize that Dewey always started with a specific problematic situation where a concrete problem of injustice is identified. He analogizes this to the clinical situation of doctor with patient. This, he argues, parallels the radical singularity of each instance of injustice. As well as the provisional aspect of any diagnoses.

This emphasis upon radical singularity is challenged in Matthew Festenstein's *Ideal and Actual in Dewey's Political Theory*. Rather than focus upon the radical singularity of the problematic situation, Festenstein focuses upon the question of where the ideal fits in to Dewey's theory of inquiry. He claims that therein, the ideal is best conceived of as a tendency viewed as completed and perfected. The role of ideals in inquiry is not as an abstract goal separate from means. Rather, they must have effective role in thinking. With Pappas he accepts the "methodological priority of injustice" and of the aim of local improvements rather than perfect justice. But, he argues that pragmatism is not as particularist as Pappas because "Generalization is ineliminable" and there is the requirement of ideality.[24] This is because the quest for a more just world is an activity rooted in problems, but the problems are seen in terms of more general goals. Ideals are, when properly understood, tools helpful in this quest. As Festenstein puts it, "ideality is not dispensable but a feature of a

[18] 206.
[19] 207.
[20] 207.
[21] *An Aesthetics of Resistance: Deweyan Experimentalism and Epistemic Injustice*
[22] 224.
[23] *Empirical Approaches to Problems of Injustice: Elizabeth Anderson and the Pragmatists*
[24] 110.

reflective response to a problem."[25] As such, ideals should be judged in terms of their fruitfulness to generate analysis and construction. Take, for instance, Dewey's ideal of democracy. Democracy is offered as the ideal of community life. But this concept is not utopian, and not just an a priori regulative assumption, but rather "a heuristic formed in nonideal circumstances which suggest possibilities for action and for how our values may relate to one another."[26]

Christopher Voparil's chapter, *Pragmatism's Contribution to Nonideal Theorizing: Fraser, Addams, and Rorty,* expands upon Fraser's investigation of non-normal justice theory. While he agrees with her overall highlighting of the seemingly ubiquitous non-normal aspects of justice, he argues that "Fraser's prioritizing of conceptual clarity risks granting temporal priority to theorizing (abnormal) justice at the expense of addressing current injustices."[27] That is, it seeks conceptual clarity over the project of understanding and solving pressing and concrete problems of injustice. Voparil argues for a turn towards the work of Jane Addams and that "creating a democratic moral community attainable only through sympathetic knowledge and mutual understanding" is needed to remedy injustice.[28]

Many other chapters are written in the spirit of Collins, that is, either pointing out areas that were not covered sufficiently in the writings of the classical pragmatists or with the intent of showing how pragmatism can help contemporary justice centered projects. This is quite proper for pragmatist theory to do and these chapters offer some of the most interesting and challenging aspects of the anthology.

For example, in *Realism, Pragmatism, and Critical Social Epistemology,* Susan Dieleman investigates whether social epistemology needs a realist foundation. This is thought important because any such epistemological tool seemingly must diagnose the lack of correspondence to the real and make the injustice concrete. Her chosen example is the theory of Charles Mill and the epistemology of ignorance. Mill, she argues, shows a fear of postmodernism because he requires that there must be a way to see rightly or wrongly and postmodern thought seems to eliminate this possibility. Indeed, what would a claim of structural ignorance consist of if not founded on a distinction between true and false? Dieleman claims, contrary to the purported need for realism, that pragmatism works just as well. First, she claims that we must follow Rorty and realize that there is no independent test for accuracy. Once this limitation is accepted, instead of looking for a real that transcends perspective, we must use changes in vocabulary and pragmatist tools to reconstruct justice. Rortian resdescription is "a pragmatist account of social progress-and by extension, of justice" and "provides us with a nonrealist framework in which to theorize and practice critical social epistemology."[29] Pragmatist tools, as emphasized by multiple authors, also allows the use of various types of evidence – such as the testimonial and hermeneutical. Dieleman shows, briefly, how this broader set of tools has worked in the trans community. Ultimately, she argues that the tools of redescription and redefinition are more helpful than realist assumptions because contingency must be embraced and new possibilities must be constructed.

V. Denise James offers an important analysis of pragmatisms's ability to be radical.[30] She argues that putting Dewey and Du Bois together helps to find some often unnoticed radicalism in pragmatic philosophy. James further argues that Dewey's lack of racial frame creates a significant lack in his analysis of freedom and justice. Therefore, Du Bois's analysis of oppression and need for change is an essential corrective. Reading Dewey and Du Bois together, it is claimed, shows that the distinction between freedom and justice cannot be

[25] 103.
[26] 108.
[27] 66.
[28] 72.
[29] 137.
[30] *Pragmatism and Radical Social Justice: Dewey, Du Bois, and Davis*

sustained – that freedom and justice are intertwined in a messy and inseparable complex. James then adds Angela Davis's thought to the mix to create a properly radical pragmatist notion of justice and social change.

A distinction is made by James between radicalism and revolutionary thought. Revolutionary thought requires both willingness to risk life and limb (as does radical thought) but also a "conviction that the whole of society needed to be made anew, at once."[31] This the pragmatists see as a form of absolutism. But, James continues, Dewey's conception of social justice was too abstract, too attached to freedom rather than justice, was all too white. Even so, James concludes that we should keep his inclusive view of democracy and his radical democratic commitment, but more concrete descriptions of the conditions necessary for their realization must be offered.

Indeed, James claims that because for Dewey freedom was seen as distinct from justice, "Dewey subscribes to a notion of freedom that is fraught with historical and experiential problems."[32] Here James seems absolutely correct. James is on dubious grounds, though, when she goes on to claim that is because, "Dewey…often treated effective or negative freedom as a priority without due consideration of his own subject position."[33] This seems patently false, if anything Dewey was clear on the substantial positive requirements for freedom, even if mistaken on specifics. But it is surely correct that Deweyan social theory can greatly benefit from a "black radical corrective." The theory of Du Bois can indeed bring together in much more concrete terms issues of justice and emancipation as well as the radical importance of group-based social justice claims. James also combines Dewey's theory with Davis's. Both see the aims of freedom as constructed through poetic knowledge. But, "Where Davis differs from Dewey, at least in emphasis, is in her insistence that freedom is a collective enterprise that requires we constantly attend to history."[34] This seems correct as long as we argue more specifically that Dewey was insufficiently inclusive of the history of groups. Certainly, Dewey knew we needed to attend to history, but the invisibility of historically important groups (in his theory if not his actions) is a notable and troubling feature of his work, and one that requires rectification in current pragmatist thought.

In *Contesting Injustice: Why Pragmatist Political Thought Needs Du Bois,* Colin Koopman asks whether or not pragmatism can motivate when "shining ideals" are needed. Koopman focuses upon the "challenge to contestation." That is, can pragmatism motivate contestation in the face of injustice? Koopman thinks that in Dewey's case the answer is maybe not. But, importantly, Dewey's thought is not the only resource. Therefore, a turn to Du Bois and William James is helpful. From James, Koopman takes the emphasis upon the clinical case rather than conceptual application. He argues that James's thought offers a "double-barreled pragmatism." One aspect of his ethics is just like physical science, but the other acknowledges victory and defeat as well as social struggle. James, he argues, faced the sometimes tragic aspect of social conflict whereas Dewey tried to avoid conflict. Indeed, Koopman finds important, "James' attentiveness to the butchering involved in moral and political contestation."[35] For Koopman this aligns with "Du Bois's patient acknowledgement of strife as constitutive of the political."[36] Also important is Du Bois's emphasis upon the importance of discontent and struggle combined with a lack of moralistic tone. This is because, "contestation must become cunning, strategic, and politicizing in intent."[37] Importantly in light of the critique of Dewey's social theory as too abstract, Koopman notes that Du Bois offers a theory that analyzes six different forms of social interaction;

[31] 164.
[32] 167.
[33] 168.
[34] 174.
[35] 183.
[36] 183.
[37] 183-184.

"physical proximity, economic relations, political relations, intellectual contact, social contact, and religious enterprise."[38] Under this type of pragmatic social thought, instead of an overly harmonious picture of social progress, democratic contestation and "contestatory pragmatism" is emphasized. Tragic strife and tools necessary for "sustaining contestation midst perilous conflict" are also emphasized.[39] Indeed, as opposed to Dewey, for Koopman, Du Bois understands that progress is "necessarily ugly."

Of course, it is possible that the "shining ideals" or even the tools for contestation chosen might be ineffective or even detrimental. Or, as Ruth Anna Putnam noted, they might have been very serviceable in one context and now have become obsolete or impediments. Shannon Sullivan, in *Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice,* argues for the need to look for strategies "beyond liberal faith in civil rights and white people's good intentions to cooperate with racial change."[40] She argues that fixation on "hope" as that faith in civil rights has got in the way of the necessary task of expanding the number and types of tools available. Indeed, according to her analysis, in contemporary culture black hope is a type of cruel and dysfunctional optimism. To support this, Sullivan uses some results of social science as evidence that hope as defined is actually physically harmful to black people. Instead of following Cornel West and believing that the right thing will happen in the end, she argues that it would be better to realize with Derrick Bell that is contemporary society racism is permanent and indestructible. Hope is, therefore, a farce, indeed a political fantasy. As she puts it succinctly, what is needed is coping rather than hoping skills.

Conclusion

Pragmatism and Justice is a challenging anthology on many levels. As can be seen by the overview above, the anthology is wide-ranging and somewhat idiosyncratic. The relationship between pragmatism and justice needs systematic treatment and Dieleman, Rondel, and Voparil's efforts certainly have made a stride towards a better understanding of the tools pragmatism offers for issues of justice, or perhaps better, injustice. The articles are ultimately somewhat uneven, with many offering what I would consider somewhat confused pictures of the theories they are critiquing. For instance, I do not think Shannon Sullivan's description of Cornel West's hope is accurate. Portraying him as having certainty that "the right thing will happen in the end" seems to ignore the explicit aspect of human tragedy that West accepts. But this is a somewhat trivial criticism of her important point that the specific hope seen in civil rights discourse might have its own avoidable limitations and that greater tools must be developed for progress in race relations in the United States to happen. More problematic are incomplete portrayals of pragmatism's tools and tenants such as treating Dewey's theory as allowing negative views of rights or as frustrating urgent reform. Also strange is the relative lack of responses to the Rawls, et al, theory of justice industry. While I think it is true that pragmatism offers a salutary alternative to the Rawlsian tradition of conceptual theories of justice, emphasizing the identification of particular injustices and experimental and constructive melioristic responses to concrete experience, the relative invisibility of other philosophical responses to the issue of justice is somewhat troubling none the less. The justice industry in philosophy is long and wide – surely some of the tools it offers could be put to good use in pragmatist philosophy.

More important, though, are the positive aspects of the anthology. *Pragmatism and Justice* offers three helpful sets of writings. First there are the reprinted articles that help construct a basic set of pragmatist

[38] 184.
[39] 187.
[40] 231.

tools for issues of justice. Particularistic and experimental pragmatist inquiry, the epistemic justification of democracy and the idea of non-normal justice discourse are three important tools among the many offered that can help build a workable pragmatist response to injustice. Second, there are chapters that properly extend the list of authors and theories that count as pragmatist. The ever-greater inclusion of figures such as Jane Addams, Du Bois, Angela Davis, etc., in the core set of pragmatist theorists is important and very helpful in understanding what the greater working project of pragmatism offers. Also important here are the chapters that help fill out theories of pragmatist inquiry and search for a greater breadth of tools than the narrowly progressivist cliché version of pragmatism would seem to allow. Third, there are articles that bring pragmatist analysis in to contact with contemporary issues and theories. As a working program that is supposed to be flexible, experimental and issue-driven, it should not be surprising that earlier pragmatists did not develop the necessary tools for contemporary issues. Of course it is striking the absence of acknowledgement of issues that were obviously pressing in their times such as the ubiquity of white supremacy. But it is important to acknowledge that given a pragmatist understanding of philosophical inquiry new tools are always needed, and old tools often become obstructions (perhaps even more so due to their earlier success). Bringing pragmatist theory into greater contact with other tools and areas of inquiry is very important and this anthology offers a good start.

Susan Dieleman, David Rondel, and Christopher Voparil have done important work in bringing together the papers included in *Pragmatism and Justice*. The anthology offers an overview of many of the basic methodologies, figures and contemporary issues involved in a pragmatist investigation of justice. The relative absences from the anthology, for instance the before-mentioned absence of other theories of justice, but more importantly the absence of extended analysis of issues such as international relations, economic structure, details of democratic process, etc., and the use and usefulness let alone application of pragmatist tools outside of the boarders of the United States, are due less to faults in the anthology but rather more to do with the breadth of the urgent and pressing aspects of injustice that demand attention in the contemporary world. Certainly, the anthology provides tools and motivation for further action.

RETHINKING THE EGO/RECONCEPTUALISING PHILOSOPHY: SHUSTERMAN'S "MAN IN GOLD"

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The paper provides a reading of Richard Shusterman's 2016 *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life*. I contend that this book, that brings together philosophy, literature and photography, provides a compelling, albeit implicit, expression of two of the challenges that somaesthetics poses to philosophy – first, a rethinking of the foundations of subjectivity in the Western philosophical tradition by way of the concept of the alter ego; and second, a challenge to the received perception of the nature and relation of philosophy and art.

> There is nothing in theory, and certainly nothing in experience, to support the extraordinary judgment that it is the truth about himself that is the easiest for a person to know.
>
> — Harry Frankfurt, *On Bullshit*

> It was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split.
>
> — D.H. Lawrence, *Phoenix*

Introduction

Blurring the lines between literature and philosophy, Richard Shusterman's 2016 *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life*, is, I contend, an attempt to rethink the foundations of subjectivity from a life-affirming and somatic perspective consistent with his somaesthetic agenda. The book is presented as an "experience" – in the sense of "experimentation and risk"[1] - and that experimentation can be read, in my view, as an oblique dissection of the modern ego in order to critique the metaphysics that undergirds it.

Specifically, in my reading, Shusterman's book takes a place in the long series of attempts to critique modern subjectivity, and it achieves this by means of an exploration of an alter ego – *l'homme en Or* (the Man in Gold). The book becomes a place to unmask, in a quintessentially Nietzschean fashion, the fragility of the philosophical foundations of the "subject" – that (white, male) subject who aims, amongst other things, "to bring light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the earth."[2] I demonstrate in this paper how the figure of Shusterman's Man in Gold stands as a challenge to the positivistic vision of the subject understood in terms of unity, rationality, free will and self-control. In addition, I posit that this juxtaposition of ego and alter ego can be also understood as an implicit commentary on the relationship of philosophy (the ego) and its "rival" art (the alter ego).

It must be noted at the outset that my reading of *The Adventures of the Man in Gold* in this paper cannot address the myriad other philosophical questions I think are raised either directly or obliquely by the book. These include the capacity of the self for aesthetic experience; the "ethical consequences in opening oneself to possession and transformation;"[3] the value and nature of "limit experiences;" the relationship between art and pornography; the question of difference and belonging; the problematic nature of knowledge in the context of the aesthetic; as well as the existential dimensions of understanding the self as being revealed though art. Although all of these questions stand in an intimate relationship to the two themes addressed in this paper, they deserve separate and sustained treatment due to their complexity and significance, and so are not addressed in any detail here.

The paper takes the following form: I begin with a brief history of the "double" or alter ego, which I interpret as a challenge to the concept of self as single, homogenous, rational and free, and situate this reading within the philosophical debate on the "death" of the subject. This is followed by a section in which I discuss

[1] Shusterman, Richard, *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life* (Paris: Hermann Éditeurs, 2016), 13.

[2] Lawtoo, Nidesh, *The Phantom of the Ego: Modernism and the Mimetic Unconscious*, ed. Nidesh Lawtoo, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 95.

[3] Shusterman, *Man in Gold,* 8.

Shusterman's broader understanding of the self as it is presented in his other, more strictly philosophical, works. The next section then focuses on providing a reading of *The Adventures of the Man in Gold* and on showing how it functions as an attempt to dissolve the unitary conception of the self by means of the concept of the "double" or alter ego. This is followed by a brief discussion what I see as a parallel to the ego-alter-ego duality explored in Shusterman's book – the relationship between art and philosophy. I show that this duality, although addressed more directly in Shusterman's other texts, finds distinctive expression in *The Adventures of the Man in Gold*'s hybrid form.

The Death of the Subject: The Alter Ego as Challenge to the Unitary Concept of Self

Humanism is perhaps one of the most significant expressions of the modern in the Western philosophical tradition. As Charles E. Scott[4] points out, humanism engendered a kind of "theoretical hope" in the face of the harms that human beings inflict upon one another. This hope was presented in the form of a "scaffolding" for the "recognition of human identity across racial and cultural barriers" and for the values of human dignity and human rights.[5] And yet, humanism was revealed by a number of thinkers as concealing within itself the seeds of colonialism, gender bias and fascism, specifically due to its impulse towards the value of universal truth and identity.[6] As a result, the humanism of the modern was subjected to the critical gaze of the postmodern, which is, as Jean-François Lyotard puts it, an "incredulity" towards metanarratives.[7]

The postmodern suspicion towards the grand stories expressed in modernity finds potent expression in Martin Heidegger's pointed rejection of Descartes' portrayal of human being as a rational mind situated in a material body, and as a transcendental subject standing over and against objects that can be known in the world[8]. Heidegger challenges the Cartesian opposition, claiming that "… subject and object are not the same as Dasein and the world"[9]. Rather, in his view, "…in grasping something, Da-sein does not first go outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated" since for him, "…in its primary kind of being, [Da-sein] is always already 'outside' together with some being encountered in the world already discovered"[10]. The Heideggerian "destruktion"[11] of the ontology underlying twentieth century continental philosophy, combined with Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional conceptions of universality and time by means of his genealogical strategy, provides the impetus for Michel Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approach.

[4] Scott, Charles E. "Postmodernism" in *Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies* ed. Constantin V. Boundas (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007), 507-8.
[5] Scott, *Postmodernism*, 508.
[6] Scott, *Postmodernism*, 508.
[7] With Shusterman, I read the "post" in postmodernism to point towards an *extension* of the modern by means of "critique, inversion or subversion." See Richard Shusterman, "Aesthetics and Postmodernism" The *Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*. Edited by Jerrold Levinson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 771-782, citation from page 775.
[8] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 17th edition, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 89; translation from Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: SUNY, 1996), 83.
[9] Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit," 60; Heidegger, "Being and Time," 56.
[10] Heidegger, "Sein und Zeit," 62; Heidegger, "Being and Time," 58. Although I cannot discuss this here, it must be noted that Heidegger's position has been vigorously criticised, most notably by Jacques Derrida, who points out that Heidegger's concept of *Jemeinigkeit* conceals "a singularity, an irreplaceability of that which remains nonsubstitutable in the structure of *Dasein*" and so which "risks pointing toward both the ego and an organic or atomic indivisibility". See Jacques Derrida, "Eating Well" in Jacques Derrida, *Points…Interviews 1974-1994*. Ed. by Elisabeth Weber, translated by Peggy Camuf and others. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995), 271.
[11] See my "From Destruktion to Deconstruction: A Response to Moran" *South African Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 27 Number 1, 2008: 52-68 for an extended discussion of Heidegger's concept of destruktion and how it differs from Jacques Derrida's deconstruction.

Foucault's dissection of the grand narratives of knowledge and reason, and his exposure of the hidden forms of value and power within those accounts, turns on his rejection of the modern, humanistic concept of the subject as a unified subjectivity. Although a difficulty remains in terms of how to interpret and reconcile Foucault's early insistence on "Man's death" in the western "epistêmê", and how subjects are "fabricated" and subjugated by disciplinary power, with his later development of an ethics based on aesthetic self-fashioning that advocates a "care of the self"[12], Foucault's fundamental critique of the idea of a unified and timeless subject is far-reaching in its effect on philosophy in the twentieth century.

Foucault's "death of the subject" is taken up in the context of literature and art by Roland Barthes, for example. Barthes, in his "The Death of the Author," (1977) argues that the reader of a text can exist only at the expense of the author: "the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author."[13] For Barthes, texts involve any aspect of culture that express the thoughts of a writer and so include books, periodicals, artworks and television. For Barthes, the traditional view of the Author is that the Author is "…the father and the owner of his work: literary science therefore teachers respect for the manuscript and the author's declared intensions, while society asserts the legality of the relation of author to work (in the form of various copyright laws)."[14] Barthes' position stands in direct contradistinction to such a conception of an Author, and so constitutes yet another challenge to the modern idea of the subject.[15] The pervasiveness of this challenge is fittingly expressed by Slavoj Zizek, who opens his book *The Ticklish Subject* thus: "A spectre is haunting Western academia [...] the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic powers have entered into an unholy alliance to exorcise this spectre."[16]

The "exorcism" of the Cartesian conception of the subject as a fixed unity that I have briefly surveyed also appears in how the concept of the doppelgänger or alter ego has been employed within both philosophy and literature. Jacques Derrida, to name but one example, specifically mentions the alter ego in his discussion of the "problematic of the subject" that he asserts cannot be reduced to a homogeneity. He says:

The alter ego can never be given "in person," it resists the principle of principles of phenomenology – namely, the intuitive given of originary presence. This dislocation of the absolute subject from the other and from time neither comes about, nor leads beyond phenomenology, but rather, if not in it, then at least on its border, on the very line of its possibility. […] There has never been The Subject for anyone […]. The subject is a fable […] but to concentrate on the elements of speech and conventional fiction that such a fable presupposes is not to stop taking it seriously. […] [17]

As Derrida points out here, the alter ego is a concept that is resistant to the idea of originary presence, a notion that allows for the conception of a subject as absolute and unitary. Taking the "fable" of the subject seriously, as Derrida suggests here, is also evident in how

[12] I cannot discuss what I will call the "fabrication-constitution" debate in any significant detail here. See Peter Dews, "The Return of the Subject in the Late Foucault," *Radical Philosophy* 51 (1989): 37-41; Rob Devos, "The Return of the Subject in Michel Foucault," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 76, 2 (2002): 255-280 and Thomas Flynn, "Truth and Subjectivation in the later Foucault," *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985): 531-540 for excellent discussions of this important theme in the scholarship on Foucault.

[13] Barthes, Roland, "The Death of the Author," in *Image-Music-Text*, trans Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wand, 1977), 148.

[14] Roland Barthes, "From Work to text," in *Image-Music-Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (New York, Hill and Wang, 1977), 160.

[15] I cannot provide an extended discussion of this here, but in my view, the poststructuralist insistence on the death of the subject, or the author, does not entail equating death with complete absence This is in line with the view of Dimitris Vardoulakis as expressed in *The Doppelganger*, (Fordham University Press, 2010), 1.

[16] Slavoj Zizek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, (London: Verso, 1999). Zizek names feminists, New Age obscurantists, postmodern deconstructionists and deep ecologists as examples of trends that are all hostile to the Cartesian subject.

[17] Jacques Derrida, "Eating Well", 263 - 264.

the figure of the alter ego, "double" or the other self as a challenge to modern conceptions of the self emerges in the history of literature. The concept, rooted in Greek and Roman mythology, emerges as an especially significant theme in German literature of the Romantic Movement. The "double walker" or *Doppelgänger* is interpreted variously as a true double or twin, a split personality, or an alter ego, and has been used to represent a number of themes including, most significantly for this paper, the dual nature of human beings.[18] Vardoulakis provides a fitting description of the doppelgänger or alter ego in this context as:

> […] an operative or effective presence to the extent that it effects the undoing of the framing of the subject by the opposition between mere presence and absence. Such an operation indicates a function of relationality—the various relations that structure the subject's ontology.[19]

As such, in both the history of philosophy and in literature, the alter ego takes its place as an important challenge to the humanism of modernity that revolves around a very specific conception of the subject. Specifically, by introducing the alter ego in both literature and philosophy, the idea of an unchanging, unitary subject is called into question. How then does Shusterman's somaesthetic approach contribute to this challenge?

Shusterman on the Self and Subjectivity – a Somaesthetic Approach

The "doubleness" that I will presently show is explored in *The Adventures of the Man in Gold* is a theme that Shusterman in fact identifies as characteristic of his own life. Long before the Man in Gold was born, Shusterman notes, in an autobiographical piece, that a doubleness is to be found in his bi-nationality, the fact that he completed a double major, was twice married with two sets of children, and in the fact that his philosophical roots that are to be found in both the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy.[20] Yet these pluralities do not render the idea of the self empty or suspect, but rather that, in his view, they can be held together in a reasonably unified and stable field".[21]

The doubleness that Shusterman himself sees as characteristic of his life, and, most importantly, his contention that a self centred around "order, grace and harmony"[22] is possible despite the postmodern suspicion against a "true" self, is also clearly evident in his philosophical writings on the self. Shusterman's somaesthetic approach itself is explicitly a challenge to the Cartesian split of the self into mind and body.[23] As he explains:

> The body-mind connection is so pervasively intimate that it seems misleading to speak of body and mind as two different, independent entities. The term body-mind would more aptly express their essential union, which still leaves room for pragmatically distinguishing between mental and physical aspects of behavior and also for the project of increasing their experiential unity.[24]

[18] Deborah Ascher Barnstone in her *The Doppelgänger*, (Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2016) provides an extended discussion of the use of the concept in literature, film and other art forms that I cannot explore here.
[19] Vardoulakis, *The Doppelganger*, 1.

[20] Richard Shusterman, "Regarding Oneself and Seeing Double: Fragments of Autobiography." In *The Philosophical I: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy*, edited by George Yancey, 1–21. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), citation from page 5.
[21] Shusterman, "Regarding Oneself", 5. Interestingly, this view is already present in Shusterman's earlier critique of Richard Rorty in his "Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?" *Theory, Culture and Society* 5 (1988): 337-55.
[22] Shusterman, "Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?", 348.
[23] I provide an extended discussion of Shusterman's valorization of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's celebration of the body, and his (problematic, in my view) criticism of Nietzsche's position in detail in my "Nietzsche on Embodiment: A Proto-somaesthetics?" *Aesthetic Experience and Somaesthetics*. Ed. Richard Shusterman. (Amsterdam, Brill, forthcoming).
[24] Richard Shusterman, Thinking through the Body, Educating for the Humanities: A Plea for Somaesthetics *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 40 (1) (2006): 1-21, citation from page 2.

So, although Shusterman admits that there is pragmatic need for a distinction between the mental and the physical, the body and mind are essentially one in his view. This is reflected in his definition of somaesthetics as:

> …devoted to the critical, ameliorative study of one's experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation *(aisthesis)* and creative self-fashioning. It is therefore likewise devoted to the knowledge, discourses, practices and bodily disciplines that structure such somatic care or can improve it.[25]

From his somaesthetic vantage point, Shusterman maintains that the concept of soma denotes *not* the mere physical body but the "lived, sentient, intentional, body that involves mental, social, and cultural dimensions."[26] As a result, Shusterman can avoid the indictments levelled against a heightened attention to the body in some other approaches. These approaches depend on conceiving somatics in terms of a "…reifying exteriorization of the body – the body as a mechanical instrument of atomised parts and measurable surfaces – rather than the body as a living dimension of individual experience and action."[27]

In addition, Shusterman posits the soma as a site of "intelligent, discriminating subjectivity", as well as "unreflective spontaneity".[28] This means that in addition to somaesthetics rejecting the Cartesian view of the human being as split between a mind and a body by means of the notion of embodiment, the embodied self is seen as not merely rational, intelligent and discriminating, but also as encompassing and embracing the range of human emotion as being equally significant.

However, as has already been mentioned, Shusterman's rejection of the Cartesian self does not comprise an espousal of the idea of "…a tireless insatiable Faustian quest for enriching titillation through curiosity and novelty, a quest that is as wide-ranging as it is unstructured through the lack of centre it so celebrates."[29] Just as the poststructuralist insistence on the death of the subject (or the author) does not, in my view, have to entail equating that death with complete absence, so Shusterman's somaesthetics does not encompass a complete rejection of the concept of self. As he explains:

> …the maximised spawning of alternative and often inconsistent vocabularies and narratives of the self, an aim which explicitly seeks to undermine the idea of the true self and replace it with an open, changing, growing, multiplicity of selves or self-descriptions, makes the whole idea of an integral enduring self seem completely empty and suspect. But without such a self that is capable of identity through change or changing description, there can be no self capable of self-enrichment or enlargement…[30]

In Shusterman's view, serious consequences could result from the move towards denying the self's very existence that he asserts has become a "dominant dogma" in both establishment and anti-establishment movements.[31] He claims, for example, that by denying the existence and agency of the self, intellectuals seek to legitimate their "own political and social inaction, [their] unjustifiable and unhappy complacency, even [their] own responsibility for [their] own lives."[32] Although Shusterman is willing to admit the need for a "tolerance' of ambiguity, alternative narratives, and alternative vocabularies, he rejects the "celebration and maximisation" of such things.[33] Why?

[25] Richard Shusterman, "Somaesthetics and the Body /Media Issue," *Body and Society* 3 (3) (September 1997): 33-49, citation from 34.
[26] Richard Shusterman, "Soma, Self, And Society: Somaesthetics as Pragmatist Meliorism," *Metaphilosophy* 42 (3) (April 2011): 314-327, citation from page 315.
[27] Richard Shusterman, *Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the ends of Art*, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2000), 161.
[28] Shusterman, "Soma, Self and Society," 315
[29] Shusterman, "Postmodernist Aestheticism: A New Moral Philosophy?", 346.
[30] *Ibid*.
[31] *Ibid*., 352.
[32] Shusterman, "Postmodernist Aestheticism," 353.
[33] Richard Shusterman, "Deconstruction and Analysis: Confrontation and Convergence," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 26.

Shusterman draws on a reading of Nietzsche (as well as Emerson and Wittgenstein) to develop his call to give "style" to the self, an idea that is central to his somaesthetics. Although he acknowledges that Nietzsche's own metaphysics "repudiates the idea of an individual having his 'own true self' that is fixed and autonomous"[34], he rightly, I think, highlights the Nietzschean idea that the elements that make up that self can nonetheless be brought into a "dynamic, developing unity of tension."[35] In Nietzsche then, Shusterman finds a "doubling" of the self that includes what one already is, as well as what one can become,[36] and so, the means to develop a somaesthetics that is able to exorcise the spectre of the transcendental subject, and yet accommodate his concern with "embodied self-care."[37]

How then does the Man in Gold reflect this challenge to the transcendental subject of modernity?

Reading the Man in Gold as alter ego

The Adventures of the Man in Gold engages with the theme of the double on multiple levels. The book's text, for example, is presented in both French and English placed alongside one another on the pages. Right from the outset, this arrangement enhances the reader's impression that she is "seeing double".

In addition to the doubling of language, the book contains both text and image, with Yann Toma's striking photographs of the Man in Gold providing a "double" of the "adventures" related in the text. Toma's photographic style that derives from Man Ray's space writing[38] can itself be seen as a play on the theme of the double, since the photographer's "…lights needed darkness to work their magical energy on the Man in Gold".[39] The theme of light and dark is, of course, one that is significant within especially the literature on the doppelganger or alter ego, since the alter ego is often portrayed there as representative of "dark" forces as compared to the ego's light-ness.[40]

It is, however, in the figure of the Man in Gold that a very different portrayal of the traditional theme of the alter ego or double is brought into sharp relief. Shusterman tells us that the Man in Gold was born in the afternoon, on Saturday 12 June 2010 in the medieval abbey of Royaumont.[41] As the book relates, the Man in Gold works with Yann Toma to transform "…an ordinary middle-aged philosopher into a golden work of art." From the outset, the Man in Gold "profoundly and quite visibly unsettled"[42] the sense of identity of the philosopher. Significantly, Shusterman points out that one of the key themes of the text is "…the instability and transformational potential of the self through the powers of possession." As a result, without mentioning it directly, Shusterman already situates the Man in Gold within the history of literature and philosophy on the double or alter ego as challenge to the traditional idea of the subject as unitary.[43]

Emerging silent[44], as opposed to the philosopher, who relies on "dry, unimaginative philosophical prose"[45], and clothed in a shimmering gold body suit, the Man in Gold is constantly contrasted with the figure of Shusterman, who narrates the book. The contrast is,

[34] Shusterman, *Performing Live*, 211.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] *Ibid*., 212.
[37] *Ibid*., 144. I reserve a discussion of whether Shusterman's Nietzschean approach is able to succeed in this aim for another occasion, but my hunch is that it suffers from the same difficulties that are present when trying to reconcile Foucault's earlier and later works as mentioned in an earlier footnote.
[38] For a discussion of Yann Toma's photographic technique, Richard Shusterman's *Thinking through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239-261.
[39] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 112.
[40] Here the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is perhaps the most well-known example. See Richard Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1886) for a discussion.
[41] Shusterman, Man in Gold, 17.
[42] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 18.
[43] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 8.
[44] Shusterman calls the Man in Gold "a philosopher without words" and sees himself as his "philosophical spokesman." (Shusterman, Man in Gold, 19).
[45] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 14.

however, one that is set up to express how the Man in Gold and Shusterman, are, "…like *yin* and *yang*, woman and man, earth and heaven, [and] darkness and light", "…necessary synergetic complements."[46] As a result, the figure of the double or alter ego in the book highlights the idea that despite the fact that the idea of a unitary and autonomous self is "largely illusory", aspects of that self can indeed be brought into a beautiful harmony, despite the risks this entails.[47]

In Shusterman's view, this has important aesthetic and somaesthetic effects, since by "inhabiting and transforming" Shusterman's soma, the Man in Gold allows the philosopher "new capacities and avenues of aesthetic experience."[48] So the light and dark contrast between the Man in Gold and Shusterman as philosopher is transformed into the synergy that can exist between the aesthetic and the cognitive aspects of the self. My contention here finds support in Shusterman's discussion of the three factors driving what brought the Man in Gold to him. When discussing the first factor, he notes that artists generally expressed dissatisfaction with his explanation of how somaesthetics applies to contemporary art. Shusterman's response – "…that the soma (with its sensory, motor, and affective resources) is the medium through which we both create and appreciate works of art and that therefore improved somatic mastery could generate better aesthetic experience" was not enough of a concrete and practical application of his theory in contemporary artistic creation.[49] The Man in Gold was to allow for a concrete and practical exploration of Shusterman's conception of aesthetic experience.

The second factor Shusterman mentions also supports my contention here. As he explains, like most philosophy of art, his theory is "…dominated by the observer's or interpreter's point of view" and so would be more complete by including the artist's experience.[50] Once again, the Man in Gold became a means to interrogate the theoretical difficulties Shusterman grapples with in his more strictly philosophical works – here, the question of the experience of the artist in aesthetic theory.

The Man in Gold, who "…eschews discursive language, recognizing it as the glory of philosophy but also an imprisoning source of its oppressive folly – its one-sidedness"[51]; who is driven by both the love of beauty, and the love of knowledge in the sense of a curiosity to learn through immediate sensuous experience[52]; and who is animated by both love and fear; becomes an expression of Shusterman's contention that the self cannot be reduced to the unitary, rational, free and self-controlled subject. However, this does not mean that as alter ego, the Man in Gold dissolves the idea of the self in its entirety. As the book relates, the Man in Gold and Shusterman become the "necessary synergetic complements" that allow, in Nietzsche's sense thereof, for the philosopher to give "style" to his character.

Reading the Man in Gold: Philosophy and Art

The doubling explored in terms of the theme of alter ego in the book can also be read as an implicit commentary on the nature of the relationship between philosophy and art more generally. As Shusterman explains in another text:

> Contrary to traditional philosophy, from the somaesthetic philosophical perspective, knowledge of the world is improved not by denying our bodily senses but by perfecting them. Experience […] remains the vital heart of philosophy.[53]

[46] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 112.
[47] Shusterman, *Man in Gold,* 8.
[48] *Ibid*.
[49] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 9
[50] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 10
[51] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 58
[52] Shusterman, *Man in Gold*, 60
[53] Richard Shusterman, "Dewey on Experience: Foundation or Reconstruction?" *Philosophical Forum* 26 (2) (1994):127–148, citation from page148.

In his view then, art and philosophy can and should be brought into productive and mutually illuminating contact. This is based on his contention that "philosophy should be transformational instead of foundational" since "[i]mproved experience, not originary truth, is the ultimate philosophical goal and criterion."[54] Philosophy then becomes more than mere theory in Shusterman's recalling of the ancient idea of philosophy as an embodied practice. Shusterman specifies the way in which art and life should be conceived from his pragmatic viewpoint thus:

> My pragmatism argues against the traditional Western division between art and life that has led to art's marginalization from ethical self-cultivation and political praxis; it instead urges more continuity between art and life by refining life aesthetically with artistic skill to make one's life a work of art. But in doing so, it does not deny that there is a difference between art and ordinary life and that this difference is important. It is arguing only against certain sharp divisions between art and life that have been drawn by philosophers and that have been damaging to the role art has played in Western culture[55].

With its hybrid form, bringing together philosophy and art (in the form of literature and photography conceived of as performance), Shusterman's *The Adventures of the Man in Gold: Paths between Art and Life* expressed this assertion in a concrete and practical way, once again playing with and between the concept of the double.

Conclusion

The Man in Gold stands as a daring expression of Shusterman's Nietzschean/Foucauldian impulse to live life one's as a work of art. As I have shown in this paper, Shusterman's hybrid work can be read as a dual challenge to philosophy: first, a challenge to the tradition of the subject understood as unitary, rational, free and self-controlled; and second, as a challenge to the tradition of understanding philosophy as juxtaposed to art. Shusterman's work reminds us that the ego can no longer be contained within a single, homogeneous, and unitary frame, but aims to exorcise this spectre and the metaphysics it entails in a way that nonetheless allows for the embodied self-care that is characteristic of his somaesthetics. In addition, as a daring work that dances over the lines so strictly drawn between philosophy, art, and literature, *The Man in Gold* provides a concrete and practical application of Shusterman's theory, and so likewise challenges the strict divisions between philosophy and art. As such, it provides, in my reading, a thought-provoking experience for philosophers and artists alike.

[54] Richard Shusterman, "Somatic Experience: Foundation or Reconstruction?" *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life* (London: Routledge, 2016), n.p.
[55] Richard Shusterman, "Aesthetics as Philosophy of Art and Life," JTLA 37 (2012): 1-6, citation from page 2

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